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ABSTRACT 
Information system development (ISD) projects have been associated with the "software 
crisis" for over three decades. A set of common "root causes" has often been cited in 
literature with corresponding "solutions". Yet the overall project success rate has remained 
low, resulting in a paradox of many solutions and little progress over the years. This study 
examines the management of application software acquisition from external suppliers in ISD 
projects. Three case studies are documented based on participant observation with complete 
membership roles. After within-case analyses highlighting issues in individual cases, cross- 
case analyses are conducted, first to identify a pattern of ISD project challenges and then to 
search for their explanations. Concepts from agency theory, contract theory and product 
development literature are used in the process of diagnosing root causes behind the 
observations. The proposed explanation is that the Traditional Systems Development 
Framework (TSDF), characterized by competitive-bidding-monopolized-development, 
underlies the identified root causes. Accordingly, competitive development is suggested as an 
alternative approach. Following the "Inference to the Best Explanation" (IBE) analytical 
strategy, the suggested approach is subject to two contrastive analyses, first with the pre- 
packaged software development and then with the construction industry, to demonstrate that 
the suggestion is a "warranted inference". Further analogical analyses illustrate the feasibility 
of development competition for software product development. A Performance-Based 
Systems Development Framework (PBSDF) is outlined as a tentative implementation of the 
suggested competitive development approach for ISD projects supported by risk-sharing 
supplier contract and a relative product evaluation approach. A number of future research 
implications are described as a result of this study after summarizing the research 
contributions. (263 words) 
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Chapter 1: Information System Development Projects Involving 
Application Software Suppliers 
1.1 Introduction 
This section introduces Chapter 1 that defines the research subject for the whole thesis: the 
management of application software suppliers in information system development (ISD) 
projects. To provide a context for the research subject, the market of information technology 
(IT) products and services is surveyed (Section 1.2). Section 1.3 describes briefly the 
organisational need for information systems and the necessity of ISD projects, often involving 
external application software suppliers. Section 1.4 highlights the research motivation based 
on reported ISD project challenges, and more specifically the author's personal experience of 
troubled IT projects. Section 1.5 outlines the research objectives while Section 1.6 details the 
scope of the research and the thesis outline. 
1.2 IT Products and Services Market 
The global IT spending excluding telecommunications was expected to be $1.21trillion in 
2001 (Kumar, 2001; Wright, 2001). This figure was expected to sustain 9.8 per cent 
compound annual growth rate between 2001 and 2005 to $1.746 trillion in 2005. The 
estimates may vary from one source to another. The message is the same: the expenditure on 
IT products and services is and will be substantial. 
The IT expenditure reported above is defined as "money spent on purchasing hardware, 
software, or services of a commercial grade" (Wright, 2001). Accordingly, the IT market may 
be divided into the following segments: 
" Hardware products and services; 
" Software products and services. 
The sub-market of software products and services may be further divided into the following 
segments: 
" Pre-packaged software (PPSW) products; 
" Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) software products; 
" Custom-built software (CBSW) products; 
" Software integration and other system development services; 
" Software and system support and maintenance services, including enhancement 
development. 
Various types of software products are developed and integrated with hardware products to 
become information systems with the help of software integration and other system 
development services. The support and maintenance services are required to keep information 
systems operational. 
The concepts of PPSW, COTS and CBSW products may be further clarified. PPSW refers to 
packaged software applications ready to be used. Typically they are sold through distribution 
channels without software development suppliers being directly involved in their installation 
and integration. PPSW are designed and developed to interoperate with users' data without 
having to be modified. Examples include products like operating systems (Windows 95, 
Windows 98, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Unix and Linux) and general-purpose software 
applications like Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel. CBSW products are designed and 
developed for clients with designated purposes. They may interoperate only with specific 
clients' data. Therefore CBSW products are usually not distributed outside of the target client 
organisations. An example of CBSW is SABRE, a computerised reservation system 
developed and deployed by AMR (Hopper, 1990). COTS products are somewhere in between 
PPSW and CBSW. COTS products are developed to serve a group of clients, typically 
defined by industry sectors or business requirements. COTS products may have to be 
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modified to work with clients' data and business processes. Alternatively, the clients' data 
and business processes may have to be converted to operate with COTS. Enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) software packages offered by SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft (Ferris, 1999) are 
good examples of COTS products. The three product types can be envisaged on a continuous 
spectrum, with PPSW at one end and CBSW at the other while COTS somewhere in between 
depending on the level of development in each COTS product (see e. g. Brownsword et al., 
1998; D'Adderio, 2000; see also Section 9.2). 
There are other categories that are derivatives from the above in one way or another, for 
example, Military Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) and Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) software 
products (Kohl and Oberndorf, 2000). Since MOTS and GOTS would have been either 
bought or custom-built in the first place, they are not listed as separate categories above. 
Another often-encountered software type is the Open Source Software (OSS). OSS is 
different in its method of development and distribution (OSI, 2001,2002; Lerner and Tirole, 
2000). According to the level of customisation required for use in information systems, OSS 
may be regarded as either PPSW or COTS. 
The success of information technology as a whole has been significant since the 1950s. This 
is most evident in the hardware advancement. The famous Moore's Law, first stated by 
Gordon E. Moore in 1965, forecasts that the number of transistors per integrated circuit would 
double every 18 months. The Moore's Law still holds true to this day (Stewart, 2002). While 
the hardware performance has increased by leaps and bounds, their prices have decreased 
dramatically to be more affordable (Levy, 1987; Brooks, 1995; Dooijes, 1999). 
The software products and services sector has also seen a significant amount of progress 
PPSW provides a vast array of products when it comes to the system software and generic 
utilities like operating systems, compilers and editors etc (Brooks, 1995). There are enduring 
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successes like Unix as an operating system. Fortran and COBOL initially designed in the late 
1950s and early 1960s are still in use as programming languages. Though there are concerns 
that there has been limited progress on system software research (Pike, 2000), there are 
commercial success stories like Microsoft Windows series of Graphic User Interface (GUI) 
based operating systems. The available PPSW products may not be perfect (Kaner and Pels, 
1998), and may not have exploited the available hardware capability fully (Dooijes, 1999), 
but they certainly have made it possible for the mass population to enjoy the wonders of the 
information society. 
1.3 Information Systems and ISD Projects 
Software applications alone usually do not meet specific organisational needs. Instead they 
have to be integrated with other system elements to become information systems. A system 
can be defined as "an integrated set of elements that accomplish a defined objective" 
(INCOSE, 2000, p. 9). For an information system, the elements might include hardware, 
system software, necessary networking facilities, application software and data etc (for a 
more detailed discussion of information system elements, see Section 3.2). An information 
system does not have to be based on computer technology. However, within the context of 
this thesis, the term "information system" will be used to refer to computer-based ones. 
Information systems have been used in organisations to serve a wide range of purposes. For 
example, they might be used: 
0 To automate otherwise manual and repetitive business processes. Data processing 
systems developed in the 1960s and 1970s are among this category (Friedman, 1989); 
0 To assist management decision-making (i. e. decision support systems); 
9 To gain competitive advantage for companies in the market place, e. g. SABRE 
(Hopper, 1990); 
" To assist communication with external organisations (e. g. supply chain systems). 
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Organisations have increasingly found themselves operating in an environment that has been 
characterized as a global and digital economy (Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003), which is ever 
more dynamic and competitive. Information systems are potentially powerful tools that can 
help organisations to survive, and indeed, thrive on changes. To meet such demands, 
information systems have to be developed cost-effectively and with high quality (including 
high reliability, easy maintainability etc). 
Organisations develop new information systems by acquiring or developing the necessary 
system elements. Since information system development is usually a one-off undertaking 
involving a set of interrelated activities, they are often managed as projects. PMI (2000) 
defines a project as "a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or service". 
This definition matches well what an ISD project intends to achieve, namely, creating a 
unique information system to serve the needs of an organisation. ISD projects should be 
differentiated from other information systems related projects where existing systems are 
modified (e. g. upgrading an existing system platform to a newer version). ISD projects are 
also referred to as software projects or IT projects in the press and daily conversations. When 
there is no confusion of the meanings, these terms will be occasionally used in this thesis, 
especially when quoting from other sources. 
An ISD project involves activities of acquiring and developing necessary system elements 
and integrating them into coherent information systems for specific organisational needs. The 
defining system element in an information system is usually the core application software, 
also referred to as the software application. An organisation may develop the application 
software entirely with internal resources, as AMR did in developing SABRE over decades 
(Hopper, 1990). More often, however, external suppliers are required to supply COTS/CBSW 
software. A typical ISD project might be organised as Figure 1.1 shows with various 
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suppliers. In Figure 1.1, the project is led by a project manager, who in turn reports to a client 
project sponsor, usually a senior manager in the client organisation. The ISD project team is 
responsible for managing requirements with the client organisation on the one hand and 
working with suppliers to acquire necessary system elements, including hardware, system 
software and application software. 
Client Organisation and 
Client Project Sponsor 
ISD Project Team, led by a project manager 
responsible for 
project management and 
system integration etc 
Hardware Supplier(s) II System Software Supplier(s) I Application Software Supplier(s) 
Figure 1.1: An ISD project organisation with hardware and software suppliers 
When a group of projects are required to achieve more substantial organisational objectives, 
the projects may be managed together as a programme. An example is the NHS National IT 
Programme that is planned to run from 2003 for five years (Arnott, 2003a). This thesis 
focuses on the activities at the project level between a project team and the application 
software supplier(s). There may be one or more layers of suppliers from which an application 
software supplier acquires software components and tools. Occasionally, issues (e. g. licence 
agreements) arising from these lower tiers of suppliers are relevant to client organisations. 
Such issues are often resolved through the application software suppliers and therefore are not 
dealt with separately in this study. 
1.4 ISD Project Challenges and Research Motivation 
ISD projects have posed significant challenges to both IT professionals and their client 
organisations in the last few decades. According to Standish Group (1995), on average only 
16.2% of software projects are completed on time and within budget. At the time of that 
study, $250 billion was being spent annually in the United States alone on 175,000 projects. 
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An estimated $81 billion of these projects would eventually be cancelled. The report states 
that "software development projects were in chaos". There have been many allegations of the 
"software crisis" over the years (e. g. Naur and Randell, 1968; Brooks, 1975,1995; Glaseman, 
1982; Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1991; Gibbs, 1994; Flowers, 1996; Jones, 1996; Collins, 
1998; Glass, 1998,1999; Bronzite, 2000; Smith, 2001; Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003). 
The motivation for the research, however, has not come directly from reading the historical 
accounts of project challenges. Rather it has originated from the author's personal experience 
of ISD projects. The author was in the procurement profession in the manufacturing sector for 
over seven years before joining an information systems division of a FTSE100 company 
(referred to as UKOne throughout the thesis) in May 1999. One year later, the division was 
spun-off as a separate company (referred to as SLC throughout the thesis). As part of the 
separation deal, SLC secured a five-year contract to provide support to the IT infrastructure 
and many of the existing systems within UKOne. In addition, the deal entitled SLC to be 
treated as a preferred supplier for system development and integration in UKOne's ISD 
projects. 
The author was assigned to one of the ISD projects undertaken by SLC for UKOne in July 
2000 as a test manager. The project was initiated in April 2000. Therefore, at the time of the 
author's joining, the initial preparation had already been undertaken. The project was to be 
completed by November 2000, but did not end until March 2001. Immediately afterwards, the 
author was assigned to a new project, which was going through a project proposal stage. The 
author first acted as an assistant to the proposal manager, and then as the project test manager. 
The project was planned to complete by August 2001 but did not close down until the end of 
October that year. Both of these projects relied on external suppliers to provide core 
application software products. Both projects experienced significant challenges, some of 
which seemed similar in nature. In particular, communications with suppliers were difficult, 
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involving heated exchanges in project meetings between professionals who were otherwise 
calm and mature, Also, software products from the suppliers were of poor quality, not 
satisfactory from the clients' viewpoint. Yet there seemed to be few options available to the 
clients other than accepting the products and paying the suppliers in full. Such client-supplier 
relations seemed entirely different from what the author had experienced previously in the 
manufacturing sector. The author was curious at the time regarding what had made the client- 
supplier relations in the software industry so different. The observed contrast of the two 
different client-supplier relation types is the basis of the "study proposition" discussed as part 
of the research scope (Section 1.6) and the research design (Section 2.4.2). 
The author consulted with his colleagues at the time and met with a general sense of cynicism 
and resignation. A typical response was "it has always been like that! " A casual glance of ISD 
project related books like Brooks (1975,1995) and Collins (1998) seemed to confirm the 
widespread cynicism but there had appeared to be no specific discussion on supplier 
management in ISD projects. The author decided to embark on a research journey. The author 
registered with the University of Stirling in September 2001 for a research degree on a part- 
time basis. In the meantime, the author continued with the full-time employment in SLC. The 
thesis is the result of the research effort. The two projects mentioned above, together with 
another one participated by the author from November 2001 to March 2002, have been 
documented partly based on the author's personal experience, and more significantly based on 
the available project documents. The three projects are presented as Chapters 4,5 and 6. The 
research methodology is considered in Chapter 2. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
This study aims to develop a better understanding of ISD project challenges so that a new 
potential explanation might be found for the challenges and corrective actions can be 
formulated accordingly to guide project management. More specifically, the objectives are: 
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" To confirm some of the common symptoms of the ISD project challenges; 
" To understand why some of the current solutions may have not been successful; 
" To seek reasoned explanation(s) for the observed ISD project challenges; 
" To develop a new potential solution based on the above explanation(s); 
" To identify future research directions related to the proposed solution and other 
opportunities that may arise as a result of this study. 
The research strategy and design is described in Section 2.4. 
1.6 The Scope of the Research and The Thesis Outline 
To achieve the above objectives, this study focuses on the management of suppliers for the 
purpose of acquiring or developing application software within the context of ISD projects. 
Such software may be of COTS or CBSW types. The study does not address the development 
or acquisition of PPSW, though the PPSW market segment is examined as a contrast to COTS 
and CBSW in a comparative study in Chapter 9. The research does not attempt to address the 
problems associated with outsourced IT support and maintenance, which is a subject of 
research on its own (see e. g. Lacity and Willcocks, 2000). 
There are mainly three reasons for focusing on supplier management in ISD projects. First of 
all, a software application is at the heart of an information system. When the application is to 
be purchased, either as COTS or CBSW, from external suppliers, its success or failure 
directly affects the success or failure of the entire ISD project and the resultant information 
system (e. g. Page et al., 1993). Secondly, supplier management is related to many other 
aspects of project management. In PMBOK Guide (PMI, 2000), project management is 
broken down into the following nine areas: 
0 Project Integration Management 
0 Project Scope Management 
" Project Time Management 
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" Project Cost Management 
" Project Quality Management 
" Project Human Resource Management 
" Project Communications Management 
" Project Risk Management 
0 Project Procurement Management 
While the project procurement management includes important issues of supplier selection 
and contract management (PMI, 2000), it cannot be isolated from other aspects including the 
management of requirements (scope), time, cost, quality, communications and risk. The 
approach taken in this study aims to examine all aspects related to supplier management 
holistically. This is necessary due to the complexity and the uncertainty of software 
development process, which has led to difficulties in contract management. Lichtenstein 
(2002) reports "puzzles" in the study of software development contracting, which might be 
attributed to its approach of separating contracting from other complex issues like 
requirements management and product evaluation. The third reason for focusing on software 
supplier management is that the organisational boundary between a client and a supplier helps 
their communications to be formalised and commitments to be made specific and recorded. 
Such documentary evidence has been used extensively in the participant case studies in this 
thesis to establish project issues and forms the basis of the case studies. 
The scope of the study excludes in-house ISD projects. The study assumes that the client has 
decided to "buy" COTS software for further development and integration, or to "buy" the 
management and technical expertise from suppliers for developing CBSW. The study does 
not intend to make any contribution to the debate about the pros and cons of "make" or "buy" 
approaches. However, the study is potentially relevant to internal ISD projects. This is 
because internal software development teams might be considered as part of an "internal 
value chain" in the same way as external suppliers form part of the "external value chain" 
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(Ward and Peppard, 2002). Any attempt to extrapolate the research findings to internal ISD 
projects, however, should be carried out with caution and should be rigorously validated by 
further research. 
The study does not deal with the relationship between the client project sponsor and the ISD 
project team specifically. It can be argued that this set of relationship is also critical to the 
success of an ISD project. This can be the case especially when an ISD project is largely 
managed and staffed by external resources from outside the client organisation. However, for 
this study, it is assumed that the interests of the client and the ISD project team are aligned, 
either because of organisational allegiance or appropriate risk and reward contracts. It would 
be a separate study altogether to examine how such alignment of interests can be achieved. 
The thesis is organised essentially into three parts. The first part consists of Chapters 1,2 and 
3. Chapter 1 provides the context of the research. Chapter 2 considers the research 
methodology. Chapter 3 surveys the literature relevant to ISD project challenges and some of 
the solutions available already. This part answers questions like why the research is necessary 
and how it will be carried out. The second part consists of Chapters 4 to 6, consisting three 
participant case studies. The third part of the thesis provides analyses of the root causes of the 
project challenges and proposes a management framework as a solution. Chapter 7 is Part 1 of 
the cross-case analyses, describing the pattern of ISD project challenges. Chapter 8 is Part 2 
of the cross-case analyses, identifying the root causes for the pattern of ISD project challenges 
and proposing a unified explanation to the common ISD project challenges. The explanation 
is subjected to a number of comparative analyses in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 proposes a 
management framework as a potential solution based on the explanation. Chapter 11 
concludes the thesis with an outlook for future research potentials. 
1.7 Summary 
This chapter defines the research subject for this thesis as the management of application 
software suppliers within the context of ISD projects. Due to operational, competitive and 
regulatory needs, organisations require information systems to improve efficiency and to gain 
or sustain competitive advantages. Within the overall successful IT products and services 
market, however, ISD projects have long been associated with the "software crisis" and have 
presented significant challenges to client organisations. In addition to the well-recorded 
challenges in the literature, the study is also motivated by the author's personal experience of 
ISD project challenges in the IT industry. The objectives of the research are to understand 
these challenges and to help client organisations to manage them better. The focus on 
application software suppliers is due to a combination of the central role of application 
software in developing successful information systems and the possibility of examining 
supplier management in ISD projects holistically with well-documented evidence. By 
focusing on this important area, it is hoped that some contribution can be made to resolving 
the "software crisis". 
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
"The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowledge, 
is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions 
to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are controlled by criticism; that 
is, by attempted refutations, which include severely critical tests. " 
(Popper, 1963, p. vii) 
"The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to 
accept another, and the judgement leading to that decision involves the comparison 
of both paradigms with nature and with each other. " 
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 77) 
"... I claim that the typical descriptive unit of great scientific achievements is not 
isolated hypothesis but rather a research programme. " 
(Lakatos, 1978, p. 4) 
"One of my motives for writing Against Method was to free people from the 
tyranny of philosophical obfuscators and abstract concepts such as `truth', `reality', 
or `objectivity', which narrow people's vision and ways of being in the world. 
Formulating what I thought were my own attitude and convictions, I unfortunately 
ended up by introducing concepts of similar rigidity, such as `democracy', 
`tradition', or `relative truth'. Now that I am aware of it, I wonder how it happened. 
The urge to explain one's own ideas, not simply, not in a story, but by means of a 
`systematic account', is powerful indeed. " 
(Feyerabend, 1995, pp. 179-80). 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter first considers the epistemology of scientific research at a philosophical level, 
outlining the competing schools of thoughts and research approaches in guiding our pursuit of 
knowledge (Section 2.2). Next, available research strategies are briefly surveyed and a 
research process is described to unite various research strategies, methods and techniques 
(Section 2.3). It is suggested that such a research process is fitting for tackling business 
problems based on the mixed-method research approach. The research strategy and design for 
this thesis is then mapped out, identifying sources of evidence and the analytic approach 
(Section 2.4). In Section 2.5, the method of "participant observation with complete 
membership roles", which is used to collect the first-hand research evidence, is described in 
some detail. Section 2.6 considers the analytic approach further. The issue of research ethics 
is considered in Section 2.7. A summary is given at the end of the chapter. 
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2.2 Philosophical Schools and Research Approaches 
There seem to be more philosophical and methodological debates regarding research 
approaches in social sciences than in physical sciences. These debates are a healthy sign since 
scepticism "is an essential part of scientific inquiry, and different types of methods represent 
important critical perspectives" (Brewer and Hunter, 1989, p. 11). In this Section the author 
attempts to give a brief survey of the mainstream debates gleaned from the literature. 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) give an account of four philosophical traditions (mainly based 
on Lincoln and Guba, 1985 in the first place): 
" Positivism, also called logical positivism; 
40 Postpositivism; 
9 Constructivism, other variants of which are known as interpretivism, naturalism; 
" Pragmatism. 
Each of the philosophical schools has its associated "axioms" in terms of ontology, 
epistemology, axiology, generalisations and causal linkages. For example, positivism has the 
following "axioms": 
0 Ontology (nature of reality): positivists believe that there is a single reality (naive 
realism); 
0 Epistemology (the relationship of the knower to the known): positivists believe that 
the knower and the known are independent (dualist/objectionist); 
0 Axiology (role of values in inquiry): positivists believe that the inquiry is value-free; 
" Generalisations: positivists believe that time- and context-free generalisations are 
possible; 
" Causal linkage: Positivists believe that there are real causes that are temporally 
precedent to or simultaneous with effects. 
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According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 7), logical positivism was discredited as a 
philosophy of science after World War II due to "dissatisfaction" with these axioms. As a 
result, postpositivism came in its place, with some of the tenets modified from those of 
positivism (Guba and Lincoln 1998, p. 203 and p. 205): 
0 Ontology: critical realism. Reality is assumed to exist but only to be imperfectly 
apprehendable because of basically flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the 
fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena; 
" Epistemology: modified dualist/objectionist; critical tradition/community; findings 
probably true; 
" Methodology: modified experimental/manipulative; critical multiplism; falsification 
of hypotheses; may include qualitative methods. 
Postpositivism remains "within essentially the [same] set of basic beliefs" as positivism 
(Guba and Lincoln 1998, p. 202). Terms like "positivism", "positivist" and "positivistic" are 
often used to refer to a series of related philosophical inclinations including positivism and 
postpositivism. For example, Remenyi et al. (1998) classify research approaches into 
"positivist" and "non-positivist (phenomenology)". 
Constructivism together with the other variants like interpretivism and naturalism is a more 
radical reaction to positivism. However, unlike postpositivism, which is a direct heir to 
positivism, interpretivism can be traced back to the "Chicago School" of the 1920s 
(Hanunersley 1989, Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). In contrast to positivism/postpositivism, 
constructivism/interpretivism adopts directly opposing philosophical positions: 
" Ontology: there are multiple, constructed realities (relativism); 
" Epistemology: the knower and the known are inseparable; 
" Axiology: inquiry is value-bound; 
" Generalisations: time and context-free generalisations are not possible; 
" Causal linkages: it is impossible to distinguish causes from effects. 
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In addition to Guba and Lincoln's polarising depiction of these different philosophical 
schools, Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) attempt to supplement these attributes with an 
additional dimension on logic. Thus the positivists are associated with deductive logic, "... an 
emphasis on arguing from the general to the particular, or an emphasis on a priori hypothesis 
(or theory)" (p. 7). The constructivists, on the other hand, are associated with inductive logic, 
"... an emphasis on arguing from the particular to the general, or an emphasis on "grounded" 
theory" (p. 10). However, it has to be pointed out that this added dimension seems 
contradictory with Guba and Lincoln's assertion that constructivists do not believe in 
generalisations in the first place. 
Associated with different philosophical schools are different sets of research practices, 
namely quantitative and qualitative research approaches (or research paradigms). These 
paradigms have been differentiated in the following ways (condensed based on Becker's work 
as quoted in Denzin and Lincoln 1998, pp. 8-11; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, pp. 9-10): 
0 Different underlying philosophical school: positivism/postpositivism for quantitative 
research and interpretivism/constructivism for qualitative research; 
" Acceptance of post-modem sensibilities: quantitative research emphasizes objectivity 
as a research evaluation criterion while qualitative research believes in multitude of 
criteria "including verisimilitude, emotionality, personal responsibility, an ethic of 
caring, political praxis ... "; 
0 Capturing the individual's point of view: quantitative researchers think that empirical 
materials obtained through softer, interpretative methods (like interviewing and 
observation) are "unreliable, impressionistic, and not objective"; 
" Examining the constraints of everyday life: Quantitative researchers "see a 
nomothetic or etic science based on probabilities derived from the study of large 
numbers of randomly selected cases. These kinds of statements stand above and 
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outside the constraints of everyday life. Qualitative researchers are committed to an 
emic, idiographic, case-based position, which directs their attention to the specifics of 
particular cases"; 
0 Securing rich descriptions: "Qualitative researchers believe that rich descriptions of 
the social world are valuable, whereas quantitative researchers ... are less concerned 
with such details". 
In other words, the two different research paradigms prescribe for different types of data, 
different ways of data collecting, analysis and interpretation, and different representation of 
research results. That they appear to be totally incompatible seems obvious when one 
considers the opposite underlying philosophical inclinations. The polarising depictions of the 
two paradigms have been termed as "the incompatibility thesis". Consequently, "paradigm 
wars" broke out in the 1980s across several "battlefields" concerning different issues, such as 
the "nature of reality" and "the possibility of causal linkages" (Tashakkori and Tedlie, 1998). 
While the methodology purists were hotly debating "who is right" based on the 
incompatibility thesis, there were calls for a truce. A compatibility thesis was proposed by 
Reichardt and Rallis in 1994 (quoted in Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) to unite the two 
seemingly opposite research paradigms. They suggested that the two research paradigm 
camps shared the following fundamental values: 
" Belief in the value-ladenness of inquiry; 
" Belief in the theory-ladenness of facts; 
" Belief that reality is multiple and constructed; 
" Belief in the fallibility of knowledge; 
Belief in the underdetermination of theory by facts, that is to say, any given set of data 
can be explained by many theories. 
The advocates of the compatibility thesis suggest a mixed-method approach and adopt 
pragmatism as the underpinning philosophy. Pragmatism, as a philosophical school, has been 
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championed by American philosophers like C. S. Peirce, W. James and John Dewey. The 
central tenet is "whatever works! ". One key element of pragmatism is the emphasis on the 
application of the derived knowledge (Field, 2001). The mixed-method research paradigm 
encourages a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, each having its own 
techniques and serving its unique purpose in the process of inquiry. Lincoln and Guba (2000), 
two of the original proponents of the "incompatibility thesis", acknowledge that: 
"Indeed, the various paradigms are beginning to "interbreed" such that two 
theorists previously thought to be irreconcilable conflict may now appear, under a 
different theoretical rubric, to be informing one another's arguments. " (p. 164) 
The trend in recent years is to use a problem-focused methodology with different methods 
complementing each other when appropriate (Nau, 1995; Davison, 1998; Kelle, 2001). As 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 21) state: "... we believe that pragmatists consider the 
research question to be more important than either the method they use or the world view that 
is supposed to underlie the method. " 
It may still be useful to differentiate epistemological research frameworks, one being 
positivistic and the other being non-positivistic or phenomenological (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
The strict association of positivistic research to quantitative studies and that of non- 
positivistic research to qualitative studies, however, prove to be less than useful. As Trochim 
(2002) points out, "All quantitative data is based upon qualitative judgements; and all 
qualitative data can be described and manipulated numerically. " (emphasis in the original). 
With qualitative and quantitative research approaches reconciled as a mixed method under 
pragmatism, consideration is turned next to the research process and research methods that 
are available to researchers, especially in business and management research. 
2.3 Research Strategy and Research Process 
Business and management research involves the application and development of theoretical 
and empirical knowledge from established disciplines to business and management activities 
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(Wass and Wells, 1994). As such, it is often multi-disciplinary in nature. In addition, the field 
of study is broad and approaches are wide-ranging (Wass and Wells, 1994; Remenyi et al., 
1998). More importantly, there is a strong emphasis on the application of knowledge rather 
than on the creation of knowledge for its own sake (Remenyi et al., 1998). This study is an 
example, using a number of concepts and techniques from economic theories with the 
objective to find a potential solution to ISD project challenges. This section first considers 
briefly common research strategies for management studies and then discusses a research 
process that unites different research strategies and methods for tackling business problems. 
2.3.1 Research Strategy 
There are a variety of research strategies available for management studies. The most 
common ones are experiments, surveys, case studies and action research (Galliers, 1985; 
Bennett, 1991; Robson, 1993; Saunders et al., 2000). These strategies are not mutually 
exclusive and each uses methods and techniques that might be found in others. These 
strategies are briefly considered here and the selection of the research strategy for this study is 
considered in Section 2.4. 
Experiments (laboratory or field) are common in the research of physical sciences. It has also 
been used extensively in some branches of social sciences like psychology (Saunders et al., 
2000). The researchers are expected to isolate and control variables in experiments (Galliers, 
1985). Due to complex social and organisational constraints, experiments are often not 
appropriate for researching management and organisational issues (Bennett, 1991). However, 
the concept of experimentation has played a role in developing the action research method, 
which will be discussed later in this section. 
The survey strategy is popular in business and management studies. The main methods used 
in surveys include questionnaires and interviews (Robson, 1993). The researcher may use 
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mail, telephone or face-to-face meetings to reach survey targets, each with its advantages and 
disadvantages (Jobber, 1991). For example, the mail survey may be economical but requires 
the survey questions to be highly structured. On the other hand, the face-to-face survey allows 
a researcher to take a more flexible approach, though much more resource-intensive. The 
common characteristic of the survey method is that the questions posed by the researcher are 
structured. In surveys, what kind of information to be obtained can be predicted, and extra 
information is often discouraged (Becker, 1996). This makes the survey strategy inappropriate 
for researching complex and open issues. 
The case study strategy has often been presented in contrast to survey in management studies 
(Smith, 1991). It refers to a fairly intensive examination of a single "case" or a small number 
of related "cases". The approach allows the researcher to generate answers to the question 
"why" as well as "what" and "how" (Robson, 1993). Case studies may incorporate a range of 
different research methods, including observations and interviews. Stake (1994) suggests 
"case study is not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied". This thesis is 
based on the case study strategy. The "object to be studied" is ISD projects involving external 
application software suppliers (see Section 2.4 for research design details). 
Action research (AR) might be considered as a subset of case studies, but its underlying 
philosophy sets it apart (Galliers, 1985). The AR strategy intends to introduce certain changes 
into a real social context and study the resultant effects. AR does not purport to control all 
variables, thus it is different from the experiment research strategy discussed above. One 
prerequisite for this strategy is some existing theoretical framework for the researcher to 
formulate the intended change in the first place. This makes the strategy useful for "theory 
elaboration and development" (Eden and Huxham, 1996) but not for theory generation. In 
other words, AR might be more suited for theory-testing than theory-building. 
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Research strategies may also be classified according to the purpose of the inquiry into that of 
descriptive, exploratory and explanatory (Robson, 1993; Yin, 1994). The choice of the 
research strategy may depend on many factors, not least the research questions and access to 
research data etc. The choice of research strategy for this thesis is considered in Section 2.4. 
2.3.2 Research Process 
Research process is usually depicted to start from research planning and literature review or 
evidence collection and to end with a theory or a research report with management 
guidelines/recommendations (Wass and Wells, 1994; Remenyi et al., 1998; Day, 1998; Flick, 
1998). Such a description may be appropriate within certain contexts. However, they give the 
impression that the research process start and finish with one individual researcher without 
involving corresponding research communities. In addition, they do not reflect the complex 
nature of applying research results to real world problems. This section considers a possible 
research process framework that can accommodate wide-ranging concepts from various 
research approaches. The framework emphasises the objective of management research as 
solving substantive business problems. Moreover, the framework recognises a spiral 
improvement process along which a theory can be developed, applied and refined. This is 
perhaps what Lakatos (1978) means by a "research programme". Lakatos disagrees with 
Popper (1959,1963) in that scientific researches are based on simple hypothecation and 
falsification. Rather researchers develop research programmes to deal with anomalies 
incompatible with the existing hypothesis and theories on a longer-term basis. 
The process framework is shown in Figure 2.1 and is proposed based on the following 
observations: 
" Real problems in the business world are complex and unwieldy, and are usually 
beyond the means of a single research project (see e. g. Benbasat and Zmud, 1999). 
Division of labour is therefore often a necessity; 
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" Researchers depend on their peers heavily for discussions and constructive criticism; 
" Business entities are risk-averse, therefore application of any new potential solution 
to any substantive problem can and should only happen after careful risk-assessment 
by the research community (via peer-reviews) and the business stakeholders (e. g. 
cost-benefit analysis); 
" Various research methods and techniques are best understood within a unified 
research process. This helps to avoid developing each technique into a separate 
"methodology". 
Each stage of the process is discussed below with appropriate methods, always with business 
research in mind. 
Stage 4: Theory testing 
and application 
Stage 1, Research problem 
formulation, data collection 
Stage 3, Disseminating 
Stage 2, Data analysis, 
research findings, Peer 
theory building 
reviews 
Figure 2.1: Research process spiral 
Stage 1: Research Problem Formulation and Data Collection 
Research problems are formulated and data collection is carried out at this stage. This stage 
might be further divided into different phases. Like many other activities in research, problem 
formulation and data collection tend to intertwine (for a discussion on this issue see Brewer 
and Eiunter, 1989). There are a variety of research methods suitable for this stage. Broadly 
speaking, they can be grouped into observing, interviewing and questionnaires (Robson, 
1993). Observational methods might be further classified into formal or informal approaches 
according to how structured the information gathering process is. The formal observation is 
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more structured while the informal approach allows unstructured and complex information to 
be gathered. Another related dimension is the role adopted by the researcher. Thus, the 
researcher may be a pure observer with little participation at one extreme to a complete 
participant (Adler and Adler, 1987; Robson, 1993). 
Interviews and questionnaires are "self-report" techniques since they rely on respondents' 
revealing about themselves (Robson, 1993). They are the main methods used in survey 
(Jobber, 1991; Section 2.3.1), though they can be used in combination with other strategies 
like case studies. Other data collection methods include archival analysis and simulation etc 
(Robson, 1993; Yin 1994). For this study, the author adopts a complete participant approach 
for data collection (see Section 2.4 for the research design for this study). 
Stage 2: Data Analysis 
While Stage I in Figure 2.1 is descriptive, Stage 2 is analytical. Writing features highly in this 
stage. Writing not only helps remembering observations, sources and ideas, it induces 
thinking and improves understanding (Booth et at., 1995). That said, writing is part of 
thinking and naturally accompanies any stage of research, not separable, for example, from 
evidence gathering (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, pp. 19-21). For some research questions, 
research stops at Stage I (called descriptive research by Trochim, 2002 or fact-finding 
research by Brewer and Hunter, 1989). Most problem-solving researches, however, require 
further effort to uncover correlational links or causal links among variables. 
The traditional tool employed for data analysis is induction. Grounded theory is one of the 
methods conceived to serve such a purpose (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). It is a "qualitative 
research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived 
theory about a phenomenon" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 24). Grounded theory was 
proposed in the 1960s as a reaction to "grand theoretical schemes" prevalent in the mid- I900s 
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(Locke, 2000, p. 26). The method provides codified procedures for data analysis consisting of 
note-taking, coding, memo-ing, sorting and writing (Dick, 2000). Despite the claim made 
about grounded theory being a general method of analysis (Lowe, 1996), the specialised 
terminology and procedures mean that its use is limited to certain types of data. What is more 
problematic is a certain amount of confusion within the proponents of grounded theory. While 
Strauss (1987) argues for all modes of activity - induction, deduction and verification - to 
enter into the process of inquiry, Orlikowski (1993) identifies three characteristics of 
grounded theory method, one of them being specifically inductive (the other two being 
contextual and processual). Researchers practising grounded theory methodology give 
conflicting advice regarding whether the method is suitable for new researchers (cf. Urquhart, 
2000 and Davidson, 2001). There have been divergent opinions between the two originators 
regarding the "right" way, with Glaser taking a more "emergent" approach while Strauss is 
seen to give more prescriptive guidance (Babchuk, 1996; Locke, 2000; Dick, 2000; Smit and 
Bryant, 2000). Such conflictions indicate that there are perhaps fundamental issues yet to be 
addressed within the methodology. Smit and Bryant (2000) observe that "recent 
developments in the method have centred around the split between Glaser and Strauss, rather 
than on genuine progress and evolution". A full appraisal of grounded theory is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but it can form an interesting separate study to examine the methodology 
critically with the benefit of the epistemological debates outlined in Section 2.2. 
Triangulation is another research method often mentioned in literature. According to 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 18), Campbell and Fiske pioneered the concept in 1959 and 
"used more than one quantitative method to measure a psychological trait". In 1978, Denzin 
further "described four different types of triangulation methods, including data triangulation, 
investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological triangulation. " 
Triangulation is based on an analogy drawn with the surveying technique. It is a simple 
concept, as described in Hutchinson Reference (1991): 
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"In triangulation, surveyors measure a certain length exactly to provide a base 
line. From each end of this line they then measure the angle to a distant point, 
using a theodolite. They now have a triangle in which they know the length of one 
side and the two adjacent angles. By simple trigonometry they can work out the 
lengths of the other two sides. " (p. 834) 
In other words, triangulation in surveying is based on trigonometry to determine the distance 
between a surveyor and a far-away point. If the surveyor carries out the readings correctly and 
the instruments used are accurate, the results will be accurate within the expected tolerance 
level. As a research method, however, triangulation does not give us any certainty to match 
what surveyors enjoy. In using triangulation, the researcher merely gains different 
perspectives. There is no inherent equivalent research trigonometry to guide the researcher to 
reach a conclusion. The real test of theories and hypothesis is at a later stage of application. 
Triangulation may enhance the researcher's confidence in the facts and evidence obtained but 
it does not provide any certainty. It may not replace application or falsification as part of the 
overall research process. 
Stage 3: Research Result Dissemination and Peer Reviews 
Stage 1 and 2 are recognised in conventional terms to constitute a research process (e. g. 
Saunders et al., 2000; Remenyi et al., 1998). Some types of research stop here, especially 
those commissioned by organisations where research results are for internal consumption only 
and not visible to wider academic communities. However, many research results do find their 
way into academic communities via seminars, journals, books, the Internet and other 
channels. Peer-reviews in these channels are part of the research process. Due to the 
underdetermination of theory by facts, new observations can be afforded different 
interpretations by other researchers with different critical perspectives. 
In business and management research "there is a strong emphasis on the application of 
knowledge rather than on the creation of knowledge" (Remenyi et al., 1998, p. 10). This 
means that not only academic researchers, but also practitioners in the business community 
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will be interested in and be able to provide valuable feedback on relevant research results. If 
research results are to be applied in business organisations, it becomes critical to get the 
practitioners involved. This is believed not to be the case currently in some aspects of 
management studies. Benbasat and Zmud (1999) lament about the lack of relevance of 
information systems research to practitioners. Whether the lack of relevance is due to research 
topic selection or is due to the lack of communication between the academic and business 
communities is worth further inquiring. 
It should be recognised that testing new hypothesis in real world organisations, especially on 
substantive management problems, is inherently risky. A peer-review stage could be 
construed as part of risk management process. So far as target businesses are concerned, such 
risk assessment activities are nothing short of essential. Possible scenarios should be mapped 
out, possible anomalies anticipated and disaster recovery plans thought through. 
One thing to guard against, however, is to see practitioners as judges for research results (e. g. 
Remenyi et al., 1998). Without appropriate training, practitioners lack necessary theoretical 
understandings and are thus ill-equipped to evaluate research results constructively. 
Practitioners carry valuable experiences that can shed a different light onto a research 
problem, but they are not researchers. Mintzberg (1973), when discussing research methods 
on managerial work, comments: 
"It would appear that the simplest way to find out what managers do is to ask 
them, by way of interviews or questionnaires... The results have been 
disappointing... to ask the manager what he does is to make him the researcher; he 
is expected to translate complex reality into meaningful abstraction. There is no 
evidence to suggest that managers can do this effectively; in fact there is ample 
evidence from empirical studies... that managers are poor estimators of their own 
activities. Despite their convenience, the interview and questionnaire methods 
should be recognised as useful only in the study of managers' perceptions of their 
own jobs. " (p. 222) 
Consider the research problem of finding out the success/failure causes of ISD projects as an 
example, practitioners may be able to give their perceptions of what may have gone wrong, 
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but they can by no means be expected to uncover the true root causes. 
Stage 4: Application of Research Results 
Stage 4 is a stage of applying new knowledge and understandings in real world organisations. 
The application of theory serves two objectives: one is to test the theory from the scientific 
inquiry point of view and the other is to solve practical problems. One technique that might be 
useful for this stage is that of action research (AR). To put it simply, AR is to introduce 
certain changes into a real social context and study the resultant effects. AR does not purport 
to control all variables, thus it is different from laboratory experiments. There have been 
increasing attention paid to AR in recent years in ISD research (Kock and Lau, 2001). Kock 
and Lau (2001) caution on the use of AR to test theories: 
"... one may try to test a model (or a set of hypotheses) by conducting an action 
research study. The problem with this choice is that the lack of control and 
narrowly focused data collection, which is typical in action research, will almost 
always ensure that such tests do not conform to well-established positivist 
methodological standards. " 
This caution may be valid when considering the complex nature of research context and the 
often-conflicting interests of stakeholders within, for example, an ISD project. But if the 
"well-established positivist methodological standards" refer to those uses in the classical 
laboratory experiments with all variables controlled, this comparison is misplaced. By 
definition, AR is different from laboratory experiments. AR, as a research method, can also 
be used as a starting point to build a theory in combination with participant observation and 
appropriate analytical methods. A research project designed in this way effectively starts the 
research cycle from Stage 4, and progresses to Stage 1 and Stage 2 later. This is perfectly 
valid and logical. It demonstrates that the numbering of stages in Figure 2.1 is for conceptual 
convenience only. The wheel of learning does not have a fixed starting point. 
In summary, a typical business research process might be described as a journey from 
problems to potential solutions in the shape of hypotheses and theories, then to peer-reviews 
27 
of the solutions, usually aiming for the application of the solutions. The application is likely 
to yield unexpected observations, and anomalies contrary to the original theories. Further 
observations and evidence require further analysis and thus the research carries on. Dividing 
the research process into different stages does not mean to compartmentalise activities 
mechanically. It is recognised that observations and hypothesis building activities are closely 
interwoven. The described stages are not meant to be prescriptive either. The application of 
theory (Stage 4) may not happen if a given theory is not mature enough. Figure 2.1 is an 
effort to unite some of the seemingly disparate research methods for solving business 
problems. Such a conceptual scheme may be helpful in guiding business and management 
research toward a general goal of application, thus increasing its relevance without 
necessarily sacrificing the rigour of inquiry. 
2.4 Research Design 
Given the research motivation (Section 1.4) and research objectives (Section 1.5), and bearing 
in mind the research process discussed above, this Section considers the research design for 
this study. The choice of the research strategy is discussed in Section 2.4.1 and the research 
components are outlined in Section 2.4.2. Methods for data collection and data analysis are 
further discussed in Section 2.5 and 2.6. 
2.4.1 The Adopted Research Strategy 
The focus of this thesis is on identifying the root causes of ISD project challenges and 
possible courses of remedial actions. There is no pre-existing theoretical framework assumed 
for the research. Thus the research can be said to be exploratory and explanatory in 
identifying causality on one hand and assume a problem-solving approach rather than testing 
any a priori theory on the other. To achieve this purpose of inquiry, the adopted research 
strategy is that of case study (Section 2.3.1). Comparing with other options, the choice is 
made due to the following reasons: 
28 
" ISD projects take place in complex social settings involving many individuals, teams 
and organisations. Variables and factors affecting ISD projects are not conducive to 
isolation and control. Therefore, the experiment strategy is ruled out for this study. 
" The survey strategy has been used by many previous researchers in examining the 
root causes of ISD project challenges and failures (Section 3.5). Though surveys 
results are useful in many ways, the value of repeating the previous studies is not 
particularly high. In addition, owing to the rigid and structured nature of the survey 
strategy, it may have contributed to the identification of superficial reasons for project 
challenges but not the "real" root causes (Section 3.7). Therefore, the survey method 
is not used for this study, though many of the previous survey results are incorporated 
later in the thesis. 
" The action research (AR) strategy requires an existing theoretical framework. Since 
the objective of this study is exploratory and aims for theory-building rather than 
theory-testing, the AR strategy is therefore unsuitable. However, the author 
recommends the AR strategy for possible follow-up studies (Section 11.5.2). 
Within the general case study approach, Yin (1994, p. 80) identifies six sources of evidence: 
" Documentation; 
" Archival records; 
" Interviews; 
" Direct observations; 
" Participant-observation; 
" Physical artefacts. 
For this thesis, participant observation with "complete membership role" (Adler and Adler, 
1987) from three ISD projects provides the core research evidence supported by project 
documents, private conversations, emails and software artefacts. The research is based on 
three ISD projects encountered by the author while working in the IT industry. The projects 
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have not been selected or "sampled". There was no deliberate change or control introduced 
into any of them for the purpose of this research. According to Dyer and Wilkins (1991), such 
an approach is more suited to the exploratory research for the purpose of "theory-building". In 
contrast, case studies that are based on "sampled" or "controlled" cases are more relevant for 
theory testing. 
With reference to the research process described in Section 2.3.2, the strategy is to limit the 
research to recording empirical evidence, formulating and refining a hypothesis and 
proposing a potential solution. These activities fall within Stage 1 and Stage 2 of an initial 
research spiral (Figure 2.1), leaving the application (or falsification) of the derived 
proposition to separate studies after a suitable peer-review stage. Such a strategy carries with 
it inherent limitations, the major one being the lack of empirical hypothesis/theory testing. 
This is based on two considerations. The first is the recognition of the magnitude of ISD 
challenges, and the limited resources and time available for a PhD project. To carry out both 
theory-building and theory-testing within such limited resources may lead to "premature 
empirical testing" (Haig, 1995). The second consideration is that meaningful empirical testing 
of the proposed solution in real world organisations should only take place after careful 
assessment of risks and the associated costs and benefits to the target organisations (Section 
2.3.2). In addition, the theory of scientific inquiry consistently reminds us that it is only 
possible to verify propositions by elimination and not possible to "prove" a proposition by 
confirmation (Popper, 1959,1963; Kuhn, 1970). What is important is to establish 
propositions that are falsifiable and to reveal, as far as possible, the assumptions inherent in 
the explanations (Bakker and Clark, 1988). 
2.4.2 Research Components 
Yin (1994) suggests to consider the following research "components" in designing case 
studies: 
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" Study questions; 
" Study propositions; 
" Unit of analysis; 
" The logic linking data to propositions; 
" The criteria for interpreting the findings. 
These components are discussed below relating to this study. 
Study Questions 
The study questions are based on the research motivation (Section 1.4) but slightly expanded. 
Two central questions are addressed: 
" What are the root causes of ISD project challenges? 
0 What can be done to address the root causes? 
There are other related questions. In particular, before the first question can be answered, it is 
important to understand the project challenges in the first place. In this respect, the case 
studies based on participant observation help significantly due to the understandings of 
project background, associated contracting parties and their relationships. In addition, it is 
important to understand the current explanations of the challenges and available solutions and 
why they may not have been effective in overcoming the project challenges. 
Study Propositions 
A proposition "directs attention to something that should be examined within the scope of the 
study" (Yin, 1994, p. 21). In that sense, the central proposition for this study is that the 
management of application software supplier is the key to the successful delivery of quality 
application software, which in turn is the key to the success of an ISD project (see Section 
1.6). The study proposition is not a foregone conclusion that cannot be disputed. Rather, it 
provides a basis for data collection and helps to limit the scope of the study (Yin, 1994). 
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Unit of Analysis 
Three projects are documented in this thesis as three case studies (Chapters 4,5 and 6). 
However, the main unit of analysis is one client-supplier relationship since the research 
proposition is related to supplier management. In Case 1, two such relationships are described 
while Case 2 and Case 3 each describes one. Each client-supplier relationship is established 
within the context of the corresponding project. The "time boundaries" (Yin, 1994, p. 24) for 
data collection are limited to the successive phases of supplier selection and contracting, 
software product development, delivery, evaluation and integration, not including system 
installation and system support. While the client-supplier relationship forms the basic unit of 
analysis, some issues are discussed at the project level when necessary. 
The Logic Linking Data to Propositions, and Criteria for Interpreting the Findings 
Yin (1994) admits that these two components, representing data analysis steps, have been "the 
least well developed in case studies" (p. 25). While Yin does not give much general guidance 
regarding these components when discussing research design, he does provide useful 
suggestions in a later chapter about analysing case study evidence (Yin, 1994, pp. 102-125). 
A number of analytic techniques are suggested. Two of them are used in this study. One is 
"pattern-matching" (Yin, 1994, p. 106). Applying this technique, a pattern of ISD project 
challenges is derived in Chapter 7 based on individual cases. This pattern is then compared 
with what has been described in literature. The other technique adopted is "explanation- 
building". This is central to the study since one of the objectives is to find the root causes of 
ISD project challenges. The initial explanations are based on a number of existing theoretical 
concepts found in the literature of product development, agency theory and contract theory 
etc (Chapter 8). The analysis of the research evidence produces a generalisation in the form of 
a unified explanation. In more traditional research methodology parlance, the process is 
described as "analytic induction" rather than "enumerative induction" (Znaniecki as quoted in 
Robinson, 2000) or "analytic generalisation" rather than "statistical generalisation" (Yin, 
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1994, p. 30). Ideally, a set of pre-determined criteria should be specified to examine the initial 
explanations and generalisations. However, according to Yin (1994, p. 26), currently "there is 
no precise way of setting the criteria for interpreting these types of findings". 
The guidance available in the literature about making generalisation in case studies has been 
limited. Benbasat et at. (1987) resort to "the integrative powers of the researcher". Eisenhardt 
(1989b) prescribes a series of steps involving pre-defined "constructs", which might be more 
relevant to "theory-testing" rather than exploratory "theory-building" studies (Dyer and 
Wilkins, 1991). However, merely maintaining that theories will emerge from research data 
(e. g. Glaser and Strauss, 1967) without being explicit of the reasoning process does not help 
to increase the rigour of research methodology, nor does it allow peer researchers to offer 
effective critiques of research findings. In the meantime, the author recognises that the 
epistemological process has been addressed as a general philosophical issue. Instead of 
formulating a special process for making generalisation from case studies, it might be 
appropriate to seek advice available in the epistemological literature. One source of advice is 
found in the "Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)" process described by Lipton (1991). 
IBE is adopted as the overall reasoning framework for this study incorporating some of the 
specific research techniques for case studies described earlier. For a detailed discussion of the 
IBE process as applied in this thesis, see Section 2.6. 
2.5 Data Collection Based on Participant Observation 
The core evidence of this study comes from three first-hand case studies based on participant 
observation with complete membership roles (Adler and Adler, 1987). The author was in 
employment from May 1999 to February 2003 with a medium-sized information systems 
"solution provider" company, coded as SLC. From July 2000 to March 2002, the author 
participated in three ISD projects that have been documented as case studies in Chapters 4 to 
6 (also see Section 1.4). The ethical issues are considered in Section 2.7. This Section 
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discusses participant observation as a research method and provides further background 
information for the cases documented. 
2.5.1 Participant Observation as a Research Method 
Participant observation as a research method has its roots in the "field work" of the Chicago 
Schools in the 1920s. By the 1950s and 1960s, the technique had been further developed and 
codified by the so-called second generation of Chicagoan social scientists represented by 
Herbert Blumer, H. S. Becker and Everett Hughes (Adler and Adler, 1987). According to Adler 
and Adler, participant observation has the following characteristics: 
" The goal is to contribute to general theoretical statements about cultural and social 
life; 
" In order to do this, it is necessary to venture, first-hand, into the places where the 
activities of interest are taking place, and to observe human group life "in situ"; 
" Researchers can take various roles including complete observer, observer-as- 
participant, participant-as-observer and complete participant, ranging from least to 
most involved in the group and its activities. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the approach as used for this study are discussed in the next 
section. 
2.5.2 Participation in the Case Study Projects 
Historically, SLC used to be the Information Systems Division of UKOne. As a division, SLC 
had always undertaken the development of many information systems in support of the 
business operations of UKOne's various subsidiaries. The systems were usually developed 
jointly with other software suppliers with specific business domain expertise and 
technological know-how. As of April 2000, SLC was spun off as a separate company with a 
new identity. Part of the separation agreement was that UKOne had guaranteed a level of 
workload over five years for SLC. This was through two type of activities, one being existing 
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systems' support and maintenance, the other being new systems development, usually in 
collaboration with other suppliers for UKOne's the subsidiaries. 
The three projects described in this study were undertaken by UKOne's three different 
subsidiaries. It is worthwhile to note that: 
" Cases are not selected because of any particular displayed feature. Rather they are 
"random" in that they have happened to be within the author's experience on a 
continuous basis from July 2000 to March 2002; 
" Each case does have its own distinctive client. Each subsidiary has its own personnel, 
its own locale, its own approach to ISD projects and its own sub-culture. It means that 
the systematic biases associated with single-location case studies are under check 
even within the limited time period and a single overall corporate entity. 
The case studies have been written after the projects had ended. This approach has a number 
of implications. First of all, the approach seems to have avoided two issues traditionally 
associated with it when the researcher is a complete participant. One is the risk of "going 
native", the other the need to take a "covert" strategy. Being a "native" to start with, the 
author did not have a separate agenda or an "outsider" view (Spradley, 1980). At the time of 
carrying out the project duties, the author did his job with the best of his ability in accordance 
with company procedures. There was no need to take any "covert" strategy. Secondly, the 
observations thus acquired in the day-to-day project involvement are unstructured. 
Unstructured observation has been used and has proven as an effective method to deal with 
the complexity of a research situation. Mintzberg (1973) assigns two "great strengths" to this 
method: 
"First, the researcher can be purely inductive. He imposes on himself no artificial 
constraints or premeditated structure. Nothing need stand between the work he 
observes and the theory he develops save his own ability to interpret. Second, the 
researcher is in a position to probe deeply into the work that he observes. If an 
incident is unclear, he is there and he has the time to find out more. " (p. 226) 
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The second strength is only relative to the other research methods like survey. In surveys, 
what kind of information to be obtained can be predicted, and extra information is often 
discouraged (Becker, 1996). Unstructured observation does not give the researcher any 
artificial limit in terms of the types and amount of information. The researcher is out there to 
gather everything possible that is of interest, including "a mixture of events, anecdotes, views 
and attitudes of those observed, documentary evidence, and so on. " (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 
226). This is essential for a creative, and open-ended research. 
The downside of the unstructured observation is its subjectivity. Although subjectivity is 
recognised as a universal issue in many qualitative methods in social inquiries, it can be 
potentially more significant with unstructured observation. The author relies on available 
project documentation and artefacts for accuracy check at the time of writing up the cases 
rather than purely relying on personal observations. Typical ISD projects generate 
voluminous documentation from requirement specifications, software design and architecture, 
testing specifications, testing evidence and various project reports. Artefacts are mainly 
software codes and patches, software installation instructions and user guides etc. Careful 
crosschecking of research evidence helps enhance the reliability of the case materials but it 
does not eliminate the subjectivity all together. The observations available for analysis 
represent the author's perceptions of ISD projects under study. That such perceptions can be 
rooted in realities is a fundamental belief of critical realists and provide the basis for further 
epistemological inquiries. 
2.5.3 The Structure of Case Study Composition 





" Theory building; 
0 "Suspense"; 
" Unsequenced. 
The "linear-analytic" structure is adopted for presenting the case materials in Chapters 4,5 
and 6. Such a structure consists of a "sequence of subtopics" (Yin, 1994, p. 138) relevant to 
the case study. Each of the three chapters reports on one project. Each case is generally made 
up of two parts. The first part is descriptive including the project background, the client and 
its requirements, the selection of suppliers and contract arrangement, the management of 
project schedule, cost and quality. The second part presents a within-case analysis that 
focuses on issues in each project based on observation. This part of the case studies is less 
structured than the first part since each case tends to have different issues. In addition, each 
case study includes a project chronology and a section of internal references. 
2.6 From Observation to Understanding 
The empirical inquiry starts from observations and facts (in a critical realistic sense). But 
what is the process that leads us from what we observe to a level of general understanding? 
And how do we assess the validity of our understanding? Yin (1994) acknowledges that these 
two areas are "the least well developed in case studies" (Section 2.4.2). Of course, these 
questions are not limited to the case study research methodology. Rather they are general 
epistemological issues. Traditionally induction is considered to be the process to generate new 
understandings. However, there are problems with induction as an epistemological process. 
One problem is that the observed data does not justify the unobserved. When we reach a 
conclusion that "all ravens are black", what we mean is the conjunction of "all observed 
ravens are black" and "all unobserved ravens are black". There is no empirical justification 
for the second statement (Psillos, 1996). Secondly, the argument for the validity of induction 
is circular. These are two problems underlying David Hume's sceptical argument about 
37 
induction (Lipton, 1991). The problems are so serious that Popper (1959,1963) proposes to 
abandon induction altogether, opting instead for "conjectures" to generate hypotheses and 
then relying on refutations to falsify them. 
However, Hume himself did not conclude that inductive reasoning should be rejected (Rosen, 
1999). Instead, the problems of induction make us aware of the fallible nature of our 
understanding and the need for supplementary techniques. The "Inference to the Best 
Explanation (IBE)" process (Lipton, 1991), also referred to as the abductive reasoning 
(Josephson, 1996,2001; Psillos, 1996), promises to overcome the problems associated with 
induction. This next section examines the basis of IBE followed by a section about the criteria 
of "the best" and an overview of the process as applied in this study. 
2.6.1 Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) 
Josephson (2001) equates IBE with the abductive reasoning and defines it as a form of 
inference that follows a pattern like this: 
"D is a collection of data (facts, observations, givens). 
[Hypothesis] H explains D (would, if true, explain D). 
No other hypothesis explains D as well as H. 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Therefore, H is probably correct. " (p. 1622) 
The strength of the conclusion thus reached, according to Josephson (2001), depends on: 
0 how decisively the leading hypothesis surpasses the alternatives; 
0 how well the hypothesis stands by itself, independently of the alternatives; 
0 how thorough the search was for alternative explanations. 
Psillos (1996) sets down four desiderata for a general model of ampliative reasoning and 
suggests that abductive reasoning meets all four. First of all, abduction produces "the best 
explanation", which can be defeated when an even better explanation is found (it is non- 
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monotonic). Secondly, abduction warrants generalisations due to its explanatory 
considerations (it solves the "cut-off' problem"). That is to say, abductive generalisations are 
more than simple enumerative correlations. Thirdly, abduction "employs hypothesis that 
involve reference to unobservables and need vocabulary that goes beyond the conceptual 
resources of the evidence" (it caters for "vertical" extrapolation). Lastly but most importantly, 
abduction accommodates the eliminative dimension of ampliative reasoning. That is to say 
that abduction considers competing potential explanations and eliminates all but one of them. 
In contrast, induction, in its simple enumerative form, only accommodates the first of the 
above desiderata (Psillos, 1996): 
"Enumerative induction can accommodate only the first of the above: it is clearly 
non-monotonic. For instance, if added in the premises, the information that the 
sample was biased undercuts the previous conclusion. But it fails on the rest. It 
cannot solve the `cut-off point' problem. It does not tell us when the evidence is 
enough to warrant the generalisation. Without extra information about the quality 
of the data, we cannot tell when we have seen enough instances to warrant the 
generalisation. It cannot accommodate `vertical' extrapolation. In a certain sense, 
enumerative induction, pretty much like deduction, operates with the principle 
`garbage in, garbage out': the descriptive vocabulary of the conclusion cannot be 
different from that of the premises. Hence with enumerative induction, although 
we may arguably gain knowledge of hitherto unobserved correlations between 
instances of the attributes involved, we cannot gain `novel' knowledge, i. e., 
knowledge of entities and causes that operate behind the phenomena. Finally, 
enumerative induction cannot accommodate the eliminative dimension of 
ampliative reasoning: unless we consider alternative generalisations of the 
observed correlations, we cannot attempt to eliminate them. But enumerative 
induction does not have the resources to generate alternative generalisations. " 
However, induction may be considered as a special case of abduction (Harman, 1965; 
Josephson, 1996; Psillos, 1996). It seems that on a philosophical level, abduction or IBE is a 
superior mode of ampliative reasoning which overcomes, to a considerable extent, the 
scepticism resulted from the enumerative induction. The concepts of abduction and 
enumerative induction coincide with the analytic and statistical generalisations often 
discussed in research methodology literature (Yin, 1994; Robinson, 2000). Looking in this 
light, one can appreciate the reason that Yin (1994, p. 31) refers analytic generalisation to be 
higher (theory level) than that of statistical generalisation (population level). 
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2.6.2 Criteria of "The Best" Explanation 
An important question to be addressed is what is meant by "the best" in the phrase "the best 
explanation". Thagard (1978) lists three criteria: consilience, simplicity and analogy. 
Consilience measures how much a theory explains. Thagard (1978) states: 
"Roughly, a theory is said to be consilient if it explains at least two classes of 
facts. Then one theory is more consilient than another if it explains more classes 
of facts than the other does. Intuitively, we show one theory to be more consilient 
than another by pointing to a class or classes of facts which it explains but which 
the other theory does not. " (p. 79) 
A number of other terms have been used to denote the concept of consilience, including 
"explanatory power", "systematic power" and "unification" etc, though they may have 
different meanings depending on their exact definitions (Thagard, 1978; Lipton, 1991). A 
theory can be highly consilient if it is allowed to be complicated with many ad hoc 
assumptions and "auxiliary hypotheses". The criterion of simplicity therefore puts a constraint 
on consilience: "a simple consilient theory not only must explain a range of facts; it must 
explain those facts without making a host of assumptions with narrow application. " (Thagard, 
1978, p. 87, emphasis in the original). The third criterion is analogy. Thagard argues that 
analogies support theories by improving the explanations that the theories are used to give" 
(Thagard, 1978, p. 89). Of the three criteria, consilience and simplicity are widely recognised. 
As for analogy, it is not clear how it acts as a criterion to judge how good an explanation is. 
Analogy may be considered more as a technique to assist formulating and defending 
hypotheses (Section 2.6.3). 
Lipton (1991) distinguishes between the "likeliest" explanation (the one that best fits the 
available evidence) and the "loveliest" explanation (the one that, if true, would provide the 
most understanding). "Likeliness speaks of truth, loveliness of potential understanding" 
(Lipton, 1991, p. 61). These are clearly two different standards. The likeliest explanation may 
not be enlightening. Johnson (2000) provides the following example. The fact someone is 
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elected as a governor can be convincingly explained by one's numerical majority in an 
election. But such an explanation does not tell us anything about the candidate's policy 
stances or any other information. Therefore the explanation is not lovely. On the other hand, 
an explanation may be lovely without being likely, like some conspiracy theories (Lipton, 
1991). Lipton argues that the criterion of loveliness is more fundamental to IBE. This is 
because "... the explanation that would, if true, provide the deepest understanding is the 
explanation that is likeliest to be true" (Lipton, 1991, p. 63). 
2.6.3 The IBE Process and Its Application in This Study 
IBE provides a structure for reasoning and deriving "warranted inferences" (Harman, 1965; 
Lipton, 1991; Johnson, 2000). It suggests a two-stage process. The first stage is the generation 
of the best potential explanation, equivalent to the conventional hypothesis. The second stage 
is the selection of the best explanation. The first stage relies on background knowledge and 
guesses. This is in line with the conjecture school of philosophy of science (Popper, 1959, 
1963). It is also in line with the scientific tradition that researchers are required to be familiar 
with their field of research and literature. The emphasis on background knowledge is in 
contrast with advice from grounded theory methodology that a researcher should be "avoiding 
the literature most closely related to what you are researching" (Dick, 2000). IBE does not 
have any guard against any existing literature. 
A new potential explanation compatible with available evidence is not enough to be justified 
as "the best" explanation. IBE suggests a "contrastive inference" process that puts the new 
potential explanation to the test through a fact-foil analytical process (Lipton, 1991). This 
enriches the explanation and can provide new understanding. In addition to contrastive 
analysis, analogies might be used to draw similarities between different phenomena to support 
explanations and suggest possible new hypotheses and guide new conjectures. Analogical 
reasoning is a technique widely used in science (Dunbar, 1995; Holyoak and Thagard, 1997). 
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Dunbar (1995) suggests that "analogies were an important source of knowledge and 
conceptual change". The exact process of analogical reasoning is a separate topic of research 
(e. g. Blanchette and Dunbar, 2000) that will not be discussed further in this thesis. 
This research follows the IBE reasoning structure. Three case studies (Chapters 4,5 and 6) 
based on participant observation are documented with within-case analyses. Chapter 7 
provides the first part of the cross-case analysis that shows a pattern of ISD project 
challenges. This pattern is derived not only from the cases recorded in this thesis, but also 
incorporating evidence from many published case studies. In particular, this pattern matches 
similar descriptions of ISD project challenges in the literature (e. g. Yourdon, 2002; see 
Section 7.7). Chapter 8 provides the second part of the cross-case analysis, which attempts to 
explain the observed pattern. With reference to concepts and theories in agency theory, 
transaction cost theory, contract theory and product development literature, and combined 
with the author's background knowledge and literature survey, the author formulates a new 
potential explanation by constantly comparing with alternative explanations. The new 
potential explanation is subjected to two instances of contrastive analysis (Chapter 9). The 
contrastive analyses are conducted through a fact-foil structure and "causal triangulation" 
(Lipton, 1991, p. 54) to refine the explanation while the analogical analyses are carried out by 
examining practices in comparable situations. It is based on the refined explanation and 
suggestions from the analogical reasoning that a management framework is formulated as a 
possible solution (Chapter 10). 
In summary, IBE provides guidance for exploratory and explanatory studies. Though the 
criteria of "the best" may appear to be inevitably subjective, appealing too much to intuition, 
IBE does represent advancement from pure "conjectures". Indeed, one important benefit of 
IBE is to lay bare the process of reasoning or the "intermediate lemmas" (Harman, 1965). 
Josephson (2001) suggests that: 
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"It is desirable to adopt reasoning strategies that produce conclusions that can in 
principle be justified. Even better are reasoning strategies in which the confidence 
in a conclusion arrives bearing a structure of argumentation that can be critically 
examined, and in which little or no additional work is required to extract, 
organise, or economize arguments. " 
In the mean time, it has to be added that IBE as a reasoning framework is still in the process 
of being developed and refined. In some small way, this study may contribute to the 
development of IBE by offering an example of its usage. 
2.7 Research Ethics 
Business research is conducted through observing and analysing business activities of 
individuals and organisations, and thus has the potential of infringing the interests of those 
involved. Therefore, the research activities must observe relevant ethical principles. These 
principles may not always fit with each other in a given context, hence there may also be a 
need to make a considered choice for a specific approach, be it at the research topic selection, 
data collection or other stages. One principle is that a research project should benefit society 
(SRA, 2002; Remenyi, 1998). SRA (2002) puts it succinctly: 
"Social researchers should use the possibilities open to them to extend the scope 
of social enquiry and communicate their findings, for the benefit of the widest 
possible community. " (Section 1.1) 
ISD projects consume significant sums of economic resources, and a considerable portion of 
which is wasted (Section 1.4). In addition, the lack of ISD project success exerts adverse 
financial and psychological pressures on organisations and individuals involved. It is in the 
society's interest to have the workings of these projects examined from different perspectives 
so that plausible ways can be found to reduce the economic wastes and to improve the 
organisational and psychological welfare for those adversely affected. 
Having said that, there are ethical questions to be addressed. One key question concerning 
this research is that whether the participant observation and the project documentation should 
be used on an "informed consent" basis or not. It is a difficult decision to make, particularly 
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difficult for an employee researcher (SRA, 2002; Buchanan et al., 1999). Informed consent in 
principle is the ideal approach. It will relieve the researcher of any uncertain and perhaps 
guilty feelings towards the employer and his colleagues. However, the action of requesting 
consent carries considerable risks to the research project. One risk is affecting the impartiality 
of the research results. "Case studies" in some commercial websites demonstrate the impact 
of partiality on quality of information. Typically such cases are not detailed and are void of 
any critical content. Another risk is a permanent delay in getting the research to a conclusion. 
Commercial organisations, especially large organisations, are simply not set up to deal with 
such requests swiftly. The problem is made worse by the sheer number of parties involved in 
a typical ISD project. To be fair to all parties, if one party is asked for consent, all parties 
must also be asked. The risk is significant for one or more of the companies not being able to 
yield consent, rather than intending to refuse. 
The alternative of keeping the observation covert is not attractive. This is because there is an 
implicit deception on the part of the researcher to the organisations and individuals involved 
in the projects. The issue of covert research has been much debated (Dench et al., 2003). 
However, SRA (2002) states in its guidelines: 
"... it would be as unrealistic to outlaw deception in social enquiry as it would be 
to outlaw it in social interaction. Minor deception is employed in many forms of 
human contact (tact, flattery etc. ) and social researchers are no less likely than the 
rest of the population to be guilty of such practices. It remains the duty of social 
researchers and their collaborators, however, not to pursue methods of enquiry 
that are likely to infringe human values and sensibilities. " 
While discussing confidentiality and anonymity, Saunders et al. (2000, p. 137) suggest that 
"covert study" as "a deceitful yet benign way". 
The author has reached a conscious decision that apart from the general support from the 
employer for the author to study the subject, no further specific consent is sought from the 
clients, the suppliers and the individuals involved in the cases. To a large extent, this decision 
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is based on the author's firm belief that all parties in the cases studied, including the author, 
have a unified goal in turning all the projects into successes. This is different from some other 
social inquiries with aims to reveal social activities involving immorality and illegality, where 
researchers may have diverse goals from those being studied. In the meantime, the author is 
clearly aware of the need to respect "human values and sensibilities". This is achieved by 
observing strictly the following ethical principles (SRA, 2002; Trochim, 2002): 
" Anonymisation: all cases are documented carefully to avoid the companies and 
individuals to be identified. After all, the purpose of the study is not about any 
organisation's or individual's success or failure in the projects. Rather the research 
focuses on the process and the economic forces that each party represents; 
" Confidentiality of records: While anonymisation disguises the identities, the security 
of the records prevents uncontrolled access. While some risk of disclosure is always 
present, the author endeavours to take reasonable steps to restrict access to the 
original materials and the compiled case studies; 
" No harm to the individuals and companies: in addition to the above steps, extra care 
is taken in the writing of the case studies to respect the individual's dignity and not to 
cause any harm to the individuals and the companies, so far as there is no sacrifice of 
impartiality. This is in acknowledgement of the fact that, however well the 
anonymisation is carried out, the participants will have little difficulty in identifying 
themselves in the roles and responsibilities described. The subject of the study is not 
any individual as such, rather it is the roles they play within the cases. 
In summary, the research has been initiated with significant potential benefits to organisations 
and their members. To achieve the research objectives, a difficult decision has been made to 
document cases only with a general agreement from the employer to support the research. 
Such a decision has not been made lightly and is supplemented with the ethical principles of 
anonymisation , confidentiality and no harm to the participating parties. 
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2.8 Summary 
The study adopts the pragmatic mixed-method approach in an attempt to find the root causes 
of ISD project challenges and possible remedial solutions. The research strategy is 
exploratory and theory-building rather than theory-testing. The main research evidence comes 
from three participant observation-based case studies with complete membership roles. The 
first-hand cases are supplemented by published surveys and case reports. The IBE reasoning 
strategy is adopted to guide the process from observations to understandings with the help of 
contrastive and analogical analyses. 
The author recognises the limitations of the overall research design and the techniques used 
for data collection and data analysis. First of all, the lack of direct empirical testing of the 
proposed hypothesis or explanation is no doubt a shortcoming. The participant observation 
method for acquiring first-hand research evidence carries with it an inherent weakness of 
subjectivity, which is limited to a certain degree by cross-checking with available project 
documentation. Commercial sensitivity also features highly in the author's mind throughout 
the research. As part of the ethical consideration, the author adheres to the confidentiality of 
records and anonymisation of identities. The IBE reasoning strategy, epistemologically sound 
as it may be, still appeals to intuition for the degree of "goodness" for the resultant 
explanations. While bearing these methodological limitations in mind, The author believes 
that research presented in this thesis will stimulate debates in the field of ISD project 
management research. 
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Chapter 3: The "Software Crisis" and the Current Solutions 
"The development of large applications is one of the most hazardous and 
risky business undertakings of the modem world, " 
(Capers Jones, quoted in Vowler, 1999) 
3.1 Introduction 
In the early days of computing, hardware and software were tightly coupled. Software 
applications were developed for specific hardware and maintained accordingly (Friedman, 
1989). From the 1960s onwards, software became more separated from hardware. General 
purpose programming languages like FORTRAN and COBOL enabled software to be 
developed independent from hardware. From the 1970s onwards, with the availability of 
cross-platform operating systems like UNIX, general-purpose software systems have become 
widespread. However, there have been many troubled and failed ISD projects in the process 
of developing software systems. Though the majority have not been subject to detailed 
scrutiny (May, 1998; DeMarco and Lister, 1999; Yourdon, 2002), sufficient evidence has 
been accumulated for the state of software development to be referred to as the "software 
crisis". 
This chapter first of all considers the definition of an information system by each system 
element (Section 3.2). Section 3.3 examines critically the success and failure criteria for ISD 
projects. The differentiation of project success and product success is suggested. Sections 3.4 
and 3.5 examine some of the evidence of the "software crisis" in published case studies and 
surveys. The available case studies and surveys provide not only empirical project 
descriptions and statistics but also some perceived root causes and corrective actions, which 
must be considered in the search for alternative explanations and solutions. One particular 
group of solutions includes many information system development methodologies (ISDMs), 
47 
which are examined briefly in Section 3.6. The on-going ISD project challenges demonstrate 
the failure of the existing solutions in resolving the "software crisis". An attempt is made in 
Section 3.7 to explain the paradox of many solutions and little actual progress in overcoming 
ISD project challenges. Section 3.8 provides a summary for this Chapter. 
3.2 Defining an Information System 
This thesis focuses on information system development projects. In order to do so effectively, 
it is important to be clear exactly what an information system (IS) is. In this Section, a 
critique is made of some currently available definitions in the literature. A refined definition 
is suggested for the discussions to follow. 
3.2.1 Current IS Definitions 
An IS can be defined from various perspectives. A typical definition can be found in Bocij et 
al. (1999): 
"An information system is a group of interrelated components that work 
collectively to carry out input, processing, output, storage and control actions in 
order to convert data into information products that can be used to support 
forecasting, planning, control, coordination, decision making and operational 
activities in an organisation. " (p. 27) 
Bocij et al. supplement the definition by describing IS as relying on "people resources, 
hardware resources, software resources, communication resources (including networks and 
the hardware and software needed to support them) and data resources". Though hardware, 
software and communication resources are given dedicated treatment in the book, no such 
privilege is given to data resources. 
Britton and Doake (1996) provide a definition describing a slightly different set of system 
"elements": 
"... as comprising the software, documentation, method of operation, hardware, 
users and operators which together make up the software system. " (p. 4) 
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In this definition, the element of data is missing altogether, and documentation, users and 
method of operations (business processes) are included as part of an IS. While there is little 
dispute about including hardware and software, there are clear differences regarding whether 
the definition of IS should be extended to data, documentation, users and business processes. 
The following sections look briefly at hardware and software as system elements and examine 
whether the other items should be regarded as IS elements or not. 
3.2.2 Hardware 
Bocij et al. (1999) describe hardware as "the physical components of a computer system", 
including "input devices, memory, central processing unit, output devices and storage 
devices" (p. 47). In addition, hardware components are also essential for networking and 
communications. Compared with the software cost, the proportion of IS hardware cost has 
been dramatically reduced (Boehm, 1976; Vienneau, 1996). Though there are issues in 
selecting and acquiring hardware in ISD projects (e. g. rapid depreciation, see Newell, 1995 
for an example), they are not the focus of this study. 
3.2.3 System Software and Application Software 
In addition to classifying software products into PPSW, COTS and CBSW (Section 1.2), an 
alternative is to group them by the purposes they serve. There are two main categories: 
system software and application software (Bocij et at., 1999). System software manages 
hardware resources and conceptually sits in between hardware and application software. 
System software includes operating systems, database packages and network software etc. To 
client organisations not in the software development industry, system software is usually 
acquired as PPSW. Application software "enables users to perform specific information 
processing activities" (Bocij et al., 1999, p. 102). Common examples include word processing 
packages like Microsoft Word and enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications etc. 
Application software, also referred to as software applications, may be acquired as PPSW, 
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customised from COTS or developed as CBSW. The focus of ISD projects is usually to 
develop CBSW and COTS in such a way that they can be successfully integrated with other 
system elements in client organisations to become coherent systems in order to meet client 
organisational needs. The success or failure of application software development, either based 
on COTS or developed as CBSW, is critical to the success of resultant systems and ISD 
projects. In fact, the term "software development" is often used to mean designing, 
developing and delivering information systems (e. g. Pfleeger, 1998). This study focuses on 
managing such development activities by using external suppliers in ISD projects. 
3.2.4 Data as Part of an Information System 
Modern business systems have their origin in data processing (Friedman, 1989; Davis, 2000; 
Ward and Peppard, 2002). The business orientated programming language COBOL was 
designed to process business data in the 1960s. Though technology has moved on, the 
fundamental raison d'&re for many information systems in organisations has remained the 
same. The difference is that there are many more varieties and much higher volumes of data 
to be processed. A system might have reference data and operational data. Though a standard 
definition does not appear to exist (Howard, 2003), reference data (also called static data) are 
part of a system's configuration and are essential for it to operate. Operational data serves 
business needs (see e. g. 4TRESS, 2003). A software application may be able to compile and 
execute without operational data, yet it will not be able to serve its intended business 
purposes. Data, like hardware and software application, is an integral part of an information 
system. 
The interactions between data and application software can be complex. Data might travel 
through a system and be manipulated in many possible ways: 
" Raw data input into a system through user interfaces or system interfaces; 
" Raw data stored; 
50 
" Raw data processed and transformed; 
" Transformed data stored; 
" Data transferred to another system; 
" Data referenced for validation or other manipulations; 
" Data retrieved, analysed (aggregated); 
" Data deleted; 
" Data formatted and printed onto some output (including onto a screen); 
" Data logged as exceptions to be processed manually. 
Some of the above operations may logically follow one another. Some may be limited to 
certain data types. A simplified data lifecycle model might be represented in Figure 3.1. 
Users (Operational Users, System Supporters and System Administrators etc) 
User Interfaces 
Database links and Other 
System Interfaces Built-In Business Logic Exception Logging 
Other Systems 
Data Stores (Files and Databases) 
Figure 3.1: The lifecycle of data in an information system 
As an example, data might be entered by a user through user interfaces. It enters the system, 
is stored and then processed by some business logic. The result might be stored as well and 
also transferred to other systems (inside or outside of an organisation). The fact that a data 
item has been transferred may also be recorded. Sometimes the source system expects a return 
message from the target system for confirmation. Stored data might be called up by users 
through user interfaces. However, user interfaces are often designed for data entry and may 
only display a limited set of data available in the data stores. When a system encounters 
difficulties in processing certain data (e. g. no business logic is programmed to handle certain 
data sensibly from the system's point of view --- dividing by zero being a classic one), it 
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usually is expected to log the difficulties and inform relevant users. In short, the interactions 
between application software and data are highly complex and vital for the success of an 
information system. 
3.2.5 Documentation as Part of an Information System 
Few people disagree that necessary documentation is a "vital" part of an information system 
(Brooks, 1995). Depending on the perspective, documentation can be categorised in a number 
of ways. Pfleeger (1998, p. 267) refers to all "descriptive material" embedded in software 
source codes as "internal documentation" and others as "external documentation". Within an 
ISD project, documents might be grouped into project working documents and system 
documents according to their purposes. Project working documents are produced to assist the 
running of the project. For example, project schedules, budget projections etc. System 
documents are written to describe the target system to be developed. They may include 
architecture descriptions, software system specifications, installation guides, lists of known 
defects and issues, user guides, and system support guides etc. System documents relating 
specifically to the application software may also be called software documents. When 
software application development is outsourced, it is critical for suppliers to deliver quality 
software documents. System documentation must be up to date and contain sufficient details 
to be of use to users of various kinds. 
3.2.6 Business Processes as Part of an Information System? 
A business process can be thought of as "a series of steps involving activities, constraints, and 
resources that produce an intended output of some kind" (Pfleeger, 1998, p. 44). In the 
business process re-engineering (BPR) literature, a process has been portrayed as "a number 
of roles collaborating and interacting to achieve a goal" (Ward and Peppard, 2002, p. 217). 
These are high-level definitions and give the impression that business processes can be clearly 
defined and enforced. When it comes to implementing business processes through new 
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information systems, however, this may be problematic. There are a number of possibilities. 
One is that the new system automates part of existing processes. Such an implementation may 
involve usual data inputs and outputs, but with a new system imitating the old one, whether 
the old one is computerised or not. How closely a new system can do that will make a 
difference in terms of how comfortable and how much extra training a user might need. 
Importantly, the new system must maintain the business process consistency, including data 
input format, data transformation, data storage, data transfer format etc. Another possibility is 
that a new system is implemented as part of business process change programme, whether 
intended or forced upon. This may be risky if the new process has different business logic and 
requires different supporting datasets. There are a number of things to consider. First of all, 
how can the legacy data be migrated into the new system? This is typically done through a 
data migration exercise. It is difficult to ensure that legacy data is correctly represented in the 
new system due to format difference and data interpretation. Secondly, new processes 
embodied in a new system must connect with other related business processes that are not 
subject to changes. One of the biggest challenges in acquiring COTS applications is to decide 
whether the client has to change its processes to suit the applications, or the applications 
should be customised to suit the client organisation in areas where the built-in processes do 
not match those in practice. For example, Gage (2002) reports that a human resources 
management system from PeopleSoft catered for 80% of a client's business processes. The 
client had to change the other 20% to suit the software system. In other words, business 
processes may not be defined and enforced at will when they are linked to information 
systems. 
A business process involving an information system usually straddles across users and 
software applications, often linked by data. This can be seen in Figure 3.1 with data flowing 
from users to various layers of systems and between systems, both internal and external. In 
addition, to maintain system integrity and to assist system auditing, a significant amount of 
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data is generated in the process to record transaction details both within and across systems. 
The meanings of these data items can only be understood through understanding relevant 
business processes that generate them. Such process knowledge is sometimes found in 
software and system documentation and sometimes only found in the minds of the expert 
users. Thus it would be simplistic to list business processes separately as part of an IS. Rather 
it might be more appropriate to treat the embedded part of business processes as an integral 
part of an information system (the software application and the corresponding documentation) 
while treating the remaining part to be outside of the system. Such an approach makes it clear 
that business processes cannot be delivered in "one fell scoop" with an information system. 
Instead, they have to be understood by users and absorbed into business practices. It also 
highlights the need for client organisations to be alert to the impact and potential disruptions 
of new information systems to business operations (e. g. Gattiker and Goodhue, 2002). 
3.2.7 Users as Part of an Information System? 
Users often form part of an overall business environment and must be considered throughout 
the process of designing, developing and implementing information systems. But users cannot 
be considered as part of an information system within the context of ISD projects. Bocij et at. 
(1999) might be correct in emphasizing that an information system relies on people resources 
to be operated. Unlike other integral system elements (e. g. data), users interact with 
information systems through implicit and explicit processes. If an information system is 
considered as the output of a project, it is clear that users cannot be considered as part of the 
project deliverables. 
3.2.8 A Recommended Definition of an Information System 
Based on the above discussions, a refined definition of an information system, considering the 
types of software and data, can be recommended as follows: 
An information system is an integrated entity that may serve specific 
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organisational needs. The elements of an information system may include 
necessary hardware, system software, shared network facilities, application 
software, reference data, operational data, necessary interfaces and related 
documentation. 
In the above definition, business processes are not specifically mentioned and users are 
excluded. Different system elements are integrated into an information system usually 
according to some defined architecture. A possible schematic architectural representation is 
shown in Figure 3.2 (partly based on Josittus, 2001 and Shaw & Garlan, 1993). The expected 
software artefacts from a supplier in an ISD project might be illustrated with the shaded areas. 
For possible alternative IS architectural representations see Josittus (2001) and Shaw and 
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Figure 3.2: A schematic IS architecture 
3.3 Success and Failure Criteria of [SD Projects 
Having examined the elements of an information system, the following sections discuss the 
management of ISD projects, starting by examining the success/failure criteria with an 
emphasis on those found in IS/IT literature. This is followed by examining the "software 
crisis" with published case studies and surveys found in the literature (Sections 3.4 and 3.5). 
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3.3.1 The Traditional Approach on Project Success Criteria 
The PMBOK Guide (PMI, 2000) does not give a definition of project success/failure criteria. 
In fact, there appears to be "a lack of agreement concerning the criteria by which success is 
judged" (Crawford, 2000). The traditional criteria of cost, time and quality, the so-called 
"Golden Triangle" (Gardiner and Stewart, 2000) or "Triple Constraint" (Rosenau, 1998) have 
often been used. These criteria are relevant but somewhat incomplete and misplaced. The 
incompleteness is obvious if we ask "quality of what". Quality does not stand on its own. 
Quality is a collection of concomitant characteristics of something. That "something" is the 
end product a project aims to create. To address project quality concerns, the product cannot 
be overlooked. For a construction project, the product may be a building. For an ISD project, 
the product is an information system. A product can have basic functions and features, each of 
which may have its own quality dimension(s). When a project aims to develop a product, the 
product should be considered as part of project criteria. 
There are other complications in applying the traditional success/failure criteria. For example, 
a client may be quite happy to see a small budget overrun. A classification of failure for such 
projects may contradict with the client's perception. This may render the classification rather 
meaningless. To cater for this difficulty, a tolerance level for applying success/failure criteria 
is sometimes suggested. For example, Capers Jones classified as "best in class" projects those 
that show "cost over-runs are less than 5% and schedule over-runs are less than 3%" (Vowler, 
1999). However, no consensus on the actual level of tolerance is realistic since each client has 
its own expectation. 
Sauer (1993) proposes the concept of "termination failure" or "terminal failure". That is to 
say, a project fails when it is cancelled. In Sauer's own words: 
"So long as the project organisation can command the resources and power to 
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sustain its system, it will not be counted a failure because it is serving some 
organisational purposes. " (p. 30) 
Sauer's definition focuses on defining failure rather than success. In this sense, it represents a 
different approach to the project success/failure criteria. However, it seems to confuse a 
project with its intended output. A project always has a finite life by definition since it is a 
"temporary endeavor" (PMI, 2000). Therefore the termination of a project organisation could 
well be pre-planned and has nothing to do with any project failure. Indeed, a project has to be 
terminated after it has successfully achieved its objectives. Yet the output of a project, usually 
a product of some sort, is expected to last and to be used after the project. For example, a 
building is constructed as a product of a construction project and is expected to remain long 
after the project finishes. An information system is developed and then operated to improve 
business efficiency and productivity after the project is closed down. Therefore, the focus 
should be on the product of a project rather than its organisation. 
Standish Group Report (1995) suggests three "resolution types" for ISD projects: 
" Resolution Type 1, or project success: The project is completed on-time and on- 
budget, with all features and functions as initially specified; 
" Resolution Type 2, or project challenged: The project is completed and operational 
but over-budget, over the time estimate, and offers fewer features and functions than 
originally specified; 
" Resolution Type 3, or project impaired: The project is cancelled at some point during 
the development cycle. 
Such a scheme avoids the simplistic dichotomy of success and failure. It is useful in 
highlighting the scale of the "challenged" projects as well as the "failed" projects. However, 
this seemingly comprehensive scheme also has its shortcomings. For example, a project may 
deliver and implement a software product without being cancelled during the development 
cycle. However, shortly after the project is completed, the client may realise that the deployed 
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software product does not meet operational needs and is therefore either replaced or scrapped. 
This is what happened with the Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) System Project undertaken 
by London Ambulance Service in 1992 (Page, 1993; see also Section 3.4.1 below). With the 
above classification, it is not clear if this type of project is "impaired" or "challenged". 
Maude and Willis (1991) propose a different approach: 
"Software development projects can be said to fail if, for whatever reason, it 
would have been more economic not to have run the project at all. " (p. 15) 
This definition relates the perceived value by the client throughout the project to the project 
cost. Thus, in the beginning of the project, the client would perceive the benefit/cost ratio to 
be high for the project to be initiated. If at some point in the project, the cost projection 
should increase to the point that benefit/cost ratio is 1: 1, the client would be ambivalent to 
continuation or cancellation. Should the cost be increased further or the perceived benefit be 
reduced further, the client would be looking to terminate the project. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to assess the exact benefits and sometimes even the exact costs of developing an 
information system (Bannister et al., 2001). As a result, it is difficult to implement the above 
definition in practice. This is especially the case when clients have no option other than to 
deploy a developed system due to reasons strategic, political or regulatory etc. 
3.3.2 Project and Product 
PMBOK Guide defines a project as "a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product or service" (PMI, 2000, p. 4). This definition therefore excludes those endeavours 
whose objectives may be purely to gain information or understandings. However, for projects 
whose objectives are to create products and services, the definition highlights the central role 
of the end output, be it a product or service. Since services are often called service products, 
the term "product" seems to be appropriate to refer to both in the following discussions. 
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For an ISD project, the relevant product is the intended information system, the core part of 
which is usually an application software. The success or failure of the application software 
and therefore the information system may be evaluated according to its functions, features 
and their associated quality dimensions. A software function may be a specific action or a 
series of actions serving a particular business process. A product with any missing function is 
an incomplete product. The word "feature" is often used interchangeably with "function" 
(SPR, 2002). However, features can be construed as more than just the basic functions. 
Features can be the differentiators between one product and another. While one product may 
function in the same way as the other, they may have different features. For example, all 
consumer cars sold in the market can go from A to B (a basic function of a car), some cars, 
however, may have power steering, spoilers and alloy wheels (features). 
A software product assumes quality characteristics through relevant functions and features. 
For example, a system may be judged to be "secure" if all relevant functions are secure: 
including network connections, database connections and user interface logins etc. Each 
function and feature may have its own relevant quality dimensions. Such dimensions may 
include: 
0 Performance, or the response time. For any given function, there is an associated 
sequence of actions. The measurement from the start to the end point can be precise 
for each time though results may be different each time depending on a variety of 
factors. Performance is an important area to focus on when it comes to a product 
quality. Software performance is a major technical challenge and has often 
contributed to software project failures (Glass, 1998); 
" Usability: "a measure of the ease of use of a system, the user friendliness... " (Maude 
and Willis, 1991); 
" Maintainability/Adaptability; 
" Security: security features highly among the governmental and corporate concerns 
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about software quality. It has been claimed that software security problems are 
directly linked to "flaws of software development" (Festa, 2001); 
" Compatibility: software compatibility is important if a software system operates 
across less than perfectly homogeneous operational environment. This is particularly 
so with web applications. The end users of web applications are dispersed around the 
world with unlimited possibilities of access platforms. Therefore compatibility is a 
compulsory part of web application's quality criteria. 
Functions, features and their quality dimensions are closely linked. Product functions are the 
basis to which features and quality dimensions are attached. A fundamental requirement for a 
software product is that it has to function according to clients' requirements. In the celebrated 
words of Weinberg (1971): 
"If a program doesn't have to work, measures of efficiency, of adaptability, or of 
cost of production have no meaning. " (p. 19) 
On the other hand, a software product that works functionally may not serve a client's 
operational needs if it has poor usability and performance. 
3.3.3 A Proposed Approach to Project Success/Failure Criteria 
With the above discussions, a possible set of project success/failure criteria might be given at 
two tiers. First of all, a project may be judged to be successful if it is completed on time, 
within budget and delivers a successful product. Secondly, for a product to be judged as 
successful, it should meet or exceed the client's expectation in terms of functions, features 
and quality attributes. In the case of software products, the quality dimensions include 
performance, usability, maintainability, compatibility and security etc. In this way, product 
functions and features are rightly emphasised and quality is made more tangible by being 
related to product. 
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Though the two-tier approach brings a conceptual clarity, applying it to define project failure 
carries with it similar problems of tolerance regarding cost and schedule targets. While a 
project may be deemed to have failed if the intended product is not produced, what if a 
successful product is produced with cost and time targets exceeded? To cater for such 
scenarios, it is proposed that a project should be a "qualified success" if it successfully 
produces a product with budget and deadlines exceeded. Likewise, a project is called a 
"controlled termination" if it fails to produce a product and is terminated before it is out of 
control (Table 3.1). Table 3.1 suggests that projects can have different degrees of successes 
("Total Success" and "Qualified Success") and different degrees of failures ("Controlled 
Termination" and Total Failure"). 
Table 3.1: Project success/failure categories for projects aiming to develop products 
Product Success Product Failure 
Within Cost Budget Total Success Controlled Termination 
and Time Schedule 
Over Cost Budget Qualified Success Total Failure 
or Time Schedule 
The cost and schedule are considered together in Table 3.1. This is because cost and time are 
closely related, not independent variables as have been portrayed (e. g. Rosenau, 1998, p. 16). 
Cost increases are often a result of project delays (e. g. KPMG, 1997). 
A key question is then how a product should be judged to be a success or a failure. It would 
be difficult to give a generic answer. A paraphrase of Maude and Willis' (1991) definition 
may help: a product is a failure if it would have been more economic not to produce it. This is 
not practical enough for easy implementation, since it often takes time to measure the value of 
a product (Kharbanda and Pinto, 1996). However, for ISD projects that subcontract software 
product development to external suppliers, this definition might be adapted as: a product is a 
failure if it would have been more economic not to accept it, considering all known costs and 
benefits. Therefore, a product is successful if it is delivered to the project, evaluated and 
accepted by the client. A product is a failure if it is either not delivered by the supplier as 
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agreed, or delivered but rejected after evaluation, considering the cost implication of the 
rejection. Here the concept of product success and failure is a relative one. For a COTS 
product, it may be accepted by some clients and rejected by others. For a CBSW product, it is 
only a success to the client if it is accepted and deployed by the ISD project, given the choice. 
This concept of product success or failure depends on an evaluation. The result of the 
evaluation is binary: accept or reject. As a result, the status of a product relative to a particular 
project is also binary: success if accepted, failure if rejected. The assumption is that the client 
is rational and capable to make such an evaluation and the subsequent accept/reject decision. 
The suggested two-tier success/failure criteria are not easily applicable to historical projects 
without an appropriate phase of product evaluation. However, the proposed concept is used in 
the design of a new management framework later in the thesis (Section 10.3.3). 
3.4 The "Software Crisis": Published Cases 
Though there is a lack of consensus on success and failure criteria, there is a general 
consensus on the lack of overall success in ISD projects. The term "software crisis" has been 
popular since its first use in the late 1960s (Naur and Randell, 1968; Friedman, 1989). In this 
Section and the next, the scale of the "crisis" is examined based on published case studies and 
industry-wide surveys. This helps to justify the need for research into the causes of the 
"software crisis" and possible innovative solutions. 
Considering the total number of ISD projects undertaken by organisations, relatively few have 
been subject to detailed investigation and analysis (Flowers, 1996). Still, there have 
accumulated a substantial amount of evidence regarding the lack of ISD project success. The 
evidence ranges from anecdotes to independent audit reports and inquiries. In this section, 
three published case studies are reviewed to appreciate the varieties of projects that have run 
into difficulties. Though the problems identified in these case studies are closely linked with 
their organisational contexts, they are also representative of problems encountered in general. 
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3.4.1 The Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) System Project 
The Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) system project was undertaken by the London 
Ambulance Service (LAS) in the early 1990s in an attempt to enhance the ambulance services 
in London. The system was implemented in October 1992 and was abandoned within two 
weeks. It was well recorded thanks to an inquiry immediately after the suspension of CAD 
system operation in November 1992 (Page at el., 1993). The Inquiry Report addresses both 
the CAD system project management and the operations of LAS as an organisation. It draws a 
number of diagnostic conclusions and provides corresponding recommendations. The case 
study is also found in Flowers (1996) and Collins (1998). This case summary is based on 
Page et al. (1993). All page numbers refer to Page et al. unless otherwise stated. 
Though LAS was a complex organisation with a history of an adversarial management-labour 
relationship, Page et al. find that "there was unanimous support for technology to be used to 
enhance the delivery of ambulance services to people in London" (p. 45). In addition, "there is 
very little wrong with the overall concepts embodied" (p. 47) in the system. The problem is 
that the system "for a great many reasons, did not achieve what it set out to achieve" (p. 47). 
The Report claims that "The biggest question mark must be over the application software" (p. 
46), recognising the key role of the application software in an information system. 
Though the Inquiry Report was thorough in its coverage of the project and its organisational 
context, its recommendations appear to have addressed only the immediate causes for the 
symptoms rather than the "real" root causes. Consider the supplier selection process, for 
example, the lowest bid supplier was used for the software development. Being a public 
organisation, LAS was obliged to comply with strict procurement guidelines, in this case, the 
relevant Regional Health Authority (RHA) Standing Financial Instructions. While pointing 
out that the guidelines had been followed by the project, the report diagnoses one of problems 
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to be the supplier selection: 
"These standing instructions provide little qualitative guidance to procurement 
teams. The emphasis is very much on obtaining the best price. This may be 
appropriate when dealing with procurement of tangible products where the 
specifications may be similar, but it is arguably less appropriate when dealing with 
major IT procurements where it is often more difficult to make quality 
judgements. We recommend that the standing financial instructions should be 
extended to provide more qualitative guidance for future major IT procurements. " 
(p. 16) 
The suggested action to "provide more qualitative guidance" is to address a perceived cause 
for selecting a supplier who failed to deliver. The report does not recognise that, in this 
project, like so many other ones, the project team was selecting a supplier based on suppliers' 
promises, not finished products ready for use. However extensive the qualitative guidance is, 
it is difficult to foretell a finished product from the initial promises, especially when they are 
separated by a highly uncertain software development process (see Section 8.7). 
Nevertheless, the report is excellent in recording many strands in the unfortunate tale of the 
CAD project failure. It recognises that some of the key problems are in the management of 
the project, rather than the technology itself. It dismisses the allegation that the system failure 
was due to "wilful misuse of the system" by ambulance crews. It even claims that "the system 
did what it had been designed to do". Instead, the report concludes that "much of the design 
had fatal flaws that would, and did, cumulatively lead to all of the symptoms of system 
failures" (p. 41). Though the report does not give specific recommendations regarding the 
management of design risks, it helps this thesis to focus on the management of application 
software suppliers and design uncertainty. 
3.4.2 The CONFIRM Project 
In contrast to LAS' CAD System Project, the CONFIRM Project took place in the private 
sector in the US (Oz, 1994; Flowers, 1996). AMR, who had developed the highly successful 
airline reservation system called SABRE, formed a new division AMRIS and proposed 
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CONFIRM as a highly integrated Computerised Registration System (CRS) for the travelling, 
hotel and car-hire booking industries. AMRIS sold the concept to Marriott, Hilton and Budget 
Rent-A-Car, industry leaders in their respective markets. As a result, the four companies 
formed a consortium called Intrico in October 1987. After a year of preparation and 
negotiations, Marriott, Hilton and Budget signed "a partnership agreement" with AMRIS in 
September 1988. They agreed to design, develop, operate, and maintain the new "state-of-the- 
art" reservation system worldwide. While AMRIS was the "supplier-partner", the other three 
companies were the "client-partners". Such a venture would have required the highest level of 
management commitment from the participating companies. That the venture should be a 
total failure was certainly unexpected. The project ended with a series of lawsuits. 
The CONFIRM project displayed some common themes of troubled ISD projects. For 
example, there were problems in managing client requirements. When AMRIS presented a 
"base design" in December 1988, Marriott claimed that it was inadequate. The project had 
difficulty planning for the development. A plan issued by AMRIS in March 1989 was 
"unacceptable" to the other partners. As development progressed and deadlines were missed, 
AMRIS continuously reassured its partners and the partners in turn "trusted" AMRIS. The 
project cost estimate went up from $55.7million to $72.7million and then to $92million. Yet, 
AMRIS was only able to deliver a partial system at the agreed deadline of June 1992. The 
partial system had "major problems". The Intrico consortium was disbanded in July 1992 and 
a series of lawsuits ensued from September 1992. 
One thing that has made this case different from many other ISD projects was the 
participants' responses to the project failures. The AMRIS senior management blamed the 
project staff as being dishonest in the first instance. However, later AMRIS blamed its client- 
partners for assigning personnel who "lacked adequate knowledge of the industry" and for 
failing to specify exactly what they wanted from the system (McPartlin, 1994). The project 
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also resulted in legal claims and counter claims. These claims were eventually settled out of 
court. 
In analysing the CONFIRM case, both Oz (1994) and Flowers (1996) refer to potential 
conflicts of interest in AMRIS assuming a role as a client-partner and a supplier. However, no 
detail of such an argument is given in these sources. This notion appears to come initially 
from the testimony of a former employee of Intrico and was not subject to any critique 
(McPartlin, 1994). Conflicts of interest normally arise due to hidden relations (Bott et at., 
2001). For example, if a project manager decides to purchase a large software package from a 
supplier whose sales director is the project manager's partner, there is a potential conflict of 
interest. Conflicts of interest are usually overcome by disclosing the hidden relations (Bott et 
al., 2001). The fact that AMRIS was both a partner and a supplier in the CONFIRM venture 
was an intended arrangement. One may even argue that being both a client and a developer 
could align the interest of AMRIS with the other client-partners, since AMRIS' own interests 
were closely tied with the success of the venture. 
Based on a suspicion that "unprofessional behaviour might have contributed to the mishap", 
Oz (1994) suggests a solution through a professional code of conduct. Oz's approach has 
some generic merit in that every professional should observe a level of ethical codes, written 
or otherwise. However, Oz does not consider why software professionals should behave 
unethically. To adopt a moral approach to solve complex technical and organisational 
problems is perhaps simplistic. Such a moral approach is also problematic since it is difficult 
to evaluate its cost and benefits, and it is not easy to implement in real world projects. 
The CONFIRM project further illustrates the difficulties in evaluating a supplier's 
competency by looking at its past achievement. The case is also a painful reminder that 
"partnership" and trust does not necessarily guarantee harmonious relationship in the pursuit 
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of technology innovations. The legal claims and counter claims demonstrate the possible 
complex interactions between clients and software suppliers. The case has also shown that IS 
researches have been inadequate in uncovering root causes for project failures and have 
sometimes resulted in recommendations that might be considered too general and impractical. 
On the positive side, the case provides a good example of how clients may cancel an ISD 
project without necessarily letting it become a "never-ending" story (Webster, 2000). 
3.4.3 The CAPSA Project 
The CAPSA Project was undertaken by Cambridge University from mid 1998 and the 
developed system was to go live in August 2000. The CAPSA system was intended to be an 
integrated accounting system replacing an existing one for the university with some extra 
functionality. The project turned into an "unmitigated disaster" and received a thorough 
inquiry from two academic peers from other universities. The inquiry result was presented in 
two parts: Part A focuses on the management of the CAPSA project (Finkelstein, 2001) while 
Part B is about the "management and governance issues" of Cambridge University relating to 
the project (Shattock, 2001). This case summary is based on Finkelstein (2001). The 
paragraph numbers (§#. #) refer to those found in Finkelstein (2001) unless otherwise stated. 
After a chaotic software supplier selection process, Oracle Financials was selected in 
preference to SAP. In the subsequent effort to implement the system, many deliverables were 
dropped (§7.59) in a race to meet the "go-live" deadline of August 1st, 2000. Though the 
project was not cancelled, the "going-live" was described as an "unmitigated disaster" 
07.67). Six weeks after "going-live", "the system was all but unusable" (§7.76). Even after 
three months' live operation, the system required "at least 11 people for a further 6 months to 
deal with the critical system issues and stabilise CAPSA" (§7.80). Such a level of system 
support requirements was not anticipated. In fact, no system support was ever planned for in 
the first place (§7.72). 
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The CAPSA case is cited here for a number of reasons. First of all, accounting is one of the 
most often computerised functions in organisations (Demarco and Lister, 1999). Cambridge 
University had had two accounting systems implemented before CAPSA. Therefore, the 
project was not a foray into the unknown, either for the client organisation or for the IT 
industry in general. Secondly, the project took a COTS approach, which is a "buy" rather than 
"build" solution that has been regarded as a possible solution to ISD project challenges 
(Brooks, 1995; Oberndorf and Carney, 1998). Yet the resultant system was "of low quality, 
being both unreliable and difficult to use" (§3.2). Thirdly, the system enjoyed support from 
the user communities. This is evident in the users' response to the user training as Finkelstein 
records: 
"Early summer was not the best time in the academic year to hold training courses 
for hard-pressed Departmental administrative staff but there was, nevertheless, a 
substantial enrolment for the courses, and still some will on the part of attendees 
to'make CAPSA work'. " (§7.70) 
The project did not fail due to any lack of commitment from the CAPSA project team and the 
software supplier either. The project team members "were working exceptionally long hours" 
(§7.65) and the supplier Oracle Financials was "devoting substantial effort and showing clear 
commitment to dealing with the outstanding issues" (§7.69). The IT consultancy firm KPMG 
was engaged to manage the overall project. KPMG seemed ideal for this role since: 
"KPMG were experienced system implementors with a well established 
technology partnership with Oracle and considerable exposure in Higher 
Education. ... Above all KPMG were large and reputable, a 'safe bet' for a troubled project. " (§7.55) 
Yet at an expense of over £1.6million, KPMG made a series of mistakes (§8.17). 
Surprisingly, KPMG project management team "formally" handed the project over to the 
University in mid August 2000 while the system was in an unusable state. KPMG received a 
damning verdict in Finkelstein's report, charged with paying "only lip service to risk 
management" (§8.17). Clearly, the management of consultancy suppliers like KPMG poses a 
serious problem on its own. One additional observation is that two project methodologies 
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were supposed to be used in CAPSA. One was from Oracle called "Application 
Implementation Methodology (AIM)", designed to provide "templates for high level planning 
and management, generic workflow definitions, documentation and other standards, as well 
as testing frameworks" (§7.40). In conjunction with AIM, PRINCE2 project management 
methodology (CCTA, 1998) was to be adopted. The project reality, however, showed "little 
evidence" (§8.13) that PRINCE2 was ever followed. AIM, though resourceful, was not 
effective (§8.13). 
This section has sampled three published ISD project cases to provide a glimpse of the 
possible project contexts and some of the research and investigation results available. It seems 
that ISD projects have been failing across organisations in different sectors, sometimes 
involving previously highly successful software suppliers and well-respected management 
consultancy firms. Other cases studies support such observations with varying degrees of 
details. Sauer (1993) records a project undertaken by the Australian Government in the 1970s. 
The high-profiled Taurus Project in early 1990s has featured in a number of case studies in 
academic journals and also in the popular press (e. g. Flowers, 1996; Currie, 1997; Collins, 
1998; Drummond, 1999). Collections of troubled and failed ISD projects can be found in 
Flowers (1996), Collins (1998) and Glass (1998,1999). Collins (1998) further provides a 
catalogue of cases in one of its appendixes. The National Audit Office (NAO) of the UK 
Government and the General Audit Office (GAO) have provided authoritative accounts for 
many ISD projects in the public sector (e. g. NAO, 2000,2001,2003; GAO, 1992a, 1992b, 
1994,1997,2002). Academic journals often feature case studies with various research 
emphases (e. g. Southon et al., 1997; Mitev, 1996). Trade magazines track many high-profile 
projects with considerable insights (e. g. Computing, ComputerWeekly, Computerworld, IT 
Week, CIO, CIOinsight etc). Many published cases are used in supporting the analyses in 
Chapters 7 and 8 (e. g. The RISP Project and the LAS CAD Project in Section 7.3.1; The 
NIRS2 Project in Section 8.4 and The Libra Project in Sections 8.4,8.5.1 and 8.7.3 etc). 
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Though the reported and researched cases may only represent a small portion of the total ISD 
projects population, they have formed a considerable body of cases materials. The cases are 
supplemented by industry-wide surveys and reviews, which are examined in the next section. 
3.5 The "Software Crisis": Surveys and Reviews 
While in-depth case studies provide rich contexts, industry-wide surveys offer a different 
perspective in helping us to understand the scale of the "software crisis". Standish Group 
(1995) publishes a survey entitled "The CHAOS Report". The survey was carried out with a 
sample of 365 respondents from across public and private organisations, representing 8,380 
applications. The survey confirms the common pattern of IT projects to be running late, over- 
budget and with deficient functionality. Many are eventually cancelled. The survey groups 
projects into three categories: successful, challenged and cancelled, recognising the lack of 
clear-cut success/failure criteria (see Section 3.2). The statistics indicate overall 16.2% 
success rate, and 31.1% cancellation rate, leaving 52.7% in the "challenged" category. The 
financial implication is significant. According to its extrapolation, in the US alone, of a total 
$250billion spent in 1995, $8lbillion worth of IT projects were to be cancelled. The Standish 
Report provides further details of software project success rates based on company sizes 
(Table 3.2, based on Standish Group, 1995; see also NAO, 2000). 
Table 3.2: Software nrniectc cuceecc rntec by emmnnnv ci7ec 
Small Companies (%) Medium Companies Large 
Annual T/O between (%) Annual T/O Companies (%) 
$100million and between $200million Annual T/O > 
$200million and $500million $500million 
Project successful: Completed 28 16 9 
on time (less than 20% over), 
on-budget (less than 20% 
over), with all features and 
functions as initially specified 
Project challenged: Completed 50 47 62 
and operational but over 
budget, or over the time 
estimate, and offers fewer 
features and functions than 
on ginally specified 
Project cancelled: at some point 22 37 29 
in the development cycle 
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In addition, the survey asks the respondents for their opinions on the success factors for IT 
projects. According to the survey: 
"The three major reasons that a project will succeed are user involvement, 
executive management support, and a clear statement of requirements. There are 
other success criteria, but with these three elements in place, the chances of 
success are much greater. Without them, chance of failure increases dramatically. " 
The survey further establishes a "success potential" chart and benchmarks four IT projects, 
three historical and one (Banco Itamarati) was still in progress at the time. It suggests that the 
chart would be "a useful tool for either forecasting the potential success of a project or 
evaluating project failure". According to the benchmark, the project in Banco Itamarati 
"started with a high success probability". Unfortunately, no information has been found 
regarding the outcome of the project in Banco Itamarati to verify the prediction. 
Notwithstanding the specific prediction, the findings in Standish Report (1995) have been 
corroborated by a number of other surveys. Bronzite (2000) produces a "survey of surveys", 
including the one from the Standish Group'. The average success rate obtained from all these 
surveys is under 15% (Table 3.3, simplified from Bronzite, 2000). 
Tahl. I. i! A enrvrv of cnrvrvc nn IT PrniFrt cnrrrcc ratpc 
Location Year Source No. Samples Success Rate 
UK 1990 Kearney 400 11 
UK 1994 Pagoda 100 11 
USA 1995 Standish 365 16 
UK 1996 OASIG 45 15 
Canada 1997 KPMG 176 16 
All surveys ask its respondents about the reasons for failures with similar results, varying 
usually with the sequence of the specific reasons. Common ones are: 
0 Poor user requirements 
9 User not involved 
" Weak project planning 
1 None of the surveys differentiates project successes and product successes as discussed in Section 3.2. 
Therefore the project success rates should be interpreted in the traditional sense with potential 
variations from one survey to another. 
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" Technical incompetence 
" Lack of management support 
" Weak business case 
" Changing requirements 
" No teamwork 
" Poor accountability 
While surveys may be good in establishing the scale of the problems, they are "not 
particularly good for exploratory or other research which requires large numbers of open- 
ended questions" (Saunders et al., 2000, p. 279). Part of the problem is that each respondent 
would have a different concept of "poor user requirements" and "user not involved". In 
addition, there is a lack of any mechanism in surveys to ask further probing question like 
"why user requirements are poor" and "how users should be involved". Standish Report 
(1995) acknowledges that the study was not "in-depth enough to provide a real solution" to 
the complex problem of IT project failures. 
Systematic reviews of the root causes and corrective actions represent another step in the 
effort to address the "software crisis". For example, Smith (2001) catalogues 40 root causes 
numbering from RCO1 to RC40 (see Appendix B). However, such a catalogue of root causes 
is likely to be incomplete even though Smith "was unable to find more than 40 generic root 
causes". For example, in the case of CONFIRM (Section 3.4.2), there was apparently the 
problem of project staff behaving unethically by concealing problems (Oz, 1994). Smith's list 
does not feature such an ethical dimension. Some of the causes defined by Smith are wide 
reaching and therefore likely to overlap significantly with other causes. For example, RC 15 
("Poor project planning, management and execution") may arguably cover many activities in 
a project. Some root causes are defined with terms like "unrealistic" (RC01, RC05 and RC07) 
that may be too subjective. Still other causes are given with various assumptions that are 
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hidden yet disputable. For example, RC08 assumes that it is possible for a buyer to define 
"non-functional" requirements in the first place, which is questionable (see Section 8.3). 
Webster (2000) presents a review based on 120 lawsuit cases dealing with "some form of 
system failures spanning 25 years from 1976 to 2000". The review gives six "consistent, 
repeating patterns" that are not mutually exclusive. One is called "The Never-Ending Story": 
"The client contracts with the manufacturer to develop and install a system. The 
project starts. The completion date slips. It keeps slipping. Each time the adjusted 
delivery date approaches, the project slips yet again. At some point, one of three 
things happens: the manufacturer/vendor abandons the project; the client cancels 
the project; or the manufacturer delivers a system that the client terms wholly 
inadequate and unacceptable. In some cases, the effort has gone on for years, with 
millions of dollars spent and little to show for it. " 
In addition to the descriptions of such patterns and their causes, Webster suggests that the 
general trend of these legal cases is on the increase. Within the sample base, the number of 
cases increased from five cases per three years in the late 1970s to twenty cases every three 
years in the later 1990s, though the review does not claim the numbers to be exhaustive. Like 
surveys, the causes identified by Webster are often only the immediate causes rather than the 
"real" root causes. As a result, the recommendations given are often no more than "thou shall" 
type of advice that is often difficult to implement. Consider one recommendation for an 
example: 
"... you should do a thorough risk assessment of the entire project at the start and 
take steps to reduce any risks and protect your interests accordingly... " 
Such recommendations have been given many times before. One weakness of such measures 
is that they fail to address the question of why these "thou shalls" have not been adopted in 
the first place (see Chapter 8 for root cause analysis, and in particular, Section 8.5 on 
incomplete contracts). 
The report by the UK Government (Cabinet Office, 2000) does not escape this pattern either. 
This report is a comprehensive review of IT project management in the face of continued 
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project failures in the UK public sector, drawing lessons from UK and abroad. The Report 
starts by echoing the survey results already mentioned: 
"In the past, Government IT projects have too often missed delivery dates, run 
over budget or failed to fulfil requirements. " (p. 5) 
The report makes a series of recommendations in correspondence to "great many reasons why 
failures occur" (p. 5). The report dedicates a section on the important aspect of "Procurement 
and Supplier Relationship". It records evidence of "underpriced or unrealistic bids from 
potential suppliers". However, instead of searching for reasons that might explain such 
opportunistic behaviours, the report simply asks suppliers to take actions to "produce realistic 
plans, including financial, technical, personnel... ". Further the report notes that suppliers play 
the common "bait and switch" game (Johnson, 2000a) by: 
"fielding a highly-skilled team of IT practitioners during the tender evaluation 
process but substituting weaker personnel after the contract had been awarded" (p. 
45) 
Having recorded the problem, the report fails to make any specific recommendation to deal 
with it. The report recommends in general "co-operation and an open dialogue between 
supplier and client". This is unlikely to be effective. If a supplier chooses to behave this way, 
it would be naive, to say the least, that it would communicate such an intention openly. 
Overall, the report prescribes wide-ranging measures in the hope that they would be cost- 
effective to implement and improve the ISD project success rate without really understanding 
the root causes of the observed problems. One such measure is the recommended "Gateway 
Process", featuring peer reviews combined with project approval processes. The Gateway 
Process has been implemented by the Office of Government Commerce (OGC, 2001). It may 
be too early to give a final verdict but there are signs that the Gateway Process appears to 
have been ineffective. In March 2003, it was reported that OGC was advocating another 
initiative to establish "Centre of Excellence" teams in each government department (Arnott, 
2003b). Much research might be carried out to examine the cost effectiveness of the measures 
adopted by the UK Government since the publication of Cabinet Office (2000). 
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3.6 Information System Development Methodologies 
Many recommendations given in case studies, surveys and reviews alongside immediate "root 
causes" have often been loosely called "Best Practices" (e. g. Perks, 2003). To address the 
perceived problems more systematically, researchers and practitioners have proposed many 
information system development methodologies (ISDMs). In this section, the concept of 
ISDMs is explored followed by a brief review of the available ISDMs and their effectiveness 
in dealing with the "software crisis". 
3.6.1 What is an ISDM? 
Before discussing ISDMs, it is necessary to comment on the difference between "method" 
and "methodology". Some authors have been known to equate methodology with "method" 
and regard the use of "methodology" as a corruption of what a methodology should be, which 
is the study of methods (Stamper, quoted in Jayaratna, 1994, p. 35). However, if the actual 
uses of "method" and "methodology" are compared, they may be clearly differentiated. A 
method is a way to achieve a goal. That "goal" can often be defined, for example, a method to 
extract iron from the ore with charcoal, or a method to solve a quadratic equation. A user can 
learn a method without necessary knowing why the method works. A methodology can have a 
much broader connotation. A methodology does contain the necessary activities and 
techniques to achieve a goal, but more importantly, it includes an element of philosophy. 
Jayaratna (1994) emphasises the "why" element in its definition of a methodology as: 
"an explicit way of structuring one's thinking and actions. Methodologies contain 
models and reflect particular perspectives of reality based on a set of philosophical 
paradigms. A methodology should tell you `what' steps to take and 'how' to 
perform those steps but most importantly the reasons `why' those steps should be 
taken, in that particular order. " (p. 37) 
The "why" element may be entirely missing in a method. Avison and Gitzgerald (1988) 
likewise thinks that a methodology "is usually based on some philosophical view, otherwise it 
is merely a method" (p. 4, emphasis in the original). In addition, a methodology may serve to 
achieve a more substantial and less well-defined goal. To do that, there may be a whole series 
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of concepts and techniques required, not just one. Such a concept of methodology is 
applicable to undertaking research projects as well as developing information systems. 
Based on the above discussions on methodology, an ISDM might be defined as "a 
recommended collection of philosophies, phases, procedures, rules, techniques, tools, 
documentation, management and training for developers of information systems" (Maddison, 
1983, quoted in Avison and Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 263). This definition is adopted in this thesis. 
3.6.2 The Many ISDMs 
Apparently there were over 300 ISDMs by 1985 (quoted in Avison and Fitzgerald, 1988). By 
1994, the count had increased to over 1000 (Jayaratna, 1994). The total number has since 
been estimated to be perhaps less than a hundred (Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003). Avison and 
Fitzgerald (1988,1995 and 2003) provide an excellent survey of many ISDMs. Jayaratna 
(1994) offers a thought-provoking conceptual framework for evaluating them. In this section, 
the historical development of ISDMs is traced. 
In the early days of computing (1950s), there was no formalised methodology for software 
development (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1988). Software programs were mainly either for 
scientific calculations or for basic data processing needs in commercial organisations. By the 
end of the 1950s and early 1960s, general purpose programming languages like Fortran and 
COBOL came into existence. The intended systems became more complex. This is when 
"software was beginning to overtake hardware as the limiting factor in computerisation 
growth" (Friedman, 1989, p. 93). Though there were clear signs of software problems in the 
early 1960s, these problems were regarded as "a new technical challenge that would soon be 
met" (Friedman, 1989, p. 101). It was not until the landmark Conference on Software 
Engineering in Garmisch, October 1968 when there was the first open admission of the 
"software crisis" (Naur and Randell, 1969; Friedman, 1989). During that conference, the 
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symptoms of ISD projects were reported: 
"Many conference participants reported experiences of large projects which had 
been disappointing in three main ways. The projects ran on long after their 
estimated deadlines. They cost more than their budgets allowed. They resulted in 
systems that did not match performance expectations anticipated in the beginning 
of the projects... " (Friedman, 1989, p. 102) 
The causes identified then included the increasing size of the attempted software systems, the 
difficulty to measure progress and managing large numbers of people. In addition, the lack of 
documentation, the lack of design and testing and the lack of skilled manpower were all cited 
as causes of the "software crisis" (Friedman, 1989, pp. 104-105). Among the suggested 
solutions, some kind of a "right" way to develop systems was debated. One key 
recommendation from the Garmisch Conference was to adopt a software engineering 
approach as follows: 
"First, standardization of program structures, particularly via modularisation, was 
recommended. Second, there should be a specific ordering of stages in the systems 
development process. Third, design and programming procedures should be 
standardized. " (Friedman, 1989, p. 106). 
This staged approach to systems development was later known as the "Waterfall Model" 
(Royce, 1970). However, some reacted to such an approach critically. Several conference 
participants stressed that one could not assume that a system could be designed and specified 
adequately and completely before coding and testing. Potential problems with the Waterfall 
Model was recognised by Royce (1970) with proposed actions of iterations and prototyping. 
Many ISDMs have since been proposed. Iivari et al. (2001) suggest a scheme in order to 
categorise the many ISDMs available. Based on these researches, current ISDMs may be 
grouped under five main approaches (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4: Classifications of ISDMs based on their annroaches 
Approaches Examples 
Structured Approach Structured Analysis and Systems Specification - SASS (DeMarco, 
1979), STRADIS (Gane and Sarson, 1979) 
Information Modelling Information Engineering, Data Analysis (Howe, 1983) 
Sociotechnical approach ETHICS (Mumford, 1983a, 1983b), prototyping (e. g. Lantz, 1987) 
Object-oriented approach Object Oriented Analysis and Design (e. g. Pomberger and Blaschek, 
1996) 
_Systems 
Approach Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981 
77 
There are other ISDMs not fitting into any of the above categories. In particular, a group of 
"agile methods" based on an iterative approach have recently been keenly advocated, 
including SCRUM (Schwaber, 1996), the Rapid Application Development (RAD) 
methodology (Stapleton, 1997), Rational Unified Process (Royce, 1998; Kruchten, 2000), 
eXtremeProgramming (XP), (Beck, 2000) and various "adaptive" methodologies (Highsmith, 
2000; Abrahamsson et al., 2002). The many ISDMs have posed as a methodology "jungle" 
(Avison and Fitzgerald, 1988; Iivari et al., 2001). A research topic has been to understand, 
classify and evaluate the available ISDMs (Jayaratna, 1994; Jayaratna and Holt, 1996; livari 
et al., 2001). While the iterative approach will be examined critically later (Section 8.10), it is 
outside of the scope of this thesis to evaluate specific ISDMs. However, the overall 
effectiveness of the ISDMs together with the other available solutions is examined in the next 
section. 
3.7 The Paradox of Many Solutions and Little Progress 
As reviewed above, there have been many solutions proposed to overcome the "software 
crisis" since the late 1960s. They range from best practices to systematic ISDMs. How 
effective have they been? There have been technical innovations in areas like programming 
languages and techniques. However, there is almost a consensus among researchers and 
practitioners that there has been no significant progress in overcoming the "software crisis" in 
general (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1991; DeMarco and Lister, 1999: Eischen, 2002). 
Brooks (1995) asks with a sense of frustration about his book first published in 1975: 
"How can a book written 20 years ago about a software-building experience 30 
years ago still be relevant, much less useful? " (p. 254) 
One explanation Brooks offers was that the "software development discipline has not 
advanced normally or properly" (p. 254). Collins (1998) states on the "Author's Note" page 
that his book "has not had the slightest beneficial effect". Collins continues: "The numbers of 
disasters, if anything, appears to be increasing". Bronzite (2000) remarks that "the picture 
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appears largely unchanged over time" (p. 47). Jerry Weinberg, a celebrated writer in the field 
of software engineering for over thirty years, remarked that no concepts or methods 
introduced and adopted in the last 30 years have changed the face of software engineering 
dramatically (quoted in Layman, 2001). Glass may be a lone voice in saying "it was simply 
getting harder to find good failure stories" (Glass, 1998). Glass' perception that "software is 
the dramatic success story of our age" is not necessary contradictory to the "software crisis" 
under discussion. The software success may be attributed to PPSW while the "software crisis" 
has been related to ISD projects (see Section 9.3 for a comparative study between PPSW 
market and ISD projects). 
It is a perplexing situation indeed. It has been claimed that "all" root causes of the ISD project 
challenges have been catalogued (Smith, 2001). Nash (2000) claims "root causes of IT 
failures haven't changed a bit over the years" despite many available "methodologies" 
(Section 3.6). Such a paradox of "many solutions and little progress" deserves some 
explaining. Among possible explanations, two are considered here. One is that the root causes 
have been correctly identified and the available solutions have the potential to fix the root 
causes if adopted and applied. But somehow practitioners and their organisations have 
consistently refused to do so. The other explanation is that the root causes have not been 
successfully identified. Consequently the current available solutions do not address them. As 
a result, the practitioners either find the solutions impossible to adopt or have adopted and 
applied them without much effect. To paraphrase from Humphrey (1998), in the former case, 
what has been "preached" is the right message and somehow the message has not been 
adopted and applied. In the latter case, the message is wrong, and hence it has been judged as 
inapplicable or has been applied without much effect. These two possible explanations are 
each examined below. 
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3.7.1 "Why they do not practise what we preach? " (Humphrey, 1998) 
Many have adopted the former view and are asking a similar question as Humphrey is. Nash 
(2000) claims that organisations do not learn. Such an accusation can trigger off a series of 
questions. For example, it might be asked: 
" What should be learned? 
" Who should be learning? 
" Why the learning is not taking place? etc. 
Humphrey (1998) speculates that education is the key to guide the practitioners to do the 
"right things". Yet questions like the above have not been specifically raised and answered. 
Of course, answers might be inferred from Humphrey's almost accusatory phrasing of the 
question: 
" "What we preach" is valid and should be learned; 
" "They" should learn and practise --- presumably referring to the practitioners; 
" "They" do not learn because they have not been educated. 
Similarly, Lyytinen and Robey (1999) conclude that organisations have failed to learn. 
Lyytinen and Robey emphasise that "much of the information from which ISD organisations 
might learn is readily available from previous experience with ISD projects". The major 
reasons for the failure to learn are suggested to be "limits on organisational intelligence, 
disincentives for learning, organisational design and educational barriers to learning". 
Lyytinen and Robey further suggest: 
"In the parlance of organisational learning, organisations must develop the 
capability to modify their theories in use about systems development. " (emphasis 
in the original) 
Lyytinen and Robey do not consider the possibility that there might be a huge gap between 
the ISD project case materials and what organisations might need for modifying their 
"theories in use". Instead, assuming what is "readily available" is readily applicable, Lyytinen 
and Robey conclude that organisations "accept and expect poor performance"! 
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There are two problems with this approach of explaining the paradox. The first one is that it 
assumes "what we preach" or what is currently available contains the right solution. The 
current solutions in the form of best practices, processes, quality standards and methodologies 
are indeed widely available in books, training courses, websites, and organisational standards. 
The message has the potential to reach their targeted audiences. There has been evidence to 
show that the message has actually reached the targeted audience! Brooks (1995) features an 
anecdote where Brooks came across a reader with his book. When asked to comment on the 
book, the reader replied that there was nothing in it that the reader had not known already (p. 
254). Smith (2001) receives a similar review for his book (Anonymous, 2001). If we take the 
responses from these readers at their face value, we might be delighted that the readers have 
got the message, either from the books they have read or from elsewhere. It is not important 
where they have acquired the message, it is important that they have heard what is being 
"preached". There has also been evidence that the message has been received at the 
organisational level. Organisations involved in troubled projects like CAPSA pledged to the 
use of formal methodologies like PRINCE2 and AIM (Section 3.4.3), thus signalling their 
awareness of and the desire for the existing solutions. This is not to suggest that all 
practitioners and organisations have a perfect understanding of all the solutions available. 
However, the evidence does suggest that practitioners and organisations have been made 
aware of them and have attempted to learn and apply them. It is a highly questionable claim 
that organisations "accept and expect" failures. In the case of the CONFIRM project (Section 
3.4.2), the supplier AMRIS was part of the organisation that had built the exceptionally 
successful SABRE system. It is unlikely that the partners in the CONFIRM project went into 
the joint venture expecting a failure. The fact that many lawsuits have been filed for failed 
ISD projects (Webster, 2000) indicates that organisations do not "accept and expect" ISD 
projects to fail. 
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The second problem is that the explanation assumes that the practitioners and organisations 
are somehow "irrational". Any individual or organisation, or more generally any economic 
agent is rational if it chooses to maximise its own utilities, albeit bounded by the availability 
of information (Arrow, 1986). A rational economic agent is expected to adopt better ways to 
improve its own economic welfare, given the choice. In troubled and failed ISD projects, all 
parties face challenges including overworking, high levels of stress, unpleasant meetings of 
"blame", potential humiliations and accusations if projects fail to deliver. Given the initial 
commitment each party gives to undertaking an ISD project, a project failure is not the 
optimal result. If any party finds a way to improve the project so that its own benefit would 
increase, the party would be expected to do so. To suggest that the practitioners are aware of 
better approaches, and are convinced that they will produce better results yet refuse to do so is 
to suggest that the practitioners are irrational. Such a suggestion is contrary to the basic 
assumption of economic agent's rationality. There is no evidence to show that organisations 
and practitioners involved in ISD projects are less rational. Due to these two problems, it does 
not seem to be a plausible explanation that what has been "preached" is the "right message", 
and practitioners either have not got the message or got it but refuse to apply it. 
3.7.2 Have we got the "message" right? 
The more likely explanation of the two is that the current solutions do not work. If "what we 
preach" is actually the wrong message, it is possible that the practitioners may reject the 
message and refuse to adopt it, or accept the message, apply it without much effect. There is 
growing evidence that this might be the case. There has been a recent revolt against ISDMs, 
not from the practitioners, but from some veteran methodologists! Yourdon (1997) urges 
practitioners to forget about ISDMs and simply get the job done. Rosenblatt (1997) points out 
the irony Yourdon's book poses: 
"This book contains advice that is disappointingly mundane, considering the 
source. Here is the man who virtually invented software development 
methodologies, now telling us to avoid the corporate "Methodology Police" in 
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order to get the project done on time. " 
Faced with the proliferation of ISDMs and the continued lack of success, Russo and 
Stolterman (2000) challenge the underlying assumptions regarding ISDMs. They first identify 
five commonly held assumptions and challenge them by suggesting the following opposite 
(ISM in the quotes stands for "information systems methodology", an alternative term for 
ISDM): 
" "Methodologies are not beneficial for the design process"; 
" "The practice of system design is basically rational (in specific situations)"; 
" "People cannot identify and make explicit their understanding of good design 
practices (due to `tacit knowledge')"; 
" "It is not possible to communicate design knowledge to practising designers (most 
ISMs are either not known or not accepted by the practitioners)"; 
" "It is not possible to change the way practising designers view the design process 
(ISMs cannot be "inflicted" upon the practitioners)". 
Russo and Stolterman do not advocate the above views as universal truth. Rather, they simply 
try to explain the failures of ISDMs by challenging their underlying assumptions. 
The concept and technique of prototyping may serve as an historical example of how "the 
preached message" might be wrong due to the underlying assumptions. Prototyping as a 
technique has been used widely in traditional engineering industries. Though it is a familiar 
and intuitive concept, there is no generally accepted definition when applied to ISD projects. 
For example, Lantz (1987) defines it as follows: 
"Software prototyping is an information system development methodology based 
on building and using a model of a system for designing, implementing, testing 
and installing the system. " (p. 1) 
The "model" of a system, apart from the specified purpose, has not been described with any 
particular features. Pomberger and Blaschek (1996) provide a definition that requires a 
prototype to be executable: 
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"A software prototype is an executable model of the proposed software system. It 
must be producible with significantly less effort than the planned product. It must 
be readily modifiable and extensible. The prototype need not have all the features 
of the target system, yet it must enable the user to test all important features before 
the actual implementation. Prototyping encompasses all activities necessary for 
the production of such prototypes. " (p. 4) 
However, the above definition uses terms like "significantly less effort" and "all important 
features" that may be widely open to interpretation. Nevertheless, prototyping has been 
advocated as a methodology for the benefit of software development (Lantz, 1987; Maude 
and Willis, 1991). Brooks (1975) coins the popular slogan "Build two, throw one away. You 
will anyway! " to support the concept of prototyping. However, the deceptively simple 
concept of prototyping has its many problems when applied to ISD projects. 
First of all, building a prototype system is not an easy task on its own. Maude and Willis 
(1991) demonstrate that it could be difficult even to agree the objectives of a prototype 
between a client and a supplier. Secondly, prototyping is a costly exercise requiring precious 
resources and time. Yet its benefit is difficult to ascertain since a prototype is constructed for 
learning purpose by definition and it is made to be thrown away. Without a reliable 
mechanism to conduct cost-benefit analysis, the client would be excused for not wanting to 
pay for the extra. The technique of prototyping itself does not provide an answer to such a 
managerial-level question. Thirdly, a successful prototype does not guarantee a successful end 
software product (e. g. Adolph, 2000). Curtis et al. (1988) even suggest that "the best 
prototype was a failed effort", indicating that any prototype that misses the problem areas 
would not provide the required insight. In addition, unlike a clay model for a car, the nature of 
software entices the growth of prototype to become a full system without any apparent 
barrier. The consequence is that too often due to cost and delivery pressure, the prototype gets 
implemented as the final system, as Maude and Willis (1991) demonstrate in one of the case 
studies. Instead of getting a better system, the client gets a prototype of the system! ' 
Z This phenomenon was first pointed out to me by one of my learned colleagues in SLC through his 
84 
Brooks (1995) retracts his popular slogan for prototyping by pointing out that the concept of 
prototyping is based on the "discredited Waterfall Model" (Wilson, 1998). The example of 
prototyping demonstrates that an intuitive technique that has been successfully used in other 
industries for product development, and has been elaborated and keenly advocated may be 
unworkable for ISD projects! In the case of prototyping, it is fortunate that the original 
advocators like Brooks have had the opportunity and courage to re-examine the concept and 
acknowledge its fundamental weaknesses. The author makes an attempt in Chapter 8 (Section 
8.10) to evaluate critically the contributions and shortcomings of the iterative approach, on 
which many popular agile methods are based. The evaluation of specific ISDMs is, however, 
outside the scope of this thesis (see e. g. Abrahamsson et al., 2002). 
3.7.3 Why might we have got the message wrong? 
Why, having recognised the "software crisis" for over three decades, might we have got "the 
message" wrong? This is too big a question to be addressed fully here. As a potential 
contribution to answering the question, it might be conjectured that the situation is related to 
the chasm between the IS industry and the IS academia. The chasm has existed in the last two 
or three decades without much change according to Glass (1997). Humphrey's (1998) 
phrasing of the question with "we" preaching and "they" practising inadvertently reinforces 
Glass' observation. The chasm may have led to the lack of rigour of many research efforts by 
practitioners on the one hand and the lack of relevance of the research by the academia on the 
other (Benbasat and Zmud, 1999; Davenport and Markus, 1999). 
The fact that we may have got the message wrong is not necessary helped by the vast amount 
of raw evidence we have. The key problem might be the lack of coherent theories to explain 
many years of practical experience with ISD projects within UKOne. The tendency is also described in 
Marciniak and Reifer (1990). 
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the available evidence. In fact, the overall theoretical foundation of project management has 
been questioned (Koskela and Howell, 2002a; Soderlund, 2004). In other words, the "theories 
in use" (Lyytinen and Robey, 1999) may not be adequate in the first place. As a result, the 
prescribed message to modify the "theories in use" would be ineffective to overcome 
problems that are more deeply rooted. Many solutions, especially the recommended best 
practices, are prescribed to overcome the apparent symptoms as if they were the root causes. 
The ineffectiveness of such "obvious" solutions might also be explained by the IBE Theory 
(Section 2.6). The IBE Theory differentiates two types of explanation: the "likeliest" ones and 
the "loveliest" ones (Lipton, 1991). The "likeliest" explanations are those that fit well with 
available evidence. The "loveliest" ones are those that can provide most understandings and 
thus can provide guidance for further actions. The vast number of root causes identified in the 
popular books about ISD projects (e. g. Brooks, 1975,1995; Corder, 1985; Royce, 1998; 
Bronzite, 2000; Smith, 2001) are suspected to be of the "likeliest" type in that they fit well 
with immediate evidence. However, they are not "lovely" as they cannot guide us for 
effective corrective actions. They are not "lovely" because they are not unified by coherent 
theories. Royce (1998) advocates "top 10 principles" for software development but admits 
that they have "no scientific basis" (p. 65). Further research may be carried out as a study on 
the success and failure of the epistemological process hitherto used in the IS researches. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter starts by examining the elements in an information system followed by a survey 
of success/failure criteria used ISD projects. A two-tier approach is then proposed to highlight 
the importance of product success to the overall project success. The subsequent discussions 
of the "software crisis" and ISD project challenges take place with the awareness that there 
has not been general agreement on project success/failure criteria. To appreciate the scale of 
the alleged "software crisis", three published case studies are briefly reviewed. These case 
studies provide detailed organisational contexts to facilitate the understanding of ISD project 
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challenges. The industry-wide surveys are then reviewed to demonstrate that the "software 
crisis" is not limited to any particular client sector. In addition, the historical perspective is 
explored to show that the "software crisis" was identified as early as the 1960s. 
Though many ISD projects have taken place without having ever been subjected to 
independent review and assessment, a considerable body of evidence has been accumulated 
over the years to facilitate the development of many solutions. Some of the solutions may be 
useful in specific circumstances. Their overall effectiveness, however, has been questionable. 
Prototyping is used as an example to illustrate how an intuitive and well-proven technique in 
other industries may not have been effective for ISD projects. This chapter ends with a 
possible explanation to account for this paradox of "many solutions and little progress". 
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Chapter 4: Case 1- The WebShop Project 
(April 2000 - March 2001) 
4.1 Background 
At the time of the WebShop project was initiated, the core business of UKOne3, a major 
utilities company in the UK, was to serve its customer base of nearly 5 millions energy 
customers with electricity and gas. In addition, UKOne had a chain of over 100 retail stores 
selling domestic appliances and consumer electronics throughout the UK (UKOne, I)4. Some 
of the retail shops had facilities to enable energy customers to pay their bills and marketed 
energy related products and services. The idea was that energy customers' attention could be 
turned into consumer goods sales opportunities. Likewise, customers coming into the shops 
for consumer goods would be exposed to marketing campaigns for energy sales and services. 
Thus retail and energy offerings were to compliment each other. 
Against a background of energy market deregulation and intensifying competition (Ofgem, 
undated), decreasing gas and electricity profit margins and ever increasing customer 
expectations, it was recognised by the UKOne management that on-line services using new 
web-based technologies were an "essential way forward" (SLC, 1). UKOne corporate Board 
confirmed an e-commerce vision in a Board meeting on 22/3/2000 (SLC, 1): 
"The vision is to create Retail and Energy e-commerce channels that are 
complimentary to existing store and service offerings, with a supporting capability 
that will drive customer reach beyond the base. Closer relationships with 
customers will be developed, retaining existing customers and gaining new 
customers. " 
3 All companies directly involved in the case studies have been given fictitious names in accordance to 
the consideration on research ethics (Section 2.7). Any similarity of the names to those of real 
companies is purely co-incidental and is not intended by the author. 
References found in the case studies in this and the next two chapters are of two types. The internal 
references are given in the format of (Company, Number) corresponding to the entries in the sections 
entitled "Internal References" within each chapter. The external references are given as usual in the 
format of (Author, Year) corresponding to the entries in References at the end of the thesis. 
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To realise this vision, a project called "WebShop" was initiated. The project was championed 
by one of UKOne's subsidiary, SubA, which had been responsible for UKOne's existing 
energy and retail offerings. In addition to providing the technical infrastructure, the project 
aimed to develop a web-based system with functions to enable energy customers to submit 
meter readings, view and pay bills as well as purchasing goods. The WebShop Project was 
formally launched in mid April 2000. Initially, the core project team concentrated on defining 
the scope. By the end of June 2000, a number of achievements had been made including the 
selection of the "technology platform", the identification of skill requirements, the selection of 
suppliers and the collection of functional requirements through workshops. 
This case study focuses on the WebShop Project delivery effort, especially the roles played by 
the suppliers. The project organisation is discussed first (Section 4.2) followed by the 
selection and contracting of the main suppliers (Section 4.3). The key project milestones are 
then outlined, emphasising the changes of deliverables (Section 4.4) followed by discussions 
on cost and quality (Sections 4.5 and 4.6). Section 4.7 provides reflections on topical issues 
related to this case. 
4.2 Project Organisation and Resources 
There were many parties involved in the project. The project organisation is depicted in 
Figure 4.1. The direct client was SubA, represented by its E-Business Project Director. Within 
SubA, three related but separate teams were holding stakes in the outcome of WebShop 
Project. The first was the Marketing Team responsible for customer capture and services. The 
second was the Retail Team responsible for selling domestic appliances and consumer 
electronics. The third was the Energy Team responsible for energy sales and services. Each 
team was represented by one or two Product Manager(s). Their role was to specify business 
processes, agree functional specifications, carry out acceptance testing and "sign off' the 
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system, among others (SLC, 1). Product Managers reported directly to SubA's E-Business 
Project Director, whose role was to "[a]gree the scope, objectives, timescales and budgets for 
the project" (SLC, 1). The E-Business Project Director was supported by a project sponsor, 
who was a senior business manager at the director level within SubA, providing a link into 
both the corporate board and SubA's Project Review Board. 
UKOne Corporate Board SubA Project Review Board 
Project Sponsor 
SubA E-Business Project 
Director 
SLC 
SLC Project Support Office Project Manager 
Design and Retail Customer Services Energy Services 
Architecture Workstream Workstream Workstream 
Team Leader Team Leader Team Leader Team Leader 
SubA Product Managers: 
- The Marketing Team 
- The Retail Team 
- The Energy Team 
Test External Software 
Manager Development 
Suppliers 
Figure 4.1: The WebShop project organisation 
SLC was the prime contractor for the project. SLC provided the core project team members, 
including the Project Manager, Workstream Team Leaders and the Test Manager. Due to the 
historical link, SLC had retained a considerable amount of UKOne's business domain 
knowledge (see Sections 1.4 and 2.5.2 for background information on the link between SLC 
and UKOne). SLC remained to be the system support provider, with teams of staff familiar 
with UKOne's systems and skilled at integrating new systems into the existing infrastructure. 
However SLC lacked a pool of technically skilled and qualified personnel for software 
development. Therefore, SLC in turn subcontracted software development to various 
suppliers. The key position of "Design and Architecture Team Leader", otherwise called the 
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"Lead Architect", was taken up by a consultant from a supplier called MSS. The Lead 
Architect was to provide the "overall architecture and hardware expertise" (SLC, 24) and was 
instrumental in technical decisions. 
It is worthwhile to point out that the project organisation was dynamic in several ways. First 
of all, there were changes in the number of suppliers involved. Initially two suppliers were 
envisaged to carry out the main development. Later, one additional supplier was called in to 
provide extra development capacity while the need for the services of some legacy systems 
suppliers for the purpose of system integration disappeared due to reduced scope. Secondly, 
roles and responsibilities of the key project personnel changed overtime. For example, the 
Project Manager initially doubled up as the supplier manager (SLC, 1). As the project 
progressed, the project manager was overloaded and became the bottleneck of project 
communications. A separate supplier manager had to be added to manage suppliers and 
reported to the project manager. Another example was the role of the Lead Architect. Half 
way through the project, the Lead Architect re-defined his role as a consultant providing 
"advice and guidance" to the project. The Energy Services Team Leader became more 
involved in the architecture of the solution since The Energy Services workstream was "de- 
scoped" from the initial phase of delivery (Section 4.4.2). 
4.3 Selecting and Contracting Application Software Suppliers 
As mentioned earlier, two suppliers were initially envisaged to participate in software 
development, one for graphic designing, providing the "look & feel" part of the system, and 
the other for the "backend functions" (i. e. business logic, see Section 3.2.8). NQ and MSS 
were chosen to fulfil the roles respectively. 
4.3.1 Selecting and Contracting NQ 
NQ, a company with 250 employees and with offices in London, New York and San 
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Francisco (NQ, 1), was selected via a process of proposal, review and referencing (NQ, 1; 
SLC, 2,3). There was no evidence of competition in the selection process. That does not 
mean that NQ was necessarily a poor choice. Based on the dazzling presentation (NQ, 1) and 
well versed proposal (NQ, 2), NQ seemed to be capable and experienced. In the presentation 
(NQ, 1), there was emphasis on risk management, timeboxing method (see Section 4.7.5), 
scenario modelling and architecture based system development approach etc. In the proposal 
document (NQ, 2), solutions were offered with potential issues highlighted, demonstrating 
remarkable understandings NQ had acquired in the early stage of the project. The selection 
decision was made soon after NQ's initial presentation. A contract was concluded on 
23/06/2000 (SLC, 5). 
The contract for NQ's services was between NQ and SLC on a Time and Materials (T&M) 
s 
basis (NQ, 4). The contract clearly specified NQ's services to comprise of activities covering: 
" The design stage 
" The build stage 
" The system testing stage 
" The integration stage 
" The roll out stage to deliver software for launch 
" The regular steering and team briefing meetings 
To carry out these activities, different types of resources were estimated in terms of hours, and 
each resource type had an hourly rate specified. This gave an estimated cost of £655,776 
(excluding VAT) for the services. One important clause in the contract was related to the 
possibility of exceeding the cost estimate: 
"[NQ] shall not without the Client's prior written consent exceed these estimates. 
Accordingly, on becoming aware that these estimates will be exceeded [NQ] will 
notify the Client and, once these estimates have been reached, [NQ] will be 
entitled to suspend provision of the Services until it receives the Client's written 
S Time & Materials (T&M) contract is also called cost-plus contract. For a detailed definition, see Bott 
et al., (2002). 
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consent to continue. " (NQ, 4) 
This clause suggests that if the cost estimate is reached without having completed the 
promised activities, the client is given a choice of accepting what is developed or allowing the 
development to continue with an increased budget. SubA and SLC actually had to make this 
difficult choice in the project (Section 4.6.3). 
4.3.2 Selecting and Contracting MSS 
MSS, a consulting company closely identified with Microsoft and based near the client, was 
selected to develop the backend functions (the "business logic" or the "processing layer" 
together with data storage layer in software system architecture terms, see Figure 3.2). The 
process through which MSS was selected was not well documented. Anecdotal information 
indicated that it was related to a decision made by UKONE/SubA senior management earlier 
to establish a "partnership" with Microsoft. MSS was involved in the project as a Microsoft's 
proxy. Available cost information showed that MSS staff were active in the project as early as 
April 2000 (SLC, 15, SLC, 16), yet a T&M based agreement with MSS was not finalised until 
early July (SLC, 13). This looked unusual at least from a process point of view. More unusual 
was the fact that one MSS member of staff was assigned to the critical role of Lead Architect. 
This made the technology platform selection a severely biased activity since MSS was closely 
associated with Microsoft. Any alternative technology platform would have been unthinkable. 
Nonetheless, an evaluation document was produced in June to assess the pros and cons of 
Microsoft platform versus that from Sun Microsystems (SLC, 6). The evaluation concluded 
by recommending Microsoft platform unequivocally. Unfortunately this meant that the project 
would rely upon a middleware platform called "Commerce Server 2000 (CS2000)" from 
Microsoft, which was still in its beta version at that time. It meant that NQ would have been 
unable to perform some of the tasks initially planned for. For this reason, MSS committed to 
undertake extra tasks to fill the gap while the budget for NQ was reduced accordingly (the 
budget for NQ was subsequently increased due to the inclusion of a flash page, see Table 4.3 
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for cost information). Using the project manager's own words, the project was using a 
"bleeding edge" technology. 
4.3.3 Work Allocation Between NQ and MSS 
There was no formal Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) documented for the project, but the 
overall development workload was discussed in a meeting in July among team members from 
SLC, NQ and MSS. The agreement was documented (NQ, 3), identifying four categories of 
deliverables: 
" Category 1: Static pages (html/JavaScript) - the "look & feel"; 
" Category 2: Dynamic ASP6 pages; 
" Category 3: ASP pages for help functions; 
" Category 4: Components (COM). 
These were divided between NQ and MSS, with NQ taking on Category I and MSS taking on 
Categories 3 and 4. Category 2 were split between NQ and MSS (NQ, 3). To integrate the 
new applications with legacy systems (e. g. retail sales fulfilment database), co-operation from 
suppliers responsible for legacy systems were also foreseen. 
4.3.4 An Additional Supplier IFG 
As the project progressed, it became increasingly evident that MSS was not able to deliver 
what it had promised. In early July the Lead Architect, representing MSS, pledged in writing 
(MSS, 1) a series of deliverables to be completed by the end of July. This did not happen. The 
project atmosphere became tense. MSS management commissioned a review of the project by 
an independent project manager between 07/08/2000 and 11/08/2000 (MSS, 5). A series of 
recommendations were put forward. One suggestion was to clarify the client requirements by 
compiling a full list of "feature sets". Each feature would be the basis of man-day estimate 
6 ASP stands for "Active Server Page". ASP is a Microsoft technology standard. 
COM stands for "Common Object Model", also a Microsoft technology standard. 
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and project re-planning. This "no-fault" re-planning was completed by 24/08/2000 (MSS, 2). 
The new plan revealed a need for many additional development man-days. Since MSS did not 
have the required capacity, an additional supplier IFG, a certified Microsoft partner company 
based locally and had worked with MSS before, was chosen to supplement the capacity. The 
selection of IFG was completed within one week or two (SLC, 47,48,49) in a desperate 
hurry. At this point, the project had used up five months time and had only two months to go 
before the original target delivery date. Yet development in terms of coding had not yet 
started. Even with the newly mobilised capacity in IFG, to achieve the original delivery date 
with the original deliverables was impossible. Using the technique of "timeboxing" 
(Stapleton, 1997; see Section 4.7.4), the scope of the project had to be reduced. 
IFG was introduced to the project due to its status as a certified Microsoft partner company 
and its established working relationship with MSS. From the available documentary evidence, 
it is not clear if a formal contract was ever signed with IFG. The reports on the number of 
hours worked, (IFG, I and 2) indicating that IFG was paid on a T&M basis. 
4.4 Suppliers' Deliverables and Milestones 
Before going into the details of the suppliers' deliverables, it is helpful to look at the original 
intended system architecture (Figure 4.2, simplified from SLC, 6). As Figure 4.2 shows, the 
proposed three-tier architecture included a presentation layer (the WebServers), a processing 
layer (the Application Servers and Microsoft Transaction Servers) and a database layer (see 
Figure 3.2). Such three-tier architecture was adopted to address "issues of reliability, 
scalability and availability of the overall service without relying on hardware and software" 
(SLC, 6). However, what was delivered was rather different. To follow the changes of the 
deliverables, it is helpful to divide the project into three periods according to the changing key 
milestones. Each of the stages is discussed below. 
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Figure 4.2: The initially intended architecture for the WebShop System 
4.4.1 Period 1: From April to mid September 2000 (SLC, 9,10,11) 
The key milestone was to achieve a comprehensive "soft launch" by the end of October 2000. 
That included a system with all three parts (Retail Services, Energy Services and the 
integrated Customer Services) plus the full integration with other systems, some internal, 
some external. The internal systems for integration included, for example, Retail sales system 
to check stocks and enable fulfilment of purchases, and Energy Services system to accept 
customers' meter readings and to provide customers billing information. An example of the 
external system for integration was a bank payment system. The "soft" in "soft launch" meant 
the system availability to UKOne's intranet rather than the Internet. By the end of June, it was 
clear that the project was at least one month behind the schedule (SLC, 12). The project team 
suggested a "soft launch" with reduced functionality (SLC, 13) as early as July. But MSS' 
pledge of deliverables in July remained full scale. The "feature-set" approach adopted toward 
the end of August offered a few different scenarios, some with much reduced functions and 
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some less so (SLC, 25). Project communication with the client on 05/09/2000 recommended a 
review to be "undertaken against original scoping documents" (SLC, 35). 
4.4.2 Period 2: From Mid September to December 2000 
What the project manager presented to the client on 18/09/2000 (SLC, 11) was to separate the 
system delivery into two releases: Release I (Shop Front or Retail Part without Energy 
Services) and Release 2 (with Energy Services fully developed and integrated). The key 
milestone was proposed to be the launch of Release I on the intranet ("the soft launch"), 
followed closely by a launch of Release I on the Internet by the end of November, while 
leaving Release 2 to be completed and launched in early January 2001 (SLC, 11). Such a 
timetable did not meet the client's operational needs. By the end of November, the Christmas 
peak season would have practically passed from a retailer's point of view, considering the 
required delivery time for sales through the web channel. As a result, the project team 
committed to mid November "live" launch for Release 1. As a compromise, the client 
accepted a further delay of Release 2 to be the end of January (Table 4.1, based on SLC, 27). 
Tohla A1" WnhQhnn lrav milnafnnna ac of ä arly Ortnher 2000 
Milestones Target Date 
Release 1: Shop Front 
Development and Test Complete 30/10/2000 
Usabili Testing Complete Mid Nov 
Launch Mid Nov 
Release 2: Energy and Integrated Solution 
Development and Complete 30/12/2000 
Usability Testing Complete End of January, 2001 
Launch End of Janua , 2001 
In the process of delivering the Retail part to the Internet, a few requirements were dropped. 
One was the back end integration with the existing sales fulfilment database. Instead, a 
manual interface was to be put in place for ordering goods on behalf of the customers, just 
like the high street shop would do to process a sale. This scope reduction was proposed on 
3/10/2000 by the project team and accepted by the client on 10/10/2000 (SLC, 28). The other 
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major change was to the architecture. The original "three-tier" architecture was reduced to a 
"two-tier" one with the middle tier removed. This meant that the scalability of the system was 
compromised. This important change did not go through the established change process (i. e. 
not found in the project's "Variations Register", SLC, 42). These changes represented major 
"scope shrinks". Figure 4.3 (mainly based on the author's understanding, with reference to 
MSS, 3) represents a view of what Release 1 was aiming to be (cf. Figure 4.2). 
However reduced the scope was, the critical deliverable was still a developed application from 
the supplier to SLC so that it could be installed onto an integrated test environment for 
integration and acceptance testing. Comparing the new plan with the original one, initially the 
development of the whole system was scheduled to be complete by the middle of September, 
leaving six weeks for planned testing. The new plan indicated that the partial system was to be 
developed by the end of October, leaving only two weeks for testing! 
Figure 4.3: Architectural sketch of the delivered WebShop system by February, 2001 
8 The "COM Bridge" in Figure 4.3 was not marked in the initial architecture document (Figure 4.2). 
However, there was always a need for the two databases to communicate. The missing "COM Bridge" 
in the initial design document was likely to be an oversight. 
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SLC received a partial Release I on 6/11/2000, and did not receive the rest until the next day, 
one week later than the revised target of the end of October as shown in Table 4.1. As a result, 
"Mid November" launch date was stretched and interpreted as 20/11/2000 (one of the few 
amusing moments in project communications to the client). However, testing revealed many 
issues and defects. The soft launch date was split further into "soft" soft launch, or Soft 
Launch 1 (internal intranet based browsing only) and Soft Launch 2 (internal intranet 
transaction-enabled allowing internal staff to purchase goods, or called Internal Live Launch). 
The Internal Live Launch became the primary short-term objective at that point, and it was 
delayed from 20/11/2000 to 29/11/2000 first, then to 4/12/2000 and eventually to 13/12/2000. 
The delays were due to over 200 defects found during testing which had to be diagnosed and 
fixed (SLC, 35; MSS, 7). 
Juxtaposed with these defects was a delay with Microsoft's production release of Commerce 
Server 2000 (CS2000). As a result, the Soft Launches were forced to be planned on the basis 
of the beta version, which had been used for software development but considered unstable 
for production use. Though CS2000 production version was eventually released on 
13/11/2000 (MSS, 4), there was no time to test what was developed on the new version. The 
initial objective of launching the site to the Internet for the Christmas rush season eventually 
failed. Effectively, by Christmas of 2000, only UKOne staff was able to purchase goods from 
the website using an office PC. Looking at the positive side however, a version of the system, 
however limited, was delivered before the Christmas break, bringing a degree of relief for the 
project team. 
4.4.3 Period 3: From Jan 2001 to March 2001 
During this period, the objectives were dominated by transferring the application to the 
production environment. The plan was to launch the website to the Internet after a two-week 
stability period and a security audit. The time between soft launch and Internet launch was 
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typically given as one to two weeks (e. g. SLC, 20). On return from the Christmas break, the 
project team happily announced that "No outstanding showstopper defects" existed for the 
Internet launch and it was suggested to launch the website onto the Internet on 15/01/2001 
(SLC, 21). However, "Major technical issues" were encountered in moving the application to 
the production environment (SLC, 22). As an example, one problem was that the database 
used for holding the sales transaction details was Microsoft SQL Server 7, while working fine 
in the test environment, was not compatible with the clustering configuration of the 
production environment. SQL Server 7 had to be upgraded to SQL Server 2000 first. The 
commissioning of the production environment was delayed a number of times after that (see 
Table 4.2). The delays had significant impact on the project cost that is discussed next. 
m,.:.:.. A 'I. -4r4-h- a..... I.,....,, t: mot.... .. f wohcti,., r, Prniort from Inn 2(101 to FPh 
2001 
Milestones Plan On Plan On Plan On Actual On 
9/1/2001 23/1/2001 30/1/2001 26/2/2001 
(SLC, 21) (SLC, 22) (SLC, 23) (SLC, 50 
Release I Transfer to 15/1/2001 28/1/2001 02/2/2001 01/02/2001 
production environment 
Release I Internet launch 31/1/2001 Not specified 16/2/2001 26/2/2001 
4.5 Project Budgeting and Cost 
The total project cost mainly consisted of provisions for hardware, system software and labour 
costs for various participants. Hardware and system software costs were budgeted for and 
spent up front with little controversy throughout the project9. Labour costs were mainly for 
three tasks, namely, the web graphic design and development assigned to NQ, the overall 
system design and processing layer development by MSS and IFG, and the project 
management and integration activities by SLC. These costs in terms of the monetary values 
are presented in Table 4.3 together with their corresponding estimated total cost (Estimated At 
Completion - EAC) at the time. Also noted in the table is the percentage of each task's cost 
comparing to the corresponding EAC. It can be seen that the steady increase of the labour 
9 Though there was insufficient provision for testing environment in the beginning of the project, there 
were three spare servers to use for testing due to the removal of three Microsoft Transactional Servers 
from the three-tier architecture. 
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costs of these three tasks both in terms of the absolute monetary values and as percentages of 
the total project cost (using EAC as the proxies). 
Table 4.3: Estimated (Costs) at Comnletion (EAC) for three tasks from June 2000 to March 2001 
Date N MSS/IFG SLC Total Comments (Sources) 
f000 % of £000 % of £000 % of Estimat 
total total total cd Cost 
£000 
23/06/2000 655 27 240 10 750 31 2,457 Contract signed with NQ (SLC, 
5) 
17/07/2000 456 20 300 13 800 35 2,276 Some tasks re-assigned from 
N to MSS (SLC, 29 
05/09/2000 565 24 500 21 785 34 2,327 Flash1° included in NQ's 
deliverables; MSS/IFG cost 
increased due to re-planning. 
Hardware cost reduced (SLC, 
26) 
18/09/2000 550 20 799 29 953 34 2,794 Split release strategy requiring 
extra time (SLC, 11 
02/10/2000 550 20 810 29 963 34 2,815 Launch delayed further (SLC, 
18) 
17/10/2000 550 22 695 27 882 35 2,549 Retail back-end integration 
abandoned (SLC, 28,30 
24/10/2000 550 20 695 25 882 32 2,749 £200k contingency fund added 
to budget (SLC, 32) 
19/12/2000 550 19 873 30 1,025 36 2,870 A new delivery timetable 
suggested SLC 31 
09/01/2001 525 19 877 31 985 35 2,806 Delivery time adjusted (SLC, 
21) 
23/01/2001 520 18 892 30 1,122 38 2,933 Delivery time adjusted (SLC, 
22) 
30/01/2001 520 18 851 29 1,122 39 2,892 Minor adjustment on MSS 
spending (SLC, 23) 
13/03/2001 520 18 867 30 1,142 39 2928 Project closedown delayed to 
16/3/2001 v36 
The project started with an initial estimated total budget of £2million (SLC, 7). Suppliers' 
indicative costs in the beginning suggested that the project was under-budgeted. Throughout 
the project, much effort was spent on containing cost. First of all, tasks were reassigned from 
NQ to MSS, hoping to capitalise on MSS' willingness to undercut the competitor's price for 
the mid-tier development. That hope was dashed when MSS increased their estimate 
significant as a result of the re-planning (SLC, 35). Due to the nature of the contracts with all 
suppliers being of the T&M type, the project delays forced the cost up despite the continued 
10 Flash: A technology that enables animation to be displayed on a web browser. For a more detailed 
definition, see TechTarget (2002b). 
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scope reductions. Table 4.3 clearly shows the high percentage of the total labour costs. The 
three main parties' (counting MSS and lFG as one) labour costs added up to 67% of the total 
budget in the beginning and 86% toward the end. One important point to note is that SLC's 
cost increased as the project was delayed. There was a significant amount of idle time within 
SLC since the planned resources were in place yet could not be effectively utilised due to the 
software products not being available from the development suppliers. 
Even the above cost overrun was somewhat under-reported. This was due to some of the 
costing incurred by SLC team members charged elsewhere under the management instruction. 
SLC had a system to charge the staff time to different financial codes for different projects 
and tasks. In that way, project budgets could be tracked and managed. When the WebShop 
Project's budget was under pressure, some staff were instructed to book some of their time to 
other codes. Whether the funding was from SLC's internal sources or other UKOne related 
projects is not the issue. The important thing to note is that SLC's cost figures in Table 4.3 are 
likely to be under-represented. It would certainly be true to say that no effort was spared to 
contain the SLC costs within the budgeted limit. Even so, the SLC cost kept increasing well 
above the original estimate. 
4.6 Software Product Quality Control 
To ensure the quality of any software product, the client has to make sure that the 
requirements match the real needs. In addition, the client has to make sure what is delivered 
match the requirements. The first part is done through requirements management before and 
during the product development stage, the second through quality control at the product 
acceptance stage. The essential observation was that neither stage worked well in the 
WebShop Project. 
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4.6.1 Requirements Management 
Within the WebShop Project, there was no specifically stated and enforced process about 
requirements management. The activities of generating requirements and having them 
reviewed and authorised were guided by document templates, whose own quality was variable 
depending on their sources. The client teams used UKOne's document templates for the 
functional requirements. Three main functional documents (SubA, 1,2,3) were produced at 
the beginning of the project. They were issued for comments and feedback was incorporated 
as indicated by a revision history. However, there were a number of problems. First of all, 
requirements documents contained running commentaries without clearly delineating separate 
functions. As a result, it was difficult to establish a clear link between a requirement and a 
specific developed software feature. Secondly, there was no formal process controlling the 
reviewing, updating and issuing activities. Thirdly, related to the second problem, it was not 
clear at any moment of time if a document was mature enough to be issued for design and 
development. A conceptual milestone existed that the requirements should be "signed-off' 
before development activities could have started. But there were both theoretical and practical 
reasons preventing the sign-off from taking place. Theoretically the concept of requirements 
sign-off was considered to be based on the discredited "Waterfall Model" (Wilson, 1998). 
Practically, initial requirements would have been incomplete and incoherent. Any sign-off 
would have been taken as the baseline for suppliers' cost commitment. Any subsequent 
change would have been regarded as variations and might have attracted cost penalty and 
been blamed for any schedule delay. As a result of these requirements management issues, 
three main requirement documents were found to be last updated on 27/06/2000,30/06/2000 
and 04/08/2000 respectively in the project archive. Two of the documents were left in the 
draft status, the status of the other one was not clear. Subsequent changes were not 
incorporated into the original documents. Though some variations were raised when 
requirement changes were agreed, the variations did not cross reference to the original 
requirements documents. The value of the original requirements documents was thus 
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diminished as the project progressed. Using the requirements as objective quality criteria was 
therefore not possible. 
One variation of the requirements management process in the project was the Rapid 
Application Development (RADS 1) approach to develop the "look & feel". RAD methodology 
dictated that the design should be attempted and refined according to the client's feedback. 
This was tried with NQ producing the "look & feel" design for the client to review. After 
"numerous iterations" (SLC, 26), a baseline design was signed off by 18/08/2000 (SLC, 26, 
39). On top of that, each web page based on the design was also to be signed off by the client. 
Although at times, the speed of sign-off was "a source of concern" (SLC, 40), the project 
manager reported that all graphics and content had been signed off by 12/10/2000 (SLC, 28). 
A demonstration of the design followed for the first time to a wider audience from the client. 
It was reported (SLC, 41) that the client had "issues" with the design. An entry in the risk 
register was more specific, stating that the client had a "dislike" of the design (SLC, 14). By 
then, it was too late to have any substantial change. The risk was that if "there is a 
requirement to modify the layout this will affect all pages - and will require substantial 
rework" (SLC, 14). As a result, no further action was taken to remedy the graphic design. As 
intuitive as the RAD approach was, the result failed to meet the client's expectation. 
4.6.2 Product Acceptance 
Another mechanism to control supplier's software product quality is product acceptance. The 
idea is that a number of acceptance criteria should be agreed between the client and the 
supplier before software product development. At the product acceptance stage, the software 
can be accepted if all criteria are met (Pfleeger, 1998). This approach was attempted in the 
WebShop Project. The acceptance criteria were repeatedly mentioned as one of the key 
Rapid Application Development (RAD): a software development approach conceived to overcome 
the traditional methodology following the Waterfall Model (Stapleton, 1997; Murch, 2001; DSDM, 
2002). 
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dependencies in September and October of 2000 (SLC, 11,26,27,28,32,34). The 
compilation of the criteria was helped by an independent consultant joined the project in early 
October 2000 (SLC, 43). In a meeting agenda drafted by the consultant, 5 major categories of 
attributes was listed, covering 12 minor categories of quality dimensions (Table 4.4, based on 
SLC, 43) as a starting point of considering the acceptance criteria. 
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The client took on the suggestion and produced two drafts of criteria (SLC, 44,45) with 
additional categories (e. g. security). These documents went into considerable details regarding 
some of the technical aspects. References were also made to other testing phases and 
established data standards (SLC, 45). However, the criteria document suffered from a number 
of shortcomings. First of all, the criteria did not refer to any previous requirements 
specification. Secondly, when the established data standards were included, no reference was 
made to any specific documented item or authority. Therefore the acceptance criteria appeared 
disjointed with the rest of the project and the client company's general IT and data policies. 
Thirdly, no option was established as for what would happen if one or more of the criteria 
were not met. A natural default position would be to extend the project until all criteria were 
met. But such an option, though eventually taken by the project team, meant heavy penalty in 
terms of budget overruns and a high level of stress on all project team members. 
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What was surprising was that the acceptance criteria, once compiled, were practically ignored. 
The decision to launch the website onto the Internet in February 2001 was based on a different 
checklist called "Critical Success Factors" (SLC, 46). The approval mechanism conjured up 
was that each item on the checklist was to be endorsed by named individuals. Most of the 
named individuals were part of the project team. There was no specific reference back to the 
acceptance criteria produced earlier. 
4.6.3 Quality of NQ Deliverables 
In NQ's proposal document (NQ, 2), a few activities were specifically mentioned in relation 
to quality assurance. Here is an excerpt regarding "System Testing": 
"System testing follows build and involves the development team testing the `code 
complete' software for defects against defined test scripts written following 
design. " 
Unfortunately no test script based system testing was documented and communicated by NQ 
to the project team. NQ delivered html pages but they proved to be not compatible with 
Netscape browser versions. NQ refused to carry out further work without extra funding when 
they used up the pre-agreed budget (see Section 4.3.1 about the relevant contract terms). Extra 
coding had to be added by SLC staff later. Fortunately SLC Team was able to do it 
technically, and with resources freed from the Energy Services workstream to concentrate on 
the Retail and Customer Services work. 
In addition to the html pages, NQ was also responsible for the "look & feel" design of the web 
pages. As discussed in the section on requirements management, although the design was 
reviewed to be "excellent" by "all parties" (SLC, 26) in the beginning, it was disliked by the 
client (SLC, 14). There was no evidence that this issue was tackled. 
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4.6.4 Quality of MSS/IFG Deliverables 
Before IFG was introduced into the project toward in August 2000, MSS was solely 
responsible for the system design with deliverables including the system architecture. MSS 
had great difficulties in meeting its own promises to deliver. So far as the architecture was 
concerned, MSS did eventually issue a document entitled "High-Level Architecture & Design 
Document" (MSS, 3) on 01/09/2000 under much pressure from the project team. But the 
document was a draft version and it was incomplete. The document was not known to be ever 
updated thereafter. 
After IFG joined the project, MSS limited itself to developing some core software artefacts 
and assumed mainly a consulting role for giving advice and carrying out quality assurance 
work on what was produced by IFG. This was much welcomed by SLC since the project test 
strategy did call for independent quality assurance team separate from the development team 
(SLC, 33). However, highly competent (and highly paid) independent quality assurance 
technical staff were not able to prevent defects and issues. A total of over 200 issues were 
discovered and logged within a week of IFG's release on 7/11/2000. Table 4.5 (based on SLC, 
35) shows the defects resolution progress between 14/11/2000 and 24/11/2000. 
Tahla A C" Ilnf *J1ccnnc ctafictirc hwtwncn 1d/11/20110 and 24/11/2(1(10 
Severity Level Open as of 14/11/2000 Open as of 24/11/2000 
Severity Level 1 44 0 
Severity Level 2 99 77 
Severity Level3 74 19 
Non Priority N/A 13 
More defects and issues were discovered as the project moved on. Many issues arose from 
system level testing after the software artefacts were delivered (e. g. browser compatibility 
testing), indicating a lack of testing by the development suppliers in the first place. Other 
issues came up due to interactions of different artefacts and platforms. 
12 Severity Level of a defect is normally judged by the defect's impact on the system's behaviour. 
Defects of Severity Level I have more negative impact on the system than those of Severity Level 2 
and so on. 
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4.7 Project Issues and Within-Case Analysis 
The WebShop Project appears to be a typical "challenged project" in the scheme of Standish 
Group's project classifications (Standish Group, 1995; see Section 3.3.1). By the initial 
deadline of the end of October 2000, the project had not delivered a workable system. By the 
time the project drew to a close (middle March 2001), the system delivered was partial 
compared to what was planned. A second phase had to be initiated afterwards. As the project 
was delayed further, the project cost kept going up. In this section, the issues causing the 
challenges are highlighted and analysed with supplementary project details where necessary. 
4.7.1 Project Organisation 
An issue that affected the project operation profoundly was the assignment of a lead architect 
who happened to be a team member of the key supplier MSS. This assignment appeared to 
have been made by senior management out of a desire to forge a close alliance with 
Microsoft. The project manager had no prior influence, neither could he change such an 
arrangement. The impact was both personal and organisational. On a personal level, the lead 
architect had no loyalty to the project manager, and conversely, there was little respect from 
the project manager to the lead architect. There were often stormy arguments between the two 
in project meetings. On the organisational level, the lead architect was the technical authority. 
Due to the company association, he was closely identified with Microsoft and its technologies. 
Whether it was wise to go for the "bleeding edge" technology (Commerce Server 2000 at its 
beta version), the lead architect would be expected to have a strong influence of the 
technology decision in June 2000 to favour Microsoft. It was a risky proposition yet the 
project team was comforted by the thought that some vice president of Microsoft was behind 
the project. More seriously, since the lead architect was the lead designer of the overall system 
and also part of the development team in MSS at the same time, the design was changed at 
will without being fully documented and agreed with SLC project team and the client. 
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The situation was extremely stressful and was alleviated to a certain degree when lFG was 
introduced to supplement MSS' development capacity. MSS limited itself to developing some 
core artefacts and turned itself largely into a consulting role providing project advice on 
design and quality assurance. These changes had the effect of separating design and 
development to some extent. Another welcomed change was the introduction of a new 
account manager within MSS to co-ordinate their resources and activities, and thus reducing 
the direct exchanges between SLC project manager and the lead architect. Unfortunately, 
these changes happened at a considerable extra cost to the project, therefore contributing to 
the project cost overruns (MSS, 8). 
4.7.2 Supplier Selection 
NQ's selection was completed rather quickly. NQ made a presentation on 01/06/2000 and 
issued a proposal on 08/06/2000. By 09/06/2000, the decision had already been made to select 
NQ as the design "partner", "pending successful commercial negotiations" (SLC, 3). There 
was no evidence that any competition took place in the process. The decision seemed to be 
made before any substantial technical review was carried out (SLC, 3), and before references 
were taken and price negotiation was concluded (SLC, 3,4 and 5). Such a process was 
unorthodox to say the least. This may be explained by the supplier partnership approach 
assumed by the project and the client. However, it is an example of early supplier selection 
commitment, much too early considering the desired product was a design output with a 
considerable level of uncertainty. 
MSS' selection was made even earlier. A weekly project report dated 12/05/2000 to the client 
revealed a task planned but not completed in that week to "Finalise Commercial agreement 
with [MSS]" (SLC, 36). There was no documented evidence within the project as for exactly 
when and how MSS was selected. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it was a decision made 
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outside of the project by SubA's senior management out of a desire to forge a strategic 
marketing partnership with Microsoft. MSS was closely identified with Microsoft and was in 
a position to provide Microsoft technologies and services. There was no objective assessment 
available to indicate that MSS was suitable for the project. To SubA, MSS was seen to be key 
to the web marketing strategy. To SLC, there was an expectation to have certain technology 
skills transfer from MSS to SLC project team members. These organisational objectives were 
neither good nor bad in themselves. But they were to be achieved by imposing on the 
WebShop Project a key "partner" for reasons not related to the focused project objectives. 
This had a series of impacts on the project causing many difficulties. It may serve as an 
example of external inference to project decision-making. 
4.7.3 Partnership Approach 
Throughout the project the "supplier partnership" approach was emphasised. Within SLC's 
project team, all suppliers were to be called "partners". This approach was shared by the 
suppliers, at least in words. NQ claimed it to be the "ideal partner" in its proposal (NQ, 2). 
The concept of partnership may explain the supplier selection process to be totally devoid of 
competitive tendering. Unfortunately, at times of conflict and difficulties, there was little 
guidance and no effective mechanism to manage the partnership relationship. 
A specific example was NQ's refusal to carry out system testing, even though that was 
specifically promised in the contract as one of the activities to be carried out (NQ, 4; Section 
4.3.1). From NQ's point of view, it was logical to conclude that it was a T&M based contract 
constrained by a budget. When the budget was exhausted but the work had not been 
completed, it was fully justified for NQ to request for further funding. Otherwise, no further 
work would be done. Indeed, who could have blamed NQ for refusing to carry out work "free 
of charge"? The "partnership" approach did not appear to have made any difference. 
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Another example was that MSS failed to deliver a host of items as promised before the end of 
July 2000 (MSS, 1). To salvage the project, SLC eventually had to bring in another supplier 
IFG at a considerable extra expense. When the project was delayed further and the overall 
project cost was exceeding the original budget, MSS continued to enjoy the same high fees as 
time went by. The "partnership" approach did not appear to have made any difference here 
either. The observation from this project is that supplier partnership is a slogan with little 
substance. 
4.7.4 The Timeboxing Method 
Timeboxing is a technique advocated in the Rapid Application Development (RAD) 
methodology (Stapleton, 1997; see also Section 8.10.3). This method was much emphasised at 
the early stage of the project as a key to controlling the project scope, to achieve on-time 
delivery within the set budget (SLC, 1). In practice, the technique was used aggressively and 
resulted in significant reduction in the project scope (Section 4.4). However, it did not prevent 
the project from being late and over budget. From the experience of this case, two problems 
are observed with the timeboxing method. 
One is that timeboxing does not deal with the complex, interrelated nature of software 
components. It was possible to leave behind a whole workstream like Energy Services, but it 
would not have made any sense to segregate customer services from the retail part. Selling 
goods was not separable from delivering the goods. In other words, the required application 
could only be divided within considerable constraints. The other problem was highlighted by 
NQ's refusal to fulfil its obligation to carry out system testing on its deliverables. The lesson 
was that functions may have been completed in its rudimentary form but testing and defect- 
fixing may require considerable efforts. But NQ used timeboxing as an excuse for not 
proceeding any further. In other words, quality was "de-scoped" as well as functions. The net 
result was a poor bargain for the teams carrying out down stream activities. In WebShop 
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Project, the integration team had to carry out considerable extra work to make the NQ's html 
pages to be compatible with different browser versions. The observation is that timeboxing 
could not secure even a reduced system with essential quality attributes to be delivered on 
time or within budget. 
4.7.5 Requirements Management and Variation Control 
The approach to requirements management was not consistent in the project, to say the least. 
At the early stage (from May to early August 2000), business functional specifications were 
produced by the three workstreams. Discussions took place and feedback was incorporated in 
many revisions. But the functional specifications remained as drafts (Section 4.6.1) and 
therefore could be considered as "incomplete". In the meantime, the RAD methodology 
(Stapleton, 1997; DSDM, undated-a) was adopted from the start of the project (SLC, 37). It 
was believed that with RAD, it was not necessary to spell out requirements before starting 
development. This perhaps explains the fact that no functional specification was "finalised" or 
"signed-off'. However, in the review requested by MSS management by an independent 
project manager, the incomplete functional requirements were cited as the key to many 
problems and delays (MSS, 5). Fierce arguments broke out regarding the necessity of detailed 
documented requirements. In the end, MSS won the debate. But instead of reviewing and 
updating the functional requirement documents already available, the project team spent two 
weeks preparing a spreadsheet listing all the "feature sets" (MSS, 6). Shortly before the 
delivery of the software artefacts, all requirements were further distilled into a single page, 
listing the functions to be in included or excluded in the first release (SLC, 27,28,32,34). No 
effort was made to update early requirements specification. Requirements specification 
seemed to become less comprehensive and highly simplified as the project moved forward, 
leaving many details to interpretation. Therefore, the requirements remained incomplete even 
at the end of the project. 
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Closely associated with incomplete requirements is the concept of variation control. This is 
supposed to reduce "scope creep" in requirements management (e. g. Aniceto, 2003). Strictly 
speaking, an initial baseline of requirements should be established first. Development 
activities should be planned according to the baseline of requirements. The baseline should be 
subjected to variation control. Development activities can therefore vary accordingly and the 
project cost and schedule can be managed based on requirements variations. In reality, 
variations appear to have been used more to reduce the project scope in Case 1 rather than to 
increase it. In total, 35 variations were documented in the "Variations Register" (SLC, 42). 
The variations are a mixture of requirements clarification, scope reduction and cost increase 
requests. The single most significant variation recorded was a requirement reduction, taking 
the integration with the sales and the banking systems out of the project scope. On the other 
hand, some of the most significant variations were not documented. One example was the 
removal of a middle tier of Microsoft Transaction Servers, resulted in a system with much less 
scalability (Section 4.4). In short, despite the concepts of requirements management and 
variation controls, control on requirements seemed difficult and ineffective. 
4.7.6 Resource Capacity Planning 
There appeared to be a real problem with resource capacity planning in the project. Resource 
capacity planning refers to arranging the right amount and types of resources at the right time 
to perform required tasks. MSS had a serious problem to meet its own promise to deliver a set 
of artefacts by the end of July with only 4 staff (Section 4.4.1). The available resource level 
proved to be inadequate. It was only through a "re-planning" exercise did the project team 
realise the scale of the problem. A new supplier had to be brought in as a matter of 
emergency. The resource level requested in the new plan (see Table 4.3) was considered to be 
excessive (SLC project manager suspected it to be excessive to the tune of 20% at the time - 
private conversation). Even with such seemingly generous resource availability, and assisted 
with significant scope reduction, the eventual delay of Release I delivery was significant. 
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Long-term resource planning might be difficult due to unforeseeable events. How about the 
accuracy of short-term planning? From November 2000 to February 2001, the project team 
was focusing on short-term objectives. But the record of assessing what had to be done and 
when the objectives could be achieved was not an impressive one (Section 4.4). The project 
could not predict beyond a week or two as for what could be achieved. There could be many 
potential explanations behind repeated failures to meet delivery targets. Among other things, 
the client's pressure to have a working system delivered before Christmas could have 
jeopardised the project team's sense of judgement before Christmas. More likely, however, is 
that software development is full of uncertainty that defies careful planning and estimating. 
4.7.7 Risk Management 
Risk management was much emphasised in the project. A risk management process was in 
place (SLC, 38). Risks were logged and assessed with pre-emptive actions documented. But 
implementing the intended actions was often a challenge. For example, there was a risk 
registered (R005)" as early as 08/06/2000 regarding "timely and cost effective delivery" from 
third party suppliers (SLC, 1,14). The proposed action was to have "[c]lear supplier 
responsibilities identified and enshrined in contract" and "Supplier Management 
responsibilities clearly identified" (SLC, 14). Though efforts were made toward that direction, 
the risk manifested itself as a serious issue by the end of August 2000 regarding MSS' 
deliverables. It was not clear how the risk management could have made any difference. The 
problem seemed to be that when the risk had manifested itself, there were few options 
available due to the constraints of time and cost. To resolve the issue of MSS' inability to 
deliver, SLC had to bring another supplier in a hurry (Section 4.3.4) at a considerable extra 
expense borne by the client. 
1' R005 was the number assigned to the risk in the risk register. The risk number was sequential for the 
convenience of referencing. The same applies to the other risk numbers mentioned below. 
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4.7.8 Project Success or Failure? 
The WebShop Project was not breaking any new technological ground. By the Year 2000, 
there were many sophisticated retail websites (such as www. amazon. com) available on the 
Internet. Yet the project was full of challenges. As commented in the beginning of this 
Section, it rightly belongs to the "challenged" category since it was neither an outright 
success, nor a cancelled project before Release 1. 
The WebShop Project serves to illustrate many problems that ISD projects face. The 
definitions of activities and processes never stood still. There were serious uncertainties with 
the development activities. The problem the client faced was that there had seemed no 
alternative to delaying the project in the first place and accepting a product that was 
unsatisfactory in the end. 
As a postscript, it should be noted that, within four months of the website going live on the 
Internet, UKOne decided to sell off its Retail operation. The retail website was withdrawn 
from the Internet before the retail operation's ownership was changed. The hardware from the 
project was recycled for other uses and the application software was scrapped apart from one 
webpage retained as a link to some other services provided by UKOne. 
4.8 The WebShop Project Chronology 
22 March 2000: UKOne Board confirmed its e-commerce vision. 
20 April 2000: WebShop Project Phase 0 was initiated. 
April-May 2000: Workshops conducted to gather business requirements. 
12 May 2000: Attempt to finalise commercial agreement with MSS. 
01 June 2000: NQ made a presentation. 
08 June 2000: NQ issued a proposal. 
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09 June 2000: NQ had been selected as the design partner. 
23 June 2000: Contract with NQ signed. 
26 June 2000: Technology decision made in favour of Microsoft and thus MSS. 
27 June 2000: NQ not comfortable with the new Microsoft Commerce Server 2000. 
28 June 2000: MSS volunteered to develop main components within four weeks. 
MSS' tasks expanded and NQ's tasks shrunk. 
04 July 2000: MSS' estimated effort was 273.5 days. 
14 July 2000: Responsible areas between MSS and NQ agreed and documented. 
27 July 2000: SLC presentation to SubA not accepting a fixed price as requested. 
01 August 2000: Demonstration of Retail and Customer Services prototype. 
02 August 2000: MSS indicated that insufficient information for development. 
04 August 2000: MSS requested a project audit by an external project manager. 
11 August 2000: MSS internal review indicated a minimum 306 days effort 
for development alone. 
14 August 2000: MSS initiated project audit feedback recommending the preparation 
of a full feature-set. 
18 August 2000: Feature set matrix indicating 505 days development effort. 
21 August 2000: Feature set matrix reviewed. A possible scenario with scope 
reduction required 320 days development. 
22 August 2000: MSS was unwilling to commit to development for less than 430 days 
23 August 2000: Client review recommended scope reduction to 311 days according to 
the feature set matrix. SLC considered additional third party 
developers. 
24 August 2000: In preparing a draft project plan, MSS identified additional tasks. 
Total estimate went up to 528 days. 
25 August 2000: MSS produced revised plan showing 506 days. 
25 August 2000: SLC reviewed other Microsoft partners for extra development 
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capacity. 
End of August 2000: IFG was brought into the project to provide extra developers. 
05 September 2000: MSS delivered a draft architecture document. 
18 September 2000: Project deliverables split into Release I and Release 2. 
30 October 2000: Microsoft Commerce Server 2000 not released as planned. 
13 November 2000: Commerce Server 2000 released to manufacturing. 
13 December 2000: Release 1 launched internally. 
09 January 2001: Prepared to launch Release 1 to Internet within two weeks. 
26 February 2001: Release 1 launched to the Internet. 
13 March 2001: The project was terminated. Release 2 was to be developed as a 
separate project. 
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Chapter 5: Case 2- The Gas Meter Reading Management System 
(March 2001 - October 2001) 
5.1 Background 
Historically, the gas market was a monopoly run by BritishGas (Beesley et al., 1994; O'Neill, 
1996). Even though it was privatised in 1986, BritishGas continued being a monopoly player 
in the gas transportation and gas supply market (MMC, 1993). Since 1996, competition has 
been gradually introduced into the residential gas supply market (Giulietti and Price, 2000). 
By 1998, the gas supply market was "fully liberalised", which meant that all gas suppliers can 
sell to customers anywhere in the UK (Ofgem, 1998). 
Transco, as part of BritishGas, used to act as the meter reading agency (MRA) for gas 
suppliers as well as managing the gas meters as part of the gas transportation network. 
Companies entering into the gas supply market theoretically had a choice between using 
Transco or a licensed company for obtaining meter readings. In reality, however, competition 
in this part of the market was not happening. Most companies without any readily available 
alternative simply chose to "do nothing" and have kept Transco as their MRA (Ofgem, 1998). 
Even those companies with alternative means of obtaining meter readings took only limited 
steps to "unbundle" the meter reading business from Transco due to other considerations like 
system constraints and geographic coverage. For example, SubB, the subsidiary of UKOne 
responsible for its gas operations in the open gas market, unbundled less than 50% of meter 
reading business from Transco by early 2001 even though it operated its own meter reading 
services. Over 50% of SubB's meter reading business remained with Transco. 
Indeed, Transco was in a privileged position to act as an MRA for gas suppliers. Transco 
performed the upper stream function as a Public Gas Transporter (PGT) while owning and 
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maintaining gas meters. There was a single integrated software system (known as Sites and 
Meters) in Transco handling information regarding the meters and meter readings. This set-up 
gave Transco a commercial advantage no other competitor could have and was deemed to be 
"discriminatory" (Ofgem, 1998). 
As a result, in October 1998 Ofgem published its first proposal on "Securing effective 
competition in the gas metering and meter reading services" (Ofgem, 1998). It aimed to bring 
competition into the Non Daily Meter (NDM) part of the meter reading market, which was 
most labour intensive, and thus costly. After various consultation stages, Ofgem published its 
final proposal in May 2000 (Ofgem, 2000c) setting April 2001 as the deadline for: 
"Implementation of stand-alone NDM reading IT system, and removal of 
Transco's meter reading business' access to sites and meters database... " (p. 60) 
This came to be known in the gas industry as MRA/PGT Separation Project, referred to as 
MPS Project throughout this case study. The "stand-alone NDM reading IT system" that 
Transco was to acquire and implement was called Proteus, which implemented a whole set of 
new exchange file formats. Gas suppliers were required to comply with the changes or lose 
their operating licences. The task of managing this regulatory requirement for UKOne was 
undertaken by its subsidiary SubB that was responsible for gas operations. 
5.2 SubB's Requirements 
SubB had acquired a series of systems in support of its gas operations. MPS Project had an 
impact on many of them. Figure 5.1 outlines the existing systems and how they were related. 
All systems apart from "Transco PGT/MRA" were owned and operated by SubB. The core 
ones were (all system names have been slightly altered from the original ones for anonymity): 
" SPMS: Supplier Point Management System 
" UMRS: Unbundled Meter Reading System 
" GDCS: Gas Data Collection System 
125 
Figure 5.1: Systems related to gas operations in SubB before the MPS Project 
Other systems were peripheral and related to the above systems as shown in Figure 5.1: 
" GCMR: Gas Customer Meter Reading 
" MWMS: Meter Work Management System 
" HHT: Hand-Held Terminal for collecting meter readings in the field 
" CRS: Customer Registration Systems 
" CBS: Customer Billing Systems 
SPMS was at the heart of SubB's gas operations. It maintained SubB' gas customers portfolio, 
all records of supply points and meter points plus all historical meter reading records. It was 
the gateway to communicate with Transco PGT for gains and losses of gas customers. It was 
also the gateway through which Transco MRA had been supplying the "bundled" meter 
readings to SubB. Furthermore, it was used for SubB to communicate their unbundled meter 
readings to Transco PGT for consumption reconciliation. All these would have to be changed 
since SPMS was not able to work with the new Proteus file formats (SLC, 2,5). 
As mentioned in Section 5.1, SubB carried out part of the gas meter reading itself. The 
process as it was can be briefly described as follows. The readings were first collected in the 
field by RHT. MWMS retrieved the readings from HHT and passes them onto UMRS for 
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processing. The readings were then recorded by SPMS for further communication to Transco 
PGT for authorisation. After authorisation was obtained, SPMS passed them onto customer 
billing systems (CBS). Customer registration system (CRS) would also be affected if a new 
system was to be implemented to accept new customer records. The key SubB's requirement 
was that the gas systems were either modified or replaced so that SubB could work with 
Transco's Proteus file formats for meter readings exchanges, validation, confirmation and 
error handling etc. Depending on changes related to the core systems, the peripheral systems 
might had to be adapted accordingly. 
5.3 Options Available and Supplier Selection 
Although as early as May 2000, it was known in the industry that the deadline for MPS 
Project was to be April 2001, it was not until early January 2001 when SubB's management 
commissioned SLC to carry out a feasibility study (SLC, 1). SLC duly completed the 
feasibility study (SLC, 1), which found that: 
" The timescale was desperately short. However, the consolation was that, according to 
industry sources and the IT supplier community, no one was ready for the April 2001 
deadline. The new implementation date was likely to be July 2001; 
0 SLC would not be prepared to undertake the whole project alone in such a short 
timescale. The risk was considered too high. 
The recommendation was to acquire an application software package. There were two 
potential suppliers considered. One was a supplier called AGL. AGL had started developing a 
software product to cater for MRA/PGT Separation with nine gas suppliers already. Although 
AGL had a good reputation in the IT industry, and also had developed a good working 
relationship with both SubB and SLC, AGL's solution required the replacement of both SPMS 
and UMRS. Replacing SPMS would have meant "significant additional systems analysis and 
systems integration tasks" (SLC, 1), thus more expensive and more risky. 
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The other potential supplier was AES. Like AGL, AES claimed that they had started 
developing systems for MRA/PGT Separation, although with only two gas suppliers already 
signed up at the time. AESs solution was for SubB to keep SPMS and only replace UMRS 
with a new "module" called "Gas Meter Reading Management" (GMRM) to manage Proteus 
file formats. Since AES had supplied SPMS in the first place, it was considered to be of lower 
risk in integrating GMRM with SPMS. However, AES' track record of delivery, quality and 
services had been known to be poor (SLC, 1). The feasibility study concluded that all options 
carried high risks. The cost implication of the two options is summarised in Table 5.1 (based 
on SLC, 1,19), which shows a small advantage in favour of AES. The feasibility study 
recommended AES "WITH SEVERE RESERVATIONS" (SLC, 1). 
Table 5.1: Indicative cost summary of the twn snnnler nntinns 
AGL AES 
Software Application License Cost £125K £250K 
Supplier Consultancy for System £100K £100K 
Integration & Implementation 
Annual Operational and Support Cost £175K £50K 
Charged by Supplier 
Other Items (including acquiring other £1000K £841K 
system elements, system integration and 
Implementation etc 
Total Indicative Costs £1,400K £1 241K 
By March 2001, the project was under tremendous pressure to get started. SubB finally 
decided to commission SLC as the prime contractor and opted for AES as the software 
supplier. One of the key factors that persuaded SubB to choose AES was the fact that there 
would be "minimal" changes to SPMS (SLC, 1). The proposed solution was to (SLC, 2): 
9 Keep SPMS as the key link to Transco PGT, Customer Registrations and Customer 
Billing Systems; 
" Replace UMRS with GMRM to manage meter readings from Transco MRS and 
SubB's own systems; 
" Re-write GDCS to be GDCS2 to be compatible with Proteus file formats. 
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There were other associated requirements to be met, for example (SLC, 2): 
" Data extraction from SPMS/UMRS and data population into GMRM; 
" Data migration from GDCS to GDCS2; 
" Management information reports from GMRM; 
" Development of a web based customer reads interface; 
" Modifying GCMR so that the customer reads were fed into GMRM instead of SPMS. 
The targeted architecture is shown in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Simplified architecture for the proposed solution 
The whole project was complex with a number of workstreams involving both external 
suppliers and internal developers in SLC. The focus of this case study is on the part of the 
project that was to acquire GMRM from the external supplier AES. 
5.4 Project Organisation and Resources 
SLC took on the role as the prime contractor assigning one of its senior managers to be the 
MPS Project Manager. Most of the other project team members were also from SLC. A senior 
manager within SubB acted as the Project Sponsor. SubB also allocated internal resources 
with business domain knowledge working with SLC project team. The project organisation 
chart is shown in Figure 5.3 (based on SLC, 2). The Project Manager had responsibility for all 
aspects of the project. Apart from reporting into the Project Sponsor, the Project Manager 
reported regularly to SLC management team. The other project team members, though they 
129 
had their own respective line managers, were managed directly and solely by the Project 
Manager for the duration of the project. 
MPS Project Sponsor 
I MPS Project Manager I 
Project Office Support Gas Business Manager with Gas Business 
Team Members 
Project SLC AES SLC 
Design Test Project Application 
Authority Management Manager Development 
Figure 5.3: The MPS project organisation 
SLC 
Data Migration and 
Production Cutover 
The appointed Project Manager had over at least 20 years of IT project-related experience 
with a track record in managing complex and high profile projects. He was politically astute 
and good at communication with the client, the project team and the suppliers. The project 
manager also prided himself for the fact that the client entrusted him to be the project 
manager, i. e. there was to be no project manager from the client to oversee the project 
progress on a day-to-day basis. 
5.5 Contracting with AES 
The contract for GMRM was between UKOne (rather than SubB or SLC) and AES (AES, 4). 
The contract was for AES to supply GMRM for a fixed fee. Observations are made here 
regarding the contract, including deliverables and the delivery schedule, price and contract 
administration. 
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5.5.1 Deliverables and Delivery Time 
The deliverables and milestones were found in AES' contract proposals. AES made the initial 
commitments in the proposal dated 28/03/2001 as shown in Table 5.2 (based on AES, 2). 
Tahle 
_S_2! 
AF, S' deliverahles schedule dated 2R/03/2001'5 
Deliverables Date 
Order to be placed and accepted by AES 02/04/2001 
GMRM Release 1 Development Complete 30/04/2001 
GMRM Release I Delivery to SLC with Installation and User Guide 30/04/2001 
GMRM Release 1 On-site Acceptance Test Complete 04/05/2001 
GMRM Release 2 Development Complete 02/07/2001 
GMRM Release 2 Delivery to SLC with Installation and User Guide 02/07/2001 
GMRM Release 2 On-site Acceptance Test Complete 04/07/2001 
Client Raise priority I and 2 PIRs or sign acceptance certificate 04/07/2001 
AES Deliver the fixes for priority 1 and 2 PIRs 24/07/2001 
Client re-test priority I and 2 PIRs fixes complete 31/07/2001 
Client sign acceptance certificate 31/07/2001 
Start of Warranty Period 31/07/2001 
The exact features of Release 1 and Release 2 were not detailed in the proposal. It was 
understood, however, that Release I was to provide the core functionality that would allow 
SubB to participate in an industry testing in June. Release 2 was expected to have extra 
functionality built in to manage multiple MRAs and to manage ad-hoc reads, which were 
required to meet SubB's operational needs at the time of implementation in July. The project 
team considered Release 2 delivery on 02/07/2001 being too late if the release was to be 
properly tested and to meet the industry deadline of 23/07/2001. This concern was taken up 
by AES and Release 2 delivery date was moved to 22/06/2001 in the revised proposal (AES, 
3,4). 
5.5.2 Contract Price and Payment Schedule 
At the time of the feasibility study, AES' proposed license fee was £250K (SLC, 1). At the 
time of project initiation at the end of March, the license fee was requested to be £350K 
15 The term "Phase" was used instead of "Release"" in the original document (AES, 2). "Release" was 
used in later documents (AES, 3,4). To be consistent, the term "Release" is adopted throughout the 
case study. 
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(AES, 2). The increase was apparently due to a mistaken calculation. It was eventually 
negotiated down to £300K (AES, 3). The payment schedule was requested by AES (AES, 3) 
as shown in Table 5.3 (based on AES, 3). 
T. hla C 1. A Ti C' initial n. -at crharlnla 
Project Milestone Price (ex VAT) Indicative Dates per Proposed Project Plan 
Order Acceptance 50% (11 50K 2/4/2001 
Release I Delivery 15% £45K 30/4/2001 
Release 2 Delivery 15% £45K 22/6/2001 
Final Acceptance of 
Release 2 delivery 
20% (£60K) 23/7/2001 
5.5.3 Acceptance Criteria 
There had been no product acceptance criteria set by the client before the project started. AES 
suggested in its project proposal (AES, 3, p. 20) that the software be deemed as accepted 
should any of the following occur: 
0 SubB or SLC sign an Acceptance Certificate following formal Acceptance Testing; 
" SubB use the Software in live operation; 
9 30 days have elapsed from completion of the Acceptance Testing. 
An email from the client's contract manager dated 25/07/2001 (SubB, 1) made some further 
conditions regarding software acceptance in relation to a final payment of £25K that was held 
back. The items related to GMRM product are listed below: 
0 Delivery of AES' Site Acceptance Test Report and an action plan for the resolution 
of reported GMRM defects; 
9 Delivery of an agreed list of GMRM defects at the conclusion of the UKOne/SLC 
System Acceptance Test and an action plan for their resolution (This test was to 
follow AES' Site Acceptance Test within three weeks); 
" Delivery of all agreed GMRM documentation as outlined in the proposal with a plan 
for any updated versions to incorporate any corrections/omissions identified by 
UKOne/SLC raised prior to the end of warranty. 
No provision seemed to have been made in any of available contractual documents regarding 
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the possibility of the software product not being accepted or not operating to the client's 
satisfaction. 
5.5.4 Contract Administration 
There are two observations regarding the contract administration. The first is related to the 
contractual commitment between the client and the supplier. The contract was effective from 
03/04/2001 but was not signed until after 13/06/2001 (AES, 5). The fact that AES started the 
delivery effort before the contract was actually signed suggests that UKOne must have made 
a contractual commitment to AES in some way, formal or informal. Exactly how that 
commitment was made is not clear. The rush to making a contractual commitment without 
having a contract signed was partly due to the fixed deadline being imposed externally, partly 
due to the time required to agree the details of the contract and associated proposals. Such an 
action to commit resources without a signed contract could also be interpreted as a sign of 
trust and partnership. Certainly AES did commit to work as "partners" with UKOne in its 
proposals (AES, 2,3). Though this is difficult to interpret since the term "partner" was 
perhaps used loosely without any legally defined meaning. The actual lack of trust was made 
quite clear later in a threat issued by AES for holding back Release 2 should there be further 
delays to signing the contract (AES, 5). 
The second observation is that the quality control and product acceptance procedure was not 
specified in any detail. Under the heading of "Details of, Procedure for and Commencement 
Date of Acceptance Tests", all that was stated is: 
"25'h June 2001 Acceptance testing commences, 23rd July 2001 Acceptance 
Certificate signed" (AES, 4) 
This is hardly detailed! No provision was made regarding the possible outcome of the 
software product NOT being accepted. 
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5.6 Project Budget and Cost Control 
While the license cost of GMRM from AES was "fixed" from the early stage of the project, 
other project cost items were changeable depending on the project progress. The main 
changeable items were costs for project consultancy provided by AES and system testing, 
integration and implementation activities carried out by SLC. Table 5.4 gives a breakdown of 
the MPS Project total cost as seen from mid July to mid September 2001. 
Table 4.4! MPS Prnipct cnct ectimatinn and mnnitnrinn 
















Total 549,50016 603,575 608,051 593,581 615,348 710,440 765,177, 
AES Resource 
Total 142,000 115,000 90,542 90,542 90,542 98,887 103,887 
AES-GMRM 
Licence 300,000 300,000 300,00 0 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000 
AES-GMRM 
Support 40,0001 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,00( 40,004 40,0001 
Other Costs 269,000 203,640 220,078 220,078 220,078 220,078 220,078 
Pro ect Total 1,300,5001 1,262,215 1,258,670 1,244,201 1,265,967 1,369 405 1.429.142 
Interestingly, AES consultancy expenditure came under budget. According to a private 
conversation with the project manager, this was because the project team and SubB 
management demanded free resources from AES to resolve quality problems in the process of 
testing and implementing GMRM. The biggest overspend was on the SLC resources. The 
original budget for SLC resources was £549,500, which was later increased, partly due to 
some cost variations and partly due to applying 6.3% unit (man-day) price increase by SLC 
from April 2001. The target budget was thus around £614K for SLC (SLC, 20). By mid 
August 2001, projected SLC resource cost was within the budget level. The cost estimate 
went just over the budget one week later and then went up quickly by over £l OOK less than 
two week later, an increase of nearly 20%. Two weeks later, the cost estimate went up further 
by over £SOK or an additional 8%. These increases alone were responsible for the overall 
16 This figure was later increased, partly due to some cost variations and partly due to applying a 6.3% 
man-day price increase. The target budget for this item in July 2001 was thus around £614K (SLC, 20). 
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project cost overrun of 10%, even though other cost items had come on or under budget. 
The project was initially planned to be completed by 17/08/2001 (SLC, 8). That was not 
achieved because GMRM did not function as required. AES had to continue the software 
development and SLC had to retain a number of staff for further testing and system 
integration. The project could not be closed down since GMRM was not stable in the 
production environment, requiring close manual intervention and alternative arrangements 
(data converters) to deal with daily data processing. The project had to be extended for more 
than two months, officially closed on 26/10/2001 (see Section 5.8), causing a considerable 
amount of cost overrun. The cost was passed onto SubB since the overrun was caused by 
AES. SLC was there to help recover a disastrous situation and thus expected to be paid in full. 
5.7 Product Quality Control and Acceptance Testing 
AES provided a set of acceptance testing scenario and scripts (AES, 7) with the first GMRM 
release. There were 28 test scenarios that the core GMRM product should be able to perform. 
AES advised that the first release could only perform 10 of these scenarios (SLC, 18). Even 
with the 10 scenarios, and using artificially constructed test data with nine Metering Point 
Administration Numbers (MPANs)'7 (AES, 13) supplied by AES, there were seven defects 
raised with issues ranging from test scripts errors to failures of data import or export (SLC, 
18). The client representatives provided nine comments on the graphical user interface design 
with the awareness that the development had not been completed at that stage (SLC, 18). 
Unfortunately, the pattern of software release, acceptance testing and defect communications 
was repeated many times toward the system implementation date of 23/07/2001 and thereafter 
(SLC, 13,14,15,16). As a result, no acceptance certificate could be signed either by Subs or 
SLC, as initially envisaged. As of 29/07/2001, SubB held back £25K payment, the release of 
17 Each MPAN is a point where meter reading is taken. A single customer may have one or more MPANs associated. 
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which was subject to a number of conditions including a further round of acceptance testing 
(SubB, 1; Section 5.5.3). 
5.8 Actual Project Progresses 
The actual software releases are shown in Table 5.5. 
Tahlr 5_Sý CHUM dplivprv nrnarocc ns cmmniled nn 26/11)/2001 
Release# Received Date Notes 
GMRM 1.00.01 30/04/2001 
GMRM1.01.00 23/05/2001 This was to be delivered on 21/05/2001 
GMRM2.00.00 27/06/2001 The release only contains core functionality as defined for 
Release 1. 
GMRM2.01.00 13/07/2001 This release had to be implemented on 23/07/2001 with 
limited functionality. 
GMRM2.01.01 25/07/2001 This and following patches (small releases) were for fixing 








GMRM2.02.00 14/09/2001 Release 2 as originally defined. The Release included extra 
functions which had to o extensive testing" 
On 26/10/2001, SLC closed its project officially. The product was handed over to production 
support with the project team re-assigned to support activities. At that time, the production 
system had Release GMRM2.01.08 that performed two of six major business processes: 
" Gain (live but producing exceptions which must be manually resolved); 
" Loss (live but producing exceptions which must be manually resolved); 
" Reads processing (not working); 
" Meter Exchange details (not working); 
" Multiple MRA function (not available); 
" Ad-hoc Read (not available). 
No official product acceptance certificate was ever signed. However, according to one of the 
1e Based on conversations with colleagues continued to be associated with GMRM, SubB decided to 
implement a new application from a different supplier toward the end of 2002. 
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AES' initial acceptance criteria, the product would have deemed to be accepted if the client 
used it for "live production" (Section 5.5.3). 
5.9 Project Issues and Within Case Analysis 
The following issues are discussed in this section: supplier selection, system architecture, data 
integration, documentation, risk management, and post-implementation review. A brief 
comment is made regarding the success and failure of the GMRM product and the MPS 
Project as a whole. 
5.9.1 Supplier Selection 
The selection of AES was a considered decision as a result of SLC's feasibility study, though 
with "WITH SEVERE RESERVATIONS" (Section 5.3). In other words, SubB knew it was 
taking high risks by choosing AES. Yet comparing with other options, the risks associated 
with AES were considered to be more manageable. There is no evidence from the project to 
indicate that the initial decision was necessarily wrong, even though the software product 
from AES was far from adequate. There was simply no better options. 
5.9.2 System Architecture 
In AES' initial proposal, there was a promise of close integration of GMRM and the existing 
system SPMS. In assessing various options, this tight integration helped the supplier selection 
decision to favour AES significantly. Yet GMRM as delivered to SubB stood on its own in 
managing the customer portfolio. In other words, GMRM was not "closely" integrated with 
SPMS. The SLC project team raised a question to AES Programme Manager about the 
architectural change compared with the original understanding. The question was why 
GMRM had been designed to be separate from SPMS in terms of portfolio management 
instead of being integrated with SPMS as initially understood to be. After all, SPMS already 
had a well-established customer portfolio and a tried-and-tested process to maintain it. The 
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fact GMRM was stand-alone meant that SubB had introduced another system that had a 
duplicate portfolio to be maintained and the new portfolio must be synchronised with the one 
in SPMS. A few weeks after GMRM was implemented, there were problems in achieving 
such a synchronisation. 
AES' answer to the above question was that GMRM had been designed as a stand-alone 
system so that it could be sold to a new client without SPMS. Otherwise, GMRM could only 
be sold to those already with SPMS installed or sold to new clients with SPMS bundled 
together. Neither option was going to be attractive to AES since the existing SPMS client 
base was small and SPMS had become too dated to be sold to new clients. AES' decision 
seemed perfectly rational to AES, but it created a heavy burden for SubB. Supporting two 
systems was more costly. What was worse was the potential problem of data inconsistency 
that could develop overtime among systems. Such data inconsistency would present 
difficulties for reporting and customer portfolio reconciliation. 
Surprisingly, such a fundamental issue was not discussed and clarified more between the 
project team and the supplier. The project team seemed to have formed an expectation based 
on the supplier's initial product description and waited for the first product delivery on 
30/04/2001 to understand the actual design. The tight timescale to meet an industry deadline 
meant that it would have been inconceivable for the project to switch the supplier at that 
stage. There was little chance for the project team to force AES to re-design the product 
either. The contract between SubB and AES simply did not cater for such an unexpected 
situation. All the project team managed was a feeble protest in front of AES programme 
manager toward the end of the project. The issue was a sensitive one that could lead SLC to 
be accused of negligence and was therefore not officially documented. 
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5.9.3 Data Integration 
After GMRM was installed onto the client's system platform and before it could operate for 
production, a data migration exercise, also called data population, had to be performed to 
transfer relevant data from UMRS, SPMS and Transco to GMRM' database. This exercise 
went through a carefully managed process of requirement specification, script development, 
testing and execution (AES, 8,9; SLC, 10). However, the data migration was problematic. Of 
the total target 469,034 records to be imported from Transco, 18,855, or 4% could not be 
imported for one reason or another (SLC, 12). The task of reconciling these records was left 
to the client to deal with separately after the project. 
The new system had to operate with not only the legacy data, but also daily new data for 
production purpose. Of the six main business processes, customer gain and customer loss data 
could be processed successfully after the system went live on 23/07/2001. The processing of 
daily meter reads, however, could not be accomplished with the new system (SLC, 13,14). 
Serious problems were reported including system "hanging" during loading meter reads, poor 
system performance and system had to be shutdown and restarted to progress data loading etc 
(SLC, 15). The hope of using GMRM to process meter reads for production was eventually 
abandoned. Temporary scripts were written by SLC to "convert" the reads into the right data 
format, which were then sent to Transco for gas usage reconciliation and also sent to SubB's 
billing system according to the established procedures (SLC, 14,16). 
Processing meter reads was a basic function expected of GMRM. In the initial acceptance 
testing, the basic meter reading process (Scenario 5 in AES, 18) actually passed the test (SLC, 
7). In the "Known Omissions and Faults" document issued by AES on 23/05/2001 to 
accompany Release 1.01.00, AES claimed that all functions related to processing meter reads 
were included apart from "tolerance checking in validation" (AES, 10). This Release was 
subjected to the industry trial testing in June. SLC's test report stated that, though 22 defects 
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were raised on many aspects of the application, the Release passed the necessary tests for 
processing meter reads (SLC, 17). However, the industry trial test, like the acceptance tests, 
was conducted using carefully designed test data that amounted to a few dozen records (SLC, 
17). These test data could not match the production data with "industrial strengths20 (a term 
used by AES' Technical Architect). This industrial strength is not only related to data volume, 
but also to data variety that would demand a level of system robustness. Artificial test data 
give rise to artificial test results that could not be used to extrapolate on a system's full 
capability to deal with "industrial strength" data. 
5.9.4 Product Acceptance Testing 
According to Pfleeger (1998), a software application is expected to be tested first by the 
developers until "the system meets all requirements specified" (p. 360). Thereafter, the 
application is delivered to the client and is installed onto a system platform for the customer's 
acceptance testing. Writing from the developers' point of view, Pfleeger (1998) elaborates: 
"The purpose of acceptance testing is to enable the customers and users to 
determine if the system we built really meets their needs and expectations. Thus 
acceptance tests are written, conducted, and evaluated by the customers, with 
assistance from the developers only when the customer requests an answer to a 
technical question. Usually, those customers employees who were involved in 
requirements definition play a large part in acceptance testing because they 
understand what kind of system the customer intended to have built. " (p. 360) 
The above description, however, does not reflect how acceptance was carried out in GMRM 
project. Acceptance testing, like other formal testing activities, has to be guided by a set of 
detailed test scripts. The test scripts must specify exactly the inputs required, the actions to be 
performed and the expected system behaviours and outputs. Though customer employees 
involved in requirements definition know the business processes to be incorporated in the 
application, they do not know the technical implementation details before an application is 
delivered. Yet test script writing depends closely on the actual technical implementation in 
20 In the IT industry, industrial strength is the ability of a hardware or software product or a system to 
work capably and dependably in the operational world of business (TechTarget, 2001). lJere the term 
"industrial strength" refers to volume and variety characteristics in operational data compared with 
artificially constructed test data. 
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terms of which buttons are to be pressed and which files are to be imported before expecting 
specific responses from the application. Even after a software application is delivered, 
customer employees must be trained by the supplier (the developers) to operate the system. 
Customer employees simply cannot be expected to write acceptance test scripts unless the 
software application is designed to be intuitive and for users who are expected to receive 
minimal training (e. g. web applications). For a business system like GMRM, complex data 
import and output operations together with the need to resolve application exceptions meant 
that the project team did not know what to expect before the application was delivered. As it 
turned out, AES provided acceptance testing scenarios and scripts (AES, 7; Section 5.7) in 
this project. 
5.9.5 Software Product Documentation 
Many documents related to the software product GMRM were issued from AES to the project 
team. The main ones were: 
" GMRM User Guide (e. g. AES, 14); 
" System Administrators Guide (e. g. AES, 15); 
" Installation Instructions (e. g. AES, 16); 
" GMRM Data Dictionary (e. g. AES, 17); 
" GMRM Acceptance Test Scenarios (e. g. AES, 11,12); 
" Known faults and omission for a particular release (e. g. AES, 19). 
Not all documents were issued with each release and not all documents were issued as 
complete. For example, the User Guide for Release 1 was issued as an "incomplete draft" 
(SLC, 28). The System Administrators Guide was not delivered until Release 2 in late June. 
Even then it was issued as a draft. 
Much required information was missing. For example, GMRM was designed to validate input 
data according to validation rules with adjustable parameters. This was to deal with the 
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client's concern on meter readings that might have been mistaken in some obvious way (e. g. 
readings from a wrong meter). The validation capability was supposed to be available in 
Release 2.00.00 delivered on 27/06/2001 (AES, 19). However, no detail was provided by 
AES with the release. Once asked, AES provided a list of "error codes". Not happy with the 
information provided, the issue was escalated to AES' programme manager. AES replied with 
the same file reformatted with the file name changed to "Meter Reading Validation Rules"! 
The project team did not receive the requested information even after sending a similar 
document of validation rules as an example (SLC, 29). 
5.9.6 Risk Management 
A spreadsheet called Quantitative Risk Analysis Matrix (QRAM, see Appendix C for a 
template) was used to assess the overall project risks and the potential cost implications in the 
beginning (SLC, 3). The matrix produced for the project documented seven major risks, two 
of which were related to AES. Each was given a probability of occurrence, cost of 
occurrence, cost impact, mitigation action, mitigation cost delta (if the mitigation cost had 
been budgeted for already, the delta would be zero), the residual risk level and impact after 
the mitigation. Due to the risk analysis, the project team recommended an additional 
contingency fund of £98K to cover the mitigation cost delta plus the residual cost impact 
(SLC, 2). 
A related but separate risk register was used to record and manage the on-going risks (SLC, 
4). Some risks were foreseen and managed successfully. For example, one risk entry was 
related to the acquisition of hardware necessary for building system platforms for testing and 
production. Proactive actions were taken to expedite the procurement process. In addition, 
extra funding was secured (SLC, 30) to rent necessary hard disks to build a contingent test 
platform. This was in place for the delivery of the first GMRM release on 30/04/2001 while 
the acquired hardware was not in place until the end of May (SLC, 31). Some risks were 
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identified but were not successfully managed. For example, the risk of late software delivery 
with high rate of defects was prominent on the risk register with "visible evidence" based 
"monitoring" and "inspecting" of GMRM product development and AES' test results as the 
mitigating actions (SLC, 4). However, these actions did not appear to be feasible. The 
suggestion to visit AES premise during the development did not take place for fear of 
interrupting the development and slow down the software delivery further. The risk turned 
into a serious issue at the point of product implementation (Section 5.8). Another observation 
is that throughout the project, many project issues were dealt with on an as-required basis, 
without necessary being recorded in the risk register beforehand. For example, according to 
the project manager, the fact that the Project Sponsor was replaced half way through the 
project presented one of the biggest problems. Exactly what could be done as a mitigating 
action was not clear even if this had been foreseen. As a result, the risk register as updated on 
06/08/2001 showed no further entry after 05/06/2001. 
5.9.7 Post-Implementation Review 
SLC's "Project Quality Plan" included a task of "Post Implementation Review" (SLC, 5). The 
action was "owned" by the project manager. While reviews did take place regarding 
individual team member performance, there was no review regarding the project as a whole or 
the GMRM workstream in particular by October 2001 when the project was closed down. In a 
private conversation in November 2001, the project manager confirmed the need to have a 
comprehensive post-implementation review. But he ruled out having an independent review 
by someone else in the company. He explained that that would have been contrary to the open 
and trusting culture SLC had always advocated. The author is not aware of the planned 
review has ever taken place. 
5.9.8 Project Success or Failure? 
The project can be described as "challenged" according to Standish Group (1995). The 
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project was completed in a way but delivered GMRM late and over budget with "fewer 
features and functions than originally specified" (Section 3.3.1). If the Maude and Willis 
(1991) criterion (a project is a failure if it would have been more economic not to have run it - 
-- see Section 3.3) is to be applied, the project might be considered as a failure. This is 
supported by the fact that SubB later decided to replace GMRM with a product from another 
supplied. 
5.10 MPS Project Chronology with Events Relating to GMRM 
24 January 2001: SLC presented a feasibility study highlighting options available with 
input from various suppliers; 
02 February 2001: SLC was selected as the prime contractor (SLC, 6); 
28 March 2001: AES confirmed its contract proposal, increased license fee from the 
initial £250K to £350K (AES, 2,6; SLC, 9); 
01 April 2001: The original deadline for MRA/PGT Separation, which was 
postponed to July 2001; 
03 April 2001: Transco called a meeting regarding industry trial for new systems to 
be compliant with Proteus system. The trial is to take place in June 
2001 and a go/no go decision to be made on 05/07/2001; 
03 April 2001: The contract between SubB and AES became effective ahead of the 
contract being formally signed; 
10 April 2001: Project Initiation Meeting participated by management from SubB, 
AES and MPS Project Manager; 
30 April 2001: SLC proposal to be the prime contractor was formally approved by 
SubB (SLC, 2). AES issued Release 1 as promised together with 28 
acceptance test scenarios (AES, 7); 
04 May 2001: SLC issued a test report on GMRM Release 1 (SLC, 7); 
21 See Footnote #18. 
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04 June 2001: UK-wide industry trial test started; 
27 June 2001: AES issued Release 2 but not as defined in the original proposal. 
Release did not contain SubB specific functions; 
28 June 2001: UK-wide industry trial test finish date; 
05 July 2001: The decision was made by Transco and the other gas suppliers to go 
ahead with the new system implementation date of 23/07/2001; 
23 July 2001: Transco Proteus went live. GMRM implemented and system support 
activities undertaken by SLC project team. Temporary converters 
were written to process data that could not be handled by GMRM. 
29 July 2001: SubB outlined conditions for releasing £25K payment; 
17 August 2001: Planned SLC project closedown date; 
14 September 2001: AES issued GMRM2.02.00 which was equivalent to Release 2 as 
originally defined, over three months late. The release was subject to 
on-going test and defect fixes without being implemented to the 
production platform; 
26 October 2001: SLC officially closed down the project. GMRM support was handed 
over to a dedicated support team. AES continued to develop GMRM 
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Chapter 6: Case 3- Building a Low Voltage Connectivity Model 
(July 2001 to March 2002) 
6.1 Background 
The electricity distribution network cascades down from a high voltage (HV) grid to low 
voltage (LV) networks, and finally leading to consumer points. The Great Britain is divided 
into 14 Public Electricity Supply (PES) areas. Each PES area's electricity distribution 
network is controlled by a single distribution business, usually as part of a utility company. 
Due to recent privatisation and subsequent mergers and take-overs, some utility companies 
now control more than one PES area (Robinson, 1996; EA, 2003). The management of the 
distribution network within each PES area, however, has continued to be run as a natural 
monopoly (Kay, 1994; Helm, 1994) subject to the regulation of Office of Electricity 
Regulation (Offer, 1997), later Office of Gas and Electricity Market (Ofgem). 
A distribution network may be susceptible to disruptions due to many reasons, including 
ageing equipment, extreme weather or even wild life activities. A disruption may cause an 
outage, i. e. a failure to distribute electricity to one or more customers. Among many aspects 
of work management within a distribution company, outage management is essential. 
Typically, an Outage Management System (OMS) is used to monitor, record and report 
outages in the distribution network and to help co-ordinating recovery. In an effort to improve 
connectivity and reduce the level of outage in distribution networks, Ofgem embarked on the 
second phase of the so-called "Information and Incentive Project (IIP)" on 18/01/2001 with a 
deadline of April 2002 (Ofgem, 2001a, 2001b). Two main objectives for the initiative are 
(Ofgem, 2001b): 
" To reinforce the incentives for the distribution companies to meet quality targets; 
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" To introduce more relative comparison so that all distribution companies have a 
continual incentive to focus on performance, rather than meeting a single target. 
Being a subsidiary of UKOne, SubC is responsible for maintaining the distribution networks 
in two PES areas (one is UKOne's "native" PES area and the other acquired in 1995 through 
take-over). Like other distribution companies, SubC initiated its own IIP project in response 
to Ofgem's IIP instructions and guidelines (Ofgem, 2000b, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2002). The 
project was further divided into a number of workstreams or subprojects for effective 
management. 
This case study examines one key workstream in SubC's IIP project. The workstream, known 
as LV Connectivity (LVC) Subproject22, focused on the introduction of a software tool for 
linking customer information to distribution networks to produce an LVC Model. The 
successful completion of LVC Model with a certain minimum level of accuracy would enable 
SubC to meet part of Ofgem's regulatory requirements and recover 50p per customer (SubC, 
8). Failure was not an option - if any company failed to comply by the deadline of April 
2002, Ofgem would take actions including imposing financial penalties for the breach of 
licence conditions as set out in the Utilities Act 2000. This would include a penalty of up to 
10% of the regulated income, which amounted to £40m in SubC's case (SubC, 8). In addition 
to meeting the regulatory requirements, SubC would gain operational efficiency by more 
accurate customer information, better outage management, better informed investment 
decisions and enhanced restoration of supply (SubC, 8). This case study first introduces the 
client's requirements followed by the project organisation and the selection of the software 
tool supplier. Thereafter various project aspects of cost, time and product are recorded in 
separate sections. The case is completed with within-case analyses on a number of issues. 
22 The workstream is sometimes referred to as a subproject, sometimes as a project. Where there is no 
confusion, both terms will be used interchangeably in this Chapter. 
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6.2 SubC Requirements Regarding LVC 
A Statement of Requirements for IIP was compiled based on Ofgem's instructions and 
guidelines (SubC, 9). SubC's IIP as a whole had many aspects, some of which were carried 
out by internal SubC personnel, some assigned to contractors already in place. This case study 
focuses on the LVC Subproject, which was to establish an LVC Model (SubC, 9) for the two 
PES areas under SubC's responsibility. The LVC Model is a complete representation of all 
items in a LV distribution network, from feeders (wires connecting a substation to the LV 
networks) to customers represented by Metering Point Administration Numbers (MPANs). 
Ofgem also required the resultant LVC Model to be dynamic to the HV voltage level. That 
meant that as switching occurs on the HV network (i. e. the configuration of the HV systems 
changes), LVC model should be able to track and update in real time the HV feeding 
arrangements for all customers (Ofgem, 2000a). These requirements were to be met by April 
2002. 
Ofgem's LVC requirements were translated into the following objectives for the LVC 
Subproject: 
" To acquire a software tool for linking LV feeders to customer MPANs; 
" To build the LVC model with the software tool using existing customer information 
data and map-based distribution network data; 
" To establish processes for LVC model to be maintained on an on-going basis. 
The objectives were clearly linked. The first objective was the means to realise the second 
and the third. The successful acquisition and implementation of an efficient tool was essential 
before the LVC Model could be built. On top of that, detailed business processes to keep 
LVC Model to be dynamically up to date could only be devised with a clear understanding of 
how the software tool worked. 
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6.3 Project Organisation and Resources 
SubC, as an organisation, had been well experienced in running mission critical ISD projects. 
The majority of the operational systems already in place had been developed with project 
teams directly managed by internal SubC project managers instead of relying on prime 
contractors or external consultants. IIP was also managed by an internal project manager with 
a senior business manager as the project sponsor. The project was broken down into a few 
workstreams or subprojects. Each workstream was managed by a subproject manager. The 
subproject managers were also from within SubC with business domain knowledge. They 
were assisted, among others, by one IT Project Manager who in turn commanded IT 












LVC Subproject I Project Quality I IT Project 
Manager Manager Manager (SLC) 
Supplier SC] Supplier SC2 Supplier SC3 SubC's Internal SLC !T 
(OMSTooI) (Network) (Data Bureau) Staff Staff 
Figure 6.1: Indicative organisational chart for The IIP/LVC Project 
The project organisation indicates that SubC was directly managing the overall project and 
various subprojects. Suppliers in the project were contracted and managed by client project 
managers to serve specific purposes. Supplier SC 1 was selected to provide the software tool 
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OMSTool (See Section 6.4). Supplier SC2 was an existing supplier who provided the 
necessary IT network hardware and its maintenance services. Supplier SC3 was contracted to 
operate the "Data Capture Bureau", where the OMSTool was to be deployed and operated to 
construct the LVC Model on dedicated PC workstations. SLC's IT staff were largely 
responsible for integrating the OMSTool with client data and other systems by working 
closely with SubC staff and other suppliers. 
6.4 Supplier Selection and Contracting 
The LVC Subproject aimed to deliver a complex integrated information system consisting of 
the necessary system platforms, application software and relevant data repositories. The key 
was to acquire the application software that could assist building the required LVC Model 
accurately and efficiently. In addition, there was a need to integrate the system elements 
together as well as with the existing systems and infrastructure. This section describes the 
selection of the suppliers for the application software and the system integration. 
6.4.1 Selecting the Application Software Supplier 
An invitation to tender (ITT) document was sent to six potential software suppliers initially 
(SubC, 6). SubC required each supplier to complete a "Compliance Matrix". The Compliance 
Matrix listed SubC's requirements in eight major functional areas. Each area was further 
divided into a number of sub-headings varying from three to nine. For example, under the 
main heading of "Data Import Methodology", four different file formats were listed as 
separate requirements. The suppliers were invited to reveal the level of compliance of their 
software tool by stating whether it is compliant, partial compliant or not compliant at all. 
There were fifty-three subheadings in total. Two suppliers were short-listed for detailed 
assessment, one coded as SC1 and the other SC1A. Table 6.1 (SCI, 1) shows the level of 
compliance of OMSTool reported by SCI, which was the supplier eventually selected. For 
comparison, SC 1 A's compliance matrix is shown in Table 6.2 (SC 1 A, 1). 
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Tnhle 6.1- Siinnlipr Sri 'c nprreivpd rmmnliance summary 






Data Import Methodology 4 1 2 0 7 
Core Functionality 7 2 0 0 9 
Interface 7 1 0 0 8 
Reporting 7 1 0 1 9 
Infrastructure 6 0 0 0 6 
Additional Functionality 7 0 0 0 7 
Security 3 0 0 0 3 
Output Structure 1 3 0 0 4 
Total 42 8 2 1 53 
Note: "Partial Compliant" includes "Compliant (with customisation)". 
Tnhh 6 
. 
2- Cimnlinr SC1 A'c nrrroivarl rmmnlianrt+ cnmmarv 






Data Import Methodology 5 2 0 0 7 
Core Functionality 9 0 0 0 9 
Interface 8 0 0 0 8 
Reporting 9 0 0 0 9 
Infrastructure 6 0 0 0 6 
Additional Functionality 7 0 0 0 7 
Security 3 0 0 0 3 
Output Structure 4 0 0 0 4 
Total 51 2 0 0 53 
Although there were subheadings in the Compliance Matrix showing "partial compliant" and 
"not compliant", the project team considered both suppliers' software tools to have met "the 
fundamental requirement" of associating MPANs to LV Feeders "fully" (SubC, 6). Therefore 
both software tools were considered to be "viable". In addition to the consideration of 
functional compliance, other non-functional aspects also were assessed. A summary 
document was produced, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the two options. An 
excerpt is given in Table 6.3 (based on SubC, 6, with some references to company names 
anonymised). 
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TnhIn 6_'ir rmmnarinn the hide dnrinn cunnlier celkction 
Supplier SCI Supplier SCIA 
" Web Based Architecture - Matches " The same product used successfully in 
UKOne's corporate IT strategy; SubC's sister company in US; 
" Currently used by 5 of 14 UK PES; " Experience in turnkey data delivery ; 
" SCI provide UK support; " Partnership with ICL, who know our 
" Cheaper Product of two selected. business; 
" Offers `One Corporate' solution. 
" Currently undergoing rapid sales " Product uses database that is not strategic to 
growth, so support may be jeopardised; UKOne, therefore IT support will be more 
ý 
Small Company; expensive; 
i i n hi " Li b i h h ,, " No current experience of Turnkey data cens ng so user c may ave as sw äi delivery. costs issues for scaling up its use; 
" Supplier is US based, so support may be 
problematic due to time differences. 
The project team's recommendation was to select SCI on the ground of the lower price (20% 
lower compared with SC 1 A), more flexible architecture and UK support. Another crucial 
perceived advantage was that SCI's OMSToo1 product had already been deployed or were 
going to be deployed within five other UK utility companies, who were also undertaking IIP 
projects (SubC, 6). Though SCI's support capacity was identified as a weakness in the 
recommendation document, there was no evidence that this weakness was addressed. The 
lack of support capacity proved to be a serious handicap to the project when technical 
problems surfaced (Section 6.10). 
It is worthwhile to note that the database technologies used in SCI product were of open 
standard nature. This was marketed as strength by the supplier (SCI, 1). On the other hand, 
SCIA used proprietary database technology, which in addition was referred to as "not 
strategic" to UKOne's corporate strategy. There was, however, a favourable argument for 
SC1A's product due to SubC's sister company in US having "successfully" implemented it 
already. Overall, however, the decision was still in favour of SCI. 
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6.4.2 Contracting with SCI 
Project team's recommendation for SC1 was duly approved. After a brief period of 
negotiation, SubC issued an award letter of contract to SCI on 06/08/2001. The initial full 
contract document was not available for this study. An amended version of the contract letter 
dated 10/12/2001 gave details of a "Milestone Payment Schedule" (Table 6.4), which was 
based entirely on SCI's requested payment schedule dated 23/07/2001 (SC 1,1). Among the 
milestones, the key one was the system acceptance date of 14/09/2001. 
Table 6.4: Milestnne navment -tehpdulp hetween SuhC and Sc! 
Milestone Percentage Payment of the Total 
Contract Award Price 
_Following 
Contract Award 20% 
_Following 
delivering System Design Specification 10% 
_Following 
Site Delive 35% 
_Following 
Site Acceptance (planned to be 14/09/2001) 25% 
60 days after Acceptance 10% 
There are two additional points in the contract amendment worth mentioning here (SubC, 7): 
"A requirement of the supplier to have "Professional Indemnity Insurance" of 
£1,000,000 to be in place (SC1 claimed it to be); 
0A contract sub-clause stating that "maximum loss recoverable by the client to be 
100% of contract price or the value already paid". 
However, there was no definition of conditions under which the "Professional Indemnity 
Insurance" would be claimed or the conditions under which the client would recover for any 
loss or the value paid. 
6.5 Project Budget and Cost Control 
Only budgetary details relevant to the LVC Subproject are discussed here. The initial budget 
expenditure for the LVC Subproject was set to be £ 1,943K (SubC, 29,30). That figure was 
reduced to £l, 400K (SubC, 10), mainly due to lower than expected software product cost. 
Percentages of various budget elements are given in Table 6.5 (based on SubC, 10). 
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Tahie 6_S" I. VC Cuhnrnirrt hnria, -t hrrnkdnwn 
Item No. Items Percentage of Total Bud et 
1 SubC Internal Salaries 6.6% 
2 SLC Cost for Integration 24.5% 
3 Data Capture Bureau 36,4% 
4 Data Capture Software OMSTool 17.1% 
5 Software Tool Related Platform License Fees 5.8% 
6 Reference Data Acquisition 3.7% 
7 Data Capture Hardware 5.9% 
Total 100% 
In Table 6.5, the biggest expenditure for the project was budgeted for the Data Capture 
Bureau. This was due to the labour intensive nature of the capturing operation. The OMSTool 
(Item 4) together with the necessary system software licence fees (Item 5) cost 22.9%, less 
than the planned SLC system integration cost. This might be explained partly by the fact that 
OMSToo1 was a COTS software package, therefore the development cost was shared by a 
few clients. Partly it might be explained by the complex nature of system integration, which 
was carried out through phases of requirement analysis, solution design, development and 
implementation, demanding a high level of resources. 
SC 1's price for the OMSTool was fixed (Item 4 in Table 6.5), covering "computer software 
and associated data conversion of all UKOne's LV network data, to allow linking of 
customers to LV feeders, with associated outputs ... 
" (SubC, 11). The definition was 
comprehensive. SubC was able to manage the cost of OMSTool as fixed, giving little 
opportunity for SCI to increase the price. Indeed, the project was successful in containing the 
project cost by March 2002, spending only £1,108K compared with the reduced budget of 
£1,400K (SubC, 32). On the other hand, system integration cost was based on a T&M 
contract with SLC. The costs of two other major items (Items I and 3 in Table 6.5) were also 
related to the length of project time and was initially budgeted assuming the project 
completion date was to be March 2002. As it turned out, the project had to be extended for an 
additional year, requiring £996K in addition to the initial budget of £1,400K (SubC, 31). 
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6.6 Product Quality Control and Product Acceptance 
SCI's OMSToo1 was sold as a COTS product that should require only a limited amount of 
customisation. Not all quality procedures that OMSTool went through were disclosed. So far 
as the SubC's LVC project team was concerned, the following quality related activities were 
visible: 
" SC1 presented a "Quality Manual" describing its overall quality system "designed to 
conform to International Standard BS EN ISO 9001: 1994" (SCI, 3); 
"A "Master Test Plan" was prepared up front (SC1,4) dated 23/4/2001 together with 
the first version of the bidding document. This test plan "outlines the scope of testing, 
the way in which testing is to be conducted, who will test, and what resources are 
required when". However, this document remained as incomplete with its status left 
as "Draft" and a section on risks left with no details; 
" Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) took place between 24/9/2001 and 28/9/2001 but the 
test report was not issued until 18/10/2001 (SCI, 5). The report contained no details 
on software defects other than stating the fact that 29 issues were recorded in the test; 
" Site Acceptance Test (SAT) took place on SubC's system platform between 
3/10/2001 and 5/10/2001. A number of issues were recorded and Sc! made an effort 
to provide fixes. SAT took place again between 11/10/2001 and 12/10/2001. A 
document was produced giving details of the issues (SC1,6). 
Due to unresolved critical issues after these quality control activities, the OMSTool was 
deemed not to be fully "accepted" by SubC. Therefore the milestone of product acceptance 
was left outstanding. Each subsequent patch release was tested with a subset of production 
data on a project test environment. The problem diagnosis and resolution was painfully slow. 
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6.7 Actual Project Progresses 
The key milestone of Site Acceptance initially planned on 14/09/2001 was not achieved. 
Instead, there was a Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) on 24/09/2001 on SC1's premise. FAT 
was carried out on a system platform together with test data provided by the supplier. In other 
words, the supplier had a total control on the input. The project team merely witnessed the 
system to be operated. A project progress report described the FAT exercise as "a complete 
disaster in terms of converted data available for testing and core functionality" (SubC, 13). 
Even so, the project team decided to go ahead with the next stage of planned task, which was 
the Site Acceptance Test (SAT). SAT is usually carried out in order to allow a client to 
"accept" a software product. The first round of SAT was carried out from 03/10/2001 to 
05/10/2001, producing 26 defects (SCI, 6), followed by a re-run of the same tests from 
11/10/2001 to 12/10/2001. Due to the level of defects found, the client could not "accept" the 
software product. Even by April 2002, the acceptance milestone was not achieved (SubC, 2). 
Problems with OMSToo1 impacted directly what SubC was able to achieve with the overall 
IIP project. A report from the Capture Bureau (SubC, 3) regarding April 2002's capture status 
showed that only 463,328 MPANs had been captured onto the LVC model out of a total of 
3,368,725 (13.75%), a far cry from the initial plan of completion by April 2002. As a result, a 
separate effort by SubC had to be made to meet the Ofgem's minimal reporting requirements. 
According to a private conversation with a team member, the output of this separate effort 
was a "botched-up" solution, which could not be the basis of further maintenance. Therefore, 
the project had to continue with additional resources to achieve the original objectives`'. 
23 A conversation with a project team member who continued to be involved in the project indicated 
that the application was not stable with regular crashes even by November 2002. 
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6.8 Key Issues and Within-Case Analyses 
OMSToo1 was sold to SubC as a COTS product. There were serious issues when it was 
implemented in SubC. Major issues were found in the following areas (SubC, 5,12): 
" Poor system performance; 
" Problematic data conversion and integration; 
" Poor documentation both for project communication and for OMSToo1. 
Each of these issues is discussed in a separate section below followed by observations on 
supplier response and risk management. 
6.8.1 Poor System Performance 
The performance gap between OMSTool as promised and the actual system installed was 
significant. SC 1 claimed to have conducted performance test. In SC 1's revised proposal dated 
23/7/2001 (SCI, 2), a statement on the system performance was made (performance test is 
referred to as "load test" in this document): 
"System Availability and Performance 
The product has been load tested using the WinRunner24 load test software. There 
were 500 concurrent users each creating transactions every 30 seconds on an 
AIX25 Dual processor CPU and containing one gigabyte of RAM26. The load test 
produced negligible performance degradation compared to a single user. 
We understand that the number of users on this system is relatively small. The 
system is not responsible for processing high volumes of real time data. The main 
processor demands will be due to graphical based calculations on the server. 
These will arise from map operations or user queries. These are not likely to be 
very frequent given the small number of users. " 
It was true that there were only 20-30 users of the system in the Data Capture Bureau, far 
fewer than the 500 concurrent users tested allegedly. But poor system performance proved to 
be the single most serious problem impacting the project progress. Even after months of 
improvement effort, the performance difference between a single user and the required level 
24 WinRunner is a performance test tool supplied by Mercury Interactive Corporation 
(www. mecuryinteractive. com). 
25 AIX: the name of the Unix-based operating system marketed by IBM. 
26 RAM: random access memory. 
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of users in the Data Capture Bureau could not be described as "negligible" according to the 
actual test data (Table 6.6, based on SLC, 4). The response times with a single user were 
barely acceptable in that they failed to meet some of the minimum acceptance criteria. The 
performance with multiple users was totally unacceptable. 
Tahla 6 A" Parfnrmanra tactina rncnit- cinolp near vc. multinle users on 17/01/2001 
Action Performance Acceptance 
Criteria (based on SubC, 1) 
Performance Test Result 
(based on SLC, 4) 
Maximum Response Time with 
Multiple User (above 30) 
Single User Multiple Users 
(between 21 to 27) 
Login 2m 1m35s 3m28s 
Pan 15s 13s 34s 
Zoom 15s 20s 1 m45s 
Query 15s 20s 1 m23s 
The question was what caused the poor performance: was it the OMSTool or some other 
system elements? While system performance was clearly unacceptable according to testing, it 
was complex and slow to diagnose the root causes. The overall system was a combination of 
OMSTool from SCI, network supplied by SC2, PC Workstations configured by SLC and data 
provided by SubC itself. SCI "claimed" that the fault was with UKOne's computer network. 
That was verified and rejected by SC2 (SubC, 33). Upon SCI's suggestions, SubC took other 
actions including re-configuring all operators' workstations (SubC, 34). No obvious 
improvement in system performance was achieved, demonstrating the uncertain process of 
diagnosing and resolving the underlying technical issues. 
During many rounds of performance testing, some problems were discovered in the OMSTool 
software package. For example, toward the end of February, a fault was diagnosed that 
OMSTool displayed the same data twice (SLC, 5), thus taking roughly twice the time than 
necessary! Even when this problem was resolved, the performance remained unsatisfactory. 
In a review meeting dated 07/03/2002, SC1 admitted "the feel" that OMSTool performance 
was reaching a "plateau" and "there are no further obvious advances that can be made". SubC 
countered by holding back payment equivalent to 30% of the total contract value (SubC, 1). 
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6.8.2 Poor Interoperability between OMSTool and Data 
Data was an important part of building the LVC model. SubC had all the required data 
available for the model in a number of other systems. The available data had to be transferred 
from the source systems, converted into the right format for OMSTool. There were two 
problems encountered in the process. One was data conversion and the other was data 
volume. The data conversion was declared to be "by far the greatest area for concern" in a 
project progress report in November 2001 (SubC, 15) when the Data Capture Bureau started 
operation. A few months later the converted data volume was high enough to expose the 
system performance problem (SubC, 16; Section 6.8.1). 
While the poor system performance was not foreseen at all (Section 6.8.1), some warnings 
were to be found in the original proposal from SC 1 if examined closely (SC 1,2). After re- 
assuring the client that "there should be no problem importing the data" based on their 
understandings, SCI cautioned that there might be other problems with data formats and it 
was "a key area of uncertainty" (SCI, 2). Unfortunately, no specific measure was taken to 
manage this uncertainty. 
6.8.3 Project Documentation 
In Section 3.2.5, it is suggested that project documentation be grouped into project working 
documents and software/system documents. Neither type was satisfactory from SCI. The 
project issues list dated 02/11/2001 (SLC, 12) pointed out the problem with documentation in 
general, and specific problems with release notes (not available), test reports (not detailed 
enough and contained controversial claims) and user guides (minimal in content). Similar 
issues were raised on 28/01/2002 (SLC, 5). Bearing in mind of the initial target software 
acceptance date of 14/09/2001, it seemed to be the case that SCI had given documentation a 
low priority. 
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The situation was recognised and accepted by the client to a certain degree. In one list of 
project issues (SLC, 5), the client clearly requested a lower priority to be given to resolving 
issues with documentation compared with issues on software functionality and performance. 
This could not be interpreted as a sign of encouragement for the supplier to neglect 
documentation. Rather, given the difficult choices between functionality and documentation, 
the priority had to be given to improving functionality. 
6.8.4 SCI's Poor Response to Problems 
SCI was slow in responding to issues uncovered regarding OMSTool. The above problems of 
poor performance, data conversion and integration, and documentation were featured 
consistently from the initial round of testing (SLC, 12,5). In a project summary document 
dated 09/04/2002 (SubC, 2), LVC Subproject Manager commented that the "general feeling is 
that the support from the Supplier has been under-resourced and the progress continues on an 
ad-hoc basis". 
The project team was aware of the potential lack of support capacity at the supplier selection 
stage but no obvious effort was made to address the risk (Section 6.4.1). Two separate issues 
seemed relevant. One is that SCI was a small company at the time of the project and had a 
limited resource pool. SC1 only had less than 50 employees in total yet boasted presence in 
the US, UK and Europe. The available resources were inevitably stretched to serve different 
customers in different geographical areas. Related to the above was how SC1 allocated its 
limited resources when there were conflicting demands. While LVC Project was still in 
progress and the software acceptance was yet to be achieved, the supplier won a new contract 
in the US. Should the supplier concentrate the resources to resolve the issues to achieve site 
acceptance or should the resources be diverted to the new project? The belief in the LVC 
project team was that SCI did divert the resources away from SubC's contract. The belief was 
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corroborated by phone calls between LVC project team and the SCI's key staff travelling in 
the US. This was the case despite that SubC was holding back 30% of contract payment. 
The practice of "co-locating" developers from the supplier with the client team might be 
suggested as a potential solution to secure undivided attention from the supplier. 
Unfortunately, this practice could not have worked in this project. According to a private 
conversation with a visiting technical staff from SC1, the supplier had a strict policy on 
controlling the source codes. Only the compiled code was allowed out of the company's 
premise due to the consideration of intellectual property rights. Therefore, any developer 
located on the client's premise would not be able to carry out code-level diagnosis and would 
have to be supported by other developers at the supplier's own office, which would not have 
been a feasible arrangement. 
6.8.5 Risk Management 
Risk management was emphasised from the early stage of the project. A guideline document 
drafted by the programme manager defined a risk as "an event, internal or external, that may 
cause the project to fail to meet its objectives" (SubC, 14). The document clearly specified 
that risk management was part of each subproject manager's responsibilities, alongside 
project planning and budgeting etc (SubC, 14). It was also mandatory to review risks as part 
of the weekly subproject meetings and monthly "stakeholder" meeting (SubC, 14). Many 
risks were identified. In a document dated 30/07/2001,48 risks were identified for the LVC 
subproject alone (SubC, 28). The risks appeared to be actively tracked both at the subproject 
level and the programme level. Yet the options appeared to be limited to overcome the risks 
effectively. 
Table 6.7 presents the risk tracking information from July 2001 to May 2002 regarding one of 
the main risks facing the project. The risk was referred to as the "Availability of Toolset to 
165 
Link Customers to Required Accuracy" (SubC, 17). The "Toolset" referred to the application 
software that was to be acquired from the external supplier. When the risk was first registered, 
the supplier selection decision had not yet been made. Following the supplier decision in July 
2001, the confidence was high and the "residual risk" (the risk after taking the specified 
actions) was considered to be low for three months. In November 2001, a cautious but 
positive note was registered, stating "[s]oftware improvements ongoing". After January 2002 
onwards, the residual risk level turned high and remained high despite the efforts made by the 
project team and the supplier. 
Table 6.7: Risk Assessment on the Software Availability from July 2001 to May 2002 
Month Risk Impact Actions Taken Target Residual References 
Updated Flag Date Risk 
Jul-01 aD High Decision on Product to be made 9/7/2001 
Sep-01 Medium SubC, 17 
Aug-01 High SCI installing software on site, Satisfactory Nov-01 Low SubC, 18 0 
progress in accordance with IT Project Plan. 
Sep-01 High SCI installing software on site, Satisfactory Nov-01 Low SubC, 19 0 
progress in accordance with IT Project Plan. 
Oct-01 
V 
High SCI installing software on site. Satisfactory Nov-01 Low SubC, 20 
progress in accordance with IT Project Plan. 
Nov-01 aD High SCI installed software on site. Software Nov-01 Low SubC, 21 
improvements ongoing. 
Dec-01 High SC1 installed software on site. Software Jan-02 Medium SubC, 22 
improvements ongoing. 
Jan-02 aD High SCI installed software on site. Software Feb-02 Medium SubC, 23 
improvements ongoing. Performance not at 
optimum level. 
Feb-02 High SCI installed software on site. Software Mar-02 High SubC, 24 
improvements ongoing. Performance not at 
optimum level. 
Mar-02 High SC I installed software on site. Software Mar-02 High SubC, 25 
improvements ongoing. Performance not at 
optimum level. Performance close to 
acceptable level To be agreed with SCI). 
Apr-02 High SCI installed software on site. Software Mar-02 High SubC, 26 
improvements ongoing. Performance not at (sic) 
optimum level. Performance close to 
acceptable level To be agreed with SCI . May-02 High Site acceptance criteria not yet met. Tool May-02 High SubC, 27 
performance has degraded. SCI undertaking 
site investigations. Meeting on 8/5/2002 to 
discuss degradation and options to rectify. 
Note: In the column "Risk Flag", Q means "Risk increasing since last update", ýj > means "Risk 
unchanged since last update" and vmeans "Risk reducing since last update". 
166 
Why did the project risk management fail to prevent this particular risk from impacting the 
project so adversely? Various explanations are possible. An inspection of Table 6.7 might 
suggest that the project team was overly confident of its supplier selection so that there was 
no viable alternative planned. As late as March 2002, the project team was still confident by 
stating that the software performance was "close to acceptable level", only to be disappointed 
by the performance degradation later. Due to the lack of any feasible option, the target date 
for resolving the risk was simply being pushed out reacting passively to events at the time. 
6.8.6 Project Success or Failure? 
The LVC Project did not produce an LVC Model within the planned timescale. By April 
2002, the project processed under 14% of the target data volume (Section 6.7). Compared to 
the original project plan, the project could not be considered as a success. However, by the 
original project deadline of April 2002, the project was not cancelled. By Sauer (1993)'s 
narrow definition of failure, the project could not be considered as a failure either, since there 
was enough support to continue its operation. The successful aspects of the project were not 
just limited to its continued survival after the project deadline. The successful establishment 
of the Capture Bureau, a level of completion of the LVC model and the successful 
management of OMSToo1's cost to be fixed can all be counted as successes in their own 
ways. It is perhaps fitting to describe the project as another "challenged" one according to 
Standish Group (1995). 
6.9 Project Chronology 
24 January 2001: High-level requirements documented within SubC; 
Early April 2001: SubC issued Invitation to Tender (ITT) to potential suppliers; 
Late April 2001: Responses to ITT received from suppliers; 
May-June 2001: Evaluating suppliers' responses to ITT; 
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09 July 2001: Project Steering Group Meeting approved Project Team's 
recommendation on selecting SC 1; 
12 July 2001: Post Tender Negotiation meeting with SCI; 
19 July 2001: A technical visit to SC1 to progress negotiation towards a contract; 
26 July 2001: A meeting with SCIa was held to give an update on the tender 
process and the reasons for recommending the other supplier; (The 
above based on SubC; 
06 August 2001: SubC issued an award letter of contract to SC 1; 
14 Septembe r 2001: Planned "Site Acceptance" Date; 
24 Septembe r 2001: Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) started on SCI's premise; 
28 Septembe r 2001: FAT finished, SubC internal report highlighted the FAT as a 
"disaster", but decided to proceed to Site Acceptance Test (SAT); 
03 October 2001: First SAT on the client premise started; 
05 October 2001: First SAT finished; 
11 October 2001: Second round of SAT started; 
12 October 2001: Second round of SAT finished; 
18 October 2001: SC 1 submitted reports on FAT and SAT; 
10 December 2001: An amended letter of contract to SC1 outlining an agreed "Milestone 
Payment Schedule"; 
28 January 2002: OMSTool performance was cited as the a major issue; 
18 February 2002: OMSTool performance was still the number one problem; 
07 March 2002: SCI stated "the feel" that OMSTool performance was reaching a 
"plateau" and "no further obvious advances that can be made"; 
05 April 2002: SubC reported that only 13.75% of the LVC model was complete, 
compared with the original plan of completion by then; 
09 April 2002: LVC Project Manager reported that "Site Acceptance milestone has 
not been met and thus payment withheld". 
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Chapter 7: Cross-Case Analysis Part 1: Describing the Pattern of 
ISD Project Challenges 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter forms Part I of two-part cross-case analyses. The objective of this chapter is to 
outline a pattern of ISD project challenges while the following chapter (Chapter 8) attempts to 
explain the outlined pattern. This chapter is mainly based on the case studies documented in 
the previous three chapters. Where appropriate, however, published cases are quoted to shed 
further light on the issues under discussion (see Sections 2.4 and 2.6 for discussions of the 
research methodology for the cross-case analysis). The focus is on the client-supplier 
commercial relationship, supplier's product development, product evaluation and project risk 
management. Discussions are presented from the client's viewpoint unless made clear 
otherwise. Section 7.2 gives a brief overview of the three cases in Chapters 4,5 and 6. Section 
7.3 discusses the commercial aspects of application software supplier management including 
issues of supplier selection and contracting and client-supplier relationship. Section 7.4 
examines the issues related to product development including requirements management, 
supplier capacity and documentation. The difficulties with software product evaluation are 
discussed in Section 7.5 and risk management in Section 7.6. A general pattern of ISD project 
challenges is suggested in Section 7.7. The chapter ends with a summary in Section 7.8. 
7.2 Overview of the Three Participant Case Studies 
Table 7.1 provides a comparative overview of the three cases described in the previous three 
chapters. Case I was initiated due to a vision from the client's board of management while the 
other two were undertaken due to regulatory requirements. Clients were closely involved in 
all projects. In Case 3 the project was directly managed by the client. The author's employer 
SLC was involved in these projects assuming different roles. For Case I and Case 2, SLC was 
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the prime contractor managing all suppliers on behalf of the client organisations. In Case 3, 
SLC sent IT resources to the project and managed only the technical part of the project. 
Suppliers' roles were varied and contrasting. Suppliers in Case I designed and developed 
software system elements with source codes entirely open for review. The contracts for all 
suppliers in Case I were of Time and Materials (T&M) type constrained by cost and schedule 
targets. The main software supplier AES in Case 2 was to design and develop a new 
application for a number of clients, one of those was SubB. AES retained the design 
documents as proprietary but released the software source codes to the client at the point of 
implementation. AES was to supply the software for a fixed price and to provide consultancy 
services on a T&M basis. In Case 3, the supplier SC1 supplied the software as a COTS 
product with a fixed price. The software was only released in an executable version with its 
design and source codes not available to the client. 
Table 7.1: An overview of the three cases recorded in Chanters 4.5 and 6 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
(WebShop, Chapter 4 (GMRM, Chapter 5) (LVC Model, Chapter 6) 
Reason for To realise a vision from To respond to regulatory To respond to regulatory 
undertaking client's board of requirements with a requirements with a tight 
the project management tight deadline deadline 
Client's Role Sponsoring the project and Sponsoring the project Sponsoring the project and 
providing business and providing business taking the overall project 
resources to support the resources to support the management responsibilities 
Project project 
SLC's Role Prime Contractor on a T&M Prime Contractor on a Providing resources to the 
basis T&M basis project managed by the client 
directly on a T&M basis 
Software Various suppliers to The main application The main software supplier 
Suppliers' custom-build various supplier AES to design SCI to supply and implement 
Roles software artifacts into a and develop a new a COTS application with 
coherent web application application for a number commitment to convert 
of clients legacy data, 
Software All suppliers on T&M based Fixed price contract for Fixed price contract for the Suppliers' contracts the software product software product OMSTool 
Contracts GMRM T&M contract for SCI 
T&M contract for AES consultancy services 
consultancy services 
Types of CBSW COTS (known to be in COTS 
Software development at the time 
Products of contract) 
The following discussions are based on the accounts of the three cases, supplemented by 
references to some of the case studies found in the literature. 
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7.3 Managing Supplier Selection and Contracting 
Supplier selection and contracting might be regarded as the key to acquiring good software 
applications for ISD projects that rely on third party suppliers. However, evidence from the 
cases suggests that there are various issues in the process. These are discussed below. 
7.3.1 Supplier Selection 
When a client organisation decides to outsource the development of software products to an 
external company, it is important to select the "right" supplier. However, exactly who is the 
"right" supplier is not easy to determine. Three issues are discussed below: external 
interference of supplier selection, selection decision made under various project constraints 
and supplier selection based on claims rather than finished products. 
External Interference of Supplier Selection 
Ideally, a supplier should be selected to participate in an ISD project only if it can meet 
project objectives. In reality, however, there seem be considerations outside the immediate 
project objectives in the supplier selection process. Consider Case 1, the decision to involve 
MSS was related to SubA's desire to forge a marketing link with Microsoft and SLC's desire 
to gain skills and knowledge for Microsoft products (Section 4.7.2). The management 
decision directly interfered with the project operation, leading to the eventual selection of 
MSS as one of the main software development suppliers. When problems surfaced with MSS' 
lack of development capacity, the project manager did not have the authority to take decisive 
actions to replace MSS. An additional supplier had to be brought in at a significant extra cost. 
In the meantime, the relationship between the ISD project manager and MSS deteriorated, 
causing severe problems in project communication and project team morale. 
A similar case of managerial interference in supplier selection is found in the RISP project 
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undertaken by Wessex Health Board (Collins, 1998). As a result of supplier lobbying and 
subsequent senior management interference on the client's side, the initial supplier decision 
by the project team was overturned and another supplier was contracted, almost in secret. The 
disastrous project result may not be attributed to the supplier selection process alone but the 
lack of its integrity did not help the project to achieve its objectives. 
Supplier Selection under Severe Constraints 
The selection process in Case 2 had a clear objective to produce an information system for 
meeting a regulatory requirement (Section 5.3). However, the selection was constrained by a 
number of factors. First of all, there was little time available to allow the required software 
product to be custom-built. This was due to the client organisation's delay in preparing for the 
project, an issue outside the scope of this study. Secondly, there were not many suppliers 
available for selection. It was considered to be a specialist area requiring a combination of 
industry knowledge and technical skills. Thirdly, in between the two suppliers available, the 
client had no practical choice other than selecting AES. This may be explained by the concept 
of switching cost. AES was the incumbent supplier for the core system supporting the client's 
existing gas operation with nearly a million customers. Selecting AES meant that the client's 
core systems could stay with peripheral adjustments while selecting the other supplier would 
have meant replacing the core systems at the same time (Section 5.3 and 5.9.1). Not only 
there would have been extra cost incurred, the risk and uncertainty involved in such a major 
system change meant that such a switch of supplier could not be contemplated. The concept 
of switching cost and its impact on supplier management is further discussed in Section 8.4. 
Supplier Selection Based on Claims 
Although there was no observed managerial interference in the supplier selection in Case 3, 
another common problem was observed in that software suppliers are selected based on 
suppliers' claims and promises rather than finished software systems (Section 6.4.1). Such a 
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selection decision is effectively based on many unwarranted assumptions. For example, some 
of the assumptions required supporting the selection of the supplier SCI in Case 3 may be 
described as: 
" That since core functions met the requirements already, "non-core" functions would 
not have presented many problems (Section 6.4.1); 
" That since software performance was tested by the supplier and stated in the 
supplier's proposal document, it would perform accordingly after implementation 
(Section 6.8.1); 
" That since there are other clients using the same supplier and the same product to 
meet the same regulatory requirement, it must be a sound choice (Section 6.4.1). 
The decision-makers had a problem since there was no credible information available to 
indicate otherwise. It is not necessary that a supplier would deliberately lie on technical 
issues. Rather suppliers are inflicted with development uncertainty that may seriously impact 
on the development and delivery effort (see Section 8.7 on development uncertainty). 
Of the above three issues, the problem of claim-based supplier selection is perhaps the most 
fundamental. At the supplier selection stage, suppliers are inclined to make necessary claims 
to win business. The lack of objective measurements also makes it easier for managerial 
intervention and allows an incumbent supplier to sway a suppler selection decision due to the 
client's high switching cost (Section 8.4). 
7.3.2 Time Gap Between Supplier Selection and Contracting 
There is normally a time gap between selecting a supplier and signing the contract with the 
supplier. During this period for Case 2, a surprise price increase of 40% was requested by the 
supplier AES, which was settled for 20% (Section 5.5.2). A remarkably similar price increase 
is reported in NAO (2003). In that case, the supplier ICL increased its price in between 
bidding and contracting. The client had to agree a 26% increase (from £146million to 
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£184million) after "intensive post-tender negotiations" (NAO, 2003, p. 14). Similar scenarios 
have been played out elsewhere. Lewis et al. (2000) record the following experience: 
"One of the more surprising problems occurred for a project that used a COTS 
product at one site on a pilot basis. The pilot implementation entailed a few 
hundred copies of the product; the full implementation was worldwide and would 
entail tens of thousands of copies. Once the decision was made to expand 
worldwide, the vendor raised the cost per copy. In the words of the project 
manager, `We assumed that we would get a quantity discount. The price per copy 
is actually going up. The increase in price is so great that we are seriously 
considering starting over, this time writing the system ourselves from scratch. ' A 
quantity discount had seemed so obvious that it was not included in the original 
negotiation. " 
Such price increases clearly create ill feelings between the client and supplier at the beginning 
of projects. AES behaviour during "contract negotiation" is not isolated. What is worth noting 
is the fact that suppliers get away with such price increases. One might think that, prior to 
signing a contract, the client has the right to change the supplier decision if circumstances 
change. In reality, however, there seem to be various hurdles in altering a supplier selection 
decision. First of all, the lack of time may not allow any delay in commissioning the supplier 
on software development (e. g. Case 2). Secondly, there may have been only a limited number 
of substitute suppliers available in a specific market. The initial decision might not have been 
based on price but on other considerations. While the selected supplier's price may have been 
increased, other factors may not have changed to warrant a change of supplier. Thirdly, to 
select a new supplier, the client may have to spend resources for further testing and 
evaluation. In addition to these material considerations, the decision-makers may have to 
overcome their pride to admit selecting the wrong supplier in the first place. All these factors 
may be explained by the concept of "switching cost", which is further explored in Section 8.4. 
7.3.3 Supplier Contract Management 
According to Bott et al. (2001): 
"Contracts set out the agreement between the parties: they set out the aims of the 
parties; provide for matters arising while the contract is running, ways of 
terminating the contract and the consequences of termination. " (p. 117) 
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At the simplest level, a contract for designing, developing and supplying a software product 
should set out the agreed details regarding the product and other related matters. Supplier 
management then becomes a process of making sure that the supplier keeps to its contractual 
agreement. However, there are a number of observations indicating contract management is 
ineffective in ISD projects. First of all, the contracting process appears to be slow compared 
with the observed pace of projects. While lawyers may have to take time to study contractual 
clauses carefully, there is usually time pressure on project to be started and moved forward. 
This is most evident in Case 2 where the contract was not signed until half way through the 
project (Section 5.5.4). The phenomenon of engaging the supplier first and signing a contract 
later was also observed in Case 1 for MSS (Section 4.3.2). It is perhaps not surprising that this 
is the case since there is usually a substantial amount of money involved together with a need 
to finalise many details relating to complicated software products. The second observation is 
that, according to the available contracts, the agreement tends to be at a high level and 
incomplete, lacking necessary details to settle disagreements. Consider the clause for 
acceptance testing in Case 2, while the product acceptance depended on the acceptance 
testing, no detail of acceptance testing was specified in the contract (Section 5.5.3 and 5.5.4). 
A general observation is that the contract types used in ISD projects, be it T&M contracts or 
fixed price ones, are not effective in managing suppliers' product delivery within cost and 
schedules. Consider Case 1, for example, MSS managed both to increase its price and reduce 
its deliverables with a T&M contract (Section 4.4). NQ managed to stay within the initial 
budget but only delivered a set of software artefacts without fully testing them due to the 
nature of its T&M contract (Section 4.6). With a fixed price contract, AES in Case 2 did not 
raise the price after the initial bid price increase. But the delivered software product lacked 
basic functionality and the available functions performed poorly (Section 5.8). Similarly, SC1 
in Case 3 had a fixed price contract. The poor system performance, however, meant that the 
client had to extend the project for another year, costing an extra £996K (Section 6.5). 
179 
In short, current supplier contracts do not appear to fulfil the expectation of directing software 
suppliers' performance to achieve ISD project objectives. This is supported by other studies 
(e. g. Webster, 2000; Lichtenstein, 2002). The problems with supplier contracts are further 
analysed in Section 8.5. 
7.3.4 Client-Supplier Relationship 
At the early stages of an ISD project, the intention of working as "partners" is usually 
expressed by both the client and the supplier (e. g. Section 4.7.3). However, the partnership 
approach appears to be more a slogan than a project reality. Two observations might serve to 
illustrate this point. The first one is the potential conflict between the partnership approach 
and additional cost of maintaining the partnership. Consider the supplier NQ in Case 1. NQ 
did not complete the necessary activities as promised in its contract with the client with the 
designated budget limit. As a partner, NQ would be expected to fulfil its promises of 
delivering a quality product. However, NQ presented two options: either increase the budget 
or take the unfinished software artefacts. (Section 4.7.3). 
The second observation is that the good will between a client and a supplier appears to 
dissipate over time. In Case 1, all suppliers were to be referred to as "partners" in the 
beginning (Section 4.7.2). In Case 2, the supplier pledged to work with the client as 
"partners". However, the client-supplier relationships were strained as the projects 
encountered difficulties. In Case 1, emotional arguments were frequent between the project 
manager and technical architect from MSS (Section 4.7.1). In Case 2, the supplier damaged 
the limited amount of trust in the beginning by requesting a surprise price increase. This was 
followed by poor quality of delivered software product. AES went so far as to develop the 
application with an altered architecture detrimental to the client's data integrity and on-going 
system support (Section 5.9.2). In the face of various project issues, it has been difficult to 
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reconcile the rhetoric of "partnership" with project reality. The concept of client-supplier 
partnership receives a critique in Section 8.2. 
7.4 Managing Software Product Development 
Within the context of an ISD project, a client expects a software product from the supplier so 
that the product can be integrated into the target information system. The software product is 
normally embodied in two types of deliverables (Section 3.2). One is software 
documentation; the other is the software executables and associated artefacts. The 
management of these deliverables are discussed below with a look at requirements 
management first. 
7.4.1 Requirements Management 
Poor requirements management has been identified in many studies as one of the root causes 
of ISD project challenges (e. g. Brooks, 1995; Bronzite, 2000). Two problems are often 
suggested: one is that of incomplete requirements and the other requirements changes. 
According to the author's observations, incomplete requirements do present a serious problem 
to some ISD projects. This is particular the case for Case 1 (Section 4.7.5). Consider the web 
page design, it was not quite possible to specify exactly how the web pages should have 
looked like, since the "look & feel" was very much one of the expected deliverables from the 
graphic designer NQ in the first place (Section 4.3.3). The problem of incomplete 
requirements has long been recognised. Brooks (1995) asserts that: 
"... it is really impossible for clients, even those working with software engineers, 
to specify completely, precisely and correctly the exact requirements of a modem 
software product before having built and tried some version of the product they 
are specifying. " (p. 200) 
However, requirements may be relatively complete, at least as the functional requirements are 
concerned. In Case 2, the client's requirements were partly imposed by the government 
regulations, partly decided by a common business process (acquiring and processing gas 
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meter readings), both were well understood by the supplier who was supposed to be an 
industry expert (Section 5.2). So far as the regulatory requirements were concerned, they were 
standardised and published as a set of dataflow interfaces. Considering Case I and Case 2 
together, one question might be raised: exactly what requirements should be in place before 
they can be considered as complete for software development? While the answer may not be 
clear for Case 1, it is relatively clear for Case 2. The business requirements in the 
standardised form are all what a client can specify for the software supplier. In other words, 
there is a limit of what a client can specify for building a complete software product. The 
boundary of client requirements is further explored in Section 8.3 to explain the problem of 
incomplete requirements and its possible management implications. 
The second problem often associated with requirements management is that of requirement 
changes or more often referred to as "scope creeps" (Field, 1997; Vowler, 1999; Nash, 2000; 
Kador, 2001). The allegation is that as a project progresses, the client asks for more and more 
deliverables. However, such a "scope creep" has not been observed in any of the three case 
studies. In Case 1, there was a clear understanding of the project scope in the beginning. As 
the project progressed, the scope was radically reduced rather than increased (Section 4.7.5). 
Case 2 and Case 3 were different from Case 1 in that the client requirements in both cases had 
been stable for the project durations. This was due to the fact that both projects were to meet a 
set of published regulatory requirements. Neither AES in Case 2 nor SC 1 in Case 3 used 
requirements changes as explanations for their poor quality products. Whether requirements 
are stable or reduced, there seems to be a problem of aligning product development with 
requirements. This is discussed next. 
7.4.2 Requirements-Driven vs. Delivery-Led Development 
The observations in the case studies suggest that a process through which requirements-driven 
development gives way to one that is delivery-led. Here "requirements-driven development" 
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refers to a process that produces a software product that meets with a client's requirements. In 
contrast, "delivery-led development" process produces a product that is in some way 
convenient for the supplier. Unfortunately, the considerations for requirements and delivery 
are not always compatible with each other. Consider the reduction of the three-tier 
architecture to two-tier in Case 1 as an example (Section 4.4.2). The reduction reduced "the 
reliability, scalability and availability" of the target software product but did simplify the 
product development effort. The architectural change allowed the supplier to expend less 
effort but it was not accompanied by a formal variation. In this case, the supplier was going to 
deliver less for the same cost (or more). In Case 2, the architecture for the software product 
was changed to be stand-alone rather than integrated with an existing system the client 
already had (Section 5.9.2). The change potentially affected the client's long-term business 
data integrity seriously and would cost extra for system support. The change suited the 
supplier in that the software product may be sold to new customers (Section 5.9.2). 
How could suppliers have adopted such significant changes in contradiction to client 
requirements? Of the two different examples discussed above, two different scenarios might 
be discerned. The first scenario is that a supplier, by trial-and-error, discovers that the initial 
design would take far more effort than the anticipated level to develop. Due to the pressure of 
time and resources, the supplier decides on an easier course to proceed, sacrificing the initial 
design objectives and product quality. Case I is likely to be an instance of this kind. The 
fundamental problem here might be related to the software development uncertainty, which is 
further analysed in Section 8.7. 
The second scenario is that a supplier has a hidden agenda. The agenda is implemented first 
of all by not disclosing fully the design intention at the contract bidding stage. It is difficult 
for a client to understand software product design in abstract terms, more so if a supplier 
intends to keep certain details undisclosed. Of course, when a software product is developed, 
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the design has to be disclosed together with the product. By then, however, it is usually too 
late for the client to switch the supplier. Two important issues are at play in this scenario. One 
is that software design is typically embedded in the software product and can only be fully 
understood as part of the product, at least from the client's viewpoint. This is the 
inseparability of software product design and development that is further examined in Section 
8.6. The other issue is related to the client's switching cost which is discussed in Section 8.4. 
The need for "requirements-driven" software product has been emphasised in the literature 
(Gilb, 1997; Mylopoulos, 1999). It is worthwhile to note that the concept of "requirements- 
driven development" is presented here in contrast to "delivery-led" development. However, 
Royce (1998) uses the term "requirements-driven approach" to describe the attempt "to 
provide a precise requirements definition and then to implement exactly those requirements". 
As discussed in Section 7.4.1, it has been recognised that it is generally not possible to specify 
completely and unambiguously all requirements. Therefore, such a "requirements-driven 
approach" as described by Royce is not recommended and is not intended by the author. 
7.4.3 Supplier Capacity Management 
Even when client requirements are clearly understood and documented, the software supplier 
faces the issue of estimating and deploying the necessary resources for design and 
development within the constraints of time and cost. This is the classical problem of resource 
capacity management. The problem can be subdivided into estimating the amount of work to 
be done, assessing the resources required, securing the necessary resources and making sure 
that the work progresses according to the estimate etc. 
The evidence from the cases suggests that software development suppliers do not manage 
their development capacity accurately and adequately, thus leading to unfulfilled promises. 
There are two potential contributing problems. One is that technical staff provide overly 
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optimistic estimates (Wiegers, 1998). Software suppliers make commitments to their clients 
based on these estimates resulting in insufficient time for developing quality products. 
However, behind the apparent software developers' optimism and estimating immaturity may 
lay a more fundamental problem of software development uncertainty (Section 8.7). 
The other problem is essentially a managerial one. When technical teams produce one version 
of estimate, the supplier's management team may modify the estimate in order to be 
successful in contract bidding. The adjustment typically involves the cutting of resources to 
be competitive. Such an adjustment took place in Case 2. According to a private conversation 
with AES' technical architect27, the development team's initial estimate for developing 
GMRM was £450K. The actual approved budget for the team was £250K. Due to the lack of 
accurate estimating techniques, it would not be easy for a development team to engage the 
management to debate which version of the estimates is more realistic. 
In addition to coping with lower than necessary estimates made initially, a supplier may 
reduce its resources commitment to a particular project if re-deploying the available resources 
elsewhere helps it to maximise its profit. This was observed in Case 3. While LVC Project 
was still in progress and the full software acceptance had not taken place, the supplier won 
another contract. SC1 diverted resources away from the LVC Project even though SubC was 
holding back some 30% of contract payment (Section 6.8.4). A contract with penalty clauses 
may help. However, penalty clauses may also cause difficulties. In addition to inflating 
suppliers' bid prices, severe penalty may reduce incentives for suppliers to complete work if 
suppliers have already received the maximum possible payments (flott et at., 2001), which is 
opposite to what the penalty is intended to achieve in the first place. 
27 This conversation took place between the technical architect and the author in September 2001. By 
the end of September, the technical architect left AES. 
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7.4.4 Interoperability of Application Software and Data 
A successful information system is made up of a number of system elements, including 
hardware, system software, application software, operational data, system interfaces together 
with appropriate system documentation (Section 3.2). The current practice is that, based on 
the participant case studies, software suppliers are only responsible to deliver the application 
software and the associated software documentation. The system integrator is responsible for 
integrating the application software with all other elements including the client legacy data. 
While a software product may pass testing with a small number of carefully designed test 
datasets, it may not be able to process client's production data at the system integration stage. 
Consider Case 2 as an example. During the initial acceptance test and the subsequent 
industrial trial, the software application was able to process meter readings with a few 
carefully designed test records. However, it was not able to import operational data that 
amounts to thousands of records everyday (Section 5.9.3). The difference between the 
operational data and the test data was both in terms of volume and quality. Operational data 
has an "industrial strength" (see footnote #17 for a definition) that no carefully designed test 
data can ever be expected to match. In Case 3, data played a significant role. The client had 
the required data items in various existing systems (Section 6.8.2) but not necessarily in the 
right formats. The interoperability of the supplied software and data was therefore paramount 
to the success of building the new data model. Yet the supplied software was expected to 
operate with the client data for the first time after the acceptance testing (Section 6.7). The 
problem appears to be particularly acute involving COTS software, as in Case 2 and Case 3. It 
is not clear exactly why the integration of applications and the clients' data is not attempted 
by suppliers before delivering software applications. In some instances, data protection has 
been cited as a major issue stopping clients' legacy data to be issued to suppliers. In any case, 
there appears to be a misconception that application software can interoperate with clients' 
data so far as the software is tested with a limited set of test data. 
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In integrating the supplied software and the client's legacy data, the integration team is asked 
to perform an impossible task. On the one hand, it is not technically equipped to diagnose and 
fix problems directly with a software application from an external supplier. In addition, it 
does not have access to the necessary design documents and it usually does not have access to 
the source codes. On the other hand, it has cost and schedule targets to meet within the overall 
ISD project constraints. All the project team can do is to report observed symptoms. Yet it is 
difficult to tell whether it is the data or the application or any other system element that causes 
the symptoms. The long period of time required for integrating data with delivered software 
in both Case 2 and Case 3 attests to an uncertain and unpredictable process (Section 5.9.3 and 
Section 6.8.2). In both cases, non-interoperability between the software and data led to 
repeated efforts to patch up the software applications and resulted in project delays and non- 
acceptance of software by the target project deadlines (Section 5.8 and Section 6.7). 
7.4.5 Software Documentation and Its Quality 
Software documentation is required, according to Brooks (1995), to enable software to be 
used, believed and adapted. As already discussed in Section 3.2.5, documentation is an 
important part of quality software applications and effective information systems. However, 
documentation is one of the major failings in ISD projects. Both project working and 
software/system documents have been known to be incomplete, often out of date and 
sometimes misleading. Poor project working documents hinder communications between the 
supplier and the client. Poor system documents affect the systems' use and support and 
increase the clients' cost of maintenance. 
In the case studies, software documents were often observed to be inadequate. In Case 1, 
MSS made an attempt to document the overall system's architecture. The first version had the 
word "draft" appropriately marked on it and it was never updated further (Section 4.6.4). At 
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the point of the system going live in Case 2, the software application's documents were 
incomplete and what was available could not be relied upon (Section 5.9.5). In Case 3, the 
testing reports for releases were so poor that it was difficult to know which problem was fixed 
and which one was still to be resolved (Section 6.8.3). In every project, the priority was given 
to development and delivering the software codes, leaving documentation to the last stage of 
development, producing rushed and incomplete documents. 
Brooks (1975,1995) recognises the challenges of documentation and proposed "self- 
documenting" approach. Self-documenting refers to the practice of incorporating 
documentation in source codes. This might be helpful to technical staff responsible for 
software maintenance. However, the approach does not help clients in ISD projects. There are 
a number of potential problems that are not addressed by self-documenting. First of all, not all 
documents are related to source codes. For example, an IS architecture is a high-level design 
document, not possible to be documented as part of source codes. Secondly, commentary in a 
source program may help developers but not the operators who are not conversant with 
reading codes. Thirdly, commercial suppliers often withhold source codes as proprietary and 
only release executable codes, rendering the inclusive documentation inaccessible to the 
client's support and maintenance team. There is perhaps no easy solution to the problem of 
poor documentation. Good documentation demands highly competent resources (Nayar, 
2000), often in competition with software development. This thesis suggests treating software 
documentation as an integral part of the software product (Section 10.2.1). 
7.5 Evaluating Supplier Product 
Each of the ISD projects described in the three case studies had test teams dedicated to 
evaluating software product quality (Sections 4.6,5.7 and 6.6). In particular, acceptance 
testing was usually envisaged and planned for in the beginning of the projects. Yet the 
resultant software products were of poor quality. Why was quality not effectively controlled? 
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The problem appears to be related to the process of specifying and enforcement of acceptance 
criteria. By its name, acceptance criteria might be regarded as a number of conditions by 
which a product (an application or a system or indeed any product) is evaluated for 
acceptance or rejection. However, there are a number of problems with the concept when 
applied to a software product. First of all, the client has difficulty in devising a set of 
definitive acceptance criteria before a system is built (Section 4.6.2). At the beginning of a 
project, the client does not know exactly how a new system functions. If the acceptance 
criteria must be produced, some elements will be necessarily arbitrary. For example, before a 
website is built, it is not possible to be sure how fast each web page will respond. If a criterion 
must be given, a figure of one second may be as valid as two seconds. Such criteria are not 
helpful. Boehm (2000a) reports a case where the system's response was requested to be less 
than one second. It took a separate study to establish that it would have cost $100million to 
implement, compared with a cost of $30million for a response time of four seconds. The 
initial criterion was made irrelevant due to the associated cost. 
Even when a list of acceptance criteria is available and not disputed, enforcing them until a 
product meets all criteria may cause long delays and increase the cost of a project 
significantly. Defining the criteria is just the start. A process must be in place with people and 
tools to facilitate the interpretation and verification of the criteria. From the supplier's 
viewpoint, if a product has to pass a fixed set of acceptance criteria, the product cost and the 
delivery time may exceed their targets. The supplier is likely to pass on the increased cost to 
the client wherever possible. With a fixed price contract, the client may not have to pay for 
any product price increase directly. However, it may still have to bear extra costs for 
retaining project staff due to a supplier's delayed product delivery. An added problem for a 
client is that ISD project teams, be it an internal or a subcontracted one acting on behalf of the 
client, is just as anxious to finish the project as the supplier is. ISD project managers are 
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usually measured on project budget and completion time as well as the product quality. 
Project budget and the completion time are much more visible and measurable than product 
quality. As a result, product quality is likely to be sacrificed and acceptance criteria might be 
ignored, as happened in Case 1 (Section 4.6.2). Alternatively, externally imposed project 
deadline may force a software to be deployed whether the acceptance criteria are met or not 
(Section 5.8). 
The above observations suggest that acceptance criteria are not easy to specify and enforce. 
The difficulties with specifying might be related to the lack of a complete full design before 
development (Section 8.6) and certainly before contracting a supplier. The difficulties to 
enforce the criteria may be traced to the absolute evaluation approach, which is further 
discussed in Section 8.8. 
7.6 Project Risk Management 
In line with widely available guidelines on project management (e. g. CCTA, 1998; PMI, 
2000), all three projects emphasised risk management as a key part of project management 
(Sections 4.7.7,5.9.6 and 6.8.5). The risk management processes and guidelines were 
followed to a certain degree. Some of the risks were foreseen and managed successfully. 
Some were foreseen but not successfully managed. The single most significant risk not 
successfully managed was the late delivery and poor quality of the required software product 
in each of the project. This risk was in fact identified, assessed, documented with "mitigating 
actions" planned in the beginning of each project (Table 7.2). The risks initially identified, as 
shown in Table 7.2 were accurate in describing the issues later encountered in each of the 
projects. However, the mitigating actions were inadequate in overcoming the issues, resulting 
in the risks manifesting themselves as serious issues. Consider Case 1 first, the mitigating 
actions amount to an attempt to a "complete contract". This is in fact not easily achieved with 
incomplete requirements (Section 7.4.1 and Section 8.3) and the ineffective contract types 
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used in the current ISD projects (Section 8.5). In Case 2, "monitoring" and "inspecting" of the 
supplier product development was not really possible due to the hidden information and 
hidden action problem inherent in the "principal-agent" relationship (Section 5.9.6; Section 
8.2). The risk registers from Case 3 provide a detailed historical record of how a risk turned 
into a serious issue (Section 6.8.5). By the end of the project, the client was left discussing the 
issue and seeking options with the supplier - rather late for the project. In all cases, the 
key 
problem appears to be that the proposed actions did not provide any practical option. The 
underlying reasons for the failure of risk management in ISD projects and possible 
management options are further explored in Section 8.7. 
Table 7.2: Comparison of the risks related to the required software products and the suggested 
mitI atiniz actions in across three projects ----- ----- --------- --- - Project --- --- ---- The Main Risk Proposed Mitigating The Outcome of 
Related to The Actions the Products 
Software Products 
Case 1: WebShop Timely and cost effective Clear supplier MSS/IFG delivered 
(see Section 4.7.7) delivery. responsibilities identified late and cost more. 




Case 2: GMRM GMRM not meeting the Visible evidence based GMRM Release 2 was 
(see Section 5.9.6) delivery date and having "monitoring" and delivered late and did 
"an unacceptably high "inspecting" of GMRM not function as 
incidence of errors". product development and promised. 
AES' test results. 
Case 3: OMSTooI Availability of Toolset to Various actions to manage OMSTool did not 
(see Section 6.8.5) Link Customers to the supplier, including perform to allow the 
Required Accuracy. "discuss degradation and LVC Model to be 
options to rectify". built by the project 
deadline. 
7.7 The Pattern of ISD Project Challenges 
What has been described in the previous sections is largely based on the three case studies in 
the previous three chapters. To what extent do these observations represent a general picture 
of ISD project challenges? To answer this question, it is helpful to quote at length a "pattern" 
described by Yourdon (2002): 
"[... J an ambitious business organization decides that it needs an innovative new 
information system; it then contracts with an aggressive software development 
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firm to build the system. At the beginning, the atmosphere is one of enthusiasm 
and optimism; the customer promises to devote resources and energy throughout 
the project, the vendor promises to provide high-quality, `professional' services, 
and both parties pledge to work in a `partnership' mode. A contract is generated 
and duly signed [... ]. 
After a period that ranges from a few months to a couple years, things begin to 
turn sour. Deadlines come and go; budgets are exceeded; amendments to the 
contract are hurriedly negotiated and signed; and the mood gradually turns grim 
and hostile. Sooner or later, one of the parties abandons all hope, and terminates 
the contract; in most cases, it's the client who pulls the plug, complaining that the 
project has taken twice as long as initially promised, and has cost twice as much 
as originally budgeted. And to add insult to injury, the system either doesn't work 
at all, or is full of bugs, or runs so slowly that only 3 users can access it 
concurrently, instead of the 300 that had been promised. 
At that point, both parties bring in their respective lawyers. [... ]'experts' like me 
are brought in to advise the lawyers, the judge and the jury. All of them want 
credible answers to some very basic questions: whose fault was it that the project 
failed? How did it happen? When should it have been evident that the project was 
in trouble? Why didn't someone, on either one side or the other, do something 
about it? 
If you don't think such things can happen in the `real world', let me assure you 
that they do; indeed, the cost of litigation now exceeds the cost of coding for most 
large software development organizations. Only a small percentage of such 
failures actually result in lawsuits; a much greater percentage of the failures result 
in both parties walking away from the mess, swearing never to speak to one 
another again. " 
Striking similarities might be discerned comparing what has been described in the previous 
sections with Yourdon's "pattern". First of all, each of the three projects started with 
optimistic expectations. Especially for Case 1, it started with a "vision" from the corporate 
board (Section 4.1) and a "partnership" approach was very much emphasised as a way to 
work between the contracting parties (Section 4.3). Even for Case 2 and Case 3, where 
projects were initiated in response to regulatory requirements, promises from suppliers made 
the project successes seemed inevitable (Section 5.5 and Section 6.4). Secondly, control on 
project schedules and costs seemed difficult, resulting late deliveries and budget overruns. 
This is despite adopting aggressive scope reduction or scope-freezing strategies (Section 4.4, 
Section 5.8). Thirdly, software products from the suppliers failed to meet clients' 
requirements and do not match initial supplier promises in terms of functions, features and 
quality (Sections 4.6,5.8 and 6.7). Though none of the three projects studied were officially 
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cancelled before the project closure, and the author is not aware of any lawsuit being filed, the 
clients in the case studies were certainly dissatisfied with the project outcomes. Similar 
patterns of ISD project challenges might be found in Webster (2000), Ward (2001) and other 
sources. 
This study contributes to the description of the pattern by highlighting additional observations 
in the stages of supplier selection (Section 7.3.1) and product evaluation (Section 7.5). In the 
areas of the commercial management and product development, the case studies have 
highlighted considerable level of details (Sections 7.3 and 7.4). In addition, the failure of risk 
management has been described as part of the pattern contributing to ISD project challenges 
(Section 7.6). Of course, this study is not designed to apportion blame to any specific party in 
the case studies. Instead of asking questions like "whose fault was it that the project failed", 
the focus is on the root causes of the project challenges and possible remedial actions. 
Chapter 8 uses a number of existing concepts and theories to explain the pattern of challenges 
described above. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter provides a survey of common ISD project challenges based on the cases 
recorded in the previous chapters and those published. The challenges have been examined 
mainly from the client's viewpoint. The focus has been on the process of client-supplier 
interactions. The management of commercial relationship with a supplier presents an 1SD 
project team with significant challenges. Suppliers may be selected with external 
interferences weakening the authority of the project team. Supplier selection may be subjected 
to various constraints and worst of all, all suppliers have to be selected based on claims and 
promises in the current project management framework. Supplier contracting has been 
observed to be difficult due to client's high switching cost and also ineffective in directing 
suppliers to delivering quality products within specified cost and schedule targets. The client- 
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supplier partnership has been observed to be more of a slogan than a mechanism to resolve 
any real issue of cost or quality performance. 
When it comes to product development, a number of challenges are present in ISD projects, 
ranging from requirements management, delivery-led development and the apparent 
difficulties for suppliers to keep to their cost and schedule estimates. When software products 
are delivered, the lack of interoperability between application software and client's legacy 
data causes further project delays and cost overruns, and sometimes threaten systems integrity 
altogether. Software documentation has also been observed to be of poor quality. The 
seemingly simple concept of acceptance criteria appears to be nearly impossible to implement 
in ISD projects since they are difficult to define and enforce. Risk management has not helped 
ISD projects to meet their objectives even when some of the risks are correctly identified and 
documented. The overall pattern of ISD project challenges encountered and described 
matches and enriches the descriptions already available in the literature. 
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Chapter 8: Cross-Case Analysis Part 2: Explaining the Pattern of 
ISD Project Challenges 
8.1 Introduction 
In the chapters 4 to 6, it has been confirmed that there are indeed significant managerial and 
technical challenges associated with ISD projects. In Chapter 7, it has been further confirmed 
that there is a pattern of ISD projects challenges. What are the root causes behind this pattern? 
In the course of the last three decades of research and practice, many hypotheses have been 
put forward as explanations. Technical limitations (hardware memory limit, programming 
language design etc), lack of training for practitioners, chaotic processes, poor project 
management and inadequate client organisations have all been blamed (e. g. Brooks, 1975; 
Humphrey, 1989; Flowers, 1996; Collins, 1998; Bronzite, 2000; Finkelstein, 2001). 
Corresponding solutions in the shape of new programming paradigms (object-orientated 
design and programming), training and various ISDMs and best practices have been 
prescribed (Section 3.5 and 3.6). However, that these solutions have failed to overcome the 
pattern of ISD project challenges suggests that the current explanations, likely as they may be, 
are not "lovely" (Section 3.7). 
In this chapter, the author attempts to provide a potential best explanation for the pattern of 
ISD project challenges following the IDE reasoning strategy (Section 2.6.3). In line with the 
"study proposition" (Section 2.4.2), the process of software supplier management is closely 
examined in this Chapter. The client-supplier relationship is critically reviewed first in 
Section 8.2. Thereafter, a number of root causes are suggested based on concepts from agency 
theory, transaction cost theory and literature on product development and project risk 
management. Incorporating these discussions, the stages and milestones of a typical software 
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supplier selection, contracting and delivery process are described in Section 8.9 as the 
underlying traditional systems development framework (TSDF). This is followed a game 
theoretic model for TSDF with software suppliers making "non-credible" promises. Section 
8.10 provides a critique of the popular iterative approach. Section 8.11 suggests a unified 
explanation to the observed pattern of ISD project challenges. Section 8.12 ends the chapter 
with a brief summary. 
8.2 Client and Supplier Relationship 
In an ISD project where a third party software supplier is contracted to design and develop 
application software, the client and the supplier enters into a close working relationship. The 
nature of such a relationship is important for understanding its mechanism and possible 
associated problems. This Section examines the current view of client-supplier partnership 
based on observations from the case studies. It is suggested that the relationship is better 
modelled as that of principal and agent. 
8.2.1 Client-Supplier as Partners? 
Client-supplier partnership, also referred to as supplier partnership, has been a popular term in 
the purchasing literature (e. g. Ellram, 1991; MacBeth and Ferguson, 1994; Brown et al., 
1994; Smith and Tonks, 1995) and was much talked about in ISD projects like Case 1 
(Section 4.3). Indeed, it is an approach advocated by many ISDMs (e. g. Royce, 1998; 
Highsmith, 2000). But what is client-supplier partnership? The concept seems to have 
originated in the manufacturing industry in Japan in 1970s (McGloin and Grant, 1997). It has 
since spread to the West and it "has established itself in various forms, significantly in the UK 
process engineering and construction industry" (Smith and Tonks, 1995). However, there are 
conflicting attitudes in the public sector regarding supplier partnership, with the European 
Union Directives making competitive tendering compulsory (Smith and Tonks, 1995; Parker 
and Hartley, 1997) and the UK Government promoting "partnering relationship" (OGC, 
196 
2002). Unfortunately, definitions for supplier partnership or "partnering relationship" have 
been at a high level and vague. For example, Smith and Tonks (1995) describe it as: 
"Partnering is a way of doing business which recognises that common goals exist 
which can be achieved through cooperation and open communications. However, 
it is more than a set of goals and procedures; it is a philosophy, a state of mind 
that demands commitment to respect, trust, cooperation and excellence for all 
stakeholders involved. " (p. 119) 
OGC (2002) simply states that "[p]artnering is where two, or more, organisations develop a 
close and, generally, long-term working relationship". The cooperative intention as defined at 
such a high level is difficult to fault and it seems that it should be universally applicable. The 
approach has been assigned many "advantages" compared with the competitive strategy 
according to Lamming and Cox (1995, quoted in Parker and Hartley, 1997). 
However, Ackerman (1996) reckons that "partnership may be doomed to fail" as a result of 
his experiences in the logistics business. Parker and Hartley (1997) conclude that there is "no 
a priori case" in favour of either the partnership approach or the competition based supplier 
management approach, each "has advantages and disadvantages that will vary depending 
upon the precise circumstances" (p. 124). Cousins (2002) goes so far as to dismiss the 
partnership approach altogether, arguing that "[p]artnership relations do not exist" (p. 71). 
This Section aims to provide a critique of the partnership argument within the context of ISD 
projects. 
The critique focuses on four aspects. The first is the basis of partnership, which is trust and 
goodwill according to MacBeth and Ferguson (1994). MacBeth and Ferguson elaborate 
different types of trust (contractual, competence and goodwill) and then emphasise that trust 
should be developed, "not blindly given without patterns of evidential behaviour" (p. 105). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that supplier partnership is only possible for repeat 
relationship between a client and a supplier. This has been the case for the manufacturing 
industry where a client typically purchases components repeatedly over a sustained period of 
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time, for which the concept of supplier partnership was conceived in the first place (MacBeth 
and Ferguson, 1994; McGloin and Grant, 1997). For an ISD project, the client and the 
supplier are engaged in a development process for a "unique" product (PMI, 2000) without 
necessarily "patterns of evidential behaviour" on which to develop the required level of trust, 
however desirable it might be. Though reputation has been regarded as a supplementary 
mechanism to constrain suppliers' behaviour, suppliers take a calculated approach to maintain 
their reputation rather than at all cost (Mailath and Samuelson, 2001). In addition, due to 
complexity and uncertainty in ISD projects, clients can often be blamed (e. g. Anthes, 1994; 
Johnson, 2000a; Buxbaum, 2001), allowing suppliers to defend their reputation in case of 
project difficulties. Thus the concept of supplier partnership, either based on client direct 
experience or indirect reputation mechanism, is not easily transplanted to ISD projects, or 
other similar situations where clients and suppliers are engaged in unique and risky ventures. 
The second aspect is related to the sharing of profit and loss. Partnership in the traditional 
business sense refers to a form of organisation where members (partners) share profit and 
assume "joint unlimited liability" (Parkin et at., 1997, p. 203). The conditions for a 
partnership in this sense are therefore a): that the profit and liability should be clearly 
measurable and b): that the profit and liability should be shared between the partners. When 
these two conditions can be met client-supplier partnership might be possible. For example, it 
has been reported that EDS operates a partnership with the Inland Revenue of the UK 
Government on the basis of sharing cost savings (Hynes et al., 2000). Exactly how the cost 
savings have been measured may deserve further investigation. In general, however, the costs 
and benefits of an information system themselves are difficult to define (Bannister et al., 
2001; Waller, 2002). This makes the sharing of the benefits difficult. Typically, a 
conventional procurement contract does not set out to share such benefits at all, measurable or 
not (Lacity and Hirchheim, 1995). Unlike a conventional business partnership where legal 
enforcement of the contractual obligations is possible, supplier partnership has remained a 
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philosophy and "a state of mind" (Smith and Tonks, 1995). This might explain the 
observation that "the partnership approach" has remained more as a slogan while actual 
client-supplier relations may deteriorate in the face of project difficulties (e. g. Section 7.3). 
The third aspect is the single supplier relationship implied by the partnership approach, since 
more than one supplier for a particular good or service would mean a competitive strategy in 
the first place (Parker and Hartley, 1997). When managing a single source supplier, the client 
relies on a regulatory mechanism rather than a competitive one. Therefore partnership 
approach reduces the client-supplier relationship to that of the regulator and the regulated. It 
is generally considered in the economic literature that competition is superior to regulation 
(Beesley, 1997, quoted in Parker and Kilpatrick, 2002). As a result, "a goal of regulation is to 
promote competition" (Parker and Kilpatrick, 2002). To advocate managing suppliers via 
regulation rather than competition if and when there is a choice is contrary to the basic 
economic understanding about the two options. The fourth aspect is related to the third one in 
that single source approach is inherently anti-competitive. This is particularly problematic for 
public sector purchasing where there are strict legal obligations to pursue a competition-based 
procurement policy, though some confusion seems to exist in terms of actual implementation 
of the competition policy (Parker and Hartley, 1997). 
Due to the above issues, the study of software supplier management below is not based on the 
assumption of client-supplier partnership. Instead, it is suggested that a client and a supplier 
form a principal-agent (PA) relationship informed by agency theory. The next Section looks 
at the PA relationship and how it might guide this study. 
8.2.2 Principal-Agent Relationship 
PA relationship, also called agency relationship, is common in economic transactions. The 
relationship arises when "the `principal' is obliged to hire an `agent' with specialized skills or 
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knowledge to perform the task in question" (Sappington, 1991). This description fits well the 
client-supplier relationship in an ISD project. In this case, the client would be the principal 
and the supplier the agent. The "task in question" would be designing, developing or 
customizing a software application for the client's organisation. The PA relationship is the 
focus of the agency theory, which is concerned with "how the principal can best motivate the 
agent to perform as the principal would prefer, taking into account the difficulties in 
monitoring the agent's activities" (Sappington, 1991). Arrow (1991) compares the agency 
theory with the "more standard economic theory: 
"The principal-agent theory is in the standard economic tradition. Both principal 
and agent are assumed to be making their decisions optimally in view of their 
constraints [... ]. It offers insights used in the construction of contracts to guide 
and influence principal-agent relations in the real world; at the same time it 
represents an attempt to explain observed phenomena in the empirical economic 
world, particularly exchange relations that are not explained by more standard 
economic theory. " (p. 38) 
The agency theory is closely related to the transaction cost theory in that they share the basic 
assumptions of an economic agent's self-interest and bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985; 
Eisenhardt, 1989a). It is the combination of the two that have led to "serious contractual 
difficulties" (Williamson, 1985, p. 67). These assumptions are in stark contrast to the supplier 
partnership approach where supplier opportunism is not considered. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989a), the focus of the agency theory is on "determining the 
optimal contract, behaviour versus outcome, between the principal and the agent" (p. 60). In 
other words, it examines the choice between a behaviour-oriented contract (e. g. salaries and 
hierarchical governance) and an outcome-based contract (e. g. commissions, stock option and 
market governance etc). In order to analyse the principal-agent contractual relationship, 
Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests examining a number possible variables. Relating to the study of 
ISD projects, the following issues are considered: information incompleteness, task 
programmability and outcome measurability, and outcome uncertainty. Other assumptions 
and variables may be considered for studying contracts in other circumstances. For example, 
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the removal of the assumption of self-interest or goal conflict may apply to situations 
involving "clan-oriented firm" or "selfless behaviour" (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 62), which are 
not discussed here. 
Information Incompleteness 
The basic assumption of bounded rationality in the agency theory implies incomplete 
information in the PA relationship. Incomplete information leads to the problem of hidden 
information, which refers to the misrepresentation of ability by the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Arrow (1991) describes it as: 
"[... ] the agent has made some observation that the principal has not made. The 
agent uses (and should use) this observation in making decisions; however, the 
principal cannot check whether the agent has used his or her information in the 
way that best serves the principal's interest. " (p. 39) 
Hidden information poses a problem for supplier selection in an ISD project. A supplier 
responds to a client's request for proposal (RFP) by giving a proposal with price, delivery and 
product quality information. The client does not have an easy way to verify if the information 
provided is more for winning the contract or for demonstrating the true capability to supply a 
superior product at the stated price. The problem of hidden information is considered further 
together with the concept of switching cost in Section 8.4. 
While incomplete information makes it difficult for the client to select the best supplier, it 
also causes problems in terms of communicating the client's requirements to the supplier. 
Incomplete requirements have been cited often as an explanation for ISD project challenges 
(Standish Group, 1995; Keil et al., 2002). The issue of the principal's requirements does not 
appear to have been emphasised in the agency theory literature. However, the right level of 
requirements information is a prerequisite for the subsequent task completion. The issue of 
incomplete requirements appears to be particularly acute in ISD projects and is discussed in 
Section 8.3. Incomplete information at the contractual stage leads to a general problem of 
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incomplete contracts, which have been observed in the participant case studies (Section 7.3.3) 
and published literature (Webster, 2000). The problem is examined in Section 8.5. 
Task Programmability and Outcome Measurability 
According to Eisenhardt (1989a), task programmability is defined as the degree to which 
appropriate behaviour by the agent can be specified in advance. Thus the job of a retail 
cashier is much more programmable than a software programmer. Task programmability is 
likely to affect the ease of observing and measuring an agent's behaviour. When an agent's 
behaviour cannot be easily observed and measured, the problem of hidden action is likely to 
occur. Arrow (1991) explains: 
"The most typical hidden action is the effort of the agent. Effort is a disutility to 
the agent, but it has a value to the principal in the sense that it increases the 
likelihood of a favourable outcome (technically, the distribution of the outcome to 
a higher effort stochastically dominates that to a lower effort; that is, the 
probability of achieving an outcome that exceeds any given level is higher with 
higher effort). " (p. 38) 
The agency theory suggests that "the more programmed the task, the more attractive are 
behavior-based contracts because information about the agent's behavior is more readily 
determined" (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 62). Otherwise, "outcome-based contracts" are more 
preferable. In the case of software development, the task programmability is low due to the 
inseparability of design and development, forcing software development to adopt a trial-and- 
error or an "empirical" process (Section 8.6). This suggests that outcome-based contracts are 
more appropriate for supplier contracting in ISD projects. 
However, outcome-based contracts rely on outcome measurability. When outcomes are 
difficult to measure (for the lack of time or whatever reason), outcome-based contracts are 
less attractive. Due to the lack of a full design at the point of supplier contracting, measuring a 
software product is uniquely difficult. This has been observed in the case studies as the 
challenges of defining and enforcing acceptance criteria (Section 7.5). The problem of 
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software product measurement or evaluation is discussed in Section 8.8 as one of the possible 
root causes for ISD project challenges. 
Outcome Uncertainty 
Outcome uncertainty has been managed in ISD projects as part of project risk management 
without much success (Section 7.6). The agency theory approaches the issue by considering 
how to share the risk between the principal and the agent. According to Eisenhardt (1989a): 
"When outcome uncertainty is low, the costs of shifting risk to the agent are low 
and outcome-based contracts are attractive. However, as uncertainty increases, it 
becomes increasingly expensive to shift risk despite the motivational benefits of 
outcome-based contracts. " (p. 61) 
Software development displays a high level of outcome uncertainty (Section 8.7). According 
to the standard agency theory, therefore, outcome based contracts are expensive and less 
preferable. 
Applying the above concepts from the agency theory to software development results in 
conflicting advice regarding the use of contract types. Due to the lack of task 
programmability, software development should be contracted based on outcomes. Due to the 
poor outcome measurability and high outcome uncertainty, the advice is to use behaviour- 
based contract. This suggests that the agency theory, while useful in providing a conceptual 
framework for examining possible root causes, is inadequate on its own to provide guidance 
for an effective solution. Therefore, while analysing each of the possible root causes, concepts 
and techniques from other theories are also introduced. In particular, the literature on product 
development (Section 8.3), contract theory (Section 8.5), project uncertainty management 
(Section 8.7) and product evaluation (Section 8.8) has proved to be helpful. 
The focus of this thesis is on the client-supplier relationship. However, other relations within 
an ISD project may also be construed as PA relationship. In particular, the management team 
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and the technical team within a supplier organisation may be considered as a pair of PA 
relation. In this case, the management (the principal) wants to motivate the technical team 
(the agent) to design and develop a software product. At the same time, the management team 
wants to control the technical activities so that the delivery time and cost targets are not 
exceeded. This relation is briefly discussed in the analysis of development uncertainty 
(Section 8.7). However, the thesis does not go into any in-depth analysis of this or any other 
PA relations that might be found in ISD projects. They may be explored as future research 
topics. 
8.3 Misconception About Requirements Management 
In the idealised Waterfall Model (Royce, 1998), alternatively called "the sequential model" 
(Kruchten, 2000), requirements should be complete before design and development can start. 
But that has long been recognised as impossible for software development (Brooks, 1995; 
Section 7.4.1). The problem of incomplete requirements has been tackled by the iterative 
software development approach (Stapleton, 1997; Royce, 1998; Boehm, 2000b; Highsmith, 
2000; Kruchten, 2000). However, surveys like Standish Group (1995) still point to incomplete 
requirements as one of the main reasons for ISD project challenges (Section 7.9.2). 
Conventional advice about outsourcing software development still suggests specifying 
requirements "in detail" and "thoroughly and precisely" (McConnell, 1997; Wiegers, 2003). 
This suggests that the iterative approach has somehow failed to overcome the associated 
challenges. In this section, the current explanation for incomplete requirements adopted by 
the iterative approach is first examined. Then an alternative is suggested as a conceptual 
foundation to manage incomplete client requirements. 
8.3.1 The Current Explanation for Incomplete Requirements 
The proponents of the iterative approach believe that the reason for incomplete requirements 
for software development is a syndrome known as IKIWISI (I know it when I see it). The 
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phrase is used to capture the common communication problem where it is much easier to 
recognise something than to recall from memory (Nielsen, 1993, quoted in Dhamija and 
Perrig, 2000), not to mention documenting it systematically. The implication of the syndrome 
is that, according to the proponents of the iterative approach, the assumption that "the 
requirements are knowable in advance of implementation" is "generally untrue" (Boehm, 
2000b). According to Kruchten (2000), users "don't really know what they want, but they 
know what they do not want when they see it" (p. 56). Kruchten (2000) describes how the 
iterative approach can overcome the problem of incomplete requirements: 
"[... ]address some requirements and some risks, design a little, implement a little, 
validate it, and then take on more requirements, design some more, build some 
more, validate, and so on, until you are finished. " (p. 60). 
The iterative approach assumes that requirements can be tackled "a little" at a time and uses 
various prototypes to understand requirements (Kruchten, 2000). However, would a client be 
able to specify what is further required after seeing a prototype? That may depend on both 
how close the prototype is to the client's desired result, how easily and accurately the client 
can specify the change(s) etc. Unless what is presented matches exactly what a client wants, 
there are still difficulties for the client to communicate the changes to be made. In developing 
a mechanical component, desired dimensions can be specified within a tolerance level. If the 
component is not correctly produced and requires reworking, accurate measurements can 
provide exact feedback required for improvements to be made. In other words, not only the 
initial requirements can be precise, the feedback can be precise as well. The precise feedback 
derives from the precise initial requirements and the exact measurement of any deviation. 
Such exact measurements enable accurate communication and understanding between the 
client and the supplier. The recognised problem of incomplete requirements is equivalent to 
not being able to specify accurately the desired dimensions for a software product. Due to the 
lack of a complete and accurate initial requirements specification, feedback from the client to 
the supplier is likely to be also incomplete. In other words, if the initial requirements cannot 
be complete for some reason, the feedback is likely to be incomplete for a similar reason, 
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unless the exact desired product has been obtained and minimal or no improvement feedback 
is necessary. For this reason, the iterative approach that relies on client feedback may not 
have been successful in overcoming the root causes of incomplete requirements. The failure 
of the iterative approach is illustrated by Case 1, where after many iterations using the Rapid 
Application Development (RAD) methodology, the client disliked the graphic design of the 
web pages (Section 4.6.3). 
8.3.2 An Alternative Explanation: The Kano Model 
In search for the root cause of incomplete requirements and possible remedial actions, it is 
helpful to consider how client requirements are managed in other types of product 
development. The Kano Model (Figure 8.1, based on Mazur, 1993) illustrates such an 
approach suggested by the Japanese Total Quality Management (TQM) consultant Noriaki 
Kano (Mazur, 1993, Cohen, 1995). 








The Kano Model suggests that there are three types of client requirements. Mazur (1993) 
describes Kano's three types of requirements for the service industries as: 
"Revealed Requirements are typically what we get by just asking customers 
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what they want. These requirements satisfy (or dissatisfy) in proportion to their 
presence (or absence) in the delivered service. Fast service would be a good 
example. The faster (or slower) the service, the more they like (or dislike) it. 
Expected Requirements are often so basic the customer may fail to mention 
them - until we fail to deliver them. They are basic expectations of the service, 
without which the service may cease to be of value; their absence is very 
dissatisfying. Further, meeting these requirements often goes unnoticed by most 
customers. For example, if an airplane takes off safely, passengers barely notice it. 
If it fails to take off safely, dissatisfaction, though brief, is intense. Expected 
requirements must be fulfilled. 
Exciting Requirements are difficult to discover. They are beyond the customer's 
expectations. Their absence does not dissatisfy; their presence excites... Since 
customers are not apt to be aware of these requirements, it is the responsibility of 
the service organisation to explore customer problems and opportunities for new 
levels of service. " (p. 2-3) 
With regard to a particular business problem, a client organisation may have many needs and 
wants originated from various sources. These sources can be technical and commercial. They 
can be objective or purely subjective (e. g. a user' preference for a colour scheme). As 
illustrated by the Kano Model, some requirements may be explicitly stated by the client, some 
implicitly expected and some not even known to the client. From this perspective, a complete 
requirements specification is not possible. The best a supplier can expect is a specification for 
"revealed requirements". The rest is up to the supplier. 
The Kano Model might explain why some of the practices in the iterative software 
development are problematic. One commonly used approach to manage requirements is for a 
supplier to document client requirements on behalf of the client or build a prototype and 
having them "signed off" by the client (e. g. Macromedia, undated). Signing-off would 
confirm the requirements specification to be full and complete, including the "expected 
requirements". However, the client is unlikely to be sufficiently informed to do that. As a 
result, the signature holder goes through a lengthy consultation process as a rear-guarding 
exercise. This causes delays in signing off requirement specification, which is a common 
complaint from software suppliers (Section 4.6.1). The delays caused by sign-offs, however, 
consume precious project times, which may add to project delays. 
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The Kano Model also helps to resolve the debate regarding whether a software product should 
satisfy the client's requirements or the client's expectation. The answer is "both". The client 
only manages to specify the revealed requirements but expects the delivered product to have 
the "expected requirements" built-in. The misconception that a client should "document the 
requirements thoroughly and precisely" (Wiegers, 2003) is asking the client to do the 
impossible. The iterative approach recognises the fallacy to a certain degree. Unfortunately, it 
is easy to fall into the trap of the misconception (e. g. Section 4.7.5). The Kano Model can 
guide ISD projects to adopt a more realistic approach to client requirements management. 
This is incorporated in designing the potential solution in Chapter 10. 
8.4 Switching Cost and Its Impact on Supplier Behaviour 
Switching cost is the cost a client incurs or perceives to incur when changing from one 
supplier's product to that of a competing supplier's, even when both products are functionally 
the same (Klemperer, 1995). It can be informational, transactional, artificially created, 
learning-related or psychological (Klemperer, 1987,1995). When switching cost is so high 
that switching suppliers is unthinkable, the client is said to be locked-in with the existing 
supplier (Varian, 2001). Switching cost and supplier lock-in is widely recognised in IT 
industry and the software market (Varian, 2001). NAO (2001) provides the MRS Project as 
an excellent example of switching cost that prevented the client from changing the supplier. 
In this case, the client had to decide how to purchase additional system functions. The choices 
were either to stay with the incumbent supplier or to contract with a new one. The client 
found that switching the supplier would have incurred a £44million contract cancellation fee 
for a contract originally worth up to £76million. Not surprisingly, the client decided to stay 
with the incumbent supplier. The £44million is clearly a part of the total client switching cost. 
The case serves to illustrate the potential high level of switching cost in the software market. 
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Switching cost may affect competitive behaviours of market participants leading to price wars 
in the pre-contract bidding stage (Klemperer, 1989). Consider a two-period market with a 
switching costs (s > 0) and the real cost of the product c including the supplier's normal rate 
of return, the supplier's bidding price P in the first period could be as low as (c - s). In the 
second period, the supplier charges higher prices to recover up to the value of s. In the case of 
lock-in, the supplier charges monopoly prices. Since s is high in acquiring software products, 
P is likely to be far less than the supplier's real cost, resulting a significant bargains-then- 
ripoffs opportunistic behaviour pattern (Klemperer, 1989, Farrell and Klemperer, 2001). One 
dramatic example of this opportunistic behaviour is found in the Case 2. The supplier AES 
requested 40% price increase once selected and agreed to 20% increase after tough 
negotiations (Section 5.5.2). In Libra Project (NAO, 2003), the supplier ICL increased the bid 
from the initial £146million to £184million before the contract was signed, an increase of 
26%. The concept of switching cost provides a good explanation for these price increases. 
One problem for suppliers in the stage of contract bidding is that a client's switching cost may 
or may not be observable. The switching cost is said to be observable if it is public 
information. When that is the case, all suppliers will be bidding with the same level of s. In 
the software market, however, a client's switching cost is hidden and not easily observable. 
Suppliers would have to rely on their own estimates as part of bidding price considerations. 
Thus it is possible for suppliers to over estimate s, increasing the possibility of giving 
unrealistic price commitments (e. g. Cabinet Office, 2000). 
The initial bargains present the client with a supplier selection problem. The prices offered by 
suppliers no longer simply signal their competitiveness. They also incorporate the suppliers' 
hidden estimates of the clients' switching cost. The more opportunistic a supplier is, the lower 
the quoted price might be. To make the matter worse, a client is often obliged to select the 
supplier with the lowest bid, especially in the public sector where strict guidelines are in place 
209 
regarding the purchasing process. This leads to adverse selection (Section 8.2) and was 
believed to contribute to ISD project challenges and sometimes failures (e. g. the London 
Ambulance Service's Computer Aided Despatch system project in Page et al., 1993). 
The above discussion assumes that quality is held constant across the two transaction periods. 
However, like price, quality commitment may be affected by the switching cost due to 
incomplete information (Section 8.2). There is a tendency that a supplier claims that its 
product quality is superior than it may be. One technique used by software suppliers is the 
"Bait and Switch Game" (Johnson, 2000a). A supplier would send the "A" team of highly 
skilled and experienced professionals with great credentials, but delivers with the "B" or even 
the "Z" team. Such a game is aimed at giving a quality image first and then attempting to get 
away with lower quality counting on the client's switching cost. This game was played by NQ 
in Case 1. NQ's proposal document was of high quality, led by one of the firm's partners. 
Cost information shows that the partner's involvement stopped by the end of June 2000 when 
the contract was signed. NQ also promised system testing "against defined test scripts written 
following design" but refused to carry out such testing without extra funding later (Section 
4.6). 
Suppliers' bargains-then-ripoffs behaviour pattern mirrors the transition of the market 
structure from being competitive before the supplier selection to being monopolistic 
thereafter. According to the neo-classical economic analysis of Structure, Conduct and 
Performance (SCP), structure determines performance (Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994), not 
having to consider conduct (behaviour) at all. If we accept SCP theory, we may come to the 
conclusion that bidding output (the bidding document, the pledged price, the pledged product 
and the pledged time of delivery) will be excellent due to the competitive market structure. 
On the other hand, the output from the development phase (the scope and quality of the actual 
product, the actual delivery time etc) will be poor and the actual price will be higher (the 
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monopoly price) than the promised one (the competitive price). The observations on ISD 
projects bear this analysis out. The reduced functionality, poor quality of the delivered 
product, budget overruns and late delivery are indeed the symptoms of ISD projects. 
In summary, though suppliers are often selected and contracted on a competitive basis, the 
product design and development is typically carried out by a single supplier as a monopoly. 
The high switching cost associated with acquiring software products leads to distorted bid 
prices, which is made worse by hidden information between the client and the supplier. The 
overall result is a bargains-then-ripoffs opportunistic behaviour pattern on the supplier's side. 
This pattern not only may affect product price but also product quality. The SCP analysis 
provides further theoretical support to the explanation provided by switching cost. It also 
suggests a direction for resolving some of the ISD project challenges by introducing 
competition into product development, thereby reducing client switching cost for possible 
alternatives. This will be incorporated in the unified explanation proposed in Section 8.11. In 
the meantime, it has to be admitted that there are successes as well as failures in ISD projects 
(Standish Group, 1995) operating with the same market process. Such different results have to 
be explained, possibly by the conduct of firms, influenced by other factors. These are further 
analysed in the subsequent sections. 
8.5 Incomplete Contracts 
In an ISD project, a client acquires an application software product by offering a contract with 
a selected supplier. Inadequate contracts have been cited as one of the reasons for ISD project 
challenges and failures (Webster, 2000). Webster's recommendations are clear: 
"All parties [... ] should agree ahead of time to specific expectations, promises, 
and contingencies regarding each of the areas of quality [... ]. For example, the 
system specifications should include not just the required functionality, but should 
also spell out any performance requirements or constraints, compatibility 
requirements, anticipated lifespan, and acceptable levels of defects. " 
Webster raises the problem of "incomplete contracts" in ISD projects. The problem of 
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"incomplete contracts" might have explained many of the challenges of supplier contracting 
and subsequent software developments. Indeed, without exactly agreeing "specific 
expectations, promises and contingencies", how could a supplier know what to develop and 
how could a client's needs be met? But it does not appear to be as simple as that. The 
following subsection examines the concept of "incomplete contracts", followed by Section 
8.5.2 on contracts used in ISD projects. 
8.5.1 The Concept of Incomplete Contracts 
A contract is incomplete if the goods to be exchanged are not described in full ex ante for a 
third party (e. g. the court) to enforce (Hart and Moore, 1999). Maskin and Tirole (1999) refer 
to such a problem as contracting parties having "trouble foreseeing the possible physical 
contingencies" (emphasis in the original). This appears to be common in design-build 
contracts due to a phenomenon called "preferential engineering", where a client influences the 
design by imposing its own preferences. As a result, "liabilities may become confused" 
(Marshall, 1992). Contracts with application software suppliers are typical examples of 
incomplete contracts since software products are difficult to describe in full before they are 
developed. This can be attributed partly to the problem of incomplete requirements in the 
form of functional specifications, bearing in mind the Kano Model (Section 8.3). In addition, 
design and build are difficult, if not impossible, to separate in software development contracts 
(Section 8.6). The nature of software contract incompleteness is demonstrated by the contract 
between the Lord Chancellor's Department and ICL in the Libra Project reported in NAO 
(2003). Though the supplier in this case failed to supply the promised software, the client did 
not feel that it could take the supplier to court for fear of "claims and counter claims" 
(Computing Staff, 2003). This might be explained by the concept of incomplete contracts in 
that what was agreed between the contracting parties (presumably for the supplier to sell a 
software product to the client) was felt not enforceable by the court. 
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Within an incomplete contract, price and quality commitments from a supplier are related. 
Farrell and Shapiro (1989) study how a seller may behave if an incomplete contract constrains 
some dimensions (e. g. price) and not the others (e. g. quality). They arrive at the following 
conclusions: 
1. If the seller is expected to exploit the buyer in any case ex post, then it is better 
for the seller to do so unconstrained. Otherwise if the buyer constrains the seller 
in some variables (e. g. price) and not others (e. g. quality), the result may be in- 
efficient in that the buyer will get the goods meeting the constrained variables 
(e. g. price) and is exploited on the unconstrained variables (e. g. quality). This is 
the "Principle of Negative Protection"; 
2. It can be desirable to make the seller's exploitation inefficient, if it means that he 
will then refrain altogether. That is to say, if a contract can be designed and 
accepted by the supplier so that its exploitation (lower quality) will cause 
inefficiency to itself, then such a contract will produce efficient result. This is the 
"Principle of Positive Protection". 
In the case of contracting for application software in ISD projects, some dimensions (e. g. 
price and delivery dates) are easily contractible and others (e. g. functions and quality) are not. 
According to Farrell and Shapiro's first conclusion above, therefore, it may be better to have 
no contract at all than to have a partial contract. In Case 2, the client and the project team did 
not like an initial proposed delivery date of 02/07/2001 for "Release 2". The supplier duly 
promised to bring the delivery date earlier. The "acceptable" date and a fixed price were 
written into the contract (Section 5.5). What actually happened was that "Release 2" was 
redefined by the supplier in such a way to have only contained a revised "Release 1". The 
original "Release 2" was not delivered until 14/09/2001, some two and half months later and 
did not function as promised. This serves as an example for how a supplier might be willing 
to commit on easily contractible dimensions according to the client's wishes and exploit the 
unconstrained dimensions. 
The second conclusion above calls for contracts to be designed in such a way that they will 
"hurt" the supplier should it pursue actions of exploitation. Maskin and Tirole (1999) suggest 
that, when it is difficult to specify "physical contingencies", a contract might be written to 
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specify "the possible payoff contingencies" to overcome the problem of incomplete contracts. 
This effectively calls for outcome-based rather than behaviour-based contracts according to 
the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Walsh and Schneider, 2002; Lichtenstein, 2002). 
Though in Section 8.2.2, it has already been demonstrated that neither behaviour-based, nor 
outcome-based contracts are effective on their own, the outcome-based contract type with 
"payoff contingencies" might offer a possible solution on the whole. This is adopted in 
designing the proposed management framework in Chapter 10. 
Another perspective to examine client-supplier contracts is to see if they meet the following 
two constraints (Anderbub et al., 2000): 
" Incentive compatibility constraints: this is necessary so that the interests of the 
principal and the agent are aligned; 
" Participant constraints: this is necessary so that the agent will agree to the contract. 
Anderhub et al. suggest three steps in a simplified PA contracting process. First of all, the 
principal offers a contract with a fixed wage and a return share. The fixed wage can be 
positive or negative and the return share can vary between 0 and 100 percent. An example of 
the negative wage is the rent a tenant pays to the landlord. A return share of 0 percent from 
the principal to the agent means that the principal keeps all the return while 100 percent 
means that the agent possessing the whole return. Secondly, the agent decides whether to 
accept the contract or not. Thirdly, the agent chooses an effort level that generates a return 
and causes a cost (to be borne by the agent). The landlord may offer a contract that demands a 
fixed rent to be paid and leaves the farmer 100% of the residual return. Should the contract be 
accepted, the farmer will exert utmost effort to produce as much residual return as possible. 
The two criteria and the three steps provide a basic conceptual framework to analyse contracts 
below. In addition, an attempt to adopt an outcome-based contract in Case 3 is examined to 
see why it might not have been successful. 
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8.5.2 Contracts Used in ISD Projects 
There are two types of contracts commonly used in ISD projects: time and materials (T&M) 
and fixed price, both observed in the case studies. With T&M, the client bears all the risks 
since the supplier is paid according to the amount of time worked. Therefore, T&M contracts 
meet the criterion of participation constraint. As for the incentive compatibility constraint, it 
fails altogether. While the client's objective is to complete the project as budgeted or sooner, 
the supplier might be rewarded for taking longer to complete the required tasks. When the 
budget ceiling is hit, the supplier simply stops making effort and demands an increase to the 
budget. The alternative to that is for the client to accept an incomplete product or a lower 
quality one. Thus a simple T&M contract introduces a disincentive to complete the 
development early or deliver a quality product. The T&M contract with NQ in Case 1 might 
be seen as one of the direct causes for the poor quality web page design (Section 4.6.3). 
While T&M contract leaves both the price and the product quality unconstrained, a fixed- 
price software contract constrains the price without having effective means to constrain 
product quality. Fixed price offers the supplier a fixed wage and 0% return. For software 
products, though difficult, agreeing fixed prices is possible since cost can be monitored 
relatively easily. Unfortunately, contracting on quality is much more problematic (Section 
7.5; Section 8.8). In fixed-price contracts, therefore, the supplier tends to exploit on the 
quality dimensions other than the price (Farrell and Shapiro, 1989). As a result, a fixed-price 
contract does not produce desired software products. The contract in Case 2 illustrates the 
point. In Case 2, the price was fixed after the initial shock increase (the effect of the switching 
cost - Section 8.4). The acceptance criteria were only available in general simplistic terms 
(Section 5.5). The contract might be improved upon in various ways but for the client to insist 
on detailed quality description without having seen the product would have been difficult if 
not impossible. 
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While it might be impossible for a client and a supplier to describe and agree "physical 
contingencies", would it be practical to adopt Maskin and Tirole's (1999) suggestion to 
describe the "payoff contingencies" so that an outcome-based contract could be adopted? The 
contract with SC1 in Case 3 made a limited attempt to do just that. Though no detailed 
description of contingencies were available linking with payoffs, there was a statement about 
the "maximum loss recoverable" by the client being 100% of the contract price (Section 6.5). 
This describes at least the possibility of the software product being rejected. In other words, it 
might be interpreted that the contract envisaged a number of payoff contingencies on a 
spectrum. On one end of the spectrum, the client would accept the software product and the 
supplier would be paid in full. On the other end, the client would reject the product and the 
supplier would be not paid at all. The actual result of the project was neither an outright 
success, nor an outright failure. Even so, theoretically the situation must have been covered 
by the payoff contingency spectrum. Yet no record exists to indicate that the client recovered 
any loss from the supplier. In fact, it is not easy to enforce the clause between the client and 
the supplier. Apart from the possible difficulties with measuring the outcome of the software 
product (Section 7.5; Section 8.8), the client in this case faced a problem of having no 
practical option to meet the regulatory requirements. Should the client decide to recover the 
whole amount from the supplier, it would have to abandon the software product without 
meeting the regulatory requirements. Going for another supplier's product at that stage would 
have meant incurring the switching cost. The fact that the client planned to extend the project 
for another year investing an extra £996K (Section 6.5) indicates that the client's switching 
cost was too high to have taken any other alternative action. 
In summary, neither T&M nor fixed price contract types can effectively constrain software 
product development due to the difficulties of completely specifying requirements and 
controlling quality dimensions. The use of payoff contingencies in contracts must be backed 
up with realistic options, which are limited due to high switching costs. This points to a 
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fundamental problem with monopolistic software development inherent in the current 
approach of managing ISD projects. 
8.6 Inseparability of Design and Development 
It is a common assumption that software design can be completed fully before development 
(Kruchten, 2000). This assumption is misplaced based on the following observation: 
"You can accumulate pages and pages of design documentation and hundreds of 
blueprints and spend weeks in review, only to discover, that in the process, that 
the design has major flaws that cause serious breakdowns" (Kruchten, 2000, p. 57) 
This observation reveals a fundamental feature of the software product development process, 
which might be called "the inseparability of software design and development". This is 
related to the nature of a software product as "pure design" (Callahan and Moretton, 2001; 
Eischen, 2002; Yeargin, 2002). While a construction product may be designed first and its 
quality controlled at the virtual level before production (building) work starts, software design 
is intertwined with development. A software design on paper cannot (at least at the current 
level of software technology maturity) be certified to be "right" with the necessary quality 
dimensions of "correctness, efficiency, feasibility and so on" (Kruchten, 2000, p. 57) without 
being tried out first by a stage of development. The process of development can reveal areas 
of incorrectness and inefficiency of the design. Therefore, the software development process 
might be described as a "trial-and-error" process. Williams and Cockburn (2003) refer it as 
"an empirical process" characterised by "inspect-and-adapt" cycles. 
The trial-and-error approach may explain observations of software products taking longer to 
develop, causing cost and schedule overruns. This is because the number of cycles of the 
iterations between design and development are not easy to predict beforehand. The trial and 
error process might render a previous endeavour wasted. Royce (1970) warns that a software 
development may return "to the origin", causing "100-percent overrun in schedule and/or 
cost" (p. 2). The inseparability of design and development may also explain the difficulties in 
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co-ordinating designers and developers. A designer is not able to finish a design in isolation 
of the developer or vice versa. McBreen (2002a) calls for integrated teams and recommends 
that "designers should be deeply involved in the programming tasks". 
The inseparability of design and development may also explain the poor documentation in the 
process of software development (Section 7.5.4). Nayar (2000) suggests that poor software 
documentation is due to the misconception that "it is a support task that is essentially 
noncreative and a necessary evil [... ]" (p. 29). There might be some truth in that. An 
alternative explanation, however, is that design and development are closely related so that 
design documents become redundant once coding is started. A design may be documented 
first and then "implemented" through development. The development is likely to reveal the 
inadequacy of the design. At that point, the development team has two options. The first one 
is to modify the design document and then to implement it to see if it works. The alternative is 
to modify the developed software directly. Since the modified design is not guaranteed to 
work and may require further changes, it stands to reason that the second option is likely to 
require less time to obtain the necessary feedback for further adjustments. In that way, while 
initially a design may be documented, it can easily become obsolete as soon as software 
development is started. As the software product evolves, the design evolves without 
necessarily being updated separately. In other words, design and development activities are 
too closely related with each other to encourage separate documentation. 
While the trial-and-error approach has always been the reality for software development (see 
e. g. GenerExe, 2002; Lindberg, 2003), it has often been regarded as a problem (e. g. 
Raybould, 2002). However, the proponents of the iterative approach have recognised the 
inseparability of design and development and have suggested various incremental and 
iterative techniques to address the problem (McManus, 1997; Royce, 1998; Kruchten, 2000; 
Larman and Basili, 2003). For example, Beck (2000) advocates having "enough design for 
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today's code" (p. 65). In other words, do not aim for a complete design in the first place. 
Instead, design enough for the immediate development needs and design more after coding to 
see how best to proceed. However, the iterative approach does not deal with a number of 
other project challenges and their other root causes adequately. For a fuller critique of the 
iterative approach, see Section 8.11. 
8.7 Risk and Uncertainty 
The observations from the case studies suggest that the risk management process may be 
effective dealing with certain risks but not others (Section 7.6). To understand the possible 
reasons behind such observations, it is helpful to examine the concepts of risk and the related 
concept of uncertainty (Section 8.7.1). It is suggested that uncertainty with software 
development is an important root cause for estimating errors and other management 
difficulties (section 8.7.2). 
8.7.1 The Concepts of Risk and Uncertainty 
In the literature about project management and risk management, there are a number of 
different approaches to defining risk and uncertainty and the relationship between the two 
(Williams, 1995). For example, Hertz and Thomas (1983) designate risk as "both uncertainty 
and the results of uncertainty" (p. 3). The distinctions between risk and uncertainty, according 
to Hertz and Thomas, "have limited value in the practical process of risk assessment and 
analysis. Likewise, Kerzner (1998, p. 869) defines risk as a function of uncertainty: 
Risk = f(event, uncertainty, damage) 
The implication of this approach is that risks can be "identified, assessed and provided for" 
(Kerzner, 1998, p. 871). The risk management process is therefore a process of reducing 
uncertainty associated with risks by identification, quantification, evaluation, prevention, 
reduction and transference etc (e. g. CCTA, 1998; Kerzner, 1998, Wiegers, 1998; Lieberman, 
2002). 
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Alternatively, Chapman (2000) uses the term "project uncertainty management" to denote "an 
even-handed approach to opportunities and threats" in contrast to "project risk management" 
with the focus only on "threat management" (p. 241). This implies that "uncertainty" is a 
broader term than "risk" and risk is merely a subset of uncertainty. Yet another approach 
treats risk separately from uncertainty. This is represented by Correia et al. (1989, quoted in 
Remenyi, 1999, p. 7): 
"uncertainty implies that either all the alternative possible outcomes cannot be 
identified, or that no probability can be attached to the alternative possible 
outcomes. " 
In this sense, uncertainty has been referred to as "unknown unknowns" while risk is "known 
unknowns (e. g. Crawford, 2003). The implication is that uncertainty cannot be managed with 
the usual risk management techniques of identification, quantification, evaluation, prevention, 
reduction and transference etc. Where such a distinction is made, the focus tends to be on the 
management of risk rather than uncertainty (e. g. Remenyi, 1999; Thomas, 2000). 
In this thesis, the definitions of risk and uncertainty are distinguished as suggested by Correia 
et al. and the focus of the following discussions is on the management of uncertainty. Turner 
and Cochrane (1993) suggest four types of projects based on two parameters: how well 
defined are the goals and how well defined are the methods of achieving them. They suggest 
that, for software development, goals are not well defined while methods are (Type 3 Project 
in Turner and Cochrance, 1993). In fact, research evidence has suggested that in reality 
neither goals nor methods are necessarily well defined. Ziv et al. (1996) identify many 
sources of uncertainty in software development and proposes an "uncertainty principle", 
stating that "uncertainty is inherent and inevitable in software development processes[... ]". 
This suggests that the methods (i. e. the processes) are poorly defined. Schwaber (1996) 
describes the systems development process as "unpredictable". McBreen (2000) asserts that 
"[u]ncertainty is one of the few certainties about software development". Uncertainty poses 
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serious problems to software development, rendering it more like research (O'Neil, 1999), 
which is Type 4 Project in Turner and Cochrane (1993). In the following subsection, the 
development uncertainty is highlighted to see how it might affect a software supplier's 
commitment to deliver a quality software product within cost and schedule. Other types of 
uncertainties as suggested by Ziv et al. (1996) might be explored for future studies. 
8.7.2 Software Development Uncertainty and Its Consequences 
Software development uncertainty might be described in simple terms as follows. A 
seemingly simple technical task may lead into a number of other tasks totally unforeseen. 
When a non-trivial software program is written, the programmer cannot be sure if it will be 
compiled without error. Nor can the programmer be sure that it will execute correctly as 
intended despite the programmer's best endeavour. Here the issues of staff motivation and 
process control are not relevant. In other words, there is uncertainty involvement in software 
development, which is technical in nature, not managerial. 
The uncertainty contributes to the need for the trial-and-error approach discussed in Section 
8.6, resulting necessary development "restarts" (Royce, 1970) and making the software 
development process "unpredictable" (Schwaber, 1996). This may explain the estimating 
difficulties associated with software development. Estimating effectively attempts to predict a 
level of required man-days (or man-months) for accomplishing a particular task or a 
developing software product. Yet if design and development involves uncertain number of 
iterations and indeed uncertain number of "restarts", the estimate is likely to be inaccurate. In 
studying software estimating accuracy, Lederer and Prasad (2000) conclude that neither the 
"Informal Basis" nor the "Algorithmic Basis" improves estimating accuracy. More 
interestingly, "revising an estimate does not appear to make it more accurate" (Lederer and 
Prasad, 2000, p. 41). Development uncertainty and the inherent trial-and-error approach might 
explain the failure to provide accurate estimates for software development. 
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Uncertainty may also explain why software development is successful sometimes within the 
ISD project management framework but not others (Standish Group, 1995). In a particular 
project, there is a software development team (typically in the software supplier's 
organisation within the context of this thesis) working on design and development. At the 
same time, the supplier management tries to manage the development and delivery of a 
software product within a budget and a deadline according to its initial estimate and promise. 
The client's project team is charged with the responsibility to acquire the software product 
with a specific budget and deadline of its own. At a technical level, the software development 
team may work hard to iterate design and development activities in resolving technical issues, 
and when necessary restarts with new designs for better results. Thus on the one hand, it is not 
possible to predict when a software product can be successfully developed due to the trial- 
and-error process. On the other hand, both the supplier management and the client project 
management team try to manage cost and schedule tightly. 
There may be many possible outcomes as a result of the conflict between development 
uncertainty and tight project management. Four possibilities are considered here. The first is 
that the design and development takes place as initially estimated. As a result, cost and 
schedule commitments might be kept and the resultant software product is of the expected 
quality. This scenario has not been observed in the three case studies but it may have been 
achieved by the Computerisation of PAYE Project (Morris and Hough, 1987). The scenario 
may also describe projects in the "successful project" category reported by Standish Group 
(1995). The second possibility is that an initial design is broadly "right" but requires 
considerable number of development iterations to be improved. This may results in cost and 
schedule overruns but the software product may be of acceptable quality. The OMSTool in 
Case 3 might fit into this scenario although it appeared to need an additional year to achieve 
what had been planned initially. The third possibility is that after a number of iterations the 
222 
budget or deadline may be reached and development stopped with an incomplete software 
product delivered. This was observed in Case 1 with NQ's deliverables (Section 4.6). The 
fourth possibility is that after unexpected number of design-development iterations and 
possible restarts the software product is still not "right". But due to project management 
pressure, the resultant software product is delivered and implemented. This scenario results in 
project cost and schedule overruns and poor software product functionality and quality. This 
was observed in Case 1 (Section 4.4) and Case 2 (Section 5.8). 
8.7.3 The Management of Uncertainty in Projects 
As suggested in Section 8.7.1, some project risk management literature chooses not to discuss 
the management of uncertainty even when it is recognised to be different from conventional 
risks (e. g. Remenyi, 1998). When uncertainty is discussed, the suggestion is usually to make 
available a level of contingency funding (e. g. Schulte, 2002; NIH, 2000). However, there are 
at least two problems with the contingency funding approach. The first is the determination of 
the funding level, which cannot be guaranteed to be sufficient ex ante. The second problem is 
that the extra funding may provide a partial solution to the problem of cost but it cannot 
resolve the fundamental problem of product quality. Consider Case 2 as an example. The 
project team did prepare a contingency budget. It was less than 10% of the original project 
budget (Section 5.9.6). Though it would have helped to extend the project by a few weeks it 
could not have changed fundamentally the outcome of the project. 
Project uncertainty does not reconcile easily with the usually fixed project cost and schedule 
targets. A possible solution is to increase project flexibility and to remove the cost and 
schedule restrictions altogether. In software development, this flexibility approach is adopted 
by the "SCRUM methodology" for software development as proposed by Schwaber (1996): 
"The estimate is only for starting purposes, however, since the overall timetable 
and cost are determined dynamically in response to the environmental factors. " (p. 
18) 
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The SCRUM methodology might be applicable to suppliers developing software products for 
the PPSW market. For ISD projects, software suppliers usually work with strict budget and 
time commitments. This was the case for the fixed price supplier contracts in both Case 2 and 
Case 3. There are great resistance to "dynamically" adjusting the cost and time commitments 
in project environment. Clients naturally feel suspicious about any such adjustment request 
from the supplier in a monopoly setting. In Case 1, the "re-planning" exercise allowed MSS 
to adjust its cost. The SLC project manager suspected that MSS had increased the estimates 
by 20% more than necessary (Section 4.7.6). In the Libra Project reported in NAO (2003), the 
supplier ICL's commitments on cost, schedule and deliverables were "dynamically" changed 
a number of times, each change increased the average annual cost significantly (Table 8.1, 
based on NAO, 2003). The development part of the contract, which was to be about two 
thirds of the contract value, was eventually cancelled (NAO, 2003). These observations 
indicate that flexibility with cost and time commitments within the current monopolised 
development framework potentially results in significant cost increases without necessary 
helping the development of a quality product. 
Table RA! Mnnmir riiont.. cnnniinr rnntra't rhano t in tha 1.1hrn Prniwrt 
Date of Agreement Ma 1998 December 1998 May 2000 July 2002 
Contract Cost £million 146 184 319 318 
Contract Length (Years) )1 10.5 14.5 8.5 
Average Annual Cost fmillion 13.3 17.5 22 37.4 
In the search for an effective strategy to manage project uncertainty, Pich et al. (2002) provide 
a "complete" model summarising the following three approaches: 
0 The instructionist approach: pre-specifying and triggering actions based on signals; 
o The learning approach: conducting new planning in the middle of a project; 
" The selectionist: the pursuit of multiple candidate solutions until the best can be 
identified. 
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Pich et al. suggest that the common project management techniques of task scheduling and 
risk management with contingent action are the hallmarks of the instructionist approach. This 
approach does not work when there is inadequate information due to "project ambiguity" 
(events or causality being unknown) and "project complexity" (an inability to evaluate the 
effects of actions because too many variables interact). The learning approach allows active 
incorporation of new information, either "incrementally" or "opportunistically", thus 
overcoming to some extent the problem of inadequate information. However, learning is 
merely an extension of the instructionist approach. It relies on the identification of the optimal 
policy to be modified overtime. The alternative is to try multiple solutions in the hope that 
one will work. This is the selectionist approach. This approach has been studied and practised 
to address development uncertainty in different forms. Abernathy and Rosenbloom (1969) 
recommend "a parallel strategy" for research and development projects. Sobek et al. (1999) 
formalises a "Set Based Concurrent Engineering (SBCE)" framework based on Toyota's 
successful practices for manufacturing product development. SBCE provides a good example 
of the selectionist approach at work (see Section 9.5 for a comparative study between 
software development and manufacturing product development). 
In software development, the Waterfall Model might be said to follow the "instructionist 
approach". This has long been recognised as not suitable for software development (Royce, 
1970; Larman and Basili, 2003). Many current ISDMs are based on the iterative approach, 
which might be equated to the learning approach (Schwaber, 1996; Stapleton, 1997; Royce, 
1998; Kruchten, 2000; Beck, 2000). Based on the observations from the case studies, the 
learning approach does not resolve the uncertainty problem effectively either (for a fuller 
critique of the iterative approach see Section 8.10). It is suggested that the selectionist 
approach be adopted for software development (Section 8.11 and Chapter 10). 
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8.8 Product Evaluation 
In ISD projects, there are two stages when product evaluation is conducted. At the pre- 
contract stage, a client selects a supplier by evaluating partially available products (prototypes 
or COTS if available) together with suppliers' promises. At the product acceptance stage, the 
client evaluates a delivered product as a quality control measure. It is suggested in this 
Section that there are problems associated with both stages of evaluation. Before examining 
these problems, two possible evaluation approaches are discussed first below. 
8.8.1 Two Approaches of Product Evaluation 
A product might be evaluated by comparing it against a complete model or with other 
comparable products. The former is called the absolute product evaluation approach (Morisio 
et al., 2002; Blin and Tsoukias, 2001) and the latter the relative one. The absolute approach is 
common in verifying manufactured goods. Consider a mechanical part going through an 
inspection process as an example. The complete model is embodied in one or a series of 
drawings and specifications that are controlled by the client. A client's quality inspector can 
tell if any dimension does not match what is stated in the specification by using appropriate 
measuring tools. The measurement can be repeated within an expected level of tolerance and 
diagnosis for any incorrect dimension can usually be agreed between a client and a supplier 
without much dispute if the measuring tools are in good order. Such a process cannot be 
easily applied to the evaluation of a software product. First of all, the client, when 
commissioning software development, does not possess a complete design. In fact, such a 
design is one of the key deliverables the client is looking for from the supplier due to the 
inseparability of design and development (Section 8.6). The client only has a set of 
incomplete requirements, which is inadequate in controlling the eventual software quality. 
Secondly, there are no readily available and objective measurements for many software 
dimensions. Consider Case 1 for example, in terms of functional requirements, how many 
strokes should a user key in to complete an online purchase transaction? In terms of non- 
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functional requirements, how should usability and level of security be measured? These are 
open questions without clear-cut answers. Thirdly, where measurements are easily obtainable 
(e. g. performance measured in time), it is not always repeatable. Even when a measurement is 
obtainable and repeatable, it is often difficult to diagnose the root causes for undesirable 
results. An unfavourable evaluation result can be interpreted in many ways. Is it an unknown 
application software defect or is it a result of changed system software configuration that 
causes an application to crash? Is it the client's defective data or the network traffic, or some 
mishandled memory allocation within the system software that causes the application 
performance degradation? In Case 3, the client and the supplier spent months wondering if the 
poor system performance was due to some network problems or due to application defects 
without being able to reach an agreement (Section 6.9). Clearly, the absolute evaluation 
approach can be slow, difficult and costly. 
The relative approach is generally known as benchmarking and it can be used to measure any 
conceivable dimension of products, services and work processes (Spendolini, 1992). It is 
common even for organisations to benchmark themselves against others to gauge their own 
performance. The enthusiasm for such cross-organisational benchmarking can be partly 
explained by the fact that the absolute evaluation on one single instance is difficult and costly. 
Benchmarking has been known in many other ways as relative performance measurement 
(RPM), relative product evaluation (RPE) or any number of methods with the same approach. 
RPE has been widely used by trade magazines to compare one product against another (e. g. 
Loverica, 1994; Henning, 2001). In ISD projects, RPE has been used often to evaluate COTS 
products (see e. g. Kontio, 1996) prior to supplier selection, as happened in the feasibility 
stage in Case 2 (Section 5.3) and the detailed supplier selection exercise in Case 3 (Section 
6.4). What can be established is that the relative approach is widely applicable and intuitive. 
However, the prerequisite for using the relative approach is to have two or more comparable 
products, services or processes to compare with. Thus the method has not been used in ISD 
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projects at software acceptance stage. The current single source software development 
framework forces the client to adopt the absolute evaluation approach, which might explain 
the problems with enforcing acceptance criteria (Section 7.5). 
The absolute and relative approaches are not mutually exclusive. A combined approach may 
be taken as a matter of common sense. For example, in evaluating Intel's Pentium 4 2GHz 
CPU, Henning (2001) lists many performance measures in absolute terms and then compares 
the Intel's CPU with three of AMD's CPUs. At the software acceptance stage, a combined 
evaluation approach is likely to assist the client to make an informed decision. 
8.8.2 Two Stages of Product Evaluation in ISD Projects 
The two stages of product evaluation in ISD projects are contrasted in Table 8.2. The table 
illustrates different problems for each of the stages. While the pre-contract evaluation takes 
the relative approach, it is based on suppliers' partial products (prototypes and reference 
installations if available) together with promises of price, quality and delivery time etc. Case 
studies have shown that partial products or prototypes are poor indicators to the eventual 
outcomes of software products (e. g. Adolph, 2000). Even reference installations cannot 
guarantee that the same software application for one organisation will be successful for the 
other (Mitev, 1996; Southon et al., 1997). Past performance, company reputation, personal 
experience with suppliers may all feature to a certain degree in the client's eventual decision 
but none gives a sufficient indication of a final software product's success, which might be 
explained by development uncertainty discussed in Section 8.7. Many case studies have 
identified that the supplier selection process is problematic (e. g. Page et al., 1993; West Essex 
RISP Project in Flowers, 1996; Collins, 1998). Even with an impeccable process, the 
inherent weak basis for product evaluation together with development uncertainty might still 
leave the client with a failed end product. 
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Table 8.2: Two stages of product evaluation In ISD projects 
Objectives Basis of 
Evaluation 
Approach Problems 
Pre-Contract Supplier/Product Partial Relative Weak basis for predicting 
Product Selection products product success 
Evaluation and/or 
promises 
Post-Contract Product Quality A single Absolute No absolute model to evaluate 
Product Control: for "finished" against. Difficulties to enforce 
Evaluation acceptance product acceptance criteria 
In contrast, in the current ISD project framework, the post-contract product evaluation is 
based on a single software product. This forces the client to take the absolute evaluation 
approach. Theoretically, the client has three options. One is to accept the software product 
with no further action required from the supplier. Either the product meets or exceeds the 
requirements, or the client is willing to leave any functional or quality gap to be filled later. 
The second option is to allow the development to continue if the client is not satisfied with the 
product, thus extending the overall project. The third option is to cancel the software 
development, and to source a new software product or to cancel the project altogether. 
Section 8.5 has already discussed the lack of realistic options in practice. This is made more 
difficult by not having a complete model to evaluate the software product. The product 
acceptance evaluation therefore fails to achieve its objective of controlling product quality. 
8.9 The Traditional Systems Development Framework 
Sections 8.3 to 8.8 have discussed various problems in managing application software 
suppliers. These problems include the misconceptions about incomplete requirements, the 
high switching cost in software acquisition, the incomplete contracts, the inseparability of 
design and development, the development uncertainty and the absolute production evaluation 
approach. These causes interact with each other closely to produce the pattern of ISD projects 
challenges. For example, the problem of incomplete requirements leads to incomplete 
contracts due to the misconception about the contracting strategy. The high switching cost, 
inseparability of design and development together make it possible for the supplier to pursue 
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a bargains-then-ripoffs opportunistic behaviour pattern. Development uncertainty and its 
associated trial-and-error process leads to estimating inaccuracies, which makes it genuinely 
difficult for the supplier to control development progress. Due to the cost implications, the 
supplier is likely to limit iterations. Instead, it is likely to exploit on product quality 
dimensions, which is possible due to incomplete contracts and the limitations of the absolute 
product evaluation approach. Despite many "best practices" and ISDMs, including those 
based on the iterative approach, ISD projects seem to proceed in some common framework 
and often end up with cost and schedule overruns and poor software systems. In this section, 
this common framework is re-visited in light of the concepts and issues discussed in Section 
8.2 to 8.8. Section 8.9.1 attempts to describe this common framework, referred to as the 
traditional systems development framework (TSDF). The step-by-step description paves the 
way for a game-theoretic modelling for TSDF in Section 8.9.2 (cf. Section 10.9). 
8.9.1 Describing TSDF 
This Section describes TSDF by tracing the common project stages and milestones, focusing 
on the behaviours of the client and the supplier. The description suggests that, due to the root 
causes outlined in Sections 8.3 to 8.8, the likelihood of poor software products and 
consequently challenged ISD projects is significant within TSDF. 
Stage 1: Client Preparing "Request for Proposal (RFP) " 
Consider the case when the client organisation has made a business case and decided to 
develop an information system with one or more software applications. During Stage 1, the 
client forms a project team responsible for the initial preparations and considers options 
available to acquire the required application software, based on which hardware and system 
software will be decided. When a client decides that an externally developed software 
application is required, a Request for Proposal (RFP, sometimes called Request for Quotation 
- RFQ) is prepared to solicit bids from suppliers. 
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Even at this early stage, the client faces potential PA problems. This happens when the client 
relies on third party consultants for advice and technical assistance to examine possible 
options. If the third party consultants are not truly independent, they may influence the RFP in 
favour of their own companies or business partners. In Case 1, the lead technical architect, 
whose company is closely affiliated with Microsoft, could have favoured no technical 
platform other than that from Microsoft (Section 4.3.2). The lack of appreciation of the PA 
problems can lead to conflicts of interest. For example, Collins (1998) reports that in the RISP 
Project, Arthur Andersen participated in the eventual bid (jointly with IBM) even though it 
served as an advisor in feasibility studies and bids evaluation. Such conflicts of interest in 
ISD projects prevent objective assessment of options and lend unfair competitive advantages 
to some suppliers. It can thus be detrimental to client's acquiring the best solutions. 
Milestone 1: RFP Issued 
An RFP may be brief with only a Statement of Work (SOW) or comprehensive with a 
detailed specification of requirements. In whichever case, the requirements will not be 
specified "completely, precisely and correctly" (Brooks, 1995; Section 8.3). 
Stage 2: Pre-contract Bidding 
This stage can be further divided into two. Stage 2a is the period during which competitive 
bidding takes place. The competition between suppliers is likely to be fierce due to the high 
switching cost that is not fully observable (Section 8.4) and the client faces an adverse 
selection problem (Section 8.2). 
Stage 2b is from the point a supplier is selected to the point a supplier is contracted. After the 
selection decision is communicated to the supplier, and before the contract is signed, if the 
intended contract price is to be of the fixed price type, the supplier has a short opportunity 
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window to increase the fixed price from the initial P to PI 
PSP'<_(P+s) 
In which s refers to the switching cost the client faces in acquiring the software product. The 
supplier may not go all the way to recover the switching cost at this stage since the client 
switching cost may be still relatively low. In fact, switching cost is a function of time, 
increasing as a project progresses. However, even at this stage, by announcing the selected 
supplier, there is already a considerable switching cost to the client due to financial, political 
and even psychological reasons (Section 7.3; Section 8.4.1). 
Milestone 2: Client Commits To Contract With One Supplier 
This milestone is reached when the client gives the supplier a signal to proceed with design 
and development. The signal may be given as a purchase order or less formally, some 
instruction from a recognised client authority. A formal contract may or may not be signed 
subject to legal discussions. However, a legally valid contractual relationship would be 
established between the client and the supplier nonetheless. Whether signed or not, contracts 
for substantive software products development are often incomplete (Section 8.5). 
Stage 3: Software Development Activities 
Software development involves creative activities with actions largely hidden from the client. 
There are many opportunities for the supplier to make decisions as for what to do and how to 
it. The rational behaviour for a supplier to adopt is to maximise its utilities. Its behaviours are 
discussed in the following categories: price, quality, innovation and communication. 
Part of the supplier's effort will be to recover the loss built-in as part of the low bidding price 
and extract as much as possible the return share. Whenever there is an opportunity, the 
supplier has the incentive to encourage and introduce changes so that monopoly prices can be 
charged. However, the client may resist changes by "freezing" the project scope or may even 
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adopt a scope reduction strategy (e. g. Section 4.4). Scope-freezing refers to a situation where 
a requirement is not added to the project scope despite business needs. The scope reduction 
goes a step further. The client agrees to reduce scope so that some prioritised part of a 
software product can be delivered first. A client usually agrees to scope-freezing or scope 
reduction at the expense of lower business benefits and higher future operational and support 
costs, in the hope that the project is completed on time and within budget. These are 
effectively strategies for a client to limit the supplier's monopoly exploitation in the short 
term. There is also the possibility that the supplier will demand a contract negotiation when 
the supplier can charge monopoly price for the whole contract. This happened in Case 1 in the 
shape of "re-planning", where MSS increased its price by 67% (Section 4.5). 
When a client successfully adopts a scope-freeze or scope reduction strategy, combined with 
a strict fixed price contract leaving no room for opportunistic pricing behaviour, the supplier 
may exploit the monopoly with low quality (Section 8.5). This happened in Case 2 and Case 3 
where no price increase was possible after their respective contract effective date. The 
software product quality was poor in both cases (Section 5.8; Section 6.6). 
While the supplier management may wish to keep to a certain level of budget estimate for the 
product development, the development team requires a trial-and-error approach to find the 
best solution (Section 8.7). If the conflict between the available resources (in terms of budget 
and available skills) and the need for trial-and-error is low, the product is more likely to be 
developed on time with good quality. Otherwise, the opportunity for the development team to 
innovate is likely to be limited if no sufficient time is allowed for creative experimentation. 
Communication from the supplier to the client is likely to be poor at this stage. This was 
clearly observed in the participant case studies. For example, in Case 2, the supplier AFS 
provided inadequate information regarding the data validation rule (Section 5.9.5). In Case 3, 
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some of the key resources were simply away working on another project, delaying any 
possible response to the client's queries (Section 6.8.4). Sometimes, suppliers' management 
would limit informal contacts between their development teams and their clients' project 
teams by imposing a single contact point, thus creating a bottleneck for communications. 
Suppliers may even refuse sharing design documents on the legitimate ground of protecting 
their intellectual property rights (e. g. Section 6.8.4). 
Milestone 3: The First Software Product Release 
Part of project team's role is to accept the software product from the supplier and to carry out 
necessary quality verification including installation, functional and performance testing etc. 
Therefore, the supplier is required to release the software product a few weeks or even a few 
months ahead of any information systems implementation deadline. The first release date is a 
key milestone for the project and for the supplier. 
A software product's first release can reveal a lot of what has not been communicated from 
the supplier to the client up to that point. While by this time, on the client side (the client's 
ISD project team), resources are mobilised ready to test and install the application, the 
software release is typically an anticlimax. The common observations (Section 4.4; Section 
5.8) are that the first release is often incomplete, does not work and has no proper 
documentation. The anticlimax was experienced in both Case I and Case 2 where die 
expected releases of software products were first delayed for days and then partially 
delivered. A partial delivery may be technically meaningless but it buys time for suppliers to 
improve products to some extent. Consequently, the planned time for integration and quality 
assurance activities is irrevocably eroded if project deadlines remain the same. Since ISD 
project teams are also under pressure to complete projects on time and within budget, it is 
often the case that integration and quality assurance activities are cut back. 
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Stage 4: Product Evaluation and Integration 
Upon receiving the software product, the client carries out acceptance evaluation. The project 
team installs the product onto a pre-prepared system platform (hardware, system software and 
the network environment). In addition, the project team tests the product with test datasets. 
Finally, if applicable, legacy data will be populated to the target database so that the product 
and the data can be "integrated". 
At the initial product release, the supplier tends to promise future improvements. As a result, 
instead of making any final decision to accept or reject the product, the client enters an 
iterative process of testing, reporting issues and receiving patches or new releases for testing 
again (e. g. Section 5.7). Due to the trial-and-error development process (Sections 8.6 and 
8.7), the supplier is not able to guarantee the promised improvements. Indeed, a subsequent 
release may not even be as good as the previous one. One genre of testing called "regression 
testing" is used to identify "new faults that may have been introduced as current ones are 
being corrected" (Pfleeger, 1998, p. 338). However, the supplier promises enough so that the 
client hope is sustained. The client has no practical alternative at this stage. 
Milestone 4: Information System Implementation 
In reality, the ISD project tends to drift along. Eventually, the client may accept an 
unsatisfactory software product and its associated system into the operational environment 
even though software may not be tested and integrated fully with other system elements 
(especially the legacy data). A continued effort is required from the supplier to improve the 
software product. Many press reports about ISD project failures are not about cancelled 
projects before implementation, rather they are about immature systems being implemented 
causing operational chaos (e. g. LAS CAD system in Flowers, 1996; Tiptree warehousing 
system in Collins, 1998; Cambridge University' CAPSA Project in Finkelstein, 2001; 
Greenleaf 's OneWorid system in Hayes, 2002). 
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Premature system implementation causes many problems. To start with, client's operational 
needs are not met. In Case 2, the client had to rely on alternative workarounds to deal with 
day-to-day data processing to meet regulatory requirements. LAS CAD Project was a 
disastrous example of how "lives may well have been lost" (Collins, 1998, p. 166) due to 
implementation of a premature system. Premature systems leave the client with a system 
support headache, considerably increasing operational costs. End users' job satisfaction may 
be seriously affected by having to work with cumbersome systems and having to deal with 
frequent system exceptions and failures. 
Stage S: Post-Implementation Activities 
Activities after implementation can be looked at from different angles. For the client, the 
system enters the operational stage. Support responsibilities are assigned to appropriate teams 
responsible for hardware, network, database, application, help desk etc. From the supplier's 
point of view, development and enhancements continue while acting usually as the second- 
line support to the client. For the ISD project, there should be a project review. However, 
project reviews have been conspicuous by its absence in ISD projects. Despite regular calls 
for post-project reviews (e. g. Whitten, 1995; Cooper et al., 2002; Williams, 2003a, 2003b), 
they are the exceptions rather than the rule. There are a number of obstacles in acquiring open 
and unbiased project reviews. First of all, the client may want to keep quiet about a poorly run 
project. Though few would dispute that more can be learned from failures than from 
successes, psychologically no one wants to be associated with failures. Unless external 
pressure is applied, a troubled project is unlikely to offer a detailed review from inside. 
Secondly, project reviews, when they do take place, may be seriously biased if not managed 
and co-ordinated by an independent authority. Gulliver (1987) reports that the post-project 
reviews in BP managed by an "independent unit" contribute to BP's overall financial 
performance while those performed by project teams might be biased with "preconceived 
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ideas". However, ISD projects tend to be complex both technically and organisationally, so 
that post-project reviews by an independent authority may involve considerable costs. 
Thirdly, controversial review reports are likely to be inaccessible to later project teams, 
denying organisations learning opportunities. In this respect, both UK and US governments 
are exceptional. National Audit Office (NAO) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 
the respective governments have audited and published some detailed IT project reviews 
(e. g.: NAO, 2000,2003; GAO, 1992a, 1992b, 1994). However, even when a detailed project 
review does take place and is managed by an independent authority, the complex underlying 
cause and effect relations may not be immediately obvious for reviewers (Cooper et al, 2002). 
Williams (2003b) attempts to offer simpler techniques to help practitioners but post-project 
reviews on a project-by-project basis may not expose root causes common to a group of 
projects. As a result, the practical value that organisations may gain directly from their own 
project reviews might be limited. It is therefore not surprising that the reviews often do not 
take place (Whitten, 1995). 
At the private level, however, project team members inevitably ask questions regarding 
reasons for their project challenges and failures. In relation to suppliers, they may even vow 
never to use the same suppliers again. However, there are many good reasons that suppliers 
associated with previously troubled projects are contracted again. New projects may be 
undertaken by different project teams within the client organisation. Data integration risks 
mean that incumbent suppliers may be preferred (e. g. Section 5.3). High switching cost forces 
the client to retain existing suppliers despite possible emotive feelings. The client may simply 
have no alternative choice. A client may justify such a decision by stating "Better the devil 
you know" (Bradbury, 2000) while a supplier may rightly feel that it is "no worse than 
others! " (according to a private conversation with the technical architect from AES in Case 
2). The ineffective post-project review process combined with high switching cost might have 
contributed to the continuing low ISD project success rate. 
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8.9.2 Modelling TSDF with Game Theory 
Section 8.9.1 describes TSDF that can be summarised as follows. Once a client embarks on 
developing an information system and decides that a software application is to be sourced 
externally, an RFP is sent out to a number of suppliers. Some suppliers bid for contract and 
some do not. Only one supplier's bid is accepted. The client offers the winning supplier a 
contract. The supplier makes the effort to produce the software application. The process can 
be modelled with concepts and techniques of the game theory (Gardner, 1995; Gibbons, 
1992). The game theory is useful to capture some of the essence of business games and help 
to predict outcomes. The basic concepts and techniques are briefly described below followed 
by a game theoretic representation for TSDF. 
An ISD Project as A Game 
Gardner (1995) defines a game as: 
"any rule-governed situation with a well-defined outcome, characterized by 
strategic interdependence" (p. 4) 
ISD projects satisfy the criteria in the above statement. First of all, a client and its suppliers 
are organisations that are governed by various rules of engagement in business dealings, 
written or otherwise. Secondly, ISD projects, like other project management endeavours, have 
finite duration (PMI, 2000) and have outcomes, even though the assessment of the outcomes 
may not be easy (Bannister et al., 2001). Finally, there is interdependence between all the 
"players" involved, including the client and all suppliers participated in the contract bidding. 
In the discussions below, the "subgame" concept is also used. A subgame is "any part of a 
game that itself can be played as a game" (Gardner, 1995, p. 148). The subgame concept is 
useful when the focus of analysis is on part of a game. 
Gibbons (1992) groups games into four categories based on whether they are static or 
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dynamic, and whether game players have complete information or incomplete information 
(Table 8.3, based on Gibbons, 1992). A game is said to be static if players choose their 
actions without knowing their opponents' actions. In other words, players act independently. 
This is normally the case when suppliers bid for a contract. Otherwise, a game is dynamic or 
sequential. A player is said to have complete information if one has the knowledge of the 
other players' payoff functions. If the payoff functions are private to the players themselves, 
the game has incomplete information. Gibbons' classification of the games allows a particular 
approach to study the games. Another important criterion for examining games is whether a 
player has perfection information at the decision point. A player has perfect information if all 
previous moves are known. Otherwise, the game is said to have imperfect information. 
Tahle R-A- Tvnnc of aamoc 
Complete Information Incomplete Information 
Static Static games with complete Static games with incomplete 
information, for example: information, for example, 
Prisoners' Dilemma Sealed Bids in Auctions 
Dynamic Dynamic games with Dynamic games with incomplete 
incomplete information, for information, for example, Open 
example, Chess Games Bids in Auctions 
Games may be grouped in other ways, for example, competitive and co-operative games, 
zero-sum and nonzero-sum games etc. Game theory has been used in studies of many 
branches of economics and management sciences. Only basic concepts and techniques are 
used in this thesis. The terms and notations used here mainly follow those of Gardner (1995). 
It is recognised that much further studies may be carried out to model client-supplier relations 
using the game theory. These may be pursued as separate research projects. 
Game Players 'Rationality 
The game theory shares the same basic assumption with other economic theories that game 
players are rational (Williamson, 1985; Arrow, 1986). That is to say that all players try to do 
their best "in their own eyes" (McMillan, 1992). In the game theory, it is assumed that 
rational players do not play "a strictly dominated strategy" (Gibbons, 1992, p. 4). Further, it is 
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assumed that "it is common knowledge that the players are rational" (Gibbons, 1992, p. 7). 
These assumptions are taken to be idealised conditions under which simpler models can be 
built for economic analysis. In the real world situations, game players make mistakes. As a 
result, the concept of "bounded rationality" has been developed to model imperfect 
behaviours (Gardner, 1995). The following discussions assume that all organisations involved 
behave rationally. Future research might benefit from more elaborate modelling with more 
realistic assumptions, including considerations of reputation and long-term interest. 
Modelling Client-Supplier Contract Process within TSDF 
Software development in TSDF can be modelled as a game in the extensive form (Figure 8.2). 
Product Developed with More 




Bid Accepted Product Developed with Little 
Trial-and-Error (W-P, P) 
Bid with a promise of excellent 
product with a competitive price P Bid Rejected (No Product, No Pay) 
S 
RFP No Bid (No Product, No Pay) 
C 
No RFP (No Product, No Pay) 
Figure 8.2: The game of software development in TSDF 
There are two players in the game: one is the client (C) and the other the software supplier 
(S). The game starts with the client making a decision on RFP. Deciding not to send out RFP 
could mean that the client does not plan to proceed with development or intends to develop 
the software product internally. Sending out RFP is to invite external suppliers to put forward 
proposals. Next the supplier decides to bid or not. There are many possible actions. In Figure 
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8.2, the supplier is modelled with either to bid with high promises or not to bid at all. It is 
possible that a supplier may bid with realistic promises and prices. But in an industry where 
clients' switching costs are high, such bids are likely to be rejected either for not enough 
promises or too high prices if other suppliers behave opportunistically. As a result, the 
supplier bids with a promise of excellent product with a competitive price. Subsequently, the 
client decides to accept or reject the bid. If the client accepts it, the supplier gets a contract. 
The key part of the game is the subgame that is to follow. The supplier gets the contract and 
exerts effort to develop the promised software product. The budgeted effort usually allows the 
supplier to deliver a poor product. This is due to two reasons. The first is that the supplier has 
to cut the budget to the minimum in order to bid with the lowest possible price in the first 
place. The second reason is that software product development is full of uncertainty. 
Overcoming the uncertainty requires a trial-and-error approach with a higher level of effort. 
The budgeted effort is simply not enough to pursue all options to find the best solution. The 
payoff for the supplier is the bid price P. The client gets a product that is valued at 1V and 
pays the supplier P. Its payoff function is therefore (W-P). 1V may be so low that 1V <P (i. e. 
the product's value to the client is less than the price paid). Alternatively, the supplier may 
pursue a strategy to exert extra effort above the budgeted level, costing C..,.. (>0). In that 
case, the payoff for the supplier is P- C,,,, Q. The client gets a better product that is valued at V 
(V > W) and still pays the supplier P. Therefore its payoff is (V-P). 
Which of the two strategies would a rational supplier pursue? According to game theory, for 
the supplier, the strategy of making the budgeted level of effort strictly "dominates" the 
strategy of making more than budgeted effort due to P> (P-Caro). Since a rational player 
does not play the strictly dominated strategy, the game theory predicts that the supplier will 
make the budgeted effort, even though that means the client may be left with a product worth 
less than the price paid for. The supplier takes this strategy despite its initial promise to 
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deliver a high quality product. The supplier's initial promise is said to be "non-credible" since 
making good the promise will not maximise the supplier's own payoff. 
8.10 A Critique of Iterative Development Approach 
The above sections have explored the possible root causes for the pattern of ISD project 
challenges. Some of the identified root causes have been recognised in the literature already, 
in particular the incomplete requirements and the inseparability of design and development. A 
popular iterative approach has been proposed as a solution. A number of ISDMs have been 
formulated based on the iterative approach, including SCRUM (Schwaber, 1996), the Rapid 
Application Development (RAD) methodology (Stapleton, 1997), Rational Unified Process 
(Royce, 1998; Kruchten, 2000), eXtremeProgramming (XP), (Beck, 2000) and various 
"agile" methodologies (Highsmith, 2000; Abrahamsson et al., 2002). Of course, the iterative 
approach is not new and can be traced back to Royce's seminal paper in 1970 (Fitzgerald, 
2000). The fact that the existing ISDMs have not been effective to overcome the "software 
crisis" (Sections 3.6 and 3.7) suggests that there might be fundamental weaknesses with the 
iterative approach. Some specific ideas and techniques of the iterative approach have already 
been examined in the discussions of the individual root causes. This Section offers a more 
systematic critique on the iterative approach including its contributions and possible reasons 
that the iterative approach may not have helped ISD projects to succeed. 
8.10.1 The Iterative Approach and Its Contributions 
The iterative approach has been proposed to overcome the weaknesses of the "Waterfall 
Model" (Royce, 1998; McBreen, 2002a), which is also called the "Systems Development 
Lifecycle (SDLC)" (Fitzgerald, 2000; Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003) or "the sequential 
process" (Kruchten, 2000). The iterative approach recognises that requirements cannot be 
"frozen" (Kruchten, 2000, p. 55). This is an important contribution since it dispels the 
misconception about the need for complete requirements before design and development 
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(Section 8.3). The iterative approach also acknowledges the inseparability of design and 
development (Section 8.6; Kruchten, 2000; McBreen, 2002a). As a result, many ISDMs based 
on the iterative approach, especially the agile methods, rely on user involvement rather than 
rigid project planning. At the theoretical level, these ISDMs advocate a flexible, social 
constructive approach to project management, unlike the traditional planning-based approach 
(Koskela and Howell, 2002a; Melgrati and Damiani, 2002). Koskela and Howell (2002b) 
examine SCRUM in particular and concludes that it is based on "alternative theories of 
planning, execution and control". Although SCRUM and other iterative approach based 
ISDMs may have taken a step forward to overcome the traditional project management 
methodology, they have not been successful in overcoming the ISD project challenges (e. g. 
Sections 3.6,3.7,4.6.3 and 4.7.5). Section 8.3 has already discussed the possible weaknesses 
of the iterative approach to overcome the problem of incomplete requirements. The following 
subsection focuses on its approach to overcome the inseparability of design and development, 
i. e. the converging argument. Section 8.10.3 examines how the iterative approach manages 
the other root causes identified in this Chapter. 
8.10.2 The Converging Argument for the Iterative Approach 
Highsmith (2000) provides a converging argument for the interactive approach in a 
diagrammatic form (Figure 8.3, based on Highsmith, 2000, p. 86). The iterative process is 
depicted as a series of converging steps reaching the desired result. 
Figure 8.3: The converging argument for the Iterative development 
However, there are at least two underlying assumptions that must be examined for this 
argument. One is that the converging path will lead the development to the desired end 
243 
product. But this is only possible if the starting position is the "correct" one, which is 
unknown in the beginning. If the starting position is away from the "correct" place, the result 
may converge, but will not necessarily converge to the desired end point. The converging 
process matches the "learning" approach characterised by Pich et al. (2002) in carrying out 
tasks in projects. The learning approach extends the "instructionist" approach by providing a 
level of flexibility but it does not accommodate radical changes necessary "within a 
reasonable number of iterations (Pich et al., 2002, p. 1015; see also Section 8.7.3). 
Fundamentally, the converging process does not address the problem of development 
uncertainty (Section 8.7). 
The other assumption is that the communication between the client and the supplier is always 
open and efficient. However, there are usually serious communication barriers between the 
client and the supplier (e. g. Vitharana and Zahedi, 1997). A supplier may resent 
"unreasonable" changes requested by a client. A client may fear to be regarded as stupid to 
demand obvious changes at later stages. Curtis et al. (1988) point out the need to recognise 
the cognitive processes in user interactions that have not been adequately addressed in the 
current development methodologies. Beath and Orlikowski (1994) reveal that there are 
fundamental contradictions in the assigned roles of users and analysts in one ISDM called 
"Information Engineering" that follows the iterative approach. In the prescribed practices for 
"Information Engineering", despite the emphasis of user involvement in "joint development", 
users are portrayed as "naive, technically unsophisticated, and parochial" while IS analysts 
are seen as "more knowledgeable, more professional, and more corporate-minded" (Reath and 
Orlikowski, 1994, p. 372). Such contradictions "are likely to undermine interactions between 
users and IS analysts" (p. 373). Communication barriers make iterative processes less open 
and less productive, reducing its effectiveness to tackle incomplete requirements (Section 
8.3). Case I provides an example to demonstrate how the iterative approach failed to yield a 
satisfactory result even with a seemingly "excellent" starting point (Section 4.6.3). 
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8.10.3 Inadequate Considerations for Root Causes 
While the iterative approach rightly acknowledges the problem of incomplete requirements 
and inseparability of design and development, it adopts the client-supplier partnership 
philosophy to manage the client-supplier relationship (e. g. Highsmith, 2000). As a result, 
ISDMs based on the iterative approach do not deal with possible supplier opportunistic 
behaviours. Therefore, they do not discuss the challenges caused by high switching cost 
(Section 8.4) and incomplete contracts (Section 8.5). Instead, other techniques like 
"timeboxing" are used to manage project cost and schedule. In addition, the concept of "good 
enough software" has been proposed to manage software quality. Both are examined below. 
Timeboxing 
The timeboxing technique is used by Rapid Application Development (RAD), later 
standardised as the Dynamic Systems Development Method (DSDM, undated-a). It is based 
on the observation that in the sequential process, the functionality of a software product is 
supposed to be fixed while schedule and resources are varied in a project to achieve the fixed 
functionality. Therefore the proponents of the timeboxing technique suggest varying 
functionality within a fixed timescale and a fixed level of resources called "timeboxes". The 
timeboxing technique forces a software product to be produced however limited its functions 
might be (Figure 8.4, from DSDM, undated-b; Helpsofi, undated, see also Avison and 
Fitzgerald, 2003, pp. 95-97). 
FLJNCTIONAUTY TIME RESOURCES 
FIXED 
TIME 
!! L:. ý*---- VARY ---oºV 
RESOURCES FUNC11ONAUTY 
Figure 8.4: Fixing time and resources in "timeboxes" and varying functionality 
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The timeboxing technique assumes that after a series of timeboxes, the developed software 
product will largely meet the client requirements though "some of the things that the system 
was going to do will be jettisoned" (Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003, p. 97). The technique does 
not and cannot provide answers to questions like "what percentage and which part of the 
system will be left undeveloped". Though the technique recognises the problem of 
development uncertainty (Section 8.7), it does not deal with it sufficiently to meet client 
requirements. It also fails to recognise the imperfect communication process that may lead the 
converging process to unsatisfactory end products (Section 8.10.2). The timeboxing technique 
was used to develop the front-end WebShop pages in Case 1. It was true that software 
artefacts were delivered to the client all the time, however imperfect they might have been. 
But when the project ran out of the "timeboxes", the supplier NQ refused to carry out further 
work. In this particular case, the supplier delivered the design within the budget limit and on 
schedule. However, the client was "dissatisfied" with the deliverables (Section 4.7.5). 
The "Good Enough" Software 
A natural question to pose about the iterative process is when the iteration should stop. The 
concept of "good enough software" emerged in 1990s (Bach, 1995,1997; Yourdon, 1995; 
Stapleton, 1997) to answer this question. The concept describes a software development 
strategy that the "right" defects might be left in software products delivered to clients. It is 
essentially an economic argument that software defects should be fixed based on cost-benefit 
analysis, or in terms of return for investment: 
"If something is really good enough, ... then further improvement means making 
an investment that has an inadequate return. " (Bach, 1997) 
The concept is distilled from real world projects and is not necessary new (Bach, 1997). But 
proposing it as a criterion for software evaluation in ISD projects has been controversial. 
Should it be the client or the supplier who decides whether a software product is "good 
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enough"? What further criteria should be used to judge whether the "good enough" point is 
reached? Yourdon (1995) suggests "a rational negotiation" between the client and the supplier 
to agree "all of the relevant success criteria" (emphasis in the original). However, Yourdon 
admits that the relationships between the project constraints and level of quality are not well 
understood and it will be "difficult" for clients to agree to a particular level of defects. This is 
in fact the problem of absolute product evaluation (Section 8.8). Therefore, the concept of 
"good enough" software is essentially theoretical. Its actual implementation is highly 
problematic (see e. g. McBreen, 2002b). 
In summary, the iterative approach recognises two fundamental root causes of ISD project 
challenges, namely incomplete requirements, the inseparability of design and development. 
However, it does not consider the complex principal-agent relationship between the client and 
the supplier, thus ignoring suppliers' opportunistic behaviours resulted from high switching 
cost and incomplete contracts. The iterative approach assumes an open and efficient client- 
supplier communication process, which in fact is full of barriers. The converging argument 
underlying the iterative approach does not facilitate innovative alternative solutions and 
therefore does not resolve the fundamental problem of development uncertainty. In addition, 
it does not resolve the problem of absolute product evaluation. It is for these reasons that the 
iterative approach might have failed to overcome many of the ISD project challenges. 
8.11 A Unified Explanation 
Sections 8.3 to 8.8 have discussed six root causes as explanations to the pattern of ISD project 
challenges. Section 8.9 further synthesizes the root causes and suggests that ISD project 
challenges result from TSDF characterised by competitive bidding and monopolised 
development. Section 8.10 provides a more comprehensive critique to the popular iterative 
software development approach. This Section proposes a unified explanation as a basis for 
formulating a possible solution to overcome the identified root causes: 
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A Unified Explanation: The fundamental source of ISD project challenges is 
TSDF characterised by a process of competitive-bidding-monopolised- 
development. This process allows suppliers to adopt bargains-then-ripoffs 
opportunistic behaviour pattern due to complex interactions of the root causes 
including high switching cost, incomplete requirements, incomplete contracts, 
inseparability of design and development, development uncertainty, and client's 
difficulties in devising and enforcing acceptance criteria. Though iterative-based 
ISDMs have recognised the problems of incomplete requirements and 
inseparability of design and development, they have not acknowledged the 
complex PA relationship between a client and a supplier. In addition, the learning 
approach underlying the iterative ISDMs does not resolve development 
uncertainty. As a result, they have not been able to resolve the fundamental 
weaknesses associated with TSDF. 
The above explanation implies a solution with competitive development and a selectionist 
approach. A competitive product development process entails two or more delivered products 
for the client to evaluate, thus overcoming the problem of absolute product evaluation. Two 
or more parallel product development efforts allow two or more promising solutions to be 
explored, thus at least partially overcoming the problem of development uncertainty. 
The unified explanation can explain the pattern of ISD project challenges as analysed in this 
chapter. It is both consilient and simple. These are two of Thagard's (1978) central criteria of 
good explanations (Section 2.6.2). However, a number of questions remain, for example: 
" Is this a better explanation compared with other ones? 
" How feasible is the implied solution for software development? 
" How could the high switching cost be controlled so that it does not distort suppliers' 
bidding pattern? 
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9 How can the selectionist approach be implemented? 
The unified explanation is effectively a hypothesis, which cannot be easily falsified or 
validated as it stands. Attempts are made in Chapter 9 to answer the first two questions. This 
is done by following the "Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)" reasoning process (Section 
2.6.3). Two contrastive analyses are conducted to test the validity of the explanation followed 
by two analogical analyses exploring its feasibility on the solutions implied by the 
explanation. In the long run, action research studies might be carried out by introducing 
changes to real world ISD projects based on this hypothesis (see implications for future 
studies in Section 11.5). A management framework based on the above explanation is 
suggested in Chapter 10 for this purpose. 
8.12 Summary 
This chapter attempts to identify a best potential explanation for the pattern of ISD project 
challenges recorded in Chapter 7 by following the IBE reasoning strategy. First of all, it is 
suggested that the client-supplier relationship is examined as that of principal and agent rather 
than that of partnership. The principal and the agent are assumed to be economically rational 
when entering a commercial contract. An effective contract must meet the incentive 
compatibility constraint and the participant constraint. In order to explain the challenges in 
ISD projects, the basic PA framework is supplemented by the concepts of switching cost, 
incomplete contracts and product evaluation methods. 
The steps of supplier selection, contracting, contract execution and product evaluation are 
traced to see how ISD project challenges can emerge and develop within TSDF. High 
switching cost is a key feature of the software market. Coupled with incomplete requirements, 
incomplete contracts, inseparability of design and development, development uncertainty, and 
inherent difficulties in evaluating software products and diagnosing software defects, 
suppliers adopt a bargains-then-ripoffs strategy. The consequence is that suppliers promise 
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excellent quality at low prices and deliver poor quality at higher prices. The client-supplier 
contracting process may be modelled as a game with the supplier giving "non-credible" 
promises. To fulfil the supplier's usually high promises at the bidding stage, the supplier has 
to make extra effort due to the inherent nature of software development calling for trial-and- 
error approach. A rational supplier chooses a strategy that maximizes its own payoff even 
though such a strategy results in a software product worth less than its price to the client. 
A critique is made of the popular iterative approach. Though recognising the problems of 
incomplete requirements and inseparability of design and development, the iterative-based 
ISDMs adopt a learning approach which does not effectively address development 
uncertainty. They have also assumed client-supplier relationship to be that of partnership, 
therefore have not acknowledged the complex PA relationship between a client and a 
supplier. As a result, the iterative approach has not been able to resolve the fundamental 
weaknesses associated with TSDF. 
The chapter ends with a best potential explanation (the unified explanation) that is consilient 
and simple. The process of suggesting this best potential explanation has been laid bare in this 
chapter for readers to scrutinise, and therefore, the explanation is more than just a pure 
conjecture in the Popperian sense (Popper, 1963; Section 2.4.1). However, the explanation 
remains as the best potential explanation similar to a hypothesis without going through a set 
of contrastive analyses or "causal triangulation" (Lipton, 1991; Section 2.6.3). Chapter 9 
provides two contrastive analyses to test the validity of the unified explanation and two 
analogical analyses to explore the feasibility of the solutions implied. 
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Chapter 9: Comparing ISD Projects with Other Types 
of Product Development 
There can be no differentiation without contrast. 
(Chinese Proverb) 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 explains the observed pattern of ISD project challenges by exploring a number of 
possible root causes. It ends with a unified explanation, suggesting the underlying cause is 
TSDF characterised by competitive-bidding and monopolised-development. The implied 
solution is therefore to replace the monopolised development with a competitive mechanism. 
To examine the validity of the explanation, software development in ISD projects is 
contrasted with that in PPSW market segment, where competitive force is at full play (Section 
9.2). The construction industry is examined next (Section 9.3), anticipating a potential 
counter-argument that monopolised product development can be successful. The two 
contrastive analyses suggest that the unified explanation given in Chapter 8 might be 
considered as a "warranted inference". To examine the feasibility of the implied competitive 
development solution, an analogical study is conducted comparing ISD projects with the 
"black-box" component design process in the manufacturing industry in Section 9.4. In 
addition, the Open Source Software (OSS) development process is examined in Section 9.5 to 
see the development competition at work. Section 9.6 summarises the chapter. 
9.2 Contrasting PPSW Market with ISD Projects 
Researchers and practitioners often attribute software development failures to the immaturity 
of the software industry or the complexity of software products (Brooks, 1995). In other 
words, "software is different" (Beizer, 2001). It is true that the software industry has only had 
fifty years of history. It is also true that software products can be very complex. However, is 
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this a good explanation for the pattern of ISD project challenges? If it is, it would imply that 
software development in general would be not be successful. This is not supported by the 
empirical evidence from the PPSW market segment. 
9.2.1 PPSW - Software Development Can Be Successful 
The report from Nathan Associates (1997) describes the software industry as "a powerful 
engine for US economic growth" and ranks the software industry alone as the third largest in 
US. A separate PWC (1999) report holds the same view of the software industry in the global 
economies by stating: 
"The software industry is a remarkable engine of economic growth around the 
world and holds tremendous potential for the future. In the past several decades, 
this industry has grown from infancy to robust maturity, becoming one of the most 
significant sectors of the global economy, with spillover benefits extending to 
virtually every corner of the world economy. " 
While we have been concerned with the "software crisis", PWC's report refers to the software 
industry as being in a status of "robust maturity"! When we look at the report closely, 
however, it is apparent that the successes are really only attributed to the PPSW market 
segment. Nathan Associates (1997) only looks at "the packaged business software segment". 
On the other hand, comments made about the failures of software industry usually refer to 
ISD projects involving CBSW or COTS based customisation and system integration. The 
evidence points to a dichotomy of the software market with PPSW products being remarkably 
successful and COTS and CBSW products used in ISD projects otherwise. Such a dichotomy 
may explain the conflicting impressions from different sources regarding the software 
successes and failures as experienced by Glass (1999). Rather than branding the failures 
statistics as "relatively worthless" (Glass, 1999, p. 2), the success stories and the failure 
statistics may have originated from two different parts of the software industry. 
That PPSW and CBSW are two distinctively different market segments is further confirmed 
by their historical price index profiles. Parker and Grimm (2000) provide "quality adjusted" 
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software price indexes for three software categories (PPSW, CBSW and in-house or `own- 
account" development) from 1959 to 1998. The idea of quality-adjusted pricing, also called 
"hedonic pricing", is summarised by Hollanders and Meijers (2001): 
"... it assumes that each product is made up of a multitude of definable 
characteristics, that for each characteristic a price can be estimated and that quality 
changes in a product can be viewed as adding a new characteristic to the product. 
The resulting price change can then be divided between the change resulting from 
adding the better quality characteristic and from a more general price increase (or 
decrease). As such, a quality-adjusted or `pure' price can be calculated. " 
Four price indexes are shown in Figure 9.1 (adapted from Hollanders and Meijers, 2001, in 
turn based on Parker and Grimm, 2000). The index for PPSW ("pre-packaged" in Figure 9.1) 
shows that it has fallen sharply. On the other hand, prices for internal software development 
(both "business own-account" and "government own-account" in Figure 9.1) have increased 
steadily. As for CBSW ("custom" in Figure 9.1), it shows a trend of steady increase since late 
1960s. One conclusion to be drawn from Figure 9.1 is that PPSW and CBSW are two 
distinctive segments in the same software market. PPSW segment has been able to improve 
on product quality and reduce product prices dramatically while CBSW together with the 








Figure 9.1: Quality-adjusted price Indexes for PPSW, CBSW and Internal software 
development, with the 1996 price Index set as 1.0 
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Such contrasting achievements are not explained either by software technology immaturity or 
software complexity since both are free to draw from the same technology pool. So far as 
software complexity is concerned, familiar PPSW products like popular operating systems 
(e. g. Unix and Windows series products), commercial databases, word processing and 
spreadsheet packages are most complex of all software products. The complexity comes from 
not only the sizes of the applications themselves, but also from the fact that PPSW products 
have to be developed to be compatible with many platforms. Brooks (1975,1995) conjectures 
that developing a general-purpose application takes nine times extra work than the equivalent 
for a single customised installation. However, even with recognition of the extra complexity 
and cost, Brooks (1995) urges people to buy rather than build. He states: 
"From the discipline's viewpoint, the mass-market software is almost a new 
industry compared to that of the development of custom software, whether in- 
house or out-house. " (p. 218) 
Brooks clearly recognises that PPSW and CBSW are two distinctive industries. However, 
Brooks' advice is difficult to implement since there is often no mass-market software 
available to meet specific organisational needs. 
Has COTS been historically successful like PPSW or less so like CBSW? There is no separate 
category for COTS in Figure 9.1. However, the original definition of CBSW in Parker and 
Grimm (2000) includes "new computer programs as well as programs incorporating 
preexisting or standardized modules", indicating that the remaining development, 
customisation and integration activities to turn COTS into information systems are treated 
more like CBSW. The difference of PPSW, COTS and CBSW may be illustrated by the level 
of pre-contract and post-contract development activities before a client can make use of the 
acquired software products (Figure 9.2). 
As shown in Figure 9.2, a supplier completes design and development before supplying 
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PPSW to clients. Apart from the effort for installation, there is no further development to he 
carried out. It is exactly the opposite with CBSW, which is designed and developed after a 
contract is signed with a client. In addition, there is business process and data integration and 
other activities to be carried out before CBSW can be incorporated fully into an information 
system for use. The situation with COTS is in between PPSW and CBSW. The exact 
proportion of pre-contract development and post-contract activities varies with each COTS 
product. The post-contract activities include customisation, configuration, business process 
and data integration etc. These activities may also be broadly called as development since 
they require technical resources, often from COTS suppliers or supplier designated specialists 
(see e. g. Section 6.3 about system integration). Post-contract development activities using 
COTS introduce unique issues and challenges (Langley, 1994; Brownsword et al., 1998). 
Jarzombek (1998) refers COTS as a "double-edged sword". Even implementing relative 
mature COTS software packages can be risky. This has been demonstrated by Case 2 
(Chapter 5), Case 3 (Chapter 6) and many Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) projects (e. g. 
Girard and Farmer, 1999; Wheatley, 2000; Katz, 2001). Therefore, COTS may be considered 
in the category of CBSW in terms of its historical success, or the lack of it. 





-ý-ý Development activities prior to client contract 
)evelopment activities alter client contract 
Figure 9.2: Comparing PPSW, COTS and C13SW in respect of pre-Contruct and post- 
contract development and other activities before providing client with benefit. 
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9.2.2 Different Market Mechanisms and Different Development Approaches 
The above discussion demonstrates that PPSW products have been highly successful in the 
market while COTS/CBSW have been less so. Since PPSW, COTS and CBSW all draw from 
the same technology pool, the argument that software technology is immature cannot explain 
the difference. Software complexity cannot explain the difference either since PPSW is 
potentially more complex due to the need to cater for different platforms. 
The different level of pre-contract and post-contract development associated with each 
software product type (Figure 9.2), however, may explain the difference. Pre-contract PPSW 
development means that suppliers are engaged in development competition. Competition 
encourages suppliers to design and develop PPSW products with high quality. Competition 
also enables clients to evaluate products before making purchasing commitments. Whether 
clients are cautious enough to make a thorough evaluation is another matter2g. With CBSW, 
however, clients contract with suppliers before development takes place. Post-contract 
development in TSDF means monopolised development. With COTS, though part of 
development has been undertaken prior to client contracting, the client bears considerable 
risks with the post-contract activities necessary to develop finished information systems. 
The different market mechanisms for PPSW and CIISW may influence profoundly the ways 
products are developed. There have been several studies contrasting PPSW with CBSW 
development practices (Carmel and Sawyer, 1998; Sawyer, 2000). The observations are that 
they are developed with different cultural milieus, different types of teams and different 
incentives for developers. First of all, organisations for PPSW have entrepreneurial and 
29 Corporate and home users of software products tend to take different approaches to assess software 
products. For corporate users, user groups can be an important source of information. Actual trials with 
limited financial commitment are possible. For home users, product reviews in popular trade magazines 
are often useful. However, in both cases, it is difficult to experience software products fully due to 
licensing constraints (see Kaner & Pels, 1998), time restriction or unrealistic test data. 
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individualistic cultural "milieus". In contrast, CBSW organisations are bureaucratic. 
Secondly, PPSW teams share the same product vision while CBSW teams rely on formal 
specifications and documents. Thirdly, developers in PPSW teams can expect large financial 
rewards and more motivated while those in CBSW teams are typically salary-based. Though 
the role of users is increasingly seen as critical to successful software development, users are 
generally not integral to PPSW development efforts. Another unusual observation is that 
PPSW teams' processes are "immature" compared to CB SW teams. 
The last two observations challenge some of the received wisdom in the current thinking on 
software development methodology. "User involvement" is seen to be a key to successful ISD 
projects (Bronzite, 2000). Yet PPSW development is largely detached from user involvement. 
In addition, according to Capability Maturity Model (CMM), process maturity or quality 
determines software product success (Olson et al., 1993; Paulk, 1997). Yet CBSW segment 
with "more mature processes" is not as successful as PPSW. These contradictions, however, 
might be explained by the competitive mechanism in PPSW market and its absence in CBSW 
development. PPSW suppliers, being in a competitive market from design, development to 
sales, develop products meeting the users' "expected requirements" as well as "revealed 
requirements" defined in Kano Model (Section 8.3). To win clients in the market place, 
PPSW suppliers design in delightful features as well. Even though suppliers seem to be 
detached from the users, the developers think on behalf of users in terms of cost, reliability 
and usability etc. The competitive "invisible hand" is operating not only on the price 
dimension, but also on functions, features and their quality dimensions. CBSW suppliers, 
however, may aim merely for meeting revealed requirements. Any extra feature either has to 
be paid for as extra, or is strictly controlled by suppliers to reduce development cost. 
Competition, or the lack of it, therefore, affects profoundly the outcomes of the different 
product development processes. 
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Of course, even with fierce competition, PPSW products are not always delivered to the 
market on time with promised quality, perhaps due to development uncertainty (Section 8.7). 
In such a case, it is the suppliers who suffer from the results. Clients are shielded from any 
potential negative impact since they usually do not make purchasing commitments until after 
products are available. In the case of CBSW, the clients contract with suppliers with pre- 
defined time and cost commitments. In addition, the clients plan other dependent activities 
(e. g. data migration, legacy system switch-off, new system support arrangement, new 
working practices associated with the new system etc) based on project plans before software 
products are developed. Such close dependency on the outcome of CBSW development 
causes a chain reaction from late or failed software delivery to late or failed ISD projects, and 
to potential chaos in the clients' organisations. 
In summary, PPSW successes indicate that the software industry has the know-how to build 
complex and successful software applications. A key difference between PPSW and 
COTS/CBSW is whether product development takes place before or after a client contracts 
with a supplier. Pre-contract development for PPSW means development competition while 
post-contract development in TSDF means development monopoly. Using COTS in ISD 
projects involves considerable uncertainty with COTS products customisation and integration, 
demanding suppliers' resources. The different market mechanisms causes software products 
to be developed in different ways, resulting in different product performances in the market 
place in terms of functionality and quality. Of course, PPSW are not guaranteed to be 
successful during the pre-contract development process. When PPSW suffers from 
development delays and quality problems, clients are protected through the product-first- 
contract-later mechanism. Such a competitive mechanism forces PPSW suppliers to be 
innovative in designing and developing products. On the contrary, TSDF means contract-first- 
development-later mechanism that induces suppliers to be less entrepreneurial. In addition, 
clients' organisations tend to be closely coupled with bespoke ISD projects with high 
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dependency on timely delivery of quality CBSW/COTS products. When the expected 
products fail to be delivered, ISD projects and in many cases, the dependent clients' 
organisations are thrown into chaos. 
While the contrast between PPSW and CBSW/COTS products supports the explanation that 
the lack of competition in TSDF may be the cause for the pattern of ISD project challenges, it 
is important to acknowledge that monopolised development may have worked well 
elsewhere. A particular good example is the construction industry. It may be argued that the 
competitive-bidding-monopolised-development management framework has been successful 
in construction projects. The next section examines whether the construction metaphor is an 
appropriate one for ISD projects. 
9.3 Construction Projects: An Appropriate Metaphor? 
Software development is a young industry. Naturally, practitioners adopt terms and methods 
from more mature industries. One of the most well established industries is that of 
construction and civil engineering. In a well-received book by the software development 
community, McConnell (1993) systematically explains many "best practices" by using 
construction as a metaphor. Despite such efforts, failures of software development contrast 
sharply with the successes of construction projects. Standish Group (1995) laments about 
software development being not as successful as "bridge building". However, the analysis in 
this Section demonstrates that software products have different characteristics from 
construction products so that the construction metaphor is a misleading one. In Section 9.3.1, 
the characteristics of construction projects are outlined in contrast with those of ISD projects. 
Section 9.3.2 provides a critique regarding the validity of the construction metaphor. 
9.3.1 Contrasting Construction and ISD projects 
ISD projects are deceptively like construction projects. Both go through similar phases like 
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requirements specification, design, development and acceptance etc. Both types of products 
often call for unique product designs and have to overcome unique engineering problems. 
Mass production techniques are not easily applicable for reducing costs. Also, the cost of a 
construction product is usually established by either negotiation or competitive tendering 
prior to production (Kwakye, 1997). The same goes for software projects. The metaphor of 
the construction project is so entrenched in the software industry that terms like "software 
architects" and "software construction" are used without hesitation. However, the two types 
of projects have fundamentally different characteristics. This is related to the different 
products they aim to produce. While a construction project aims to produce a physical 
construction product, an ISD project aims to produce an information system, usually based on 
a core software application, which is a virtual product. This fundamental difference 
determines that construction projects can be managed in ways that cannot be easily duplicated 
for ISD projects. Notable characteristics of construction projects are discussed below in 
contrast with ISD projects, including separate design and development, flexible and efficient 
subcontracting labour usage and real-time independent quality and cost monitoring. 
First of all, construction projects can have separate design and build stages (Kwakye, 1997). 
Importantly, due to the physical nature of the construction products, design can be detailed 
and controlled with drawings and specification. The separation of design and build allows the 
design to pass the design quality control first. It is after a design is approved when suppliers 
start bidding for development (building). Thanks to the availability of the detailed design, 
contracting can be relatively complete and production quality control can be meaningfully 
enforced. An architectural design embodies a client's requirements and is a detailed and 
complete blueprint for building. This does not imply no variations in the process of 
construction. It does mean that neither the client nor the builder can easily introduce 
variations without being noticed. Therefore, any scope or quality deviation from the design 
can be more easily identified and dealt with. The same cannot be said for software 
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development. As Standish Group (1995) comments: 
"One of the biggest reasons bridges come in on-time, on-budget and do not fall 
down is because of the extreme detail of design. The design is frozen and the 
contractor has little flexibility in changing the specifications. " 
The lack of detailed design forces ISD projects to adopt a contractual framework to combine 
design and development to be carried out by the same supplier based on incomplete 
requirements (Section 8.6). The separation of software design and development is so difficult 
that the whole software development process has been referred to as "pure design" (Callahan 
and Mormon, 1998; Eischen, 2002). A design might be defined as "a plan for an artefact or a 
system of artefacts" (Gorb, 1990, quoted in Reece, 1999). In this sense, a design of a software 
application can be said to be a plan to integrate client requirements and the necessary 
technical tools and facilities to become specific system artefacts. Of course, software is not 
merely a design if "a plan" is interpreted as only ideas on paper. Software design, if it is of 
any use, has to be implemented to operate with data and business processes. Whether a 
software design actually works or not is not easily determined by looking at it on paper. It has 
to be proven by implementation, typically through a trial-and-error approach. The 
inseparability of design and development necessitates a trial-and-error approach to effectively 
work out design and implementation at the same time (Section 8.6), unless the software is 
trivial or exactly the same as some software artefacts developed before. 
The second observation is related to the efficiency of sub-contracting labour usage. In a 
construction project, subcontracted labours like plumbers and electricians are called for when 
required. If the pre-planned work is not ready to be performed, the subcontractors may be told 
to come back another day. If that does not suit a specific subcontractor, another may be 
arranged to do the work instead. The client does not normally pay for any subcontractor's 
waiting time. Thus there is a high degree of labour flexibility in planning and executing 
building tasks (e. g. Underhill, 2002). The same cannot be said about software projects. 
Software project team members both in the software development stage and the system 
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integration stage require a period of familiarisation with a project since every project is 
knowledge-intensive, or more precisely domain-knowledge-intensive (Fischen, 2002), 
requiring the understanding of the context of different tasks and activities. This causes a 
degree of inflexibility or "stickiness" in labour usage. For example, during system integration 
stage in an ISD project, there are typically resources planned for software installation and 
testing upon receiving a software product from a supplier. Once the resources have spent their 
time acquiring knowledge about the project (the business process, test data and technical 
environment etc), they remain in their positions even when the software product is delivered 
late by a number of days or weeks. To release these resources temporarily is risky for the 
project since they may be assigned to other projects. Therefore, the project pays for resources' 
waiting time. The bigger a project is, the more waiting a product delivery delay is likely to 
cause, and the higher the cost of waiting. There are two possible ways to deal with such lost 
time. One is to delay the whole project so subsequent tasks can be performed as planned. This 
delays the project and increases the cost. The second option is to cut back the planned tasks or 
reduce effort to save time. This will result in lowered product quality. Often, it is a 
combination of project delay, cost increase and poorer product quality (e. g. Section 4.4). 
Another important process feature of a construction project is that production cost and quality 
monitoring is independent and real-time. A construction project organisation has a clear line 
of demarcation during the production phase. While the contractor (the supplier) is responsible 
for production, the client usually appoints an independent supervision team including the 
architect, "clerk of works", structural engineer, services engineer and quantity surveyor 
(Kwakye, 1997). Most notably, there is usually one quantity surveyor working for the client 
and one working for the contractor. Both quantity surveyors have a duty to monitor project 
costs. Kwakye (1997) explains the need for two quantity surveyors in the same project: 
".,. cost monitoring is of great concern to both quantity surveyors, it is for 
different objectives. From the view of the contractor's quantity surveyor, his or her concern centres around the total value of the project and the total cost of 
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resources in use and sub-contractors. The client's quantity surveyor, on the other 
hand, considers the payment the client makes to the contractor for executing the 
construction project and reports immediately to the architect whenever this 
payment is likely to exceed the client's cost limit. The cost monitoring exercises 
keep both the client and the contractor abreast of their respective current financial 
positions. It also enable them to take prompt corrective measures where the need 
arises. " (p. 199) 
Such a cost monitoring arrangement deserves a close look. First of all, the independent cost 
monitoring becomes possible due to the cost structure of a construction project, which 
includes land, materials, capital and labour. The inputs are turned into visible, physical 
outputs that can be verified independently and progressively. This contrasts with 
subcontracting a software product development, where most of the cost is labour, and the 
output is not easily verifiable independently until the end (Royce, 1970). Secondly, costs are 
closely monitored by two quantity surveyors, not one. Why is there the need for two quantity 
surveyors? Could one surveyor not serve the whole project so to save the cost for the other? 
Or if the workload is so high, could two surveyors not work for the contractor or the client at 
the same time? The construction industry appears to have recognised a profound PA problem, 
which is the agent's information may not always be presented in the best interest of the 
principal, and vice versa. To have two quantity surveyors appears to be economically more 
efficient than to have only one. Thirdly, the cost information is prepared by trained cost 
professionals. A quantity surveyor's career path starts from a degree course with further two- 
year work-based structured training programme (Hobsons, 2002). There is no such equivalent 
cost specialist in ISD projects. 
These characteristics of construction projects, namely, the physical nature of the products, the 
separability of design and development, the flexibility and efficiency of labour resource usage 
and the practice of feasible independent cost monitoring are in sharp contrast to those of ISD 
projects. With these fundamental product and process differences, the validity of the 
construction metaphor for software development might be questioned. 
263 
9.3.2 A Critique of the Construction Metaphor 
There have been critics to the construction metaphor for ISD projects in the literature. Royce 
(2002) comments: 
"It's tempting to compare software construction to the building of a house. After 
all, both projects involve requirements management, design (blueprints), 
scheduling, speciality teams (comparable to roofers, carpenters, plumbers, etc. ), 
and inspections. 
But decades of software projects have shown us that traditional modes of 
construction are very different from the diverse ways in which software is 
designed and delivered to the customer. One reason for such a low success rate is 
that traditional project-management approaches do not account for the level of 
creativity often required to complete software projects... " 
Royce clearly believes that the key difference is the "level of creativity" required for software 
development. That is valid since in construction projects, contracts with suppliers are for 
building work, not for design. The main focus for a contract is for a supplier to conform to an 
approved design though some level of creativity is required even in doing that. In ISD 
projects, a software supplier is contracted to perform an integral design and development task 
due to the inseparable nature of the two activities. Such an integral and uncertain task would 
indeed demand a much higher level of creativity on the supplier side. 
However, there is more than the question of creativity. Due to the lack of an approved design 
in the initial stage of an ISD project, there is not even the basis to form a conventional 
contract between a client and a software supplier. In TSDF, client requirements have been 
used as the basis for supplier contract. Yet, as has been elaborated earlier, client requirements 
will always be incomplete according to the Kano Model (Section 8.3). What is missing is a 
separate design stage to produce an approved design. Such a design must be detailed for cost 
estimation, for development planning and execution and for quality verification. The closest 
output resembling such a design in an ISD project is a "Technical Specification". 
Unfortunately, the technical specification is typically produced by the software supplier after 
being contracted. Therefore, it cannot be used as the basis of supplier contracting itself. 
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There are other significant differences between the traditional projects and ISD projects. 
Roetzheim (1993) suggests a number of differences at project task level during project 
planning (including differences in task decomposition, task dependencies, resource 
requirements estimates and risk analysis etc) and project tracking and controlling. Maxman 
(2003), along similar lines to Roetzheim (1993), acknowledges that software development 
projects are more like research and development and "really are different from 'traditional' 
project management, i. e. projects involving well-established technology". 
It is worthwhile to note that there is a "non-conventional" type of procurement system called 
"design-build" introduced to the construction industry in recent years (Kwakye, 1997; Levy, 
2002). In contrast, the conventional construction procurement system might be called the 
"design-bid-build" process (Levy, 2002). The introduction of this new approach has been 
controversial and there are on-going debates regarding its pros and cons (Rowlinson, 1988; 
Rowlinson and Lee, 2000; Chan and Chan, 2000; Levy, 2002). The design-build approach is 
different from the traditional one in that design and build are combined and managed by the 
same contractor. In other words, it adopts the procurement framework that, according to the 
analysis in this thesis, is one of the root causes for ISD project challenges (Section 8.6). 
According to its advocates in the construction industry, this approach apparently increases 
production efficiency due to overlapping design and development, among others (Rowlinson, 
1988; Kwakye, 1997). At the same time, there are serious observed drawbacks, two of which 
are: 
" "The client may become stranded with a construction product which is unsuitable for 
his or her needs. 
0 The client will find it difficult and/or costly to introduce variations once product has 
commenced on site. " (Kwakye, 1997, p. 299) 
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It has to be questioned that if a client gets a construction product "unsuitable for his or her 
needs", whether any production efficiency is desirable at all! The difficulty to introduce 
variations to product design reduces flexibility of the contracting arrangement and increases 
the likelihood that the end product may not be fit for the client. These drawbacks are 
strikingly similar to the issues found in ISD projects. Unfortunately, there are "confusions of 
definition and a whole host of perceptions, and misconceptions" (Rowlinson, 1988) regarding 
the design-build approach. In a sense, the differences between traditional and ISD projects 
might not be so important in a technological sense per se. Rather projects can be 
differentiated based on the contracting process. Design-bid-build projects allows the 
separation of design and build responsibilities (Marshall, 1992) while design-build projects 
confuse design and build responsibilities, which leads to confusion in project execution and 
accusations of "preferential engineering". While traditional projects have the potential choice 
between design-bid-build and design-build, ISD projects do not (Section 8.6). It remains to be 
seen whether the lessons of ISD projects will help to settle the debate in the construction 
industry. 
In summary, the comparative study in this section has highlighted that the nature of software 
product demands a different project management approach from that for a construction 
product. The separability of design and build potentially enables the engagement of building 
contractors to be firmly based on approved designs in construction projects. Software 
development has no equivalent detailed design to rely on when it comes to contract suppliers 
or to verify production progress or product quality. These differences make the construction 
metaphor a misleading one for software development in ISD projects. 
9.4 Comparing ISD with Manufacturing Product Development 
The contrastive analysis in Section 9.2 suggests that competition in product development 
helps to increase product quality and control development cost and schedule. However, it has 
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to be admitted that the mass-market competitive mechanism for PPSW does not suit 
COTS/CBSW acquisition precisely because COTS/CBSW products provide clients with 
opportunities to be involved closely for meeting their specialized needs. The question is 
therefore whether there is a mechanism to enable close client-supplier interaction without the 
risk of monopolised development. This section examines one such possible mechanism based 
on the selectionist approach used for new component development in the manufacturing 
industry. 
9.4.1 Design versus Manufacturing 
Traditionally, manufacturing products have been regarded as entirely different from software 
products. Commenting on software's changeable nature, Brooks (1995) states: 
"The software entity is constantly subject to pressures for change. Of course, so 
are buildings, cars, computers [sic]. But manufactured things are infrequently 
changed after manufacture; they are superseded by later models, or essential 
changes are incorporated in later serial-number copies of the same basic design. " 
(p. 184) 
It may well be valid for Brooks to attribute some of the software failures to software 
products' apparent changeability relative to manufactured goods. However, it has to be 
argued that it is misleading to compare them directly. This is because a software product is 
the output of a creative process that is characterised by uncertainty (Section 8.7). On the 
contrary, manufacturing is a copying process demanding conformity of the output to an 
approved design. Manufacturing products do not have to change much largely because 
necessary conceptual changes have taken place in the process of product design. The design 
process of a manufacturing product, however, is often as creative and uncertain as software 
design and development, involving marketing, engineering, suppliers and potential customers 
among others. Therefore software design and development should be compared with the 
product design process, not its manufacturing process. 
There are many types of product design processes in the manufacturing industry 
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9.4.2 "Black Box" Component Development in Manufacturing 
Typical manufactured products like cars and mobile phones are assembled from many 
components. Such assembled products may be called System Level Manufactured Products 
(SLMP), in contrast to the components they are made of. In modem SLMP assembly 
factories, most, if not all, components required are purchased from external suppliers. How 
the components are made and which suppliers are contracted to supply them is initially 
decided in the new product development stage. 
In studying the new product development process of twenty automobile makers across Japan, 
Europe and North America in 1980s, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) describe three different types 
of client-supplier relationship: 
0 Supplier proprietary parts: standard catalogue items sold to the car maker (the client) 
with no modification; 
0 Black box parts: requires developmental input from both the client and the supplier; 
0 Detail-controlled parts: all engineering work is done in-house by the client, with 
suppliers being little more than providers of production capacity. 
The first type does not involve the client in the process of design, while the third type does 
not involve the supplier. The development of the second type, the "black box parts", is of 
particular interest here due to the contribution of both the client and the supplier to designing 
the component. Such a process is similar to software design and development in that it 
requires close client-supplier interaction yet the design outcome may be uncertain. Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991) describe the black box component development process as follows (the 
assembler refers to the car maker): 
"Typically an assembler generates cost/performance requirements, exterior 
shapes, interface details, and other basic design information based on the total 
vehicle planning and layout [... ]. 
In the Japanese case, requirements information is usually communicated to two or 
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three potential suppliers that compete for the job. This small group of suppliers 
usually does the engineering for a particular component on all the auto maker's 
products. This selection process, called "development competition", typically 
takes from six to twelve months. In some cases, suppliers may not wait for 
inquiries from auto makers. Based on their knowledge of emerging technologies 
and product cycle plans, they may initiate development actions and suggestions. 
Once chosen, the supplier carries out detailed engineering, including drafting, 
prototyping, and unit testing. The car maker reviews parts drawings, tests the parts 
in prototype vehicles, ensures that requirements are met, and approves the design - 
-- thus the Japanese term for this arrangement, `approved drawings (Shonin-zu) 
system'. " (pp. 140-142) 
From the above description it can be seen that a), the client contributes "basic design 
information"; b), the requirements information is issued to more than one supplier for 
"development competition"; and c), a winning supplier is selected by testing and approving 
its design. Suppliers assume a considerable level of risk in the "development competition" 
stage that may last six to twelve months. Clark and Fujimoto further comment on the black 
box system: 
"Effective management of the black box parts system requires careful balancing. 
Assemblers have to juggle long-term relationships with suppliers against the need 
to keep the market competitive by inviting other suppliers to participate in 
"development competitions". Assemblers also must balance the need to retain key 
component technologies (e. g., electronics) in order to effectively assess design 
quality while providing technical support to suppliers and controlling basic 
engineering for total vehicle integrity [... ]. " (pp. 142-143) 
In the manufacturing industry in Japan where supplier partnership is supposed to be the key to 
its success (McGloin and Grant, 1997), what characterises the black box component 
development process is "development competition"! Such a development process is possible 
due with frequent information exchanges between the client and suppliers based on 
"partnership" (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993; Karlsson et at., 1998). With careful management, 
competition between suppliers becomes a mechanism to facilitate client-supplier partnership 
which cannot be characterised as "adversarial" as has often been perceived (see e. g. Brown, 
1997; Lamming and Cox, 1995, quoted in Parker and Hartley, 1997). 
9.4.3 Lessons from the SLMP Design Process 
There are similarities between the "black-box" component development process and software 
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development in ISD projects because both require input from the client and innovation from 
the suppliers. The client works with the suppliers by issuing only "basic design information", 
which can be regarded as the "revealed requirements" according to the Kano Model (Section 
8.3). One important feature of this process as described by Clark and Fujimoto is that there is 
little interference from the client regarding how the suppliers carry out the design, hence the 
term "black-box". The client relies on development competition for results first and then 
adopts the selectionist approach to obtain the best product. However, it does not mean that the 
relationship between the client and the suppliers is antagonistic. On the contrary, the client 
works with suppliers closely to realise the design. It might be said that in this case supplier 
partnership is being built on top of a competitive mechanism. Suppliers compete with each 
other to work with the client proactively. 
Of the three types of client-supplier relations described by Clark and Fujimoto (1991), none 
fits the competitive-bidding-monopolised-development pattern observed in ISD projects. It is 
difficult to imagine that "auto makers" would enjoy the same level of proactive contributions 
to component development if a supplier only starts to commit development resources after 
having won the competition first. Development competition allows a client to harness 
suppliers' technical expertise with limited risk. Of course, suppliers are willing to play the 
development competition game due to the prospective reward of volume orders. However, 
even after product design approval, suppliers have to be competitive in terms of unit price and 
product quality to be awarded such volume orders. 
The development competition cannot be applied directly to ISD projects, since for 
CI3SW/COTS development, there is no equivalent prospect of volume business as an 
incentive for suppliers to participate (for PPSW, replicating copies might be a close 
equivalent). A supplier is unlikely to be willing to participate in a development competition 
without being compensated for the opportunity cost. This does not mean that the comparison 
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is necessarily invalid. It does mean that a different incentive mechanism has to be devised if 
development competition is to be adopted for CBSW/COTS development in ISD projects. 
Chapter 10 suggests a partial funding approach as part of a new management framework. 
9.5 Open Source Software Development 
Software development is a complex process that requires the co-operation of highly skilled 
personnel. A question might be posed regarding the technical feasibility of a competitive 
mechanism for developing software. Would competition between developers cause 
confusion? While there is certainly a need for further research into how a competitive 
mechanism can be harnessed effectively for commercial ISD projects (see Chapter 10 for a 
suggested framework), development competition has already been at work successfully for 
developing Open Source Software (OSS). This section examines the OSS development 
process to see how it helps improving the quality and speed of OSS development. 
Open Source Software (OSS) refers to software developed and distributed under one of the 
Open Source licences that permit free distribution and require availability of the source codes 
(Linuxcare, 2000). There have been some notably successful OSS products like Linux and 
Apache web server (Zimmerman, 2001). OSS is cost-effective and has been gradually 
accepted by large organisations both in public and private sectors. According to Sol (1998), 
Microsoft had assessed OSS' quality in its internal memorandum: 
"Recent case studies (the Internet) provide very dramatic evidence [... j that 
commercial quality can be achieved/exceeded by OSS projects. " 
OSS phenomenon has been subject to many studies from different perspectives. For example, 
Lerner and Tirole (2000) explore the economic rationale for OSS' very existence. Kenwood 
(2001) evaluates OSS' potential to the development of military systems for the US army. 
From a development process viewpoint, OSS is unique in many ways. First of all, OSS is 
developed with software programmers scattered across the globe. Secondly, there is no 
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formal, disciplined requirements management process (Scacchi, 2001). Thirdly, a process of 
competitive development is used with stringent output evaluation and selection. There are 
many other aspects worth commenting on but it is the competitive development that is 
relevant here. 
9.5.1 OSS Development Process 
Kenwood (2001) notes that "[o]pen source projects utilize multiple small teams of individuals 
that work independently to solve specific problems [... ]. Parallel debugging and development 
efforts enable the coordinating developer to choose the best potential implementation from 
the many choices offered" (p. 7). What lies behind the OSS process is the principle "Let the 
best code win", apparently adopted by Linus Torvalds, the founder of Linux Project, one of 
the archetypal OSS projects. Pavlicek (2000) elaborate it in this way: 
"It does not matter whether the best solution comes from someone with three 
PhDs and thirty years of experience or from a bright 18-year-old who is just 
beginning college. The project will benefit the most by using the best solution. 
The pedigree of the author makes little difference. The issue is the solution. " (p. 
15) 
In addition to multiple solutions available for evaluation, the evaluation itself is given a high 
level of resources. The evaluators are highly qualified core-developers supplemented by 
anyone with an interest in the project. Mockus et al. (2000) describes the process: 
"All of the core developers are responsible for reviewing... to ensure that the 
changes are appropriate. In addition, since anyone can subscribe to the mailing 
list, the changes are reviewed by many people outside the core development 
community, which often results in useful feedback before the software is formally 
released as a package. " 
Through a voting system, multiple evaluations contribute to updating a "STATUS file" for a 
relevant "action item" (Apache, undated-a). The evaluation process is a selection process. It 
produces candidates for inclusion in the next release. A Release Manager (RM) then decides 
what to include based on the information available in the STATUS files. RM seems to have 
the total discretion in deciding what to include and what to exclude in making up a release. In 
the Apache Project guideline (Apache, undated), it is stated that: 
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"Regarding what makes it into a release, the RM is the unquestioned authority. No 
one can contest what makes it into the release. The community will judge the 
release's quality after it has been issued, but the community cannot force the RM 
to include a feature that they feel uncomfortable adding. Remember that this 
document is only a guideline to the community and future RMs - each RM may 
run a release in a different way. If you don't like what an RM is doing, start 
preparing for your own competing release. " 
The firm authority given to the Release Manager should prevent endless debates about the 
pros and cons of taking one action over another. Such authority allows the Release Manager 
to make quick decisions in addition to maintaining a consistent standard. Kuwabara (2000) 
gives developers' accounts of how Linus Torvalds, the keeper of Linux kernel, maintains 
coding and stylistic standards: 
"With a growing developer base, he has naturally become more selective in 
regards to accepting new code for the kernel [... ]. Torvalds enforces not only 
quality standards, but stylistic standards also. Several developers recounted their 
personal experiences, in which a patch they submitted was rejected, simply 
because it was too complex. " 
With such stringent quality control, it is not surprising that OSS products like Linux and 
Apache web server have been highly successful (Mockus et el., 2000). Enforcing quality 
standards and stylistic standards is a luxury a commercial project does not have due to the 
pressure of project deadlines and the lack of realistic options (Section 7.5; Section 8.5). 
One effect of OSS development process is its speed of response to defects. In the process of 
developing software products, defects are often considered inevitable (Davis, undated; 
Ganssle, 2002). The response time is critical in reducing users' waiting time. OSS distributes 
fixes and patches quickly, "potentially an order of magnitude faster than those of commercial 
software (Kenwood, 2001, p. xiii). Such a fast turnaround time has a lot to do with the shear 
number of developers participating in OSS projects. It may also be related to the inherent 
competitive development mechanism that selects solutions. 
OSS projects are not guaranteed successes (Zimmerman, 2001). Failures may be attributed to 
a number of reasons. One possibility is the lack of financial incentives. The other is the lack 
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of technical capacity on the Internet to accommodate too many OSS projects. Or an OSS 
project can pursue a wrong strategy (Zimmerman, 2001). The development process itself does 
not appear to have been questioned. A thorough study of the causes of failed OSS projects 
requires their background knowledge and comparative analysis with their suitable contrasts. 
This is outside the scope of the thesis and may be appropriate for a separate study. 
9.5.2 Capitalising on Software Virtuality 
The fact that software is virtual rather than physical has caused many problems in software 
development (Section 9.3). Not only has it hindered communication between client and 
suppliers and among users, software designers and developers (Brooks, 1995), it may have 
also helped suppressing the investigation of failed software projects. Had the billions of 
pounds or dollars been wasted on physical product development, there would have been much 
more visible "debris" requiring investigations. 
OSS process, however, has turned software virtuality to its advantage. The fact that more than 
one copy of a software component is submitted with only one being selected does not appear 
to have caused any concern of excessive software programs being produced. Developers keep 
developing OSS components partly as a learning exercise. So far the value of learning 
exceeds that of the effort of development, the effort of development is justified. The cost 
structure of software means that rejected software can be thrown away without any debris, or 
in economic terms, negative externality (Livesey, 1993). This is different for a physical 
product. Physical product development usually involves purchasing materials. Not only the 
materials cost money directly to firms undertaking development, the rejected materials may 
incur cost to be recycled or cause negative externality to the environment. 
In summary, OSS uses a unique process to develop complex software products. Software 
artefacts are developed competitively by developers in parallel. Quality control is achieved by 
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selection or relative product evaluation, not by enforcing a list of acceptance criteria. The 
OSS process has also capitalised on software virtuality. Though OSS process will not be 
directly applicable to commercial ISD projects due to its lack of any commercial dimension 
for rewarding software programmers, it demonstrates the technical feasibility of parallel 
development, possible improvement of software quality and reduction of development lead- 
time. 
9.6 Summary 
This chapter first examines the validity of the proposed solution with a competitive 
mechanism. Section 9.2 contrasts CBSW/COTS development in ISD projects with PPSW 
development. The analysis suggests that it is due to a competitive market mechanism that 
PPSW suppliers are highly incentivised to produce quality products. Though PPSW 
applications may also be delivered late and with poor quality initially, clients are protected 
from suppliers' failures by having a chance to evaluate first before making purchasing 
commitments. A counter argument against this explanation might be envisaged considering 
the monopolised product development in construction projects. Section 9.3 examines the 
differences between software development and construction. The physical nature of 
construction products and the maturity of the construction industry have made it possible to 
separate design and development. A detailed architectural design serves as the basis of builder 
contracting, project control and monitoring, and the final product acceptance. The 
inseparability of software design and development, on the other hand, means that there is no 
equivalent detailed design before supplier contracting. The conclusion is that, as successful as 
construction projects often are, they do not provide an appropriate metaphor for ISD projects. 
While the competitive product development mechanism might be desirable, is it feasible with 
a client being closely involved in controlling requirements? And is it technically feasible for 
software development? Two analogical studies are carried out in an attempt to answer these 
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questions. First of all, the "black-box" component development process in the manufacturing 
industry is examined to see how competition allows a client to control requirements and 
manage development uncertainty at the same time. The process is characterised by 
"development competition", with the client only providing "basic design information". The 
client relies on selection to obtain the best design. The technical feasibility of development 
competition in software development is demonstrated by the OSS development process. 
Through product selection, OSS process produces high quality products with fast turnaround 
time for enhancement and defect fixes. 
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Chapter 10: Performance-Based Systems Development 
Framework 
Any prince who has come to depend entirely on promises and 
has taken no other precautions ensures his own ruin... 
(Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XVII) 
10.1 Introduction 
The unified explanation given in Chapter 8 for ISD project challenges implies a competitive 
development mechanism. Chapter 9 further suggests that the given explanation is a warranted 
inference that might be useful for guiding future actions. However, the competitive product 
development processes for PPSW, OSS and manufacturing components discussed in Chapter 
9 are not directly applicable to ISD projects. The development process for PPSW products 
does not give clients the chance to control requirements closely. The OSS process does not 
have a commercial dimension to engage suppliers. The process for manufacturing product 
development relies on volume business to incentivise suppliers to participate. To implement 
the competitive process for software development in ISD projects, it is necessary to devise a 
new management framework. In this Chapter, such a framework is proposed based on the 
unified explanation to address the weaknesses of TSDF. The framework is called 
Performance-Based Systems Development Framework (PBSDF). PBSDF provides one 
possible way to test the proposed explanation empirically. Section 10.2 outlines some of the 
essential understandings required to implement PBSDF. Section 10.3 gives an outline of 
PBSDF itself, consisting essentially of three parts: outcome-based contracts, development 
competition and relative product evaluation. A key concept in PBSDF is the Non-Acceptance 
Price Factor, which is discussed in Sections 10.4 to 10.6. The implementation of PBSDF with 
two suppliers is discussed in Sections 10.7 to 10.9. Alternative implementations of P13SDF 
with a single supplier and multiple suppliers are discussed in Section 10.10. A number of 
other issues are discussed in Section 10.11 followed by a summary in Section 10.12. 
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10.2 Pre-Contract Understandings 
An effective management framework should prepare a client for failures yet increase the 
chance for success. PBSDF aims to meet the following criteria: 
" To enable software product development to be driven by client's requirements, not by 
suppliers' delivery (Section 7.4.1 and Section 8.3); 
0 To achieve the above cost-effectively; 
" To achieve the above time-efficiently; 
" To manage development uncertainty (Section 8.7) with an exit strategy for both the 
client and the supplier if developed software products are not fit for use. 
PBSDF has been proposed to satisfy the participation constraint and the incentive 
compatibility constraint in terms of supplier contracting (Section 8.5). The essence of a 
performance-based management framework is in linking pre-contract commitments and post- 
contract delivery. As part of PBSDF, it is essential to have the following understandings 
between the client and the supplier before a software supplier is selected and contracted. The 
understandings cover a number of areas including the concept of a software system, 
requirements management, possible variations of price and delivery time, possible outcomes 
of product development etc. Each of these understandings is discussed below. 
10.2.1 Pre-Contract Understanding: The Concept of An Information System 
An information system is made up of a system platform (including hardware, system software 
and necessary networking facilities), one or more software application (including appropriate 
documentation) and data (see the definition of an information system in Section 3.2). While 
the required interoperability of an application and the system platform causes little dispute, a 
particular emphasis is to be drawn toward the interoperability of a software application and 
the operational data. One essential understanding between the client and the supplier must be 
that a software application, if it is to be considered acceptable, must be able to work with the 
variety and volume of the client's data. This is particularly important when there are legacy 
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data to be incorporated into a new system. While the client must provide the supplier with its 
data requirements (either in the form of legacy data or a full data definition), the supplier must 
deliver a software product fully compatible with client's data requirements. 
10.2.2 Pre-Contract Understanding: Incomplete and Changing Requirements 
According the Kano Model (Section 8.3), the client can only provide "revealed requirements" 
while leaving the supplier to fill in with "expected requirements" and "exciting 
requirements". At the start of an ISD project, the client does not necessarily have a full set of 
"revealed requirements". In the process of development, due to improved understanding of 
either the requirements, or design and development, and sometimes, due to external changes 
(business requirements, regulatory environment etc), the "revealed requirements" are likely to 
go through a series of changes. Assume the initial requirements are referred to as R0, and there 
are m subsequent changes 4RI. iR2, zRj, ... AR.. 
With 4R, representing the ith change, the 
overall requirement R is: 
m 
R=Ro+YAR, 
It should be noted that: a), client requirements are about what is required, not how they are to 
be met; b), it is conceivable that later requirements changes may displace or cancel out earlier 
ones; c), requirements changes may be proposed by the supplier as well as the client 
(particularly if scope reduction is requested reflecting design and development reality); d), 
each change, whether it has any material effect on cost or delivery time, must be documented 
and communicated in writing to relevant suppliers; and e), the supplier's task is to provide a 
software product to meet or exceed R, not just Ro. 
10.2.3 Pre-Contract Understanding: Price Changes 
At any point of software development, there is one aggregate total price P between the client 
and the supplier. P may change as software development unfolds. P may increase or decrease 
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depending on requirements changes, contract re-negotiation or project delays etc. P can be 
expressed as a sum of the initial price and subsequent price changes. Assume the initial price 
is Po, and there are n subsequent changes to the price uP1, AP2, tP3, ... dP. With &Pj 




Like requirements changes, the initial price and the associated assumptions and the 
subsequent price changes must be fully recorded. 
10.2.4 Pre-Contract Understanding: Delivery Time Adjustments 
Upon starting an ISD project, a client may well have in mind a target project deadline. 
Accordingly, there is a target delivery date for any software product from a supplier, taking 
into consideration of the time required for product evaluation, integration and 
implementation. If T is designated as the total length of delivery time required for a supplier 
to deliver a working software product, T will change as project progresses both due to 
requirements changes and development uncertainty. Let To be the initial delivery time 
promised by a supplier, and assume there are w changes to the delivery time dT/, dT:, dT3, ... 
dT,,. With dTk designated as the kth change, the delivery time as measured from the 




The software development start date is relatively straightforward to determine. Having 
selected a supplier, and perhaps after a period of post-selection negotiation, the client instructs 
the supplier to start design and development. This signifies the end of a supplier's sales effort 
and the start of the delivery effort. Software product delivery date (PDD) is the supplier's 
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promised date to submit the software product in its final form for evaluation. Prior to PDD, 
there may well be initial versions of software delivered for demonstration, testing or training 
purposes. The software product delivered on PDD, however, should be fully quality-assured 
by the supplier with a full set of relevant documentation. The client makes an acceptance 
decision based on evaluation of the delivered product on PDD. 
10.3 An Outline of PBSDF 
PBSDF consists of three parts. Part I is a contract between the client and the supplier, not 
based on complete requirements but based on the possible outcomes of product development 
and evaluation. Part II is a development competition phase that is key to manage development 
uncertainty and any possible change in the post-contractual phase. Part III is a stage for 
product evaluation. 
10.3.1 PBSDF - Part I: A More Complete Contract 
When a client and a supplier enter into a software development contract in the beginning of 
an ISD project, the outcome may be uncertain. According to the discussion in Section 8.5, a 
more complete contract can be achieved between a client and a supplier if the eventualities of 
the development is understood and planned for with appropriate payoff contingencies. For the 
purpose of describing PBSDF here, the following five scenarios are envisaged: 
" Scenario 1 (S 1): The supplier has developed a working software product by a pre- 
agreed PDD. The product meets or exceeds the client's needs and/or expectation, and 
is therefore accepted by the client; 
0 Scenario 2 (S2): The supplier has developed a working software product by PDD but 
the product is not accepted by the client for some reason (e. g. not meeting the client's 
expectation). Client wishes to stop further engagement of the supplier; 
" Scenario 3 (S3): The supplier has not developed a working software product by PDD. 
Client wishes to continue development and agree a new delivery date (plus possibly 
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extra cost); 
" Scenario 4 (S4): The supplier has not developed a working software product by PDD. 
The client wishes to stop the development further at that point; 
0 Scenario 5 (S5): The client cancels the development before PDD. 
The five scenarios are illustrated in Figure 10.1. 




Figure 10.1: Five possible outcome scenarios of a software development contract 
Other possibilities exist for different projects in different circumstances. For example, a 
supplier may request to cancel a contract before PDD. All potential scenarios should be 
planned for as part of the contracting process. The following discussions will focus on the 
above five generic ones. In the above description, a "working software product" is an 
important concept that can be defined with certain flexibility to suit different circumstances. 
Generally speaking, "a working product" should meet the following criteria: 1), the software 
product meets the revealed requirements in terms of functions and is delivered with 
appropriate documentation; 2), it can be installed successfully onto the target system platform 
with minimum help from the supplier; and 3), it should compile on target system platform and 
operate with the test data from the supplier successfully. 
In the above five scenarios, Si is the desired outcome at the point of contracting. With S 1, the 
client pays the supplier the full price P. S3 is not an end status. It is conceivable that S3 may 
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develop into any of the other scenarios. In TSDF, software projects are assumed to proceed 
smoothly to the outcome of SI while S2, S4, and S5 are not planned for. In PI3SDF, the five 
scenarios should be planned for as a minimum. To cater for S2, S4 and S5, three price factors 
should be agreed between the client and the supplier in addition to the full purchase price. 
These are Non-Acceptance Price Factor, Non-Delivery Price Factor and Development 
Cancellation Price Factor. 
Non-Acceptance Price Factor 
The Non-Acceptance Price Factor (NAPF), designated as A, is defined as the percentage of 
the total price the client is willing to pay and the supplier is willing to accept if the software 
product delivered is rejected by the client. In other words, when S2 occurs the client pays the 
supplier a non-acceptance price PQ: 
Pna=A*P 
Where 0S A: 5 1. The agreement of A is preferable to a fixed Non-Acceptance Price since the 
total price for a software product is likely to change throughout the development process. The 
value of A will stay the same, however, regardless the changes in requirements, the overall 
price and delivery time. The agreement of % between the client and the supplier before the 
contract is instrumental to PBSDF. Section 10.4 provides a theoretical discussion on setting A 
and Section 10.5 provides empirical estimates accordingly. In Section 10.6, some additional 
considerations are given for setting A within the context of ISD projects. 
A question may well be raised regarding possible reasons for a client to reject a supplier's 
delivered product. Should some differentiation be made regarding if the rejection is due to the 
failure to meet the client's requirements or the failure to meet the client's expectation? In 
PBSDF, however, this distinction is not pursued due to the understanding that a client's initial 
requirements are not complete in the first place. More importantly, the client is given a binary 
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decision that a software product is either used or not used. A software product may be used if 
it is judged to bring enough value to the client to justify its adoption even if it does not meet 
the initial requirements. Likewise, a software product may be rejected even if it exceeds the 
initial requirements and expectation due to the availability of a better product. The key issue 
is not if a product meets the requirements specification. It is whether the client thinks that 
using the product provides more value than not using it, comparing with alternatives 
available. Here the fundamental assumption that the contracting parties are economically 
rational is important (see Sections 8.2 and 8.9.2). The client must be trusted to make such a 
decision rationally and the supplier must make a judgement regarding the client's rationality 
before contracting with the client. 
For the client, the non-acceptance payment of AP can be considered as an insurance premium 
against obtaining a system that might bring less value than otherwise possible. This premium 
allows the company to cancel the contract with the supplier. On the other hand, a supplier 
expects to cover part of its actual cost and some opportunity cost incurred. AP represents the 
minimum the supplier is prepared to accept in exchange of its commitment of resources for 
undertaking a risky venture. The value of A can be derived from the marginal cost pricing 
principle in microeconomics. This is discussed in Sections 10.4,10.5 and 10.6. 
To base the product acceptance decision on the value contribution has the benefit of linking 
software development to value engineering for the client organisation. According to Morris 
(2000), there is a research gap in the value engineering and value management in the project 
management discipline. The PBSDF approach might bring a useful perspective in this regard. 
The subject might be pursued further as a separate research area (Section 11.6.6). 
Non-Delivery Price Factor 
Similar to the Non-Acceptance Price Factor, a Non-Delivery Price Factor, designated as , u, 
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may be agreed to cater for S4. In this scenario, a supplier fails to deliver a working product by 
PDD, the client may cancel the development contract and pay the supplier a non-delivery 
price Pad: 
Pnd=/l*P 
Where O5 p: 5 A. The fact that uz0 means that no consequential damage is claimed for non- 
delivery of software product. It is conceivable that u=0 if there is enough competition in the 
product supply market. The fact that p <_ A should encourage the supplier to complete 
development rather than to abandon it half way. 
Development Cancellation Price Factor 
The scenarios of either non-delivery or non-acceptance only take place on or after PDD. 
However, there is a possibility that the client may wish to terminate software development 
before PDD. To cater for such an eventuality, the client may agree a Development 
Cancellation Price Factor, designated as v. If the client cancels development before PDD, the 
supplier is paid a development cancellation price Pd,: 
P =V*P 
Where 05 vSA. The value of v may be linked to the length of time already spent for 
development or linked to the actual cost already incurred by the supplier. 
10.3.2 PBSDF - Part II: Development Competition 
PBSDF adopts development competition to manage development uncertainty and the 
associated risks. Within PBSDF, development competition can be defined as engaging two or 
more suppliers in designing and development products to the same revealed requirements 
from the client. The technique of development competition is demonstrated in Section 9.4.2 
for developing "black box" components in the manufacturing industry. The concept is 
clarified further here. In a broad sense, development competition is similar to the concept of 
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"managed competition". There appear to be at least two different uses of the term "managed 
competition". One refers to a mechanism to introduce competition into the provision of public 
services, especially public health services (see e. g. Shortliffe and Perreault, 2000). The other 
refers to a form of competition that is introduced to an otherwise regulated monopoly 
(Wolinsky, 1997; Suzuki, 2002). Development competition is effectively managed 
competition used for product development. Suzuki (2002) studies managed competition in 
various forms in the manufacturing industries, including development competition to produce 
new automobile components as discussed in Section 9.4.2. Development competition has also 
been used to manage mission-critical product development in projects. For example, 
Zimmerman (2000) reports the development of "the next-generation combat weapon for the 
U. S. forces" by two suppliers' direct competition with a successful result. Zimmerman 
concludes that premature selection of a winning supplier in product development amounts to 
"gambling". In addition, competition "brings out the best from the contractors, reduces 
program risk and maximises technology options for the customer" (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 67). 
These lessons are applied here in devising PBSDF for software development. 
One important feature of development competition in manufacturing industries is that rewards 
for the winning suppliers are (mainly) in the form of volume orders at the production stage, 
not directly from winning the competition (Section 9.4). There is no equivalent volume 
business in ISD projects if only one instance of software installation is required. To encourage 
suppliers to participate, it is necessary that the client partially funds the development 
activities. This happened in Zimmerman (2000) in that the client contributed $10 million to 
each supplier up-front for product development, though the rationale of providing this 
particular level of funding was not discussed. The level of partial funding may be reduced if 
volume installations are planned for. In that case, suppliers' rewards, at in part, can be tied to 
the number of installations. Such a mechanism is emphasised in implementing PBSDF with 
multiple suppliers (Section 10.10.2). 
286 
Development competition reduces risks considerably for the client. Literature on competition 
suggests, however, that a supplier can derive considerable benefits from competition too. 
Porter (1985) describes in detail the strategic benefits of having competitors. For example, he 
suggests that competitors enhance a supplier's ability to differentiate itself: 
"Without a competitor, buyers may have more difficulty perceiving the value 
created by a firm, and may, therefore, be more price- or service-sensitive. As a 
result, buyers may bargain harder on price, service or product quality. A 
competitor's product becomes a benchmark for measuring relative performance, 
however, which allows a firm to demonstrate its superiority more persuasively or 
lower the cost of differentiation. " (p. 203) 
Porter goes on to point out many other benefits a viable competitor brings, like increasing a 
supplier's internal motivation, increasing demand, reducing buyers' risk and promoting the 
image of the industry etc. Many of these are applicable to software development. 
10.3.3 PBSDF - Part III: Product Evaluation 
Section 8.8 discusses the problems with product evaluation in TSDF, especially during the 
product acceptance stage using the absolute product evaluation approach. The absolute 
product evaluation measures a product against an idealised model (Morisio et al., 2002) or 
standards (Blin and Tsoukias, 2001). In TSDF, the absolute model is often taken to be the 
initial client requirements rather than a complete detailed design. This makes the product 
evaluation in TSDF costly and problematic (Section 8.8). 
PBSDF provides the possibility for the client to use the relative product evaluation approach 
at product acceptance stage. The term "relative" has two meanings. First of all, in PBSDF, the 
client does not make the product acceptance decision based on whether a product meets the 
initial requirements that would be incomplete anyway. Instead, the evaluation is relative to 
the value of the product perceived by the client organisation. This is possible in PEISDF due 
to the fact that the contract caters for a scenario that the developed product may be rejected 
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for a non-acceptance payment. If there is only one product to be developed, and the product is 
rejected upon evaluation, it can be interpreted that the product would bring less value to the 
client than if adopted, ceteris paribus. Though such a process sounds subjective on the 
client's side, the subjectivity is limited due to ongoing requirements adjustment in PBSDF. 
Product evaluation relative to the client's value judgement provides a crucial link between 
software development and the client's legitimate value expectation. 
The second reason for the product evaluation in PBSDF to be called "relative" is that with 
development competition of two or more suppliers, each supplier's product can be evaluated 
relative to other comparable product(s). This is particularly helpful on dimensions of 
functionality and quality where absolute measurements are difficult like design architecture, 
usability and security. The technique can be equally effective when applied to measurable 
dimensions like system performance. The relative approach does not exclude the 
measurement of quality dimensions or the setting of some initial quantified performance 
expectations. The key point is that it does not purport to measure an end product against a 
complete and idealised product model. 
10.4 The Theoretical Basis of A 
The Non-Acceptance Price Factor A is set to incentivise suppliers to participate. If a supplier 
makes an honest bid, and makes the best effort to produce the software that gets rejected in 
the end, what would be the minimum amount of payment a supplier is willing to accept for 
participation? The answer might be found in the marginal cost pricing principle in 
microeconomics. According to this principle, in a competitive market, a supplier expands its 
production until its marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost (Lumsden, 1995; Parkin et 
at., 1997). This principle applies either for short term or long term pricing. In the short term, 
the marginal cost can be approximated with variable cost. In other words, so far as the 
supplier's variable cost is covered, a supplier may accept orders, even at a price below the 
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normal long-term selling price (Lothian and Small, 1991). The same idea is expressed as the 
"loss avoidance" principle as observed by Keser and Willinger (2000) in studying payment 
schemes. Accordingly, in the short term at least, a software supplier is likely to agree to 
participate in a software product development if its variable cost is paid for by the client for 
the eventuality of its product not being accepted, with an expectation to be paid a full price if 
its product is accepted. Assume that the opportunity cost is zero (the opportunity cost is 
addressed in Section 10.6 as part of practical consideration when setting A), a supplier's total 
quoted price P may be broken down into various costs and profit: 
P= variable cost + fixed cost + supplier profit 
The Non-Acceptance Price Factor A can thus be defined as: 
A_ (variable cost)/P 
In traditional manufacturing industries, the variable cost is made up of raw materials, direct 
labour and the variable portion of overhead cost (Lothian and Small, 1991). To develop a 
software product, the cost for raw materials is negligible. The variable cost for the software 
product can be approximated by the direct labour cost (DLC) for the personnel directly 
involved in the development. DLC for software development includes basic salaries plus any 
pension contribution and tax liability for those directly involved in development including 
analysts, developers, testers and project managers, but not for line managers and other support 
staff. The invariable cost would cover all overhead costs including salaries and benefits for 
line managers, support staff and expenses relating to the office rental, heating etc. 
Depreciation is normally treated as a fixed cost since it has more to do with the passage of 
time rather than the actual usage (Lothian and Small, 1991). Therefore, the Non-Acceptance 
Price Factor A for a software development contract can be estimated as: 
A oz DLCIP 
The next section makes an attempt to estimate A based on the above definition. 
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10.5 Empirical Estimates of A 
In this section, discussions focus on using two sources of data for estimating R. The first is 
published annual accounts of software companies. The second is data from SLC in the 
participant case studies (Chapters 4,5 and 6). Further practical considerations in setting A are 
discussed in Section 10.6. 
10.5.1 Estimating A with Data from Annual Accounts 
All publicly quoted software development companies disclose accounting information in their 
annual reports. The information is usually available at a high level. Even so, it is a starting 
point to obtain a rough estimate of A. Consider the three software companies listed in Table 
10.1. These companies are selected because their published accounts provide details about 
"service revenues" versus the "cost of services" while many companies do not separate 
information about services and product (e. g. PPSW products) sales. Since product sales have 
a different cost structure compared with services, such data have to be excluded. The "cost of 
services" can be interpreted as the variable cost for the corresponding "service revenues". 
Unfortunately, the service revenues and costs listed in Table 10.1 may include services like 
consulting, training and support in addition to any custom software development activities. 
However, it is assumed that service charge rates on average are comparable to those for 
software product development, if not higher. The data can provide an indication of the high 
end of the variable cost as a percentage of the corresponding revenue. 
Table 10.1: Service costs as nercentanes of the corresnondine service revenues 
Companies 1999 2000 2001 
Business Objects Revenues from Services ($000) 87,896 128,089 166 200 
(www. businessobjects. com) Cost of Services ($000) 35 467 53 101 63,497 
Cost as percentage of revenues 40.4% 41.5% 38.2% 
Quest (www. quest. com) Revenues from Services ($000) 16,599 38,820 71,216 
Cost of Services ($000) 4 195 10,695 17,369 
Cost as percentage of revenues 25.3% 27.6% 24,4% 
Mercury Interactive Revenues from Services ($000) 56,800 90,900 124,400 
(www. mercuryinteractive. com) Cost of Services ($000) 16,957 24 679 29,231 
Cost as ercenta e of revenues 29.9% 7.1% 23.5% 
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Table 10.1 shows that the variable cost percentages of their corresponding service revenues 
range from 23.5% to 41.5%. This range gives a rough indication of the possible A for these 
companies. Company annual reports also reveal some information about staff costs. I lowever, 
costs for direct labour, support staff and managerial staff are usually not separated. To get a 
more accurate estimate of A, the next Section takes a closer look at the data from SLC. 
10.5.2 Estimating A by Labour Cost Data from SLC 
Being a company offering system integration services to ISD projects, SLC's staff costs and 
their charge rates to a client are comparable to those of software suppliers. For SLC, the unit 
cost of using internal resources or internal direct labour (IDL) includes staff salaries, benefits 
and tax liabilities. The corresponding unit revenue is the IDL's project charge rate (PCR). 
PCR is what a software supplier charges the client, typically using man-day as a unit. It is 
usually decided according to the grade of the staff (junior programmer, programmer or senior 
programmer etc. ) and the going market rates for each grade. PCR is used to plan the project 
budget first and to consume the budget during the project according to man-days used. The 
man-days charged to the client multiplied by the corresponding daily PCRs give the supplier 
the total project revenue. To illustrate the proportion of the cost and the revenue for various 
types of resources, the figures from Case 1 are shown in Table 10.2. 
Table 10.2: SLC's direct labour costs as nercenta2e of PCR (with 23% off the market rates) 
Average Annual Daily Cost Project Planned Days Direct 
Salary Cost (£, (£, assume Charge as Percentage Cost 
including social 220 Rate of Total Percentage 
security and working (PCR, £) Project Man- of revenue 
pension costs) days a year) Days 
Senior Project 45,069 205 818 15% 25% 
Manager 
Project Manager 37,258 169 681 9% 25% 
Senior Technical 36,821 167 618 10% 27% 
Specialist 
Senior Analyst 38,400 175 603 23% 29% 
Senior 32,048 146 482 34% 30% 
_Programmer Programmer 22,558 103 376 9% 27% 
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It can be seen from the above table that the internal direct labour cost is around 25% to 30% 
of the project charge rate. The weighted average is 28%. The PCR quoted in the above table 
were used in the Years 2000 and 2001. The rates were decided upon first by a benchmark 
with the market average, and then take 23% reduction due to a long-term agreement between 
SLC and UKOne. The market average project charge rates would have been higher and thus 
the direct labour percentage of the total charge rate in the market place would have been 
lower. If the PCR is adjusted back to the market average rate, the direct labour cost 
percentages are between 19% to 23% (Table 10.3). The weighted average percentage is 21%. 
Table 10.3: Direct labour costs as nercentaces of the average market full charge rates 
Daily cost (£, Average Project Days Direct Cost 
assume 220 Market Project Percentage in a Percentage 
working days Charge Rate Plan (Case 1- (%) 
per year) PCR £ LoE riceModel 
Senior Project 205 1062 15% 19% 
Manager 
Project Manager 169 884 9% 19% 
Senior Technical 167 803 10% 21% 
Specialist 
Senior Analyst 175 783 23% 22% 
Sur Programmer 146 626 34% 23% 
Programmer 103 488 9% 21% 
In addition to IDL resources, a supplier may use bought-in contractor labours (DCL) to gain 
specific skills. BCL may be from self-employed companies, which have been common in the 
last few years. Or they may come from the so-called "body shops" that lend their staff for a 
period of time for a fee. The cost for each BCL is typically a daily contract rate with no other 
liability. On the other hand, the supplier levies the client a project charge rate (PCR), just like 
the internal resources. PCR is normally higher than the rate the supplier pays for BCL, thus 
yielding a profit for the supplier. In Case 1, no individual bought-in contract labour was used 
as defined above. In Case 2, two contractors were used. The contractors' costs to SLC were 
£300 and £346 per day respectively. The project charge rate was the same for both at £482. 
This gives the direct cost percentages of 62% and 72%. Using contractor staff is clearly a 
more expensive option in this case, but still yields gross profit for SLC. 
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Only the supplier knows the exact direct labour cost percentage of its corresponding revenue. 
In entering a PBSDF agreement, the client and the supplier share the understanding that the 
supplier is paid the full price P if its application is accepted, and is paid A? if its application is 
not accepted. The competitive pressure will induce a supplier to reveal its cost information by 
agreeing to a level of % appropriate to its own cost structure. Although the concept of A is 
derived from the proportion of variable cost, it may incorporate other practical considerations 
in practice, some of which are described in the following section. 
10.6 Practical Considerations for Setting A 
At the contract bidding stage in PBSDF, a supplier is asked to submit A together with a full 
price. Though the full price may change due to many reasons (Section 10.2.3), A stays the 
same throughout the project. A supplier has to balance the need to submit a low A to be 
competitive and the need to have a high enough A to cover the risk of its final product not 
being accepted. The value of A may vary from 0% to 100% depending on the supplier's other 
practical considerations. If a supplier sets A at 0%, the message is that it is confident of its 
product being developed successfully and accepted. It is equivalent to the conventional 
"money back" guarantee. If the supplier sets A to be 100%, the supplier wants to be paid the 
same whether its product is accepted or not. This is similar to the "cost plus" type of contract 
when all risks are borne by the client. This section explores a number of practical 
considerations a supplier might have in setting A. 
10.6.1 Varying A According to the Level of Competition 
If the software development market is fiercely competitive, the competitive pressure may 
force a supplier to lower the proposed A value. In the extreme case, suppliers may propose A 
0. On the other hand, if the relevant skills are in short supply and there is a significant lack of 
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the relevant development capacity, a supplier may demand a higher A to cover not only the 
variable cost but also the resource opportunity cost. 
10.6.2 Varying ýl According to Project Length 
It has been assumed that a supplier is willing to embark on a project with a possible prospect 
of being paid only Pa = . 2P if the development can be accomplished "in the short term" 
(Section 10.4). In the long run, a supplier must make sure that the fixed costs are recovered 
through products and services in accordance with the "loss avoidance" principle (Keser and 
Willinger, 2000). An acceptable PBSDF contract may still be devised for a project lasting 
longer that "the short term" with A increased, making larger projects more expensive for the 
client. Here the concepts of "short term" and "long run" are relative to each other. 
Traditionally, "short-term" is taken to mean one year in accounting terms. The higher A value 
for longer projects would effectively signal to clients to take up smaller projects or break up 
large projects into smaller chunks. 
10.6.3 Varying A According to Project Risk 
A client may undertake ISD projects that rely on cutting-edge technology. That carries higher 
risks for suppliers. In such a case, a supplier may propose a higher A. This has the benefit of 
providing more realistic cost feedback of the risks to the client before undertaking highly 
risky projects. Such risk feedback mechanism is valuable to the client in evaluating suitable 
projects to be carried out. 
10.6.4 Varying A According to Supplier's Product Maturity 
If a supplier offers a readily available software product that requires little additional 
development work, A might be set close to zero. This is simply to capitalise on the fact that 
the marginal cost of reproducing a software product is low, though implementation cost to 
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integrate a software product into a successful system should not be overlooked. On the other 
hand, for customised development, a supplier might set A to be closer to its true variable cost 
or even higher depending on other considerations. As a result, a client is more likely to opt for 
solutions requiring less development. 
The flexibility in setting A value affords PBSDF great flexibility to take account of market 
condition and the level of project risks. This is in sharp contrast with TSDF that encourages 
suppliers to bid low initially. Low initial bidding prices entice clients to undertake projects 
that are otherwise uneconomical. This phenomenon is often described as "not having a valid 
business case" by some critics of failed ISD projects (Smith, 2001). Similarly, clients might 
undertake projects that are speculative and not mission-critical, and therefore are more likely 
to be cancelled. A supplier bidding to participate in such projects may factor in the risk by 
increasing A. As a result, some of the non-essential systems may not be funded in the first 
place. This market feedback mechanism might be considered as a useful by-product of 
PBSDF. The role PBSDF may play in project feasibility assessment might be modelled 
mathematically in separate studies (Section 11.6.3). 
10.7 Implementing PBSDF with Two Suppliers 
This Section provides an illustration of implementing PBSDF using two suppliers engaged in 
development competition, referred to as the Two Supplier Strategy (PISDF-TSS, or TSS for 
short). PBSDF may be implemented with a single supplier without development competition, 
or implemented with three or more suppliers. These will be discussed in Section 10.10. 
In PBSDF-TSS, each supplier participates in contract bidding by submitting a full price and a 
Non-Acceptance Price Factor A based on the client's Request for Proposal (the other price 
factors may be included in the bidding or may be negotiated after the initial selection). Two 
suppliers are selected to participate in a development competition. Each supplier receives the 
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same requirements specification from the client and develops a software product 
independently. Any requirement change agreed between the client and one supplier must be 
published to the other. Having developed the products, the suppliers submit them for 
evaluation. The supplier with the winning product is paid its full-asking price. The supplier 
with the rejected product is paid aA percentage of its full-asking price. What follows is a 
description of the possible PBSDF-TSS implementation, first with the project organisation, 
followed by five stages and four milestones, as used in Section 8.9. 
10.7.1 ISD Project Organisation for PBSDF-TSS 
The basic ISD project organisational structure is the same as Figure 1.1. The ISD project team 
(referred to as the project team for short) acts on behalf of the client as the principal, while 
software suppliers are the agents. The project team is responsible for specifying functional 
requirements and technical constraints, co-ordinating request for proposals (RFP), evaluating 
supplier proposals, managing requirements changes, conducting product acceptance 
evaluation and carrying out system implementation in the end. The key teams within the 
project may include a Requirements Management Team (RMT), a System Level Architecture 
Team (SLAT), a Supplier Management Team (SMT) and a Quality Assurance Team (QAT), 
among others (Figure 10.2). 
Figure 10.2: A typical ISD project organisation for implementing PBSDF-TSS 
RMT's role is to co-ordinate with users, user managers and other teams within the client 
organisation to maintain a set of up to date requirements throughout the duration of the 
project. Each requirement must be numbered and traceable (Gilb, 1997). The RMT has to 
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tread a fine line between making clear what is required and how to meet the requirements. 
Each requirement change must be communicated to both suppliers at the same time through 
SMT. SMT registers all requirements, requirement changes and negotiates with suppliers 
regarding possible impact any change may have on the overall price and delivery time. All 
changes must be fully recorded so that at any moment of time, the client knows the projected 
cost and the actual cost to date for each supplier. In addition, the project team must also know 
at any point the likely total payment to suppliers based on different possible scenarios. Part of 
the SMT's responsibilities is to work with RMT and SLAT to question and record the 
assumptions that are made by suppliers on a comparative basis. Some of the assumptions, if 
accepted, may have to be converted to requirements and communicated to both suppliers. 
QAT is to carry out product evaluation in association with . 
RMT at the evaluation stage and to 
provide support to other necessary test activities (e. g. usability test, performance test etc). 
10.7.2 Stage 1: Client Preparing "Request for Proposal (RFP)" 
The client first considers various software acquisition options available. When a client 
decides that an externally developed software application is required, an RFP is prepared to 
solicit proposals from suppliers. The RFP has to make clear to all suppliers that PI3SDF is 
used to manage software development and two suppliers will be selected to participate in a 
development competition. In addition to necessary technical details and the usual projected 
total price, a supplier is asked to quote a Non-Acceptance Price Factor .% according to the 
definition given in Section 10.2. The client must take care in formulating RFP in such a way 
to make clear business needs without prescribing implementation details. In other words, the 
client should and should only state what is required and not how requirements are to be met, 
The requirements at this stage are not expected to be complete but should include as much as 
possible "revealed requirements" as defined in the Kano Model (Section 8.3). 
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10.7.3 Milestone 1: RFP Issued 
Without having to worry about "freezing" the requirements, it is possible to issue RFP 
relatively soon after the project initiation. It is critical, however, for the client to control 
requirements strictly. If there is any revision to the requirements included in the RFP, each 
supplier must be notified at the same time with the same revision. Each supplier must submit 
its proposal based on the same version of requirements for ease of proposal evaluation and 
supplier selection. 
10.7.4 Stage 2: Pre-Contract Proposals 
Suppliers submit proposals indicating how software will be designed and developed, with the 
understanding that two suppliers will be selected. Crucially, each supplier quotes a Non- 
Acceptance Price Factor A in addition to a full asking price P. Supplier selection should be 
carried out with usual criteria like financial soundness, technical capability, development 
capacity and value for money etc. One important feature of PBSDF is that the opportunistic 
pricing behaviour as a result of high switching cost is likely to be curtailed (see Section 10.9 
below). Pricing low initially will help a supplier being selected, but charging higher prices 
later diminishes its competitiveness. What is more, suppliers do not monopolise 
development. Therefore any price change is subjected to competitive pressure. 
10.7.5 Milestone 2: Client Committing to Contract with Two Suppliers 
Having selected two suppliers, the client enters a PBSDF contract with each respectively. The 
essence of the contract is that the client will pay the supplier according to whether its product 
is accepted or not. This milestone is completed when the client gives the supplier a signal to 
proceed with development based on a clear understanding for P and A and other relevant price 
factors. PBSDF-TSS provides a relatively complete contractual framework due to its 
consideration for various eventualities (Maskin, 2002). The question of product quality is left 
to the acceptance stage to resolve. 
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10.7.6 Stage 3: Software Product Development 
Both suppliers are in a simple game: to develop a product cost-effectively that meets the 
client's business needs and technical constraints for it to be accepted. In view of the three 
types of requirements, the suppliers exert efforts so that the client's "revealed requirements" 
are met with no omission, the "expected requirements" are fully met and the "exciting 
requirements" are built into the product as much as possible. The objective is to delight the 
client with their products at the evaluation stage. 
It is up to the suppliers to adopt the best practices and tools as appropriate. The end game is 
easy to understand for every one within the supplier teams. Each supplier team member 
should be incentivised to establish a close working relationship with the client throughout the 
development stage. The competitive pressure compels each supplier's development team to 
be more innovative and to be better supported by its own management team. In the process of 
development, questions may be raised, and changes may be made to the requirements 
specification. The changes are to be recorded, costed and incorporated into the requirements 
specification if adopted and communicated to both suppliers. Any price and delivery time 
variation is to be incorporated into the overall project cost model and project schedule. The 
competitive pressure will make sure that the price variations are checked. Any excessively 
high price on changes will make a supplier's product uncompetitive, ceteris paribus. 
The management team within the supplier organisation has the incentive to provide adequate 
skilled resources for development if its product is to win the development competition. 
Developers are no longer just responding to written specifications. They are likely to be 
encouraged to be innovative and to think on behalf of users. They have to pay attention to 
non-functional requirements like performance, usability and reliability etc. In the face of 
continuing requirements amendments, suppliers have to make sure that their products arc 
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easily adaptable, which helps to lower long-term product maintenance and enhancement costs 
for the client. Software designers, developers and testers within the supplier organisation 
work closely with one single objective: to have a system that will be accepted by the client. 
10.7.7 Milestone 3: Suppliers Release Software for Evaluation 
The key milestone is for each supplier to release its own developed product to the client at its 
committed delivery date. At the point of the official release, the product should be able to 
function as a "working product" (Section 10.3). 
10.7.8 Stage 4: Client Conducts Product Evaluation and Considers Options 
Upon receiving a software product, the project team installs the product onto a pre-prepared 
system platform. This stage traditionally has been called "Site Acceptance Testing (SAT)". In 
view of the new framework, it is more appropriately called "Site Evaluation Test (SET)". 
This stage should not be rushed. During evaluation, the project team takes advantage of any 
absolute measure available. More importantly, the technique of relative product evaluation 
should be used thoroughly to compare every conceivable product dimension between the two 
products. The following criteria might be considered, among others: 
" Meeting functional requirements and technical constraints; 
" Interoperating with legacy data, if applicable; 
" Outputting data that meet corporate quality standards 
" Supporting relevant business process; 
" Compatible with corporate brand image; 
" Being cost-effective to support; 
" And possibly having a considerable number of additional "exciting" features. 
The client evaluates each product's potential value contribution to its organisation. The 
evaluation outcome for each supplier may follow the scenarios described in Section 10.3.1. 
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10.7.9 Milestone 4: Client Announces Product Evaluation Result 
The client communicates the result of product evaluation to each supplier. Necessary 
commercial transactions take place between the client and each of the suppliers according to 
the evaluation outcomes. 
10.7.10 Stage 5: System Implementation and Post Implementation Activities 
System implementation focuses on embedding the software system with client's 
infrastructure. The usual support arrangement is to be initiated at this stage. Application 
support teams are to be set up, trained and commissioned. Call centre and other support teams 
should be arranged as appropriate. The new information system should be fully supported 
white in operation. 
10.8 Cost-Benefit Analysis of PBSDF-TSS 
The implementation of PBSDF-TSS is similar to the idea of "build two, throw one away", 
which was suggested by Brooks (1975). But Brooks' approach refers to prototyping that has 
its fundamental problems (Section 3.7.2). PBSDF-TSS adopts a parallel strategy rather than a 
sequential one. Nevertheless, just like prototyping, there might be a concern with the cost of 
building two products. Is PBSDF-TSS cost-effective for a client? In this Section, the cost 
difference between using PBSDF-TSS and TSDF for software design and development is 
examined with the help of a simple total cost model. 
10.8.1 Total Cost with TSDF 
In TSDF, the total cost (Co) of developing and supporting a software system for a client may 
be represented with the following equation: 
Ca= Po+aPo+ Xo + Yo + Zo (10.1) 
In which: 
Po: initial bid price by the supplier for design and development. 
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aPo: the aggregate total of subsequent price variations after the initial accepted bid price. 
The value of a is the percentage price variation compared with the initial bid price. 
All price variations are included, e. g. requirements clarifications, requirements 
changes and contract re-negotiation etc. 
X0: aggregate total of ISD project cost items excluding those paid to the application 
software supplier. It includes costs for hardware and system software. It also includes 
costs for maintaining ISD project staff who charge their time to the project budget 
and costs for specialist services performed by other suppliers (project management 
consultancy, security audits etc. ). Xo may vary as a result of software delays or rework 
due to poor quality. 
Yo: aggregate total of costs that the client incurs during the ISD project but not charged to 
the project. Client senior managers often spend much time in overseeing troubled ISD 
projects. Such senior management time represents an opportunity cost to the client. A 
client may also assign to ISD projects critical internal resources paid for as the 
client's general overhead, rather than as part of project budget. There may be reduced 
company revenue or possibly regulatory fines as a result of late introduction of the 
intended software system. Like Xo, Yo may vary as a result of delays in software 
delivery or rework due to poor software quality. 
Zo: the aggregate total of costs related to a software system's operation, support and 
enhancement after its implementation. The client may have to increase the size of the 
support team if a software system crashes regularly and does not work with 
operational data as expected (e. g. The CAPSA case in Finkelstein, 2001). If only one 
third of the contracted deliverables is actually delivered, the client may have to pay 
further costs for either enhancing the developed system later or to start another 
project to develop the remaining functionality. Of course, the additional cost might be 
opportunity cost for having a poor system. All these costs are included in Z0. 
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The value of a in (10.1) represents a supplier's percentage price increase compared with the 
accepted bid price. There may be many reasons for price increases in TSDF. For any 
particular product, a represents a supplier's propensity for price increase (PPI). Neither the 
client nor the supplier knows how high PPI is in the beginning of a project. Consider the MSS 
price history for example (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4), the initial budgeted price for its 
software development was £240K on 23/06/2001. By the end of the project, the same part of 
the expenditure increased to £867K on 13/03/2002. The value of a in this case is 2.61. In 
other words, MSS went over its initial price by 261%. Part of the price increase came from a 
"re-planning" exercise and part from project delays. 
10.8.2 Total Cost with PBSDF-TSS 
With PBSDF-TSS, a similar total cost model can be constructed. Assume that Supplier A and 
Supplier B are selected to participate in the development competition. During the product 
development, there are a number of price changes. In the end, Supplier A's product is 
accepted and Supplier B's product is rejected, the total cost to the client is Ci: 
Cý _ (1 + ß4)P, 4 +, t8(1 +ß3d P, 8 +x/ + Y! + Zl (10.2) 
In which: 
P144: Supplier A's bid which is accepted to go forward to the full product development. 
, ß4: a percentage price change requested by Supplier A before the product is delivered. 
AB: Non-Acceptance Price Factor quoted initially by Supplier B. 
Qe: a percentage price change requested by Supplier B before the product is delivered. 
PIB: Supplier B's bid which is accepted to go forward to the full product development. 
X1, Y1 and Z1: These three items correspond with X0, Yo and Zo in (10.1). 
The first item (1 + 8A)PI,, in (10.2) is the total price the client pays Supplier A for its software 
product that is accepted. The second item ß. B(1 +QB)P! g is the total price the client pays 
Supplier B for its software product that is rejected. 
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10.8.3 Comparing Co and Cf 
The question to be examined is if C1 SCo. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that PEA _ 
PIE = P,. Further, it is assumed that both suppliers have quoted the same A value and 
requested the same Q percentage price variation during development competition. The delta 
between two total costs can then be expressed as: 
CI- Co = ((1+A, )P1- Po) + ((I+X)JP, - aPo) + (X, - Xo) + (Y1- Yo) + (Z1- Zo) (10.3) 
Consider each item in turn: 
((1 +2)Pj - Po): If suppliers quote their full true prices before contract with or without 
PBSDF-TSS, then P1 = Po = P. When that happens, the client pays AP more with 
PBSDF-TSS than otherwise. However, in the analysis of Section 8.4, it is pointed out 
that, with competitive bidding in TSDF, Po is quoted below the true price. In PBSDF- 
TSS, suppliers are likely to quote their true prices (Section 10.9). Therefore, this item 
is likely to be positive. 
((1 +22)ßP, - aPo): This item can be either positive or negative depending on a, 0 and A. 
If there is no price variation whatsoever (no re-planning, no change of requirements 
and no clarification of the requirements etc) then a= fl= 0 and this item is zero. If 
there are many price variations, the price change represented by aPo can be high due 
to monopoly pricing compared with 6P, in PBSDF-TSS. Therefore, a>p. The 
difference between ft and a depends on the demand elasticity of the software product 
in question and the number of changes required during the project. Considering the 
peculiarity of software demand and possible lock-in situations (Varian, 2001), a is 
likely to be far greater than ß Overall, the item may be either positive or negative. 
(XI - X): This is likely to be negative. Cost saving is possible due to a better chance that 
the product will be delivered on time with better quality. Though dealing with two 
suppliers may be more demanding on the client, the extra cost may be compensated 
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by efficiency gain as a result of less waiting time on the part of the project team. 
(Y, - YQ): This is also likely to be negative. On time software delivery with better quality 
will reduce the need for the client management involvement, thus reducing the 
opportunity cost for their time. 
(Z, - Zo): The last item is likely to be negative since better quality software systems will 
cost less to operate and maintain. The client may also benefit from a more 
competitive support contract at the time of product evaluation. 
The first two items in (10.3) represent the net supplier payment difference for acquiring the 
software product using the two different approaches. The two items can be written as d,: 
A, _ ((1 +A)P, - Pa) + ((1 +A)ßPj - aPa _ (1 +A) (1 +ß)P, - (1 +a)Po (10.4) 
A, may be modelled graphically. Figure 10.3 provides one possible scenario where Po = 100, 
P, = 110,, 8=0.5*a and A varies from 0.1 to 0.4. 
Modelling ds 
with PO=100, PI =110, X13=0.5*a 
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Figure 10.3: Direct payment difference for software product (d, ) between 
using PBSDF-TSS and TSDF 
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Figure 10.3 demonstrates that under the assumptions given regarding Po, P,, a and ß, the total 
payment for software product in PBSDF-TSS may be less compared with that in TSDF when 
a is high (typically a in the region larger than 1.0) and A is agreed at a relatively low level 
(e. g. A50.2). Such outright cost saving is possible due to the competitive mechanism in 
PBSDF-TSS. When the possibility of price variation is moderate (e. g. a between 0.3 to 1), a 
client pays less than 40% extra if A is agreed to be 0.3 or lower. It is only if there is little 
chance of price increase (a < 0.3), combined with a high A (e. g. Az0.3), when a client is 
likely to pay over 40% extra using PBSDF-TSS. If a supplier is able to deliver a software 
product within cost and schedule targets and with the expected quality (i. e. low uncertainty of 
the development outcome compared with the supplier's cost, schedule and product promises), 
using TSDF may cost less. If, on the other hand, there are many opportunities for price 
variations in developing a product, it may cost the client less to use PBSDF-TSS. 
In developing and operating an information system, the direct payment to suppliers is only 
one part of the total cost. The remaining three cost items in (10.1) and (10.2) represent a 
significant proportion of the total cost of ownership. Consider Case 2 as an example, the cost 
for AES' software product is only 21% of the total project budget (Section 5.8.4). In Case 3, 
the software product cost is 17.1% of the total project cost (Section 6.6). Thus, there is much 
room for efficiency improvement in areas other than the payment for the software product. 
Any reduction to product delay and improvement to product quality are likely to reduce 
expenditure in other areas. In particular, software maintenance costs a great deal to client 
organisations. Boehm (1976) suggests that software maintenance cost is 40% of the total cost 
of owning information systems ("the overall hardware-software dollar" in Boehm's words). 
Boehm predicts that the maintenance cost percentage would have grown to 60% by 1985 and 
increased further thereafter. Further studies may be carried out to verify Boehm's prediction 
empirically. If it is accepted that software maintenance takes a significant proportion of the 
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total cost of owning a system, it implies that there would be a great potential for cost saving in 
this area. In any case, further studies may also be carried out to model the effect of PBSDF- 
TSS on cost items other than the direct payment to software suppliers. In the meantime, it is 
worthwhile to point out that the main benefits of PBSDF-TSS come from possible quality 
improvement and reduced development risks, not direct savings in software product cost. 
10.9 Game Theoretic Modelling of PBSDF-TSS 
Section 8.9 provides a game theoretic model for the client-supplier contracting process within 
TSDF and explains that the process involves "non-credible promises". In this Section, 
PBSDF-TSS is modelled using concepts and techniques from the game theory to see how the 
non-credible promises may be overcome. PBSDF-TSS is potentially complex to model as a 
whole. It is therefore broken down into three subgames. One is the contract bidding subgame 
played among suppliers (Section 10.9.1). The second is the subgame played between two 
competing suppliers in development competition (Section 10.9.2). The third is the contracting 
process between the client and the supplier (Section 10.9.3). Section 10.9.4 examines how the 
presence of more than one supplier affects suppliers' behaviours so that the "non-credible 
promises" are overcome and how PBSDF-TSS provides the client with superior value 
compared with TSDF. 
10.9.1 Subgame for Contract Bidding 
In game theory, bidding is studied as one of the auction games. There are auctions to buy and 
auctions to sell. Auctions for bidders to buy have been most often studied but the principles 
apply equally in reverse to auctions for bidders to sell (Gardner, 1995). When suppliers bid 
for contract, they are in an auction to sell their goods and services. In ISD projects, suppliers 
make their bids simultaneously with information hidden from each other; hence they arc 
"sealed-bid auction to sell". In addition, if only one supplier is to be selected, as in TSDF, the 
rule of the game is usually that the bidder with the lowest price wins the contract, ceteris 
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paribus. This is called a "first-price auction". If the rule of the game is altered so that the 
lowest bidder is paid the second lowest price, the game is called a "second-price auction". 
The second-price auction is rare in practice but it has interesting features (Gardner, 1995) that 
are relevant to PBSDF-TSS. 
By studying the "first-price auction" with complete information, Gardner (1995) concludes 
that bidders do not bid with their true evaluation. In an auction to buy, bidders underbid to 
increase the buyer's surplus. In an auction to sell, bidding above the true cost allows the 
supplier to pocket the seller' surplus. Such bidding behaviours are seen in the market 
exchange place where sellers ask for high prices, expecting to be haggled downwards. In 
TSDF, such a bidding pattern is affected by high switching cost in the software product 
market, which may have led to underbidding in ISD projects (Section 8.4). 
In a second-price auction to buy, however, the bidding principle is that bidders "always bid 
true value" (Gardner, 1995). Gardner adds: 
"This principle holds true regardless of the number of bidders,.. Moreover, this 
principle does not depend on knowing your rival's valuation. It is just as true if 
you don't know your opponent's true value. Even in that case, paying the second. 
highest price means you can't lose when you bid true value. " (p. 307) 
If this principle is applied to the second-price auction to sell, the supplier should always bid 
according to its "true price". Would this principle apply to PI3SDF-TSS where two lowest. 
priced suppliers are to be selected, ceteris paribus? The fact that a client is prepared to select 
two suppliers demonstrates that the client is willing to pay at least up to the second highest 
price. However, the game rules of PBSDF-TSS are significantly more complicated since: 
" Two lowest priced suppliers with a set of bidding information (Pd, ,LN etc, not just a 
single value) are selected to participate in the development competition; 
9 Both suppliers are allowed to adjust their total prices after the contract award to allow 
requirements changes (either scope increases or decreases); 
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0 No adjustment of the price factors (A, ,u etc) 
is allowed; 
40 A supplier wins the development competition if its total price is lower, ceteris 
paribus; 
" The winning supplier is paid its full asking price P while the other is paid its AP. 
In PBSDF-TSS, two lowest-priced suppliers only win the rights to participate in the 
subsequent development competition rather than being paid directly at that point. The 
eventual payoffs depend on the outcome of the development competition. Due to the 
uncertainties associated with the cost estimation and actual development activities, PBSDF- 
TSS becomes a complicated game to model. No equivalent game theoretic model has been 
found in the literature (Elgood, 1984; Gibbons, 1992; Gardner, 1995; Bierman and Fernadez, 
1998) to match the PBSDF-TSS game rules to provide a conclusive answer to the question 
whether suppliers' best strategy is to bid with their "true prices". Whether this is the case 
warrants further separate studies (Section 11.6.2). In the meantime, the effect of the switching 
cost on the bidding prices is modelled next. 
10.9.2 Subgarne for Development Competition: The Effect of Switching Cost 
Whether the suppliers participating in the initial bidding will be proven to bid with their true 
costs, PBSDF-TSS is designed to overcome the possible opportunistic price increases due to 
high switching costs. Consider two suppliers, Supplierl and Supplier2, who have won the 
initial bidding by submitting the same lowest price Pbiing with different private valuations of 
the client's switching cost Sr, isti and Sao,,.. In other words, their undistorted prices should have 
been P, = PbjdJjng + Sh, gh and P1= Pbidd; g + S, 0 respectively. Both suppliers try to recover their 
full prices through subsequent price increases. The outcome of the development competition 
can be modelled in the normal form shown in TablelO. 4. Both suppliers adopt the dominant 
strategy to deliver an acceptable product. When the products from both suppliers are 
acceptable, Table 10.4 shows that Supplierl with the high price (PbjQj, + Shr.,. ) will be only 
paid RI(Pbj&jg+Shjgi) while Supplier2 with the lower total price will be paid the full price 
309 
(Pbwaaing + S10 ). In other words, in PBSDF, it does not pay to bid low to win contracts, only to 
be paid a non-acceptance price if its final price is uncompetitive. This is in sharp contrast to 
the bidding in TSDF where suppliers compete to underbid and are then free to increase its 
price in the bargains-then-ripoffs opportunistic pattern. 
Table 10.4: Modellinn the effect of private switchine costs In PBSDF-TSS 
Su lier2 
To deliver an acceptable Not to deliver an acceptable 
product product 
To deliver an (, TI(Pblddrng+ShIgh), (Pbi flg+SloJ) ((Pb, g+Shg! ), 22(PbkL! (n +SkiJ) g 
accepts le product 
Not to deliver an (2l(Pblddrng+Shlgh), (Pbl dý&11Mg+S, ow)) ýýltý b1uWing }Sblgh), ýJý%ýbtýNnY Sýowiý 
&n acceptable product 
10.9.3 The Contract Between a Client and a Supplier 
The client-supplier PBSDF contract can be modelled as a dynamic game with complete 
information (Gibbons, 1992; Section 8.9.2). It is dynamic since each player's action is 
sequential to the other. It has complete information since the players are assumed to know 
each other's pay-off functions based on the pre-contract understandings. The game is shown 
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Figure 10.4: The game of client-supplier contract In PISDF-TSS 
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In Figure 10.4, a client (C) decides to issue RFP for a software application to a supplier (S) or 
not. If the client decides to develop the software internally, it does not issue RFP. The game 
ends with no product from any supplier and the supplier is not paid anything. If an RFP is 
issued, the supplier must decide to bid for the contract or not. If it does not bid, the game ends 
for that supplier. If it submits a bid, the client decides to accept or reject the bid. If it rejects 
the bid, the game ends. If the client accepts the bid, the supplier is awarded a PBSDF contract. 
If the supplier then fails to deliver a product on a pre-agreed date and the contract is 
terminated as a result, the supplier is paid sP. The client loses pP and gets no product. If the 
supplier develops and delivers a product, the client evaluates it and decides to accept it or not. 
If the client rejects the product, the client pays the supplier AP and gets no product. 
Otherwise, the client pays P, accepts and deploys the product, enjoying the benefit V 
associated with having the product. 
At the last step, the client gets the chance to assess the value of the delivered product. If there 
is only one supplier's product to consider, theoretically the condition for the client to accept 
the product is: 
V-P> -AP or V> (P- AP) 
This illustrates that a client would be willing to accept a product even if the product value is 
less than the price paid for by the margin of AP. This conclusion has two implications. Firstly, 
the value A can make a difference between a client accepting a product or rejecting it. If A 
approaches 1, a client may accept a product with a value approaching to 0. This happens in 
many software projects using TSDF. The implementation of poor quality software (e. g. 
CAPSA system in Finkelstein, 2001) is partly due to difficulties in evaluating the software 
benefits, but partly due to the fact that A is set at I by default in TSDF. In that case, it is better 
for the client to have the product for paying the supplier than not having it at all. Secondly, if 
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for whatever reason, the client valuation of the software product is forced up by some external 
factors other than the intrinsic product value, a client may retain a product however poor its 
quality may be. Consider an organisation under government regulation. If the organisation 
must have a system in place by a deadline or face a fine of £10million, even if the software 
has zero operational value, the client is likely to accept the product for being seen to have met 
the regulatory requirement. This is because V= £1Omillion for having a product if the product 
can pass the government audit in some way! 
There is a critical difference between the game depicted in Figure 8.2 for TSDF and the one 
shown in Figure 10.4 for PBSDF-TSS. In Figure 8.2, the client-supplier game ends with the 
supplier taking the last step. If development uncertainty demands too much extra resources 
from the supplier to make good its initial promises, the supplier chooses to make less effort 
and deliver poorer quality products, making its initial promises "non-credible". In Figure 
10.4, the client takes the last step to evaluate the suppliers' products based on their value 
contributions, not the fulfilment of the initial promises, thus overcoming the problem of any 
non-credible promise. 
10.9.4 The Effect of Development Competition On An Individual Supplier 
The above three sections look at the PBSDF-TSS game as three subgames. Though there is no 
co-operation between any of the suppliers, the PBSDF-TSS game affects individual supplier's 
behaviours profoundly. First of all, the bidding behaviour is significantly different from that 
in TSDF. In a normal "first-price" contract bidding process, the supplier's bid is affected by 
two considerations. The first is to bid with a higher than the "true" price so to increase the 
seller's surplus. This is overcome by PBSDF-TSS due to the selection of two suppliers, 
making the bidding analogous to the "second-price" auction (Section 10.9.1). The second 
consideration in supplier's bidding is the client's switching cost (Section 8.4). In TSDF, the 
higher the switching cost, the lower the supplier's bidding price, which is part of the bargains. 
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then-ripoffs behaviour pattern (Section 8.4). In PBSDF-TSS, the switching cost effect is 
removed with the help of a suitably agreed Non-Acceptance Price Factor (NAPF) ) and the 
development competition mechanism (Section 10.9.2). Incorporating these two effects, 
PBSDF-TSS induces suppliers to bid close to their "true" prices. 
In addition to the improved bidding behaviour, PBSDF-TSS allows a considerable level of 
flexibility in terms of client requirements changes and encourages suppliers' development 
creativity to create value for the client. After all, it is the client value judgment that decides 
which supplier is the winner of the development competition. While Figure 10.4 describes the 
subgame between a client and one supplier, the decision to accept or reject a supplier's 
product depends on the evaluation of the other supplier's product at the same time. Therefore, 
the acceptance criteria for Supplierl's product is: 
Vi > (PI - ß, 1P1) and V> > V2 
Similarly, the acceptance criteria for Supplier2's product is: 
V2 > (P2 - , 222) and V2 > V, 
Both suppliers are in exactly the same position if they are treated fairly by the client. The 
above acceptance criteria suggest that suppliers will not only strive to deliver value for money 
to the client, but also will strive to deliver better value than the competing supplier. In this 
way, the competitive "invisible-hand" not only helps keeping the project cost under control, 
but also helps delivering product with functions, features and quality meeting or exceeding 
the client's value expectations. This is in stark contrast to TSDF where the supplier only aims 
to deliver with a budgeted level of effort, even though that means the client may be left with a 
product worth less than the paid price (Section 8.9.2). Of course, exactly how value can be 
measured is a separate subject that may deserve much further research (see Section 11.6.6). 
10.10 Alternative Implementations of PBSDF 
PBSDF-TSS may be suitable for a typical ISD project where a single client requires a single 
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instance of a software application. Development competition is necessary in such a case to 
manage development uncertainty and increase the likelihood that one supplier produces a 
product to be accepted. However, PBSDF may be applied with only one supplier without 
competition or with more than two suppliers in some circumstances, instances of which are 
discussed below. 
10.10.1 Implementing PBSDF with a Single Supplier 
Referred to as the Single Supplier Strategy (PBSDF-SSS), PBSDF-SSS requires a client and a 
single supplier to agree a PBSDF contract including a price and the associated price factors A, 
,u and v before the start of a project. The supplier 
is paid according to the development 
outcome. PBSDF-SSS may be useful if the client requirements are well defined (e. g. due to 
the availability of a legacy system). It may also be used if a client aims to develop an 
information system on a speculative basis and is prepared for not having a working software 
system in the end. 
With only one supplier involved in the design and development, however, PBSDF-SSS is 
similar to TSDF, suffering from many limitations. First of all, divisions of responsibilities 
may be blurred between the client and the supplier. In using PISDF-TSS, the client is 
responsible for specifying requirements. Both suppliers aim to satisfy stated requirements first 
to avoid having their products being rejected. As a result, both suppliers need a set of 
requirements that the client must provide. This is a desirable feature of PBSDF-TSS in that it 
facilitates a requirements-driven software development. With only one supplier, assumptions 
might be made by the supplier without being referred back to the client, which has led to 
delivery-led software development in TSDF (Section 7.4.2). Secondly, the single supplier is 
likely to quote monopoly prices for requirements changes. The client has no alternative 
source of information to verify prices and price assumptions, Thirdly, the client has no 
alternative system that can be used for relative performance evaluation. In addition, a client 
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may not have the luxury to reject the only product available. Even if a rejection decision is 
taken, it might be challenged by the supplier who may blame the client for a poor product. For 
all these reasons, PBSDF-SSS is not recommended. 
One advantage PBSDF-SSS has over TSDF is that it provides an exit strategy for the client. If 
its limitations stated above are fully recognised, PBSDF-SSS may still be used in preference 
to TSDF. This may be the case if a client has a set of non-ambiguous requirements and a 
decision to accept and reject a product is easy to make. A fixed price and a fixed Non- 
Acceptance Price (instead of A) may be agreed if there is little risk of later price variations. 
The client must be prepared to exit a project with a sunk cost and without a working system. 
Such a process is in fact operating in the market already. Two examples may serve to 
illustrate the mechanism. One was experienced by the author in SLC. A supplier specialised 
in data analysis offered a software tool to a client. The full product would have cost £150k for 
10 users. But the supplier was willing to import the client's data and demonstrate to the client 
on one workstation for a trial phase for £IOk to 15k. If the client did not like the product, 
either party could walk away with no further liability. In this case, the supplier quoted a full 
price and A50.1. The other example is described by Collins (1998) about a £1l0million 
project for a "Customer System" that Andersen Consulting undertook for the Barclays Bank: 
"The Customer System was left mainly in the hands of Andersen Consulting on 
the simple basis that if its consultants failed to deliver they would not be paid and 
would never work for the bank again. " (p. 291) 
Collins does not provide any detail regarding the criteria of a "failure" to deliver. So far as the 
contractual arrangement is concerned, a literal interpretation is that Aa0. These two 
examples might be viewed as possible ways of implementing PBSDF-SSS. 
10.10.2 Implementing PBSDF with Multiple Suppliers 
There are occasions when more than two suppliers are preferable to participate in the 
development competition, resulting in a Multiple Supplier Strategy (PBSDF. MSS). This is 
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especially the case where more than one instance of the software product is to be 
implemented. The key benefit for having more than two suppliers is that more than two 
software products will be available for evaluation, and thus more than one product may be 
accepted by the client. The rewards for suppliers can be linked into the eventual number of 
installations that each supplier secures. In that sense, PBSDF-MSS is similar to the 
development competition in the manufacturing industries where at least part, if not all, of the 
rewards may be from volume orders at the production (implementation) stage (Section 9.4). 
PBSDF-MSS might be applied to large ISD projects with software applications developed 
centrally but implemented locally to many organisations. It may be particularly applicable in 
large government ISD projects where centralised data standards must be complied while local 
information needs may differ (Flowers, 1996). PBSDF-MSS will allow a number of feasible 
applications to emerge through partially funded development competition. Applications that 
are certified as to be compliant to central data standards (among other "revealed 
requirements") can offer choices to local institutions for adoption. If suppliers can work with 
local institutions closely, local variations may be catered for as part of "exciting 
requirements", so far these do not contradict the "revealed requirements". Resistance to 
adopting new systems has been a major problem in large government ISD projects with 
multiple client organisations (Southon et al., 1997; Flowers, 1996). PBSDF-MSS may help to 
overcome partially such resistance. Of course, much research may be carried out so that cost- 
benefit analysis can be conducted for PBSDF-MSS in more details, preferably with support of 
empirical case studies. 
10.11 Discussions on PBSDF Implementation 
Important to implementing PBSDF is the shared pre-contract understandings between the 
client and the suppliers as outlined in Section 10.2. Combining a complete contract with 
development competition and relative product evaluation, Pi3SDF provides a flexible 
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management framework. However, PBSDF is not designed to address all problems related to 
ISD projects. Neither does PBSDF recommend or restrict the use of any other ISDMs on the 
supplier's side. For example, being in the development competition, suppliers are free to 
choose either Structured System Analysis and Development Methodology (SSADM) or 
Object-Oriented Design Methodology (OODM) so far the suppliers can be confident of the 
benefits of any tools and techniques in helping them win development competition. In that 
sense, PBSDF addresses ISD project challenges at a high level. In this section, the possible 
use of PBSDF with some other techniques is explored. 
10.11.1 Prototyping 
Prototyping has long been considered as an important method of learning in software 
development. However, prototyping is associated with a series of problems when used on its 
own in ISD projects (Section 3.7.3). Within PBSDF, however, suppliers may find it helpful to 
construct prototypes to gain better understanding regarding functional requirements and 
technical feasibility. The client will also gain indirectly from a prototype by understanding a 
supplier's proposal better. Though building a prototype adds to project cost and time, the 
value to both sides could outweigh costs. Therefore, a funded prototype could be considered 
either before or after contracting a supplier. The CAPSA case (Finkelstein, 2001; Shattock, 
2001) illustrates a missed opportunity in using prototypes: 
"An important step in the proposed process was for a direct test of both SAP and 
Oracle's solutions to take place in selected Departments. It was conceived that 
both suppliers would offer 'generic' systems making available the core 
functionality, and that these would be tested with Departmental data [... ]. It is 
clear that neither SAP nor Oracle provided a demonstration system of the type 
envisaged. Oracle did give access to a remote system and staff in the Departments 
were able to see detailed demonstrations though not as far as I can determine with 
extensive University data. SAP, not unexpectedly, balked at the significant effort 
that providing a test system would entail and offered further demonstrations of 
industrial implementations of the SAP suite. Surprisingly the Departmental users 
of both systems gave the OK and both Oracle Financials and SAP moved to the 
next selection stage. " (Finkelstein, 2001, §7.29) 
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The initial design of the user test was effectively asking suppliers for prototyped systems, and 
importantly, with "Departmental data". It was not clear why Oracle Financials did not 
construct the required prototype. It was clear that SAP did not provide such a prototype due to 
cost consideration. Had the client insisted on a prototype as initially planned with a 
reasonable amount of funding, the "unmitigated disaster" of CAPSA Project (Finkelstein, 
2001) could well have been mitigated somewhat. The contribution of PBSDF is that it 
provides a funding mechanism that can cater for planned or unplanned prototyping needs. 
10.11.2 Requirements Management 
Poor requirements have been often blamed for failed ISD projects (I3ronzite, 2000). Gilb 
(1997) suggests differentiating requirements when he states: 
"We need to articulate the difference between requirements that require design 
engineering, e. g., quality and cost-level improvements, and true application 
"functional requirements, " which merely require implementation or 
acknowledgement in existing systems. " 
However, Gilb does not clarify the ownership of the different requirements. PBSDF adopts 
the Kano Model for requirements management. The client is responsible for specifying and 
controlling functional requirements while suppliers must manage non-functional and 
"exciting" requirements with technical expertise and innovation. Gilb does emphasise fite 
need for "one legal instance" broken down into "elementary requirements" with identification 
"tags". This is made possible by PBSDF in that the client has to communicate to two or more 
suppliers at the same time. If the client controls requirements fairly and firmly, one legal 
instance is likely to emerge from the original requirements specification and subsequent 
changes. Of course, this assertion requires empirical testing (Section 11.5.2). 
10.11.3 Quantified Product Evaluation 
One remedy for product evaluation difficulties is the "quantified design evaluation" (Gilb, 
1997). This still follows the absolute evaluation approach. It is costly, if not impossible to 
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build an absolute measurement model. A measurement model has the additional weakness in 
that it is only a model. Its feasibility could be open to dispute. However, should the quantified 
approach proves to be cost-effective, the client may apply it to all suppliers with the same 
quantified requirements and evaluation model. PBSDF enables the client to adopt relative 
product evaluation method in addition to making use of any absolute evaluation technique. 
10.11.4 PBSDF for Large ISD Projects 
PBSDF is applicable to managing software development in a relatively short time frame. This 
is due to the underlying assumption that a supplier has the incentive to participate so far its 
short-term variable cost is covered. Large projects tend to last longer and a supplier will not 
be able to cover its total cost over an extended period should its product be rejected. In other 
words, large projects carry high financial risks for participating suppliers. As a result, 
suppliers may increase their A. values accordingly. This could render a large project to be 
prohibitively expensive for the client using PBSDF. In such a case, a client may consider to 
break down a large project into smaller chunks with each developed using PBSDF. This is 
preferable since previous research results have shown that smaller projects are more likely to 
succeed (Standish Report, 1995; Johnson, 1999,2000b). How a large project can be 
effectively broken into smaller ones is an important subject that should be studied by software 
system architects. 
10.11.5 The Diversity of Software Systems 
One question that might arise from the implementation of development competition is 
whether two systems developed by two suppliers will be more or less the same. If that were to 
be the case, the value of development competition as exploring different solutions would be 
lost. Design diversity is often discussed when consideration is given to designing and 
developing safety-critical systems (e. g. Inacio, 1998). In implementing PBSDF, the client has 
an opportunity at the contract-letting stage to screen the proposed systems. The client can 
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select the most promising proposals that are based on different approaches. While suppliers 
may pursue whatever solutions believed to be the best (both for the client and the supplier), 
the client may manage the risks by mixing conservative and innovative approaches using 
different suppliers. The resultant systems will then be different. The screening process may 
also prevent the selected suppliers to collude to develop a single system. 
10.12 Summary 
This chapter describes the outline of Performance-Based Systems Development Framework 
(PBSDF) as a possible solution to many of the ISD project challenges. First of all, a number 
of pre-contract understandings are outlined regarding requirements and the corresponding 
price and delivery time variations. Such changes are common in ISD projects and must be 
recognised and catered for. PBSDF is then outlined in three parts. Part I is a PBSDF contract 
based on project outcomes and corresponding payoffs. Part II uses development competition 
mechanism to reduce development risks and to encourage suppliers' innovation. Part III is a 
stage of product evaluation. 
Three price factors are proposed as part of a PBSDF contract, namely Non-Acceptance Price 
Factor A, Non-Delivery Price Factor p and Development Cancellation Price Factor v. The 
value of R is critical to the workings of PBSDF, and may be influenced by the level of 
competition and other factors like the project length and risk levels of an ISD project. Section 
10.4 examines the theoretical basis of setting the A value. Section 10.5 provides empirical 
estimates from two types of data sources. Section 10.6 discusses a number of practical 
considerations suppliers might have in the process of setting A. 
Having outlined the basic understanding and concepts, Section 10.7 provides a step-by-step 
description of a typical implementation of PBSDF-TSS. The five-stage and four-milestone 
outline structure is used with details of how an ISD Project might be organised and how 
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decisions might be taken by the client and suppliers. Section 10.8 provides a cost-benefit 
analysis for PBSDF-TSS using a total cost model from a client's viewpoint. Section 10.9 
makes an attempt to model PBSDF-TSS as three subgames using concepts and techniques 
from the game theory. The first subgame concerns the contract bidding that takes place 
among all suppliers involved. The second subgame demonstrates that the switching cost effect 
is overcome in PBSDF-TSS. The third subgame illustrates how a client makes a product 
selection decision based on its own value judgement, regardless whether suppliers' promises 
are credible or not. 
Variations of PBSDF using the Single Supplier Strategy (PBSDF-SSS) and Multiple Supplier 
Strategy (PBSDF-MSS) are described briefly in Section 10.10. Some issues in implementing 
PBSDF are discussed in Section 10.11. It is worth emphasising that PBSDF has been 
proposed based on the case studies and analyses in this thesis. It remains a "conjecture" until 
further empirical research can be carried out to test its validity, to refine its design and to 
apply it to reduce real world ISD project challenges and failures. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
Truth emerges more readily from error than from confusion. 
(Francis Bacon, quoted in Kuhn, 1970, p. 18) 
11.1 Overview of the Study 
The research journey for this thesis started when the author experienced first-hand symptoms 
of ISD project challenges. Puzzled in particular by difficult client-supplier relations and poor 
quality software products, the author set out to explore the underlying root causes and 
possible remedial actions. Three ISD projects experienced by the author provide the primary 
source of data for the research. Each project has been written up as an individual case with 
"within case" analysis examining the issues associated with each project (Chapters 4,5 and 
6). "Cross-case analysis" is then conducted to extract a common pattern of ISD project issues 
and challenges. The pattern matches and extends some of the existing descriptions of ISD 
project challenges found in the literature (Chapter 7). This is followed by an attempt to 
explain the challenges by identifying the root causes with reference to a number of concepts 
from the existing economic theories and other literature. The unified explanation suggests that 
ISD project challenges may have been caused by the Traditional Systems Development 
Framework (TSDF) characterised by a competitive-bidding-monopolised-development 
process (Chapter 8). This explanation implies the need for a competitive product development 
mechanism for overcoming the root causes associated with TSDF. The explanation is 
demonstrated to be a "warranted inference" through two contrastive analyses. Analogical 
analyses also suggest that the competitive mechanism is feasible with close client-supplier 
interaction (Chapter 9). A possible implementation of the competitive mechanism is outlined 
as the Performance-Based Systems Development Framework (PBSDF). A detailed cost. 
benefit analysis is conducted and possible varieties of PBSDF are discussed (Chapter 10). 
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11.2 Limitations of The Research 
The overall research design for this study covers two stages of the research process (Stage I 
and Stage 2 in Figure 2.1). The other two stages of the same cycle, namely the stages of peer- 
reviews and application of research findings are not included according to the research 
strategy and research design (Section 2.4). These stages are left for possible future studies. In 
addition, there are other limitations as discussed below. 
11.2.1 Limitations with Data Collection 
This research is based on data collected through case studies based on participant observation. 
There are limitations associated with this method. First of all, the selection of the projects is 
limited to what was available to the author at the time of the study. The limitation must be 
recognised though overcoming it may require a number of further studies to be carried out 
using similar methods in different organisations. Secondly, the case studies rely on the 
author's interpretation of events and relations among the contracting parties. Though 
extensively checked by documentary evidence (Section 2.5), the general outlook is still 
constrained by the author's limited perspectives. 
11.2.2 Limitations with Analysis 
The analysis conducted in this thesis follows the IBE reasoning framework (Section 2.6). 
There are two stages to the IBE reasoning. The first is to formulate an initial hypothesis as the 
best potential explanation. In the second stage, the explanation is subjected to contrastive 
analyses and compared with other explanations. There are limitations with both stages. In the 
process of formulating the unified explanation, a number of concepts and theories are used 
(Chapter 8). These are limited by the author's personal knowledge about the existing concepts 
and theories in the management sciences. Other concepts and theories may be used to shed 
further light on the issues under discussions. During the contrastive analysis, selections of 
other contrasts are possible and may emphasise different causes. 
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11.3 Main Contributions 
This section outlines the main contributions made by this study to the subject of managing 
application software suppliers in ISD projects. In the process of research, other relevant issues 
have been discussed, some of which are presented in Section 11.4. 
11.3.1 Confirming Widespread Challenges in ISD Projects 
Though the research has been based on three cases studies, they are representative of the 
population of ISD projects in many ways. The projects were "encountered" rather than 
"sampled". The projects involve different client organisations and different software 
suppliers. They were managed by different project managers with different styles and 
experiences. The projects built different systems with different technologies. Though there are 
constants throughout the three cases, for example, the author was employed by the same 
employer company, such constants do not explain the wide-ranging project challenges 
documented in the cases. Instead, what was observed in the case studies confirms reports over 
the last thirty years about "the software crisis" (Chapter 7). 
11.3.2 Root Causes of ISD Project Challenges 
The research has identified six root causes for ISD project challenges (Chapter 8). These arc 
summarised below. 
Root Cause 1: Misconception about Incomplete Requirements 
The problem of incomplete requirements in ISD projects is widely recognised. But its root 
cause has often been attributed to poor requirements management on the client side. This 
study suggests that this is not the case. With the help of the Kano Model, this study suggests 
that the client expects technical functions to be provided by the supplier without having to 
specify for them. The client may not even be aware of potential "exciting" features. The root 
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cause with poor requirements management is likely to be the misconception that requirements 
can be complete and should be provided by the client. This study suggests that client should 
only be expected to provide and control "revealed requirements" (Section 8.3). The proposed 
management framework incorporates this conclusion (Section 10.2.2). 
Root Cause 2: High Switching Cost 
High switching cost in acquiring software has been recognised in the literature (Varian, 
2001). The impact of the high switching cost on software supplier management in ISD 
projects, however, has not been fully appreciated in the past. One effect is that the high 
switching cost causes software suppliers' bargains-then-ripoffs opportunistic behaviour 
pattern. This explains some of the unexpected supplier price increases and budget overruns in 
ISD projects (Section 8.4). The problem of high switching cost suggests that a potential 
solution to ISD project challenges should aim to reduce it. Development competition with two 
or more suppliers is one possible way that can achieve this effect, and is therefore adopted in 
designing the proposed management framework (Section 10.3). 
Root Cause 3: Misconception about Contract Strategy 
Incomplete contracts have also been widely recognised in ISD projects. There appears to be a 
misconception that a complete contract is possible based on a complete requirements 
specification. Due to the problem of incomplete requirements, it is necessary to find an 
alternative contract strategy (Section 8.5). This study proposes an alternative way to obtain a 
relatively complete supplier contract by agreeing development outcomes and corresponding 
payoffs between the client and the supplier. This approach is incorporated in the proposed 
management framework (Section 10.3). 
Root Cause 4: Inseparability of Design and Development 
Software design and development activities are highly intertwined. At least at the current 
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level of modelling capability, it has not been possible to separate development from design 
completely. This is recognised by the proponents of iterative software development 
methodologies. The inseparability of design and development makes it a necessity to contract 
suppliers to design and develop at the same time. This allows the supplier a considerable level 
of freedom to formulate the solution that might help the supplier to deliver the software 
product at lower cost. This may have caused the delivery-led rather requirements-driven 
software product development observed in the case studies (Section 8.6). 
Root Cause 5: Development Uncertainty 
Development uncertainty refers to a situation when a developer knows what is to be achieved 
(the requirements), yet cannot be certain of satisfying the requirements by taking a particular 
course of actions. This leads to a trial-and-error approach of development. It may be 
overcome to a certain degree with a developer's increased experience and training but it 
cannot be overcome entirely. Development uncertainty cannot be easily controlled by 
planning or by imposing deadlines (Section 8.7). From a supplier's viewpoint, development 
uncertainty must be managed by balancing the need for more time and resources to explore 
different solutions against the need to be competitive in the market place. From the client's 
viewpoint, there is a need for a mechanism to stimulate supplier innovation yet keep the 
supplier cost under control. Development competition has the potential to achieve such a 
balanced outcome (Section 10.3.2). 
Root Cause 6: Absolute Product Evaluation 
In traditional ISD projects, a client contracts a software supplier based on its incomplete 
requirement specification. The requirements specification does not represent a complete 
product model with which the end product can be measured against. A software application is 
usually a highly complex product for the client to understand entirely. A software application, 
once integrated to be part of an information system, is also unique with its system platform, 
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network facilities and possible legacy data. The absolute product evaluation approach is 
difficult to apply without a complete design to be used as a quality benchmark. The suggested 
alternative is a relative product evaluation approach, supplemented by absolute measurements 
where possible (Section 10.3.3). 
The six root causes interact closely in the traditional systems development framework 
(TSDF), causing the pattern of ISD project challenges. Some of the current solutions 
recognise some of the root causes and attempt to address them. In particular, the iterative 
approach recognises the problem of incomplete requirements and the inseparability of design 
and development. However, it does not address them adequately and it does recognise other 
root causes (Section 8.10). The unified explanation is that it is TSDF, characterised by a 
competitive-bidding-monopolised-development process, that underlies the ISD project 
challenges. This explanation is both consilient and simple (Section 8.11). It proved to be a 
better explanation than the existing one that claims "software is different" (Chapter 9). It also 
provides the basis of the proposed Performance-Based Systems Development Framework 
(PBSDF) in Chapter 10. 
11.3.3 PBSDF -A Proposed Solution 
To address the above root causes, PBSDF is proposed as a possible solution that incorporates 
the competitive development mechanism (Chapter 10). PBSDF can be described in three 
parts. The first part is to devise an outcome-based contract by mapping development 
outcomes to corresponding payoffs. The second part is a phase of development competition. 
The third part is a phase of product evaluation. 
PBSDF Part I, - A Outcome-Based Contract Between Client and Supplier 
The simplest arrangement can be described as follows. At the contract bidding stage of an 
ISD project, each supplier is required to submit a normal full price P and also a Non- 
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Acceptance Price Factor (NAPF), designated as A (0 SAS 1). If a supplier is selected to 
participate in software development, the client and the supplier signs a PBSDF contract. The 
contract states that if at the end of the ISD project, the supplier's software product is accepted 
and deployed, the client pays the supplier the full price. If at the end of the ISD project, the 
supplier's product is not accepted, the client pays 21'. 
In the same way, a number of other project outcomes may be envisaged and their payoffs 
agreed between the client and the supplier. The more complete the set of outcome scenarios 
described and agreed in the contract, the more complete the resultant contract. The contract is 
based on a client requirements specification but does not depend on complete requirements. 
The supplier factors in the assumed risks in its commitment by setting A competitively against 
other suppliers. This part of the management framework partly addresses the problem of 
incomplete requirements (Root Cause 1) and partly addresses the problem of contracting 
strategy (Root Cause 3) in TSDF. 
PBSDF Part 11. " Development Competition 
This part of PBSDF suggests the use of more than one supplier in developing a software 
product directly competing with each other based on the same set of client requirements. 
Development competition first of all addresses the problem of incomplete client requirements 
(Root Cause 1). This is because suppliers will compete to be innovative to satisfy the 
expected requirements and the unknown requirements in addition to the "revealed 
requirements" according to the Kano Model. Development competition also addresses the 
problem of high switching cost (Root Cause 2). Having more than one supplier implies that 
the client's switching cost in the duration of the ISD project is close to zero. This encourages 
suppliers to bid close to their true prices (Section 10.9). Thirdly, development competition 
recognises the inseparability of design and development (Root Cause 4) and encourages the 
iterative development within commercial constraints. Likewise, development competition 
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recognises development uncertainty (Root Cause 5). It encourages suppliers to try different 
solutions and to be innovative in delivering the end products. 
PBSDF Part III: Combined Absolute and Relative Production Evaluation 
With the suppliers' delivered products at the end of the development competition, the client 
engages in a product evaluation exercise using both absolute and relative evaluation methods. 
The objective of the evaluation is to decide whether a product can provide value to the 
organisation, not whether the product matches the original specification. When there is more 
than one product to be evaluated, the client has to decide which one provides more value. 
Therefore, the client focuses on the value a product can provide. The client may reject a 
product if it appears to match the client's requirements specification but is perceived not to 
provide value for money, or not to provide more value for money than the competing 
product(s). With the relative product evaluation method, the client is also able to evaluate 
dimensions not easily measurable in absolute terms (e. g. usability). This part of PIISDF 
addresses the problem of development uncertainty (Root Cause 5) in that potential failures are 
anticipated. It also addresses the pitfalls of absolute product evaluation (Root Cause 6). 
11.3.4 Applicability of PBSDF to Different Types of ISD Projects 
PBSDF as a whole addresses the six root causes of ISD project challenges as outlined in 
Section 11.3.2. In implementing PBSDF, there is a considerable degree of flexibility. The 
client may choose from different implementations of PBSDF including Single Supplier 
Strategy (PBSDF-SSS), Two Supplier Strategy (PBSDF-TSS) and Multiple Supplier Strategy 
(PBSDF-MSS). PBSDF-SSS may be useful if client requirements are well defined without 
much ambiguity. It may also be useful when a client undertakes speculative ISD projects and 
is prepared to have no working information system at the end of the project (Section 10.10.1). 
PBSDF-TSS may be applied to ISD projects where there is a single target system installation 
and requirements are not complete. PBSDF-MSS may be applied to large ISD projects where 
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there are multiple target installations. Each of the target installations might have slightly 
different informational needs (Section 10.10.2). 
PBSDF is essentially a contractual framework that can supplement the existing project 
methodologies like Prince 2, which does not address the issue of contract management 
(CCTA, 1997). So far as the supplier is concerned, working within PBSDF means that the 
supplier is free to use any software development methodology. The single objective for the 
supplier is to develop a software product that can bring as much value to the client as possible 
to win the development competition. 
11.4 Other Contributions of this Research 
This study makes a number of other contributions in addition to the exploration of root causes 
of ISD projects challenges and the proposition of PBSDF. Some of the main ones are 
summarised below. 
11.4.1 Project Success and Failure Criteria 
In contrast to the traditional "Golden Triangle" approach to measure the success or failure of 
a project, this study suggests a two-tier approach considering the successes of the product 
separate from that of the project. A project may be able to produce a highly successful 
product yet the project execution may fail on the cost and schedule targets. On the other hand, 
a project may fail to produce a product but does not exceed the cost and schedule targets. This 
study suggests a scheme of "Qualified Project Success" and "Controlled Project Termination" 
to describe the two scenarios (Section 3.3). 
11.4.2 Contribution to Project Management Research 
Project management research has been biased toward practicality (Morris, 2000). While this 
study is firmly anchored in practical project experience, it is also based on concepts from a 
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number of theories including the agency theory, contract theory and game theory etc. These 
theoretical concepts help elucidating the complex client-supplier relationship and the client. 
supplier contract process. In the meantime, by using the technique of contrastive analysis, this 
study has made a distinction between one project type where design can be separated from 
development (e. g. construction projects and manufacturing product design projects) and 
another where design is inseparable from development (e. g. software development). The 
implication of making this distinction is that the project management approach and techniques 
for the first type cannot be transferred to the second one without carefully considering the 
suitability in the first place. In addition, the study casts doubt on the design-build contract 
management approach that has been advocated in the construction industry (Section 9.3). 
11.4.3 Project Risk Management 
Risk management for ISD projects has received much attention (e. g. Remenyi, 1999) but this 
study shows that risk management by identifying risks and making so-called provisions is not 
adequate. Risk management may be viewed both at the contractual and operational levels. 
First of all, there is the contractual risk that should be shared between the client and the 
supplier equitably. The T&M contract type is widely seen as a poor risk management 
mechanism (Morris, 1997). In contrast, the fixed price contract has been hailed as a 
performance-based contract type (e. g. Johnson, 2000b; Lichtenstein, 2002), which has been 
demonstrated not to be the case in this study (Section 8.5). On the other hand, simply shifting 
all risks to suppliers is equally unworkable (Morris, 1997). This has been somewhat borne out 
by unsatisfactory results from ISD projects using the PFI contract type (e. g. Arnott, 2003c), 
On the project operational level, a client must have at least one feasible option when risks 
become issues, whether planned for or not. Here the term "feasible" could be in terms of cost, 
time, product functions, product quality and organisational politics etc. The problem with 
TSDF is that many planned "mitigating actions" are not real options considering cost and 
organisational implications. 
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PBSDF provides a practical risk management mechanism. A number of price factors are to be 
agreed between the client and the supplier at the contracting stage. The most important one is 
the Non-Acceptance Price Factor (NAPF), which may incorporate a series of practical 
considerations (Section 10.6). For each risk, the worst option is envisaged in the contractual 
framework, which is not accepting a supplier's product and paying the supplier an agreed 
proportion of the full price. Through the use of price factors and development competition, 
PBSDF provides a flexible risk management framework. 
11.5 Main Areas for Future Studies 
This research is exploratory in attempting to resolve some of ISD project challenges. 
However, this is merely the beginning of a possible new research programme (Lakotas, 
1978). Following the research process described in Section 2.3.2, much further work might be 
done, including research results dissemination and applying research results in real world ISD 
projects. In addition, new concepts and techniques may be used to analyse ISD projects. This 
Section looks at the main areas for future studies, limiting to the scope of ISD projects. 
Section 10.6 considers other potential studies that might be pursued further. 
11.5.1 Disseminating the Research Findings 
In addition to this thesis, a number of other channels may be used to disseminate the research 
findings, including publishing the research findings in academic journals and presenting the 
findings in conferences etc. An additional channel is to disseminate the research findings to 
organisations through management consultancy services. This has been started in a limited 
way by the author in having established a management consultancy company since April 
2003. A number of presentations have been made to management consultants, senior 
management teams in both public and private sectors. There has been positive feedback. 
Some senior client managers are enthusiastic about PDSDF as a possible solution to ISD 
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project challenges. One management consultant has commented that, though his initial 
reaction was somewhat sceptical, the more he had thought about PBSDF, the more likely he 
considered it workable. Of course, there has been negative feedback as well. One attendant 
from the public sector commented during a presentation that PBSDF would not work, but was 
unable to explain why. Such peer-reviews contribute to the research process (Section 2.3.2). 
The author intends to continue the dissemination process and to engage a much wider 
audience in the debate of the strengths and weaknesses of PBSDF and the underlying 
assumptions and analyses. 
11.5.2 Action Research Based Case Studies 
This study relies on participant observation to collect first-hand project case materials. The 
research method allows the researcher to gain an insider view of ISD projects and to attain a 
contextual understanding of the contracting parties, project team members and their complex 
relationships. Such a method, though suffering from some limitations (Section 11.2), enables 
the researcher to assign meanings to events and documentary evidence in complex social 
organisations like ISD projects for in-depth analyses. 
PBSDF is proposed as a possible solution to ISD project challenges. One possible strategy to 
further the research is to apply PBSDF in real world projects as part of action research 
studies. Kock (1997) gives a concise definition of action research as: 
"A general term to refer to research methodologies and projects where the 
researcher(s) tries to directly improve the participating organisation(s) and, at the 
same time, to generate scientific knowledge. " 
By applying PBSDF to real world ISD projects, a researcher will be attempting to achieve 
both aims. Such action research studies may be carried out by anyone who gains a good 
understanding of PBSDF and the underlying reasoning that has led to its formulation. 
PBSDF-TSS may be used for typical ISD projects carried out in commercial companies while 
PBSDF-MSS may be used in nation-wide government ISD projects (Section 10.10). 
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11.5.3 Adopting PBSDF for Internal Software Development 
The software development "price index" for "own-account development", i. e. in-house 
development, shows a similar increasing pattern as that for CBSW and COTS in ISD projects 
(Section 9.2). There are similar problems with in-house ISD projects in terms of budget 
overruns and poor quality. Though managing internal software development may be different 
in many ways, the current in-house development process is essentially a monopolised one. 
Therefore, it is possible to apply the competitive mechanism to reform the development 
process. Internal competition may provide flexibility, stimulate innovation and motivate staff 
if properly managed (Birkinshaw, 2001). In addition, instead of competing at the product 
level, competition might also be held at a software component level. Two developers may be 
working to produce the same software component for selection. Such an internal development 
competition would require two developers working together both on a co-operative and 
competitive basis. It is worthwhile to compare such an internal development competition with 
the "pair-programming" technique advocated by XP (Beck, 2000): 
"All production code is written with two people looking at one machine, with one 
keyboard and one mouse. " (p. 58) 
Pair-programming has its advocates (Williams et al., 2000; Cockburn and Williams, 2000; 
Jensen, 2003) and critics (Rosenberg and Scott, 1997; Stephens, 2003). While pair. 
programming allows only one approach to be tried, the internal development competition 
allows two approaches to be experimented at the same time, overcoming at least partially the 
problem of development uncertainty. Internal development competition would have a 
profound impact on how an internal ISD project is structured and resourced. The impact 
assessment and cost-benefit analysis should be carried out separately as a research topic. 
11.6 Other Areas for Future Studies 
This study deals with supplier management in ISD projects that are related to many aspects of 
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software system development. It is not possible to list every single suggestion made as a 
result of this study regarding future possible research topics. This section selects a few topics 
that might be pursued in addition to the major areas discussed above. 
11.6.1 Project Success Criteria 
This study has proposed a two-tier success criteria approach that a project should be judged 
based on cost, schedule and product, and a product should be judged in turn by its functions, 
features and their corresponding quality dimensions (Section 3.3). This approach is suitable 
for projects that aim to produce products (including services). It would be interesting to 
follow up with a survey of project practitioners' opinions on such a scheme. Questions might 
include: 
0 How often, if ever, are projects undertaken not to produce a product or a service? 
0 If these projects do exist, what results are achieved to warrant these projects to be 
judged as successful? 
0 How would a controlled project termination (Section 3.3.3) be viewed in terms of 
project success or failure? 
The answers to the first two questions might help to improve the definition of the term 
"project" (PMI, 2000). The last question deals with the perceptions of the suggested 
"controlled project termination". This might contribute to the study of project abandonment 
(Sauer, 1993; Keil, 2000; Royer, 2003). 
11.6.2 Less Distorted Bidding Prices in PBSDF 
An assumption in formulating PBSDF is that if two suppliers are to be selected in a contract 
bidding, suppliers will submit prices closer to their true prices (Section 10.9). This 
assumption is based on the conclusion in the game theory that in a second-price auction, 
bidders will bid with true prices (Gardner, 1995). However, in PBSDF, the winning bidders 
are required to compete with each other to win the final prize of supplying a software product 
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at the full price. This is different from a normal auction where a winning bidder enjoys the 
outcome immediately after the auction. A study may be carried out to prove or refute that the 
bidders will indeed be bidding with less distorted prices or true prices in PBSDF. 
11.6.3 Realistic Project Feasibility Assessment 
In a study highlighted by Glass (1998), feasibility study is one of the few things organisations 
like to do better before embarking on further ISD projects. The research for this thesis helps 
to understand why feasibility studies for ISD projects may not have been properly conducted 
in the past. Consider the impact of the high switching cost on supplier bidding prices. 
Suppliers bid low to win contracts and then charge higher prices later when opportunities are 
available, demonstrating a bargains-then-ripoffs opportunistic behaviour pattern. The initial 
low prices are taken into account by clients for feasibility studies. The net cost-benefit 
analysis will thus reflect a more favourable balance in undertaking certain projects than 
otherwise. 
PBSDF is likely to force a number of adjustments in the price signals from suppliers to the 
client. First of all, suppliers are likely to bid with more realistic prices (Section 10.9), which 
will be higher than the opportunistically low bid prices in TSDF. Secondly, the risk of 
supplier development failure is made specific. Such a risk has too often been neglected in 1SD 
projects when contracting parties share "enthusiasm and optimism" (Yourdon, 2002) in the 
beginning of projects. The risk premium is for the client to pay a certain extra amount. The 
Non-Acceptance Price Factor .Z is built in with a number of other considerations like the 
supplier's opportunity cost. The net effect is that the client will have a more realistic cost- 
benefit analysis. The exact relationship between various risk considerations and project 
feasibility decisions may be modelled mathematically with further studies. 
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11.6.4 Modelling ISD Projects with Systems Dynamics 
Research may be undertaken to model the effects of PBSDF on ISD projects using Systems 
Dynamics (SD). SD has been suggested as an effective tool to model business problems for 
experimentation. Sterman (2000) outlines the basics of systems dynamics and encourages a 
model-experimental approach to test solutions that might otherwise be elusive to our limited 
ability to reason. In fact, a number of attempts have already been made to model ISD projects 
with SD concepts and techniques (see e. g. Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1991; and more 
recently, Ruiz et al., 2001). SD may be used to model specific parameters in ISD projects like 
cost estimate (e. g. Ruiz et al., 2001) or at a strategic level for a whole IT division (Williford 
and Chang, 1999). Its application to project level modelling seems to be appropriate 
(Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996; Rodrigues and Williams, 1997,1998). However, the 
assumptions made up to now in modelling ISD projects might benefit from re-examinations in 
view of this research study. For example, in modelling software development productivity, 
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) adopt the following model (based on Steiner, 1966): 
"Actual Productivity = Potential Productivity 
- Losses Due to Faulty Process" (p. 79) 
Steiner's original model was for discussing group size and potential group productivity. The 
concern here is regarding the assumption that the same productivity model applies to software 
development projects. The validity of this assumption was not discussed in Abdel-Hamid and 
Madnick (1991). According to the research conducted for this thesis, software development is 
a distinctly different process compared with manufacturing and construction operations. 
Steiner's model may not be suitable for modelling software productivity since some loss of 
software productivity may be due to the inherent trial-and-error approach. The trial-and-error 
approach is a necessary part of software development and cannot be considered as a faulty 
process. On this basis, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick's SD model on productivity may be 
revisited. Existing SD models may be modified or new SD models may be constructed based 
on the new perspectives offered by this study. 
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11.6.5 The Interaction of Process and Data 
Business process re-engineering (BPR) has not been particularly successful with "70 percent 
of all BPR initiatives fail" (Burke and Peppard, 1995). BPR has its origin in research within 
the IT field (Burke and Peppard, 1995). According to some researchers (e. g. Davenport, 
quoted in Galliers, 1995), IT plays a central role in BPR. The low success rate of BPR 
initiatives has raised questions about IT's role (Galliers, 1995). Should IT be maintained as 
the focus in BPR and or should IT be given a secondary role? This is a question that has been 
hotly debated in the BPR literature. However, "IT" has been often used as an abstract term at 
a high level without being precisely defined and it is not clear how it does or does not play a 
central role (e. g. Jones, 1995; Galliers, 1995). 
As discussed in Section 3.2, business processes involving an information system straddle 
across users and software applications, often linked by data. Though users enter and 
manipulate data using software applications based on business processes, it is the data that 
records business transactions. Such transactions can only be properly interpreted with the 
understanding of the original business processes. In that sense, business data embody business 
processes. The interactions of users, processes, software applications and business data are 
complex. Failure to understand these interactions may help explaining some of the 
"contradictions" experienced in BPR (Jones, 1995). Research at the micro-level is required to 
understand how the interactions might have affected BPR programmes in the past. Such 
understandings may then help to guide BPR programmes in the future. It is hoped that I3PR 
research can be steered away from the polarising debate between "IT-led" and "process-lcd" 
(Jones, 1995) to be re-focused on how to design and use information systems to implement 
desired business processes. This would be a significant undertaking and appropriate for 
separate research projects. 
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11.6.6 Value Management and Value Engineering 
In surveying potential research areas within project management field, Morris (2000) points 
out an important research aspect to be "how project management can best contribute to 
improved business performance". Morris concludes that one of the research gaps lies in value 
management (VM) and value engineering (VE) in projects. "VM and VE have significant 
potential to business benefits; neither is well practiced outside construction" (Morris, 2000, p. 
99). The assessment is probably particularly relevant to ISD project management. Value 
might be loosely defined as the net total of all benefits minus all costs. Part of the problem is 
that costs are difficult to establish for information systems (Bannister et al., 2001) and 
benefits perhaps more so (Mylonopoulos et al., 1995). PI3SDF, however, affords the client a 
product evaluation and selection mechanism that allows the selection to be based on the 
perceived value contribution of the supplied software products (Section 10.3). PBSDF 
provides a crucial link upon which to develop a practical model to assist the product 
acceptance/rejection decision process. The construction of such a model requires much 
further studies of the costs and benefits that can be attributed to the application software in 
information systems. 
11.7 Summary 
This chapter outlines the research activities undertaken for the entire thesis and highlights 
some of the limitations of the research. It restates the research conclusions by summarising 
the problem areas in managing application software suppliers. It also outlines the proposed 
management solution, PBSDF, in three parts. The identification of the root causes and the 
proposed management framework are the main contributions of this research. A number of 
other contributions are also described. 
A number of future potential research areas are briefly explored. Following the spiral research 
process discussed in Section 2.3.2, the main future areas are disseminating the research 
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findings for peer-reviews and applying PBSDF in action research studies. In addition, the 
possible use of the development competition technique for in-house software development is 
suggested. Other areas of future studies include further refining project success criteria, 
verifying the reduction of bidding price distortion in PBSDF, modelling ISD projects with 
System Dynamics using the new perspectives from the research and researching into the 
interaction of business processes and business data within the context of BPR. Since this 
study is exploratory in nature, it is apt to state that the research presented in this thesis might 
be the beginning of a new research programme on the subject of managing application 
software suppliers in ISD projects. 
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Appendix A: Acronyms Used in The Thesis 
AIM Application Implementation Methodology 
AR Action Research 
ASP Active Server Page 
BCL Bought-In Contractor Labour 
BPR Business Process Re-Engineering 
CAD Computer Aided Dispatch 
CBS Customer Billing Systems 
CBSW Custom-Built Software 
CMM Capability Maturity Model 
COM Common Object Model 
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
CRS Customer Registration Systems 
CRS Computerised Registration System 
CS2000 Commerce Server 2000 
DLC Direct Labour Cost 
DSDM Dynamic Systems Development Method 
EAC Estimated At Completion 
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 
FAT Factory Acceptance Test 
GAO General Accounting Office 
GCMR Gas Customer Meter Reading (System) 
GDCS Gas Data Collection System 
GMRM Gas Meter Reading Management 
GOTS Government Off-The-Shelf 
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GUI Graphic User Interface 
HHT Hand-Held Terminal 
HV High Voltage 
IBE Inference To The Best Explanation 
IDL Internal Direct Labour 
lip Information And Incentive Project 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
IS Information System 
ISD Information System Development 
ISDM Information System Development Methodology 
ISM Information System Methodology 
IT Information Technology 
ITT Invitation To Tender 
LAS London Ambulance Service 
LV Low Voltage 
LVC LV Connectivity 
MOTS Military Off-The-Shelf 
MPAN Metering Point Administration Number 
MPS MRA/PGT Separation (Project) 
MRA Meter Reading Agency 
MRS Meter Reading Services 
MWMS Meter Work Management System 
NAO National Audit Office 
NAPF Non-Acceptance Price Factor 
NDM Non Daily Meter 
Offer Office Of Electricity Regulation 
Ofgem Office Of Gas And Electricity Market 
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OMS Outage Management System 
OODM Object-Oriented Design Methodology 
OSS Open Source Software 
PA Principal-Agent 
PBSDF Performance-Based Systems Development Framework 
PBSDF-MSS PBSDF Multiple Supplier Strategy 
PBSDF-SSS PBSDF Single Supplier Strategy 
PBSDF-TSS: PBSDF Two Supplier Strategy 
PCR Project Charge Rate 
PDD Product Delivery Date 
PES Public Electricity Supply 
PGT Public Gas Transporter 
PIR Project Issues Report 
PMI Project Management Institute 
PPI Propensity For Price Increase 
PPSW Pre-Packaged Software 
QAT Quality Assurance Team 
QRAM Quantitative Risk Analysis Matrix 
RAD Rapid Application Development 
RFP Request For Proposal 
RFQ Request For Quotation 
RHA Regional Health Authority 
RISP Regional Information Systems Plan 
RM Release Manager 
RMT Requirements Management Team 
RPE Relative Product Evaluation 
370 
RPM Relative Performance Measurement 
SAT Site Acceptance Test 
SBCE Set Based Concurrent Engineering 
SCP Structure, Conduct And Performance 
SD Systems Dynamics 
SDLC Systems Development Lifecycle 
SLAT System Level Architecture Team 
SLMP System Level Manufactured Products 
SMT Supplier Management Team 
SOW Statement Of Work 
SPMS Supplier Point Management System 
SPR Software Productivity Research 
SQL Sequential Query Language 
SRA Social Research Association 
SSADM Structured System Analysis And Development Methodology 
T&M Time And Materials 
TQM Total Quality Management 
TSDF Traditional Systems Development Framework 
TSS Two Supplier Strategy (PHSDF) 
UMRS Unbundled Meter Reading System 
VE Value Engineering 
VM Value Management 
WBS Work Breakdown Structure 
XP eXtremeProgramming 
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Appendix B: 40 Root Causes Compiled by (Smith, 2001, pp. 18-19) 
(See Section 3.4 for comments on this catalogue of root causes) 
Project Conce ion 
RCO1 Project based on an unsound premise or an unrealistic business case 
RC02 Buyer failure to define clear project objectives, anticipated benefits and 
success criteria 
RC03 The Project is based on state-of-the-art and immature technology 
RC04 Lack of Buyer board-level ownership/commitment or competence 
RC05 The Buyer's funding and/or timescale expectations unrealistically low 
RC06 Failure to break a complex project into phases or smaller projects 
Project initiation/mobilisation 
RC07 Vendor setting unrealistic expectations on cost, timescale or vendor 
capability 
RC08 Buyer failure to define and document requirements (functional and non. 
functional) 
RC09 Failure to achieve an open, robust and equitable buyer-vendor 
relationship 
RCIO Vendor failure to invest enough resources to scope the project prior to 
contract 
RC11 Lack of sufficient involvement of eventual end users 
RC12 Vendor underestimation of resources (predominantly person-effort) 
required 
RC13 Vendor failure to define project tasks, deliverables and acceptance 
processes 
RC14 Failure to actively manage risks and maintain robust contingency plans 
RC15 Poor project planning, management and execution 
RC16 Failure to clearly define roles and responsibilities in the contract/sub- 
contracts 
RC17 Full-scope, fixed-price contracting (requirements, design and 
development) 
System Design 
RC18 Failure to "freeze" the requirements baseline and apply change control 
RC19 Poor choice of technical platform and/or architecture 
RC20 Vendor starting a phase prior to completing a previous phase 
RC21 Poor choice of design/development method 
RC22 Failure to undertake effective project reviews and take decisive action 
RC23 Vendor lack/loss of resources 
RC24 Poor vendor standards deployment (design, coding, testing, 
configuration management, etc. ) 
RC25 Poor vendor requirements traceability (requirements - design - code - 
test) 
RC26 Buyer retains design authority with right to approve/reject low-level 
designs 
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System develo ment 
RC27 Delays cause the project to be overtaken_by advances in technology 
RC28 Vendor failure to "freeze" the design (and technical platform) and apply 
change control 
RC29 Inadequate vendor training and supervision ofjunior staff 
RC30 Inadequate vendor review of designs/code/documentation 
RC31 Poor vendor management of subcontractors 
RC32 Lack of a formal "engineering" approach to integration and testing by 
the vendor 
RC33 Insufficient attention paid by vendor to non-functional requirements 
System implementation 
RC34 Buyer failure to manage the change implicit in the project (people, 
processes, technol 
RC35 Inadequate user/systems training 
RC36 Catastrophic failure of the system, with no effective contingency 
arrangement 
RC37 Missing a crucial "go live" date 
System operation, benefit delivery, stewardship and disposal 
RC38 Buyer failure to measure actual delivered benefit and take corrective 
action 
RC39 Buyer failure to maintain/enhance system post-implementation 
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